기쁨 주는 것들

아들과 아빠가 다정하게 배드민턴을 친다. 

한 처자는 건강을 챙기느라 열심히 걷고 

노래 강습을 받고 나오는 중년의 여성들이 고양된 음파를 흩뿌린다. 

특히 어둑한 초저녁 달빛 아래 그들 특유의 고요한 노래를 선사하는 푸른 나무들이 있다.

내가 그들 되어 누리지는 못해도 아무런 이유 없는 이 희한한 기쁨이 도대체 얼마 만인가. 

세상사로 애먹는 친구를 위로한 덕인가 보다.

[자료] Wu Ting-chang's Idea and Practice of Industrial

자료: http://en.cnki.com.cn/Article_en/CJFDTOTAL-LKXB201106013.htm

In December 1935,Wu Ting -chang became the Minister of Industry in the Nanjing National Government from a banker and a journalist and had been the Chairman of the Guizhou provincial government for seven years since January 1938.



CF. http://archive.org/stream/whoswhoinchinabi00shan/whoswhoinchinabi00shan_djvu.txt

Wu Ding-chang (Wu Ting-chang)

WU DING-CHANG (Ta Chuan), banker and newspaper directorj born in Chekiang, 1884; Hanlin Scholar under the Manchu Regime; governor, Bank of China, 1912; director, the Government Central Mint, 1913; Vice-Minister, Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, 1915; Vice-Minister, Ministry of Finance, 1917-20; president, Yien Yieh (Salt Industry) Commercial Bank, since 1921; chairman, the Banking Syndicate of Yien Yieh (Salt Industry) Commercial Bank, since 1921; chairman, the Banking Syndicate of Yien Yieh, Kincheng, Continental and China and South Sea Banks, since 1922; president of the Ta Kung Pao Newspaper Company and the Kuo Wen News Service and Weekly Company, since 1926; address: Yien Yieh Commercial Bank, Peking Road, Shanghai.

[법률상식] 불기소

자료 1: 검찰청,  사건처리절차 (불기소)


검사가 형사사건의 피의자에 대하여 공소를 제기하지 않는 결정을 통상 불기소 또는 불기소 처분이라고 부르고,

• 기소유예, 
• 혐의없음(증거불충분), 혐의없음(범죄인정안됨), 죄가안됨, 공소권없음, 
• 각하 처분이 이에 해당합니다.

(1) 검사는 피의자의 범죄가 인정되더라도 ①범인의 연령, 성행, 지능과 환경, ②피해자에 대한 관계, ③범행의 동기, 수단과 결과, ④범행후의 정황을 참작하여 공소를 제기하지 않을 수 있고(형사소송법 제247조), 이를 기소유예 처분이라고 합니다.

(2) 해당 형사사건이 범죄를 구성하지 않거나, 공소를 제기함에 충분한 혐의가 없거나 기타 소송조건을 구비하지 아니하여 적법한 공소제기를 할 수 없는 경우에 혐의없음, 죄가안됨, 공소권없음 처분을 하게 됩니다.

(3) 고소장이나 고발장으로도 불기소 사유에 해당함이 명백한 경우 등에는 검사는 조사 없이 불기소 처분을 할 수 있는데, 이를 각하 처분이라고 합니다.


가. 검사가 불기소처분을 하였을 때에는 그 결과를 피의자와 고소인·고발인에게 그 취지를 통지하여야 하고 (형사소송법 제258조 제1항), 고소인·고발인의 청구가 있는 때에는 그 이유도 서면으로 설명하여야 합니다(형사소송법 제259조)

나. 고소권을 가진 사람이 고소하였다가 불기소 처분을 받은 경우, 불기소 처분에 대하여 고등검찰청에 항고할 수 있습니다.

다. 그리고 고소인(직권남용 등으로 고발한 고발인 포함)은 ①항고 기각된 경우, ②항고이후 사건을 재기하여 수사한 후 다시 불기소처분을 받은 경우, ③항고 신청후 그에 대한 처분 없이 3개월을 경과한 경우, ④공소시효 30일 전까지 공소가 제기되지 않은 경우 해당 검찰청의 소재지를 관할하는 고등법원에 불기소 처분의 당부에 관한 재정신청을 할 수 있습니다.

[발췌: Yung-chen Chiang's] Social Engineering and the Social Sciences in China, 1919-1949

출처: Yung-chen Chiang (2001). Social Engineering and the Social Sciences in China, 1919-1949. Cambridge University Press.

자료: 구글도서

※ 주요 차례

1. Introduction  (1)

2. The Yanjing Sociology Department: The Social Service Phase, 1919-1925  (23)

3. The Yanjing Sociology Department: From Social Service to Social Engineering, 1925-1945  (46)

4. The Nankai Institute of Economics: The Germinating Stage, 1927-1931 (78)

The Financial Base  (79)

• The Foreign-Educated Faculty and the Administrators  (82)
• Franklin Ho and the Origin of the Nankai Institute of Economics  (87)
• The Entry of the Institute of Pacific Relations  (90)
• Nankai under the Aegis of the Institute of Pacific Relations  (92)

5. The Nankia Institute of Economics: Academic Entrepreneurship and Social Engineering, 1931-1947  (103)

6. Marxism, Revolution, and the Study of Chinese Society  (136)

7. Genesis of a Marxist Social Science Enterprise in the Early 1930s  (159)

8. The Social Sciences, Agrarian China, and the Advocacy of Revolution  (184)

9. Rockfeller Foundation and Chinese Academic Enterprise  (222)

10. Conclusion: The Legacy  (256)

• Social Engineering  (258)
• A Transpacific Transplantation of a Paragigmatic Debate  (261)

※ 발췌 (excerpts):

pp. 224~

Although the Institute had engaged John B. Condliffe to become the research secretary in early 1927, no research program had crystallized before its biennial conferences in Honolulu in the summer of that year. Condliffe favored a more patient approach, especially because he had not made a reconnaissance trip to East Asia. However, pressure for projects from New York was mounting. Carter had funds from Laura Spelman Rockfeller Memorial and was eager to prove to the latter the efficiency of the Institute as an agency for social science research on East Asia. [n.4] There was pressure from academic entrepreneurs as well. James Shotwell, professor of history at Columbia University and chairman of the Institute of the International Research Committee of the Institute, was eager to have projects that he could present to the Social Science Research Council.

This pressure turned the Institute's Research Committee meetings at the 1927 Honolulu conference into a desperate search for projects. The meetings were attended by a motley group with diverse backgrounds and interests. ( ... ) The meetings were chaotic and futile. Condliffe was soundly reproached by Carter and Shotwell for failing to come up with projects in advance. The exasperated Shotwell went so far as telling Condliffe that "the tail was going to wag the dog" and there was no future for him in the Institute.[.6]  ( ... ) With the help of other conference participants, Condliffe eventually came up with an assortment of a dozen projects for Shotwell to take to the Social Science Research Council.

( ... ... )
( ... ... )
( ... ... )

Although the Institute continued to support social science research in China until 1949, its importance was outshone in the early 1930s by the entry of the Rockefeller Foundation into the social science field.

The Rockefeller patronage of the social sciences in China had been sporatic, represented by a grant to Yanjing in 1928 and another to Nankai in 1932. Both were block grants to be expended entirely at the discetion of the beneficiaries, a practice Ruml pioneered at the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial. [n.10] When the Foundation entered the social science field in China in the early 1930s, its China Program departed in two important aspects from its established practices. First, bringing together social scientists, public health experts, engineers, and agronomists for a concerted attack on China's rural problems, the China Program cut across several divisional lines within the Foundation─the Division of the Social Sciences, the China Medical Board, and the International Education Board. Second, the China Program articulated an ambitious goal in social engineering, which the Foundation had eschewed. This program owed its tenacity to its creator, Selska Gunn, vice-president of the Foundation.[n.1]]

( ... )

[발췌: M.B. Bullock's] An American Transplant

출처: Mary Brown Bullock (1980). An American Transplant: The Rockefeller Foundation and Peking Union Medical College. University of California Press.

자료: 구글도서

※ 발췌 (excerpts): p.134, p.

Chapter 6_ John Grant, Medical Bolshevik

It is far more important to support Chinese efforts that are

 60% efficient than western ones that are 100%.

─John Grant, "Diary of Shansi Trip," 1922

John Grant differed in many ways from his colleagues among Peking-bound PUMC entourage aboard the ^Empress of Asia^ in 1921. For one thing, Grant was returning to the land of his birth, China. For another, his temperament and viewpoints were soon to earn him the appellative "medical bolshevik," hardly a typical nickname for one of the staff of the prudent Rockfeller Foundation.[n.1]  More importantly, he had the unusual intellectual flexibility necessary for adapting medical practice and pedagogy to the overwhelming needs of China.

Grant's adult sojourn in China was to last for 17 years, 1921-1938, 14 of which he spent as Professor of Public Health at PUMC and 3 as Co-director of the Rockfeller Foundation's progressive rural China program. A leading Chinese economist years later attributed any accomplishments in social medicine during the Republican period to the leadership of this same John Grant, concluding that he was the "spirit of public health" for modern China.[n.2]

( ... ... ) 

pp. 158-159,

John Grant had undoubtedly known Selska M. Gunn, Vice-President of the Rockfeller Foundation in Europe, before the latter made his trip to China in 1931, for both were members of the RF's International Health Board. Whatever their previous relationship, Grant came to serve as Gunn's primary guide to medical, agricultural, economic, and public health projects in Nationalist China.[n.81] When Gunn proposed a creative interdisciplinary approach to China for the Foundation, Grant elected to participate: 

( ... )

The China Progam, inaugurated formally by the Foundation in 1935, bears the stamp of John Grant almost as much as it does that of its principal author, Selska Gunn. Grant's critique of earlier Rockfeller programs contributed to the raison d'etre for the new program:

( ... )

He outlined an alternative medical policy which would be directly related to the non-medical aspects of Chinese life he had so frequently mentioned: 

The development of such a medical policy is, however, so dependent upon the progress in other fields of community activity, such as industry, agriculture, education and transportation, that it should be closely coordinated with a program of national planning. Future Foundation medical policy therefore should be limited to those projects which are a part of a unified medical program which in turn should constitute one aspect of a larger plan of social reconstruction.[n.84]

( .... ) 

[참고자료] Biographical Dictionary of Republican China,

지은이: Howard L. Boorman
자료: 구글도서




※ 발췌:

( ... ) In 1929 Ch'en Yi prepared to begin a new career in the government administration.

( ... ) After 1949, Ch'en continued to hold senior positions in the government and in major people's organizations. During the first five years of the new regime, he was a member of the Central People's Government Council and a vice premier of the Government Administratin Council. His major specific duties continued to lie in the economic sector. He was the first minister of heavy industry(1949-50), chairman of the economic-financial committee of the Government Administration Council (1949-54), ( ... )

( .... ) In December 1942, Chang was appointed secretary general of the Executive Yuan on the recommendation of H.H. K'ung, the vice president of the yuan. That appointment marked the beginning of Chang's direct participation in government administration. He was ^ex officio^ secretary general of the National Mobilization Council. ( ... )

[자료: Stacey Bieler's] Patriots Or Traitors

출처: Stacey Bieler(2014). Patriots Or Traitors: A History of American Educated Chinese Students. Routledge
자료: 구글도서

... ...

[자료: H.D. Fong's] Recollections of Early Research on Chinese Economy

지은이: H.D. Fong
출처: The Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies
자료: http://nthur.lib.nthu.edu.tw/bitstream/987654321/63800/1/JA01_1963_p69.pdf
시기: 미상

CF. The characteristic and value on Western language document of former Nankai Institute of Economics

 CF. Republican China, 1912-1949 (John K. Fairbank et al.)
...

[발췌] 법의 지배, 법치 등

자료 1: 장은주, 정의의 문제들, 

※ 발췌: 

( ... ) 공화주의에는 두 가지 전통이 있다. 하나는 앞에서 보았듯 마이클 샌델이 선호하는 그리스적-아리스토텔레스적 공화주의다. 흔히 '시민적 공화주의'라고도 한다. 이 공화주의에서는 시민들이 정치를 좋은 삶의 핵심 요소 내지 가치로 인정하고 적극적으로 정치적 삶에 참여할 필요, 곧 '시민적 덕(성)(미덕; civic virtue)'을 강조한다. 또 하나는 오늘날 많이 주목받는 것으로 필립 페팃(Phillip Pettit)이 지지하고 있는 공화주의인데, 이 공화주의는 특히 로마 시대 키케로 ( ... ) 같은 사상가가 발전시킨 공화주의 사상에 토대하고 있어 로마적-키케로적 공화주의라 할 수 있다. 이 공화주의는 흔히 '신로마공화주의'나 '신공화주의'로도 불린다. 이 공화주의 전통에 속한 사상가로는 그 밖에 마키아벨리와 앞에서 언급한 루소 등이 있다.

A. 공화주의와 자유

공화주의에서도 자유는 핵심적 가치다. 따라서 여기서도 자유에 대한 지향은 근본적인 의미를 갖는다. 그러나 공화주의, 특히 로마적-키케로적 공화주의에서 말하는 자유는 자유주의에서의 자유와 다르다. 자유주의에서 강조하는 자유는 소극적 자유(negative freedm; free from ~), 다시 말해 어떤 것으로부터 벗어날 수 있는 자유, 간섭받지 않을 자유다. 자유주의는 타인이나 공동체로부터의 간섭이 없는 상태를 지향한다. 타인과 공동체로부터 간섭받지 않고 개인적 이익을 추구하는 것을 자유라고 생각하는 것이다. 과거 박정희 대통령 시대에는 여성들이 미니스커트를 입거나 남성들이 장발을 하고 다닐 수 없었다. 또 체제에 맞지 않는 생각들은 국가안보를 위협하고 체제 전복적인 것으로 받아들여져 검열을 받았고 심지어 구속을 당하기도 했다. 자유주의 입장에서는 바로 이런 것들이 개인의 자유를 심각하게 제한하고 간섭하는 좋은 예가 될 것이다.

이런 자유주의적 자유와는 달리 공화주의적 자유는 지배가 없는 상태, 곧 '비-지배(non-domination)'를 추구한다. 비-지배로서의 자유란 개념은 진정한 자유는 한 사람이나 여러 사람들의 자의에 종속되지 않는 데에서 성립한다는 공화주의의 기본 신조에서 나온 말이다. 여기서 중요한 것인 '자의'라는 단어인데, 공화주의는 어떤 합리적 근거나 정당한 이유 없이 개인의 자유를 제한하고 개인을 종속시키는 것을 가장 경계해야 한다고 생각한다. 

루소는 이런 공화주의적 자유관을 법치의 이념을 통해 보여준다. 앞에서 언급했듯 루소는 법치공화국을 지향하는데, 그에 의하면 진정한 자유란 오직 법에만 복종하며 타인에게 예속되지 않는 것을 가리킨다. 여기서 법에만 복종한다는 말을 이해하기 위해서는 두 가지, 곧 법에 의한 지배(rule by law)와 법의 지배(rule of law)를 구분해야 한다. 법에 의한 지배(rule by law)는 법을 수단으로 하여 시민을 지배하는 것인데, 루소가 말하는 법치는 이런 것이 아니다. 군주제에서도 이런 종류의 법치는 가능하기 때문이다. 공화주의자들이 군주제를 거부하는 것은 단순히 왕이 싫어서가 아니라, 왕이라는 하는 한 사람의 자의에 의해 사람들의 삶이 결정되고 그들이 종속되는 상태를 부정적으로 보기 때문이다. 공화주의자들이 말하는 자유는 법의 지배(rule of law), 곧 (군주 같은 사람이 아닌) 법'이' 지배하는 상태를 말하는 것으로, 그들에 의하면 진정한 자유는 군주의 자의가 아니라 오로지 법만이 지배하는 상태에서 성립한다. ( ... ... ) 이렇듯 법은 자유를 구속하는 것으로 여겨질 수도 있다. 그런데도 공화주의자는 왜 법의 지배가 진정한 자유를 가능하게 한다고 생각할까?

공화주의자에 의하면, 공정한 법에 따라 개인적 선택에 제한을 두는 것은 자유에 대한 제한이 아니라 오히려 정치적 자유를 구성하는 핵심 요소다. 여기서 그들이 말하는 법이 그냥 법이 아니라 '공정한' 법이라는 점을 유의해야 한다. 모두가 동의하는 공정한 법이라야 개인적 선택에 제한을 가하는 것이 정당화될 수 있다. 또 오로지 법만이 지배력을 가져야 하고, 법 위에 군림하는 왕 같은 존재가 없어야 사람들은 자의에 의한 부당한 종속 상태에서 벗어나 진정한 자유를 누릴 수 있다는 것이다. 이런 생각을 담아 마키아벨리는 "법 위한을 제 맘대로 할 수 있는 시민이 한 명이라도 존재하면 그 국가는 더 이상 자유 국가가 아니다"라고 표현했다. ( ... )

자료 2: 최대권, 우리나라 법치주의 및 의회주의의 회고와 전망 (서울대 법학 제49권 제4호)

... ...

[강연자료: Owen Barder's] Complexity Theory and Development Policy

자료: http://www.cgdev.org/event/complexity-theory-and-development-policy (Feb 5, 2013)
발표자: Owen Barder, Senior Fellow and Director for Europe, Center for Global Development


※ 요약 및 발췌:

( ... ) Using ideas from complexity theory, Owen Barder will argue that development is a property of an economic and social system, not the sum of what happens to the people within it. Drawing on the understanding of complex adaptive systems in physics and biology, Barder will address important policy implications for policymakers who want to bring about faster development in their own country, or to help other countries to make faster progress. ( ... )

CF. Emergent Properties

CF. Emergent Properties (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

CF. 창발성의 철학적 개념과 사회과학 방법론 (민병원/나정민 | 제1회 복잡계 컨퍼런스, 2006년 12월)

[발췌: Owen Barder's] What is Development?

자료 1: http://www.cgdev.org/blog/what-development (Aug 16, 2012)

자료 2: his presentation

※ 발췌 (excerpt):

• Amrtya Sen has twice changed our thinking about what we mean by development. Traditional welfare economics had focused on incomes as the main measure of well-being until his ground-breaking work in the 1980's which showed that poverty involved a wider range of deprivations in health, education and living standards which were not captured by income alone. His 'capability approach' led to introduction of the UN Human Development Index, and subsequently the Multidimensional Poverty Index, both of which aim to measure development in this broader sense. 
• Then in 1999 Sen moved the goalposts again with his argument that freedoms constitute not only the means but the ends in development.

Sen's view is now widely accepted: development must be judged by its impact on people, not only by changes in their income but more generally in terms of their choices, capabilities and freedoms; and we should be concerned about the distribution of these improvements, not just the simple average of a society.

But to define development as an improvement in people's well-being does not do justice to what the term means to most of us. Development also carries a connotation of lasting change. Providing a person with a bednet or a water pump can often be an excellent, cost-effective way to improve her well-being, but if the improvement goes away when we stop providing the bednet or pump, we would not normally describe that as development. This suggests that development consists of more than improvements in the well-being of citizens, even broadly defined: it also conveys something about the capacity of economic, political and social systems to provide the circumstances for that well-being on a sustainable, long-term basis.

Mainstream economics has had a difficult time explaining how economic and social systems evolve to create this capacity; and, in particular, our economic models have struggled to explain why some countries have experienced rapid economic growth while others have not. ( ... ) In the meantime, there has been a growing movement in physics, biology and some other social sciences, often called complexity science. Some economists – notably Eric Beinhocker and Tim Harford – have started to make a compelling case for bringing these ideas more centrally into our analysis of economic and social systems; and a new volume of essays from IPPR later this month will call for complexity to be taken more seriously by policymakers. But with the honourable exception of Ben Ramalingam, who has a book coming out in 2013 and has published on this topic for ODI, there has so far been very little work specifically on how complexity theory might be useful in development economics and policy.

My Kapuscinski Lecture in May 2012 was an effort to explore the implications of complexity thinking for development economics and development policy. I've made this talk available as a narrated online presentation which lasts about 45 minutes. You can watch and listen online ( ... )

Complex does not mean complicated

It is not news to anybody working in development that the problems are ^complicated^ in the sense that making progress involves tackling lots of different problems. But by saying that the economy is a ^complex adaptive system^ implies something rather specific about its dynamic properties. We are using ‘complex adaptive system’ here as a term of art to describe a particular kind of non-linear system which turns up everywhere in nature – from waterfalls to ant colonies.

( ... ... )

One of the key lessons from complexity theory is that complex adaptive systems can have system-wide properties which do not correspond to the properties of individual components. (This is only possible in non-linear systems, since linear systems are by definition a weighted sum of their part.) For example, we think of consciousness as a characteristic of a human brain; but it makes no sense to say that a particular brain cell or synapse is conscious. A thunderstorm is a characteristic of the weather, but we cannot say that a particular molecule in the air is, or is not, stormy. These phenomena─which are called 'emergent properties'─are not the sum of characteristics of individual parts of the system: they are consequences of the way that the different parts of the system interact with each other.

In the talk, I argue that development is an emergent property of the economic and social system, in much the same way that consciousness is an emergent property of the brain. This seems obvious, and yet it is a surprising departure from the way most economists have normally described development as the sum of economic output of all the firms in the economy, or the sum of human well-being of the citizens of a nation.

Development is not the sum of well-being of people in the economy and we cannot bring it about simply by making enough people in the economy better off. Development is instead a system-wide manifestation of the way that people, firms, technologies and institutions interact with each other within the economic, social and political system. Specifically, development is the capacity of those systems to provide self-organising complexity. Self-organising complexity in an adaptive system is never designed or deliberately built: it comes about from a process of adaptation and evolution. It follows that if we want to accelerate and shape development, we should focus especially on how the environment can be made most conducive for self-organising complexity to evolve.

This view of development as an emergent property of a system fits with the common-sense definition of development described earlier. Development is more than improvements in people’s well-being: it also describes the capacity of the system to provide the circumstances for that continued well-being. Development is a characteristic of the system; sustained improvements in individual well-being are a yardstick by which it is judged.

( ... ... )

Dic: may or may not

Is the expression “may or may not” semantically void?


Is “may or may not” redundant?

[트랜스미러] 전치사구만으로 형성되는 주요 이미지

명사와 결합한 전치사구, 즉 전치사와 명사만으로 만들어진 어구 내에 문장이 전달하려는 메시지의 주된 이미지가 형성될 때가 많다. 이 부분을 주어와 서술어 관계로 풀어야만 우리말처럼 읽힐 수 있다.

• the spectrum in development on individual rights
• views on individual rights in development
• ...

* * *

ex) They were eloquent spokesmen for the opposite ends of the spectrum in development on individual rights.

ex) The division between them was perhaps most fundamentally expressed by Myrdal's opposite views on individual rights in development.

... ...

[발췌: Etiquette Scholar's] Seating etiquette

자료: http://www.etiquettescholar.com/dining_etiquette/table_manners/seating_etiquette.html

※ 발췌 (excerpt):


"The place of honor at the table is to the right side of the host because most people are right-handed. Men help seat the woman seated on his right then sits. A host helps the lady seated to his right. The hostess is assisted by the man to her left. To make the process easier, women should approach their chairs from the right"

[용례] code words, codified language

'code words'(maybe also 'coded words'), 'codified language'


1.

When we talk about the political and economic structure of that period, we come to know that the government had seized the property of these revolutionary Sikhs who were now content with a coarse cloth only. But the deserved a pat; their ascending spirits was never defeated and they never brought themselves in the descending mental set up. History of that period is witness to these facts and the language used by the Sikhs of that period clearly shows that they had created many code words for different type[s] of messages so that the enemy could not know about their dialogue and side by side no revolutionary should be the victime of any sort of depression. In this codified language at places some bitterness is also there but that can be understood as reaction to the cruelties being perpetrated by the rulers.

.... CHAPTER 4, Impact of Sikh Theology: 18th Century
http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in:8080/jspui/bitstream/10603/10387/10/10_chapter%204.pdf


2.

Cultural Marxism─the "Political Correctness", redefinition, re-education & indoctrination of you and your nation

https://www.google.co.kr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=17&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CE0QFjAGOAo&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.thestudentroom.co.uk%2Fattachment.php%3Fattachmentid%3D117708%26d%3D1327318697&ei=kmgwVcWxKOTDmQWxtIG4CA&usg=AFQjCNGuS2GjdL3RZzU4HO-S3GiZOU2ZoA&sig2=IXvKQKMT5_EKEGBR6n15Lg&bvm=bv.91071109,d.dGY

( ... ) In the early 1990’s, when our media adopted the new language rules called “political correctness,” rule violators risked their jobs and suffered the media’s wrath. A synthesis of the Marxist equality ideas and political correctness have become known as “Cultural Marxism”. Patrick Buchanan explained the ideology behind these rules, “Political Correctness is Cultural Marxism, a regime to punish dissent and to stigmatize social heresy as the Inquisition punished religious heresy. Its trademark is intolerance.” Cultural Marxism is a relative trend of our times as opposed to a universal truth, yet it is banded about as if it is a universal truth and critics are deposed as one would be if one broke a sacred code.

( ... ) "Anti-Fascism", "Equality", "Diversity" and "Multiculturalism" have thereore become code words for Anti-Conservative, and the person who holds the Conservative position is considered a fascist.

( ... ) Political Correctness is an immense hurdle in British Politics. Politicians often cannot discuss issues upfront and have to use a codified language, and progress is often hindered by “political point scoring” which is often done on the basis not of the facts of the matter being discussed, but because someone may have contradicted a “truth” defined by political correctness. This creates a stalemate in this country for many issues that need urgent attention. ( ... )


... ....

[건축이론 도서] Architecture Theory since 1968

http://m.friendfeed-media.com/c88bba286aca6b3603e700cd8de5834bf147020a

Dic: judge/consider something on merits/on their merits

• Everybody is selected on merits.
• Each case is judged on its merits.
• It's important to judge each case on its merits.
• We will consider each case on its (own) merits (=without considering any other issues, feelings, etc).
• They weighed up the relative merits of the four candidates.
• judge him on his merits.

* * *

△If you judge something or someone on merit or on their merits, your judgement is based on what you notice when you consider them, rather than on things you know about them from other sources.

△judge/consider etc sth on its (own) merits: to judge something only on what you see when you look at it rather than on what you know from other people or things.

△merit [countable, usu. plural] a good feature that deserves praise, reward or admiration.

△merit (often plural). a deserving or commendable quality or act

.... COBUILD, LDOCE, OALD, COLLINS

Dic: may/might (~ but) carrying a meaning of 'although'

• I may be 50, but there's not a lot of things I've forgotten.
• I may be slow, but at least I don't make stupid mistakes.
• Although this may sound like a simple process great care is needed.
• Strange as it may seem, I always felt I belonged here.
• Leeds might be an excellent team, but today they played appallingly.
• The school may not be as good as it was, but is still popular.
• He may be a good father but he's a terrible husband.

* * *

△You use may in statements where you are accepting the truth of a situation, but contrasting it with something that is more important.

△[ALTHOUGH] used to say that even though one thing is true, something else which seems very different is also true.

△might: used to introduce a statement which is very different from the statement you really want to make, in order to compare the two.

△may~but: used when you agree that something is true, but you argue that this does not change the main fact that you are stating.

△used when admitting that something is true before introducing another point.

.... COBUILD, LDOCE, CALD, Macmillan, OALD

[발췌: Syed Ali Raza's Social Democratic System] Chap 3, Political Systems

출처: Syed Ali Raza(2012). Social Democratic System. Global Peace Trust

자료: 구글도서

※ 발췌 (excerpt): pp. 31~

Chapter 3

Political Systems

There follows a brief guide to the varius political systems available from the menu of human philosophical and political experience. I have divided the systems into two distinct groups reflecting the key differences.

THE SOCIAL ENGINEERS-COLLECTIVISM

This group considers mankind the raw material from which to construct a society. The forms of society differ, the means by which its design is arrived at differs, but what they all have in common is the notion that one/some/many men should rule the others─whether it be king, dictator or majority.

AUTOCRACY/DICTATORSHIP/DESPOTISM

A supreme, uncontrolled, unlimited authority, or right of governing in a single person, as of an autocrat, characterizes an autocracy. It is very similar to a dictatorship. The key here is that the autocrat has absolute power. Au autocrat requires a massive amount of force (in an army for instance) to exert control over an unwilling people. A benevolent autocrat is a contradiction in terms. A (rational)  benevolent person recognizes that benevolence is not something, which can, by its nature, be forcibly created. A benevolent leader would seek to undo the social engineering and return the society toward the sovereignty of the individual. Iraq under Hussein is a good example of dictatorship, as was Russia under Stalin. 

( ... ... )

[자료] How Much Do Leaders Explain Growth? An Exercise in Growth Accounting

지은이: William Easterly and Steven Pennings, NYU and World Bank

자료 (version 2013): http://www.nyudri.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Leaders-And-Growth.pdf

자료 (version 2014): http://sites.bu.edu/neudc/files/2014/10/paper_369.pdf

※ 발췌 (excerpts):

Abstract: 

Higher average rates of economic growth are often seen as evidence of good national leadership. This commonly-used metric substantially upward biases the growth contribution of leaders because transitory shocks also affect average growth rates. The bias is much larger in autocratic countries, because the transitory component of their growth rates tends to be much more volatile. Even identification of the best and worst leaders is prone to error due to differences in growth rates across data sources. Assuming a contemporaneous relationship between leader quality and growth, we decompose growth into a leader-specific component, a country-specific component and a (possibly auto-correlated) random component using four growth datasets and two leader datasets over 50 years and more than 100 countries. We find a very small variance in leader effects, even in autocracies. We find that only a small fraction of the variation in growth in autocracies can be explained by variation in leader quality.

[용어] 인자한 리더 (benevolent leader)

출처: 21세기 정치학 대사전

자료: 네이버

※ 발췌: 

정치적 권위에 대한 대표적인 어린이의 인식형태이다. 어린이는 정치화, 인격화, 이상화, 조직화라는 과정을 거쳐 정치적 권위를 수용한다. 인격화란 대통령이나 장관, 경찰관 등 특정의 개인을 통하여 단순한 형태로 정치적 권위를 인식하는 것을 나타낸다. 또한 이상화란 대통령과 같은 정치적 권위가 대부분의 어린이에게 신뢰할 수 있고 다정한 존재로 비치는 것을 가리킨다. 이것들을 통합한 어린이의 정치적 권위에 대한 인식으로서 '인자한 리더’라는 개념이 생겼다. 그린스타인(Fred I. Greenstein), 헤스(Robert D. Hess), 이스턴(David Easton) 등의 조사에 의하면 특히 미유럽의 어린이들에게는 이러한 인식이 강하고 대통령이 자신의 아버지보다 지식이 있고 근면하다고 생각하고 있다. 그러나 강촌충부(岡村忠夫)와 마세이(Joseph Massey) 등의 일본의 조사에서는 총리에 대한 어린이들의 감각이 거짓말쟁이, 수전노라는 등 부정적인 것이 압도적으로 많아서 미유럽에서의 조사결과와 좋은 대조를 이루고 있다.

CF 다른 일반 용례: 

• benevolent society: an organization which gives money to and helps a particular group of people in need: ex) a benevolent society for sailors' widows

[발췌: 차병직, 인권] 인권의 어원

출처: 《인권》 차병직 지음. 살림, 2006.

자료: 구글도서

※ 발췌: 

인권의 어원

인원은 한자어 '人權'을 한국어로 표기한 것이다. 서양에서 들어 온 용어인 '권리'나 '의무'는 중국에서 먼저 번역하여 사용한 것이다. 그러나 인권은 중국보다 일본에서 먼저 사용한 것으로 추측된다. 일본의 미스쿠리 린쇼는 프랑스 「민법전」의 'droit civil'을 '민권民權'이라 번역하였다. 그리고 이 용어는 1874년 '사가의 난' 때 돌았던 격문에서 인민의 권리라는 의미로 사용되었다. 중국에서는 1890년대에 량치차오가 '민권'이란 용어를 처음 사용했다. 따라서 이때까지만 해도 아직 인권이란 용어는 등장하지 않았다. 어쩌면 일본 개화기의 계몽 사상가였던 후쿠자와 유키치가 미국 「독립선언문」을 번역하면서 인권이란 조어를 떠올렸을지도 모른다. 좀 더 분명한 것은 1945년에 발표된 「포츠담 선언」 제10항의 'fundamental human rights'를 '기본적 인권'이라 번역한 사실이다. 이 새로운 용어는 1946년 11월에 공포한 일본 헌법에 그대로 사용됐다. 이에 앞서 'human rights'라는 표현은 1941년 미국의 프랭클린 루스벨트 대통령이 의회에 보낸 연두 교서에도 등장한다.

  인권은 영어의 'human rights'를 번역하면서 만들어낸 용어다. 원래 영어권에서는 'rights of man'이란 용어를 사용했었는데, man이란 단어가 마치 여성을 배제하거나 소홀히 여기는 것 같은 오해를 불러일으킬 수 있다는 반론 때문에 'human rights'로 바꾸었다고 한다. 'rights of man'은 프랑스어 'droits de l'homme'를 영어로 번역한 것이다. 물론 'droits de l'homme'는 프랑스 혁명과 함께 공포된 「1789년 8월 26일의 인간과 시민의 권리 선언Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen du 26 août 1789」에 등장한다. 

  혁명을 맞은 프랑스와 미국에서 인간의 권리란 표현을 쓰기 이전에는 주로 자연권(natural rights)이란 용어를 사용했다. 이 자연권은 자연법 사상에 근거한다. 독일에서도 인권을 Meschenrecht라 표기하기 이전에 Rechte der Menschheit로 썼는데, 이미 1784년에 그렇게 쓰인 예가 있다고도 한다. 

( ... ... )

[토머스 제퍼슨] 미국 독립선언문(1776)

[블로그, 상식으로 사는 세상] 미국 독립선언서 1776.7.4. (같은 출처 블로그 주인장의 영한 번역문)

[주철민의 역사공부방] 미국 독립선언문

United States Declaration of Independence (Wikipedia)

The Declaration of Independence: A Transcription (http://www.archives.gov/)

Jefferson's Original Declaration of Independence Did Not Use the Word "Creator" (Jim Allison)

[주한미국대사관 공보과, 2006년] Living Documents of American History And Democracy (살아있는 미국 역사와 민주주의 문서): 독립선언문(1776), 버지니아 권리장전(1776), 미국의 헌법(1787), … …

[Some reviews of] W. Easterly's Tyranny of Experts

A List of more readings about the Book

자료 1: Christopher Stern's IN MY EXPERT OPINION: EASTERLY, EXPERTISE, & DEVELOPMENT PRACTICE

※ 발췌 (excerpt):

( ... ... ) Easterly’s premise is provocative and highly pressing, but a thorough reading of the theories and examples he uses to support his arguments betray a perspective that is perhaps not quite so heterodox as he claims.

Easterly espouses three major thematic shifts in the paradigm of approaching development practice, which he labels: (1) history vs. blank slate, (2) nation vs. individual, and (3) central planning vs. spontaneous solutions. Unfortunately his vision seems to fall short of its own potential, as his elaborations and proposed implementations do not live up to the bold prescriptions he initially makes. Overall, and quite dishearteningly, the imagination of this work seems severely constrained and skewed by tendencies of Euro-centrism and economist hero-worship. For example, Easterly insists upon a development practice that learns from the lessons of history. It is only lamentable that he doesn't seem to find any lessons worth learning beyond the history of Western Europe during World War II.

  The book spedns it first third taking the reader on a whirlwind tour of mid-20th century development practive in China, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South America. However, each episode is eerily similar, almost archetypal and even bordering on caricatural, in which a noble economist of Western breeding, an intellectual heir of Friedrich Hayek (who, Easterly seems convinced, has been the target of a character assassination conspiracy), arrives to espouse the virtues of laissez-faire economics and neoliberal maket deregulation. To our hero's dismay, while he may attract one of two fresh-faced adherents from the junior ranks of native academics, the powers of the local intelleventsia remain blinded by their greed, pride, or some combination thereof and spurn his teachings to the dire economic detriment of their homelands. "Blank Slate thinking," Easterly says, "thus opened the door for development experts to reject the utility of the West's history of individual rights and development as a precedent." Never mind the possibility that the history any of these regions might have to consider could exist outside of their relationships to Western economists. Never mind how the development of the West inextricably linked to the poverty of developing regions today. An appeal for engagement with history and historicity in development practice is truly imperative, but the underlying concepts of import are agency and accountability. The essential point is an appreciation of contextual heterogeneity, not a universal application of the same old lesson. If one is to speak of sleight of hand, it is quite a trick to use history to recast the unrestrained capitalist impulses of Europe as the would-be heroes of global development while construing local dissenters as antagonists.

The second third of the book identifies yet another critical pitfall of contemporary development practice, but again seems not to realize its own insight. Terming this point of conflict nation vs. individual, Easterly decries the current development industry fixation with analysis and action focused at the nation-state level. “The objective of development as developing the nation-state,” he says, “is so taken for granted that it is rarely even noticed.” While there is much to critique about this commonly used approach, Easterly constructs this section as a condemnation of the violations of individual rights. The place where the book’s needed imagination falters once more is in the inability to conceive of rights violations committed by any actor other than the state. Bemoaning cruel dictators and callous bureaucrats the book completely glosses over, or perhaps intentionally obscures, rights violations by such forces as multinational corporations, industrial polluters, militant religious groups, and routine institutionalized systems of discrimination.

The book also paints in strikingly wide strokes with regard to how it theorizes rights may be secured and defended. The call to let individuals be free drowns out any discussion of how they might attain that freedom or how to ensure that they remain free, again because the book fails to see any possible aggressors aside from the state. A deeper critique of the nation-state fixation of contemporary development practice might point out that the nation-state system was only applied to most of what is now deemed the “developing world” at the same time as said label, or that for most countries the construction of the nation-state can only be justified as a vestige of their history under colonialism. It would be fruitful to discuss, perhaps, the myriad ways in which nation states never have and never will adequately represent the interests of countless people living in very real stateless, transnational, migrant, nomadic, indigenous, or isolationist communities. Sadly, anyone looking for such insights in this book will be sorely disappointed.

The final third of the book is perhaps the most bewildering. Named for the perceived conflict between central planning and spontaneous solutions, this section treats the nature of, and conditions necessary for, innovation; the subsequent level of apparent naïveté pertaining too the nature of innovation is hard to credit as genuine coming from an economist of Easterly’s stature. The basic argument presented is that in order for technical innovation to flourish and rise to meet the problem-solving needs of a society, individuals must be unrestrained in their ability to experiment fearlessly for the purpose of spontaneously creating novel solutions: on the surface an appealing argument to any neoliberal economist. The level of strangeness within the theories constituting this part of the book can be seen though in one of the analogies Easterly employs.  According to Easterly, “The debate in development between conscious design and spontaneous solutions is similar to the evolution debate between religious believers in ‘intelligent design’ as opposed to those who celebrate the ‘spontaneous order’ of evolution.” Easterly has creatively chosen his own terms to match up verbally to this metaphor, but the astute observer should not let themselves be fooled; his presentation gravely misrepresents both schools of thought. In actuality the illusion of “spontaneous order” presented in evolutionary theory is really the emergent properties resulting from consistent, repeated, iterative applications of a set of determined principles. Likewise, believers of “intelligent design” insist that what appears to be fantastic precision and complexity within the systems of the natural world was actually brought into being almost instantaneously in the entirety of its current form by some powerful creative force.

This confusion of terms is in no way incidental, but in fact speaks to a profound misunderstanding on Easterly’s part about the ways in which technological innovations occur in society. Innovations do not appear out of thin air as the result of the magnanimity of charismatic individuals simply because they are permitted to do whatever it is that they please (though Easterly may be forgiven considering recent popular portrayals such as the Steve Jobs biofilm). Innovations emerge from iterative experimentation, from trial and error, from the reframing and recombining of existing concepts, and from the exchanges of ideas that take place between, rather than within, individuals. While the potential for central planning at the national level to stifle innovation exists, the solution is not the unbridled deregulation of individualistic self-interest. Rather societies might look to support education, transportation, and communications infrastructure all of which address the need for more responsive and adaptive social networks to catalyze the crucial exchange of knowledge.

The only identifiable takeaway from Easterly’s book is a petition for the greater democratization of political regimes around the world. The air of American essentialism, venerating the United States as the case of developed nation par excellence, is veiled thinly if at all. This, however, begs the question of the veracity of America’s success in the face of appalling inequality statistics that continue to intensify, the grim picture painted by critical examinations of American quality of life, and strong evidence that America’s own democracy is being appropriated by concentrated economic wealth: the forces of wealth increasingly able to exploit American understandings of freedom as mere deregulation to undermine any means of remedying the predicament. Still Easterly does offer some useable pearls, and even the possibility of redemption for distraught Development Practice students, chief among them, “It’s not about condemning all expertise, it is about distinguishing between good and bad ambitions for expertise in development.”

It is crucial to recognize that despite whatever follies can be found in the economic ideologies underpinning Easterly’s writing, his initial premise is still of paramount importance. That is, without a critical understanding of the way our own claim to expertise impacts development, we cannot hope to be effective agents of change. Kadir, in his video, echoes this sentiment saying, “We certainly need specialized technical knowledge…however, expert-lead approaches to alleviating poverty turn political and social problems into technical problems.” The short lecture presented in the video, while not able to comprise a complete prescribed course of action, opens intriguing lines of discussion that bear pursuing. Drawing on material from history and anthropology to environmental science and engineering, Kadir poses several compelling examples of how technical-solutions spearheaded by poverty experts have appeared successful while continuing to engender new unforeseen problems, to be solved by yet another group of experts. Ultimately, he concludes, “We don’t need to solve the symptoms [of poverty]; we need to dissolve the structures.” In this view it seems clear that the expertise we hope to gain as Development Practice students, be it in business, agriculture, health, education, environment, or any other sector must be valued in terms of its ability to aid us in addressing the aspects of poverty that transcend technical solutions. As the first cohort of the MDP program graduates and begins to pursue employment, while the second cohort embarks on practicum experiences around the world meant to put our newfound skills to the test, the closing words of Kadir’s video form a highly apt send-off:

“What kind of expert are you? What kind of boxes has your training taught you to draw? How have you learned to define problems, and through what lens do you see poverty? Finally, how might you come to understand what is missing from inside the boxes you draw?”


자료 2: David Roodman's Of Technocrats and Autocrats: Review of Bill Easterly’s Tyranny of Experts


자료 3: Ndongo Samba Sylla's Tyranny of experts against spontaneous solutions


.... ....

[메모] How can this emergent post-capitalist logic come into its own?

출처: STIR Magazine, Spring 2015
자료: P2P Foundation, Apr 2015
지은이: Michel Bauwens


※ 발췌 (excerpt)─발번역 주의 ! 

"자본주의가 항상 유기적이고 지배적인 시스템은 아니었다. 완전한 생산양식(즉, 사회와 문명의 한 형태로서 가치를 창출하고 분배하는 일관된 방식)의 지위를 성취하기 전에 자본주의는 구사회를 자신의 모습대로 주형하려고 해크(hack)해야 했다. 칼 폴라니는 (이른바 선대제 시스템)의 예를 들면서 초창기 상인들이 장인들과 길드 노동에 계속 의존했으며 이러한 초기에는 상품화된 노동에 의존할 수 없었던 상황을 설명한다.

오늘날 돈을 지불받는 경우든 지불받지 않는 경우든 다양한 기여자들의 공동체들이 '공유 자산(사용자들이 관리하는 공유 자원)'을 창출하고 있다. 이처럼 '공유 자산을 지향하는 생산'인 '프로토proto' 생산 시스템이 출현하고 있는데, 이 상황 역시 초창기 시절의 자본주의가 맞았던 상황과 다르지 않다. 이와 같이 이미 노동과 상품의 논리를 넘어서면서 새로 출현하고 있는  탈자본주의적 논리는 어떻게 자리를 잡게 된 것인가? 어떻게 peer production을 유기적 시스템으로 만들 것인가?

[발췌:] Push for transparency at G8 alone will not solve land grabs in Africa

자료: http://rosebellkagumire.com/2013/06/17/push-for-transparency-at-g8-alone-will-not-solve-land-grabs-in-africa/
지은이: Rosebell Idaltu Kagumire, JUNE 17, 2013


※ 발췌 (excerpt):

[In] 2012, a few months before he passed away, Ethipian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi while attending the World Economic Forum on Africa was asked a question that intrigues most African citizens. Why do African leaders-revolutionaries turn to looting their own countries once in power? The (...) leader of Ethiopia responded by highlighting foreign corporations' role in impoverishing Africa. He hinted that African leaders, in their quest to find jobs for an increasing unemployed populatin, were being held hostage by corporations that come in to invest.

“The vast majority of the loot[ing] is done by properly organized companies through all sorts of accounting gimmicks,” he said. “I think that is the most insidious form of corruption. It affects everybody, including those whose hands are not in the till.”

True as it may be, the response was just one sided. ( ... ... )

( ... ... ) land grabbing has also become an every day reality in most African countries. ( ... )

In August 2001, the Ugandan army violently expelled over 400 peasants families from their land in the district of Mubende and leased the land to Kaweri Coffee Plantation Ltd., which is full subsidiary of the German Neumann Kaffee Gruppe (NKG) based in Hamburg.

Over 10 years the company has used the land to establish a large-scale coffee plantation. FIAN, an international human rights organization the right to adequate food has issued reports on efforts by 400 evicted families to get justice in vain.

Both the company and Uganda government in this case have denied local peasants their rights as listed down in the international Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. FIAN, an organization working on right to food lodged a formal complaint to  the Germany’s National Contact Point (NCP)for OECD Guidelines for Multi-national Enterprises but still the matter is not yet solved.

In the same district, in 2010, a UK-registered – The New Forest Company (NFC) was involved in what Oxfam described as illegal eviction of some 20,000 Ugandan peasants from arable land to plant trees.

The company had been given a go-ahead by the Uganda National Forestry Authority , which licensed NFC’s operations in 2005 and permitted the company to evict the residents in Mubende and Kiboga districts whom they said were encroachers.  NFC had attracted investments from International and European banks to expand their Ugandan plantation.

After the international spotlight NFC suspended operations in Uganda to give way for negotiations and mediation.

For the last 20 years the Ugandan regime headed by President Museveni has concentrated more on attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) at the expense of local investment. Most of these foreign companies in agriculture come in the name of employment but what they really do is increase food insecurity as more land meant for food production is given up through investment deals.

( ... ... )

[발췌: Oxfam Report] Ugandan community reaches agreement with British company (8 July 2013)

자료: https://www.oxfam.org/en/grow/ugandan-community-reaches-agreement-british-company

※ 발췌 (excerpt):

In September 2011, Oxfam profiled a land deal in Uganda in which villagers were being evicted to make way for timber plantations. Now, the Mubende community has signed a Final Agreement with the New Forests Company (NFC), concluding nearly 15 months of negotiations that were facilitated by the Office of ComplianceAdvisor/Ombudsman (CAO). The CAO handles complaints from communities affected by investments made by the International Finance Corporation, the private sector arm of the World Bank.

Oxfam welcomes that an agreement has been reached through mediation. As part of this agreement, NFC will contribute funds into a community-run cooperative that has been set-up by the Mubende community. NFC will also implement development projects to benefit the affected community. The community remains far from restoring its livelihoods but the outcome of the mediation process provides a basis for community members to start to rebuild their lives.

"I am optimistic about the future but this will depend on how soon we are able to get land. At the moment we are not farming or raising animals but I am hopefulthat through the co-operative we will be able to buy land and move forward," said Emmanuel Bagibariho, a community representative from Mubende who was part of the team that negotiated the agreement on behalf of the affected community.

( ... ... )

[발췌: Oxfam Case Study] The New Forest Company and its Uganda plantaions

• 자료: https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/cs-new-forest-company-uganda-plantations-220911-en.pdf
• 지은이: Matt Grainger and Kate Geary, 22 September 2011

Related Oxfam link: https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/new-forests-company-and-its-uganda-plantations-oxfam-case-study

Related texts:

• Ugandan community reaches agreement with British company (Oxfam, 8 July 2013)
• CAO PROGRESS REPORT-Uganda/Agri-Vie Fund-01/Mubende (CAO, August 14, 2013)
• http://www.atlascorps.org/blog/?p=7454

※ 발췌 (excerpt):

* * *

When the New Forest Company (NFC) was formed in 2004 its management's aim was for it to become East Africa's biggest forester. ( ... )

Today, the NFC plants and harvests timber on 7,000 hectares of 'underutilized and/or degraded' land in Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Rwanda; it has deals in those countries totalling around 90,000 hectares.[n.2] The plantation contribute jobs and revenue, along with the timber products those countries need as they develop and which would otherwise be logged from natural forests.

- NFC hopes to attract more revenue from carbon credits, obliging the company to subit a full Product Design Document from UN's Clean Development Mechanism.[n.3]
- In 2008, the Uganda Investment Authority named NFC an 'Investor of the Year'.[n.4] The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC)─the global gold standard for forestry best practice─has certified tow of NFC's Ugandan plantatins.[n.5]
- The company has strong political ties in the countries where it works, from central government down to local level.
- NFC has attracted investment from international banks and private equity funds since 2008. The European Investment Bank (EIB), the EU's financing institution, has loaned NFC five million Euros to expand one of its Ugandan plantations. Agri-Vie Agribusiness Fund, a private equity investment fund focused on food and agribusiness in sub-Saharan Africa, has invested $6.7m in NFC. Agri-Vie is itself backed by development finance institutions, notably the World Bank's private sector lending arm, the International Finance Corporation (IFC).
- The most significant investment in NFC comes from HSBC (around $10m), which gives HSBC 20% ownership of the company and one of six seats on the NFC Board.
These investors have social and environmental standards to maintain in administering their own portfolios.

( ... ... )

Land has always been a contentious and emotive issue, even more so today given fierce competition over its use and spiralling value – and particularly so in Africa. NFC appears, on the face of it, to be the design blueprint for how a young modern business can conduct a major land investment in Africa in a responsible and ethical way. It has economic power, professional expertise, and close political support. It has a hands-on chief executive with local knowledge and ethical credentials.8 The company and its investors have clear environmental and social standards they commit to uphold and has corporate social responsibility and accountability principles embedded at the heart of its operations. [n.9]

Given all this, how is it possible that thousands of people in affected communities have alleged that land clearances, which have taken place to make way for NFC’s operations in Uganda, have been accompanied by distress and violence, and have left many in a state of poverty?

* * *

'I remember my land, three acres of coffee, many trees – mangoes and avocados. I had five acres of banana,’ Francis Longoli says. ‘I was given awards as a model farmer. I had cows for milk, ten beehives, two beautiful permanent houses. My land gave me everything from my living to my children’s education. People used to call me Omataka – someone who owns land. Now that is no more. I am one of the poorest now.’[n.10] Francis is among more than twenty thousand people11 who have been evicted from their homes and land in Kiboga district, and in nearby Mubende district, to make way for NFC plantations

The Ugandan National Forestry Authority (NFA) granted licences over the plantation areas to NFC in 2005 and embarked on procedures to remove the former residents, which it claimed were ‘illegal encroachers’.[n.12]  This had taken place by February 2010 in Mubende and between 2006 and July 2010 in Kiboga.[n.13]  Oxfam’s research estimates that the number of evictees is in the region of 22,500, although that figure could be substantially higher.14 NFC, on the other hand, claim that this figure is no more than 15,191. Even this figure, they say, is likely to be significantly inflated since it is partly based on a survey conducted by the District Planner from Kiboga, which they claim is unreliable, despite that survey having been paid for by NFC.[n.15]

( ... ... )

Today, the people evicted from the land are desperate, having been driven into poverty and landlessness. In some instances they say they were subjected to violence and their property, crops, and livestock destroyed. They say they were not properly consulted, have been offered no adequate compensation, and have received no alternative land.[n.19]

Some of the affected people in Mubende district say that their land had been given to them in recognition of their fathers or grandfathers having fought in the British army in Burma and Egypt during the Second World War. Others say they were in the process of converting their title from customary to freehold tenure. Those evicted in Kiboga district state that they had been settled on their land for 40 years or more having been invited there by the Idi Amin regime. They had functioning village and government structures, such as local council systems, schools, health centres, churches, permanent homes, and farms on which they grew crops to feed themselves and surpluses to sell at market. They paid taxes. Theirs were strong and thriving permanent communities.[n.20]

( ... ... )

[발췌: Eskinder Nega's] Letter From Ethiopia's Gulag

자료: New York Times. July 24, 2013



※ 발췌 (excerpt):

( ... ... )

We need the United States to speak out. In the long march of history, at least two poles of attraction and antagonism have been the norm in world politics. Rarely has only one nation carried the burden of leadership. The unipolar world of the 21st century, dominated for the past two decades by the United States, is a historical anomaly. And given America’s role, it bears a responsibility to defend democracy and speak out against those nations that trample it.

I distinctly remember the vivacious optimism that inundated the United States when the Soviet Union imploded in the early 1990s. This was not glee generated by the doom of an implacable enemy, but thrill germinated by the real possibilities that the future held for freedom.

And nothing encapsulated the spirit of the times better than the idea of “no democracy, no aid.” Democracy would no longer be the esoteric virtue of Westerners but the ubiquitous expression of our common humanity.
But sadly America’s actions have fallen far short of its words. Suspending aid, as many diplomats are apt to point out, is no panacea for all the ills of the world. Nor are sanctions. But that’s a poor excuse for the cynicism that dominates conventional foreign policy. There is space for transformative vision in diplomacy.

Sanctions tipped the balance against apartheid in South Africa, minority rule in Zimbabwe, and military dictatorship in Myanmar. Sanctions also buttressed peaceful transitions in these countries. Without the hope of peaceful resolution embedded in the sanctions, a descent to violence would have been inevitable.

( ... ... )

[기획재정부 보도자료로 보는] 세계은행 개요

자료: [보도자료] 은성수 기획재정부 국제경제관리관, 세계은행 이사 선출 (2014. 10. 13)


※ 발췌:

세계은행(World Bank) 개요

1. 국제부흥개발은행(IBRD : International Bank for Reconstruction and Development)과 국제개발협회(IDA : International Develpment Association)를 통칭.

2. 세계은행그룹 : 세계은행 + 3개 기관(총 5개 기관)

• 3개 기관 : 국제금융공사(IFC : International Finance Corporation), 국제투자보증기구(MIGA : Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency), 국제투자분쟁해결본부(ICSID : International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes).

1+2 → 3. 세계은행그룹은 국제부흥개발은행(IBRD), 국제개발협회(IDA), 국제투자공사(IFC), 국제투자보증기구(MIGA), 국제투자분쟁해결본부(ICSID)로 구성


4.. 세계은행그룹의 각 기관은 형식상 별도의 기관이나 실제로는 IBRD의 총재가 각 기구의 총재직을 겸임하므로 운용상 매우 밀접하게 연결되어 있음.

5. 상임이사 구성 : 총 25명

• 최대 출자국(6개국) : 이사 지명 (미국, 일본, 중국, 독일, 프랑스, 영국)
• 나머지 회원국 : 19개 그룹(Constituency)으로 구분, 그룹(Constituency) 별 이사 1명 선출
• 한국이 속한 그룹의 국가 및 투표권(14개국, 지분률계 : 3.76%): 한국, 호주, 뉴질랜드, 바누아트, 사모아, 키리바시, 몽골, 캄보디아, 파푸어뉴기니, 팔라우, 미크로네시아, 마샬군도, 투발루, 솔로몬군도, 

[발췌: 아마티아 센, 자유로서의 발전] Chap 6, The Importance of Democracy

출처: Amartya Sen. Development as Freedom. Alfred A. Knopf, 1999.

※ 발췌 (excerpts): pp. 147 ~ ..

* * *

Chapter 6_ The Importance of Democracy

Bordering on the Bay of Bengal, at the southern edge of Bangladesh and of West Bengal in India, there is the Sundarban─which means "beautiful forest." That is the natural habitat of the famous Royal Bengal tiger, a magnificent animal with grace, speed, power, and some ferocity. Relatively few of them are left now, but the surviving tigers are protected by a hunting ban. The Sundarban is also famous for the honey it produces in large clusters of natural beehives. The people who live the region, desperately poor as they are, go into the forests to collect the honey, which fetches quite a handsome price in the urban markets─maybe even the rupee equivalent of fifty U.S. cents per bottle. But the honey collectors also have to escape the tigers. In a good year, only about fifty or so honey gatherers are killed by tigers, but that number can be very much higher when thngs don't go so well. While the tigers are protected, nothing protects the miserable human beings who try to make a living by working in those woods, which are deep and lovery─and quite perilous.

  This is just one illustration of the force of economic needs in many third world countries. It is not hard to feel that this force must outweigh other claims, including those of political liberty and civil rights. If poverty drives human beings to take such terrible risks─and perhaps to die terrible deaths─for a dollar or two of honey, it might well be odd to concentrate on their liberty and political freedoms. Habeas corpus may not seem like communicable concept in that context. Priority must surely be given, so the argument runs, to fulfilling economic needs, even if it involves compromising political liberties. It is not hard to think that focusing on democracy and political liberty is a luxury that a poor country "cannot afford."


6.1  Economic Needs and Political Freedoms  (p. 147)

Views such as these are presented with much frequency in international discussions. Why bother about the finesse of political freedoms given the overwhelming grossness of intense economic needs? That question, and related ones reflecting doubts about the urgency of political liberty and civil rights, loomed large at the Vienna conference on human rights held in the spring of 1993, and delegates from several countries argued against general endorsement of basic political and civil rights across the globe, in particular in the third world. Rather, the focus would have to be, it was argued, on "economic rights" related to important material needs.

  This is a well established line of analysis, and it was advocated forcefully in Vienna by the official delegations of a number of developing countries, led by China, Singapore and other East Asian countries, but not opposed by India and the other South Asian and West Asian countries, nor by African governments. There is, in this line of analysis, the often repeated rhetoric: What should come first─removing poverty and misery, or guaranteeing political liberty and civil rights, for which poor people have little use anyway?


6.2 The Preeminence of Political Freedoms and Democracy  (p. 147)

Is this a sensible way of approaching the problems of economic needs and political freedoms─in terms of a basic dichotomy that appears to undermine the relevance of political freedoms because the economic needs are so urgent? [n.1]  I would argue, no, this is altogether the wrong way to see the force of economic needs, or to understand the salience of political freedoms. The real issues that have to be addressed lie elsewhere, and they involve taking note of extensive interconnections between political freedoms and the understanding and fulfillment of economic needs. The connections are not only instrumental (political freedoms can have a major role in providing incentives and information in the solution of acute economic needs), but also constuctive. Our conceptualization of economic needs depends crucially on open public debates and discussions, the guaranteeing of which requires insistence on basic political liberty and civil rights.

  I shall argue that the intensity of economic needs ^adds^ to─rather than subtracts from─the urgency of political freedoms. There are three different considerations that take us in the direction of a general preeminence of basic political and liberal rights:

• 1) their ^direct^ importance in human living associated with basic capabilities (including that of political and social participation) ;
• 2) their ^instrumental^ role in enhancing the hearing that people get in expressing and supporting their claims to political attention (including the claims of economic needs) ; 
• 3) their ^constructive^ role in the conceptualization of "needs" (including the understanding of "economic needs" in a social context).

  These different considerations will be discussed presently, but first we have to examine the arguments presented by those who see a real conflict between political liberty and democratic rights, on the one hand, and the fulfillment of basic economic needs, on the other.


6.3  Arguments against Political Freedoms and Civil Rights  (p. 148)

The opposition to democracies and basic civil and political freedoms in developing countries comes from three different directions. [:]

• First, there is the claim that these freedoms and rights hamper economic growth and development. This belief, called the Lee thesis (after Lee Kuan Yew, the former prime minister of Singapore, who formulated it succinctly) was briefly described in chapter 1.
• Second, it has been argued that if poor people are given the choice between having political freedoms and fulfilling economic needs, they will invariably choose the latter. So there is, by this reasoning, a contradiction between the practice of democracy and its justification: to wit, the majority view would tend to reject democracy─given this choice. In a different but closely related variant of this argument, it is claimed that the real issue is not so much what people actually choose, but what they have ^reason^ to choose. Since people have reason to want to eliminate, first and foremost, economic deprivation and misery, they have reason enough for not insisting on political freedoms, which would get in the way of their real priorities. The presumed existence of a deep conflict between political freedoms and the fulfillment of economic needs provides an important premise in this syllogism, and in this sense, this variant of the second argument is parasitic on the first (that is, on the truth of the Lee thesis).
• Third, it has often been argued that the emphasis on political freedom, liberties and democracy is a specifically "Western" priority, which goes, in particular, against "Asian values," which are supposed to be more keen on order and discipline than on liberty and freedom. For example, the censorship of the press may be more acceptable, it is argued, in an Asian society (because of its emphasis on discipline and order) than in the West. In 1993 Vienna conference, the foreign minister of Singapore warned that "universal recognition of the ideal of human rights can be harmful if universalism is used to deny or mask the reality of ^diversity^." The spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry even put on record this proposition, apparently applicable in China and elsewhere in Asia: "Individuals must put the state's rights before their own." [n.2] 

  This last argument involves an exercise in cultural interpretation, and I shall reserve it for a later discussion: in chapter 10. [n.3]  I take up the other two arguments now.


6.4  Democracy and Economic Growth  (p. 149)

Does authoritarianism really work so well? It is certainly true that some relatively authoritarian states (such as South Korea, Lee's own Singapore and post-reform China) have had faster rates of economic growth than many less authoritarian ones (including India, Costa Rica and Jamaica). But the Lee thesis is, in fact, based on very selective and limited information, rather than on any general statistical testing over the wide-ranging data that are available. We cannot really take the high economic growth of China or South Korea in Asia as a definitive proof that authoritarianism does better in promoting economic growth─any more than we can draw the opposite conclusion on the basis of the fact that the faster-growing African country (and one of the fastest growers in the world), viz., Botswana, has been a oasis of democracy on that troubled continent. Much depends on the precise circumstances.

  In fact, there is rather little general evidence that authoritarian governance and the suppression of political and civil rights are really beneficial in encouraging economic development. The statistical picture is much more complex. Systematic empirical studies give no real support to the claim that there is a general conflict between political freedoms and economic performance. [n.4]  The directional linkage seems to depend on many other circumstances,and while some statistical investigations notea weakly negative relation, others find a strongly positive one. On balance, the hypothesis that there is no relation between them in either direction is hard to reject. Since political liberty and freedom have importance of their own, the case for them remains unaffected.

  In this context, it is also important to touch on a more basc issue of research methodology. We must not only look at statistical connections but, furthermore, examine and scrutinize the ^causal^ processes that are involved in economic growth and development. The economic policies and circumstances that led to the economic success of East Asian economies are by now reasonably well understood. While different empirical studies have varied in emphasis, there is by now a fairly agreed general list of "helpful policies" that includes openness to competition, the use of international markets, a high level of literacy and school education, successful land reforms and public provision of incentives for investment, exporting and industrialization. There is nothing whatsoever to indicate that any of these policies is inconsisten with greater democracy and actually had to be sustained by the elements of authoritarianism that happened to be present in South Korea or Singapore or China. [n.5]

  Furthermore, in judging economic development it is not adequate to look only at the growth of GNP or some other indicators of overal economic expansion. We have to look also at the impact of democracy and political freedoms on the lives and capabilities of the citizens. It is particularly important in this context to examine the connection between political and civil rights, on the one hand, and the prevention of major disasters (such as famines), on the other. Political and civil rights give people the opportunity to draw attention forcefully to general needs, and to demand appropriate public action. Governmental response to the acute suffering of people often depends on the pressure that is put on the government, and this is where the exercise of political rights (voting, criticizing, protesting and so on) can make a real difference. This is a part of the "instrumental" role of democracy and political freedoms. I shall have to come backto this important issue again, later on this chapter.


6.5  Do Poor People Care about Democracy and Political Rights?  (p. 151)

 I turn now the second question. Are the citizens of third world countries indifferent to political and democratic rights? This claim, which is often made, is again based on too little empirical evidence (just as the Lee thesis is). The only way of verifying this would be to put the matter to democratic testing in free elections with freedom of opposition and expression─precisely the things that the supporters of authoritarianism do not allow to happen. It is not clear at all how this propositin can be checked when the ordinary citizens are given little political opportunity to express their views on this and even less to dispute the claims made by the authorities in office. The downgrading of these rights and freedoms is certainly part of the value system of the ^government leaders^ in many third world countries, but to take that to be the view of the people is to beg a very big qustion.

  It is thus of some interest to note that when the Indian government, under Indira Gandhi's leadership, tried out a similar argument in India, to justify the "emergency" she had misguidedly declared in the mid-1970s, an election was called that divided the voters precisely on this issue. In that fateful election, fought largely on the acceptability of the "emergency," the suppression of basic political and civil rights was firmly rejected, and the Indian electorate─one of the poorest in the world─showed itself to be no less keen on protesting against the denial of basic liberties and rights than it was in complaining about economic poverty. To the extent that there has been any testing of the propositin that poor people in general do not care about civil and political rights, the evidence is entirely against that claim. Similar points can be made by observing the struggle for democratic freedoms in South Korea, Thailand, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Burma(or Myanmar) and elsewhere in Asia. Similarly, while political freedom is widely denied in Africa, there have been movements and protests about that fact whenever circumstances have permitted, even though military dictators have given few opportunities in this respect.

  What about the other variant of this argument, to wit, that the poor have ^reason^ to forgo political and democratic rights in favor of economic needs? This argument, as was noted earlier, is parasitic on the Lee thesis. Since that thesis has little empirical support, the syllogism cannot sustain the argument.


6.6  Instrumental Importance of Political Freedom  (p. 152)

  I turn now from the negative criticisms of political rights to their positive value. The importance of political freedom as a part of basic capabilities has already been discussed in the earlier chapters. We have reason to value liberty and freedom of expression and action in our lives, and it is not unreasonable for human beings─the social creatures that we are─to value unrestrained participation in political and social activities. Also, informed and unregimented ^formation^ of our values requires openness of communication and arguments, and political freedoms and civil rights can be central for this process. Furthermore, to express publicly what we value and to demand that attention to be paid to it, we need free speech and democratic choice.

  When we move from the direct importance of political freedom to its instrumental role, we have to consider the political incentives that operate on governments and on the persons and groups that are in office. The rulers have the incentive to listen to what people want if they have to face their criticism and seek their support in elections. As was noted earlier, no substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent country with a democratic form of government and a relatively free press. [n.6]  Famines have occurred in ancient kingdoms and contemporary authoritarian societies, in primitive tribal communities and in modern technocratic dictatorships, in colonial economies run by imperialist from the north and in newly independent countries of the south run by despotic national leaders or by intolerant single parties. But they have never materialized in any country that is independent, that goes to elections regularly, that has opposition parties to voice criticisms and that permits newspapers to report freely and question the wisdom of government policies without extensive censorship. [n.7]  The contrast of experiences will be discussed further in the next chapter, which deals with specifically famines and other crises.


6.7  Constructive Role of Political Freedom  (p. 153)

  The instrumental roles of political freedoms and civil rights can be very substanstial, but the connection between economic needs and political freedoms may have a ^constructive^ aspect as well. The exercise of basic political rights makes it more likely not only that there would be a policy response to economic needs, but also that the conceptualization─including comprehension─of "economic needs" itself may require the exercise of such rights. It can indeed be argued that a proper understanding of what economic needs are─their content and their force─requires discussion and exchange. Political and civil rights, especially those related to the guaranteeing of open discussion, debate, criticism, and dessent, are central to the processes of generating informed and reflected choices. These processes are crucial to the formation of values and priorities, and we cannot, in general, take preferences as given independently of public discussion, that is, irrespective of whether open debates and interchanges are permitted or not.

  The reach and effectiveness of open dialogue are often underestimated in assessing social and political problems. For example, public discussion has an important role to play in reducing the high rates of fertility that characterize many developing countries. There is, in fact, much evidence that the sharp decline in fertility rates that has taken place in the more literate states in India has been much influenced by public discussion of the bad effects of high fertility rates especially on the lives of young women, and also on the community at large. If the views has emerged in, say, Kerala or Tamil Nadu that a happy family in the modern age is a small family, much discussion and debate have gone into the formation of these perspectives. Kerala now has a fertility rate of 1.7 (similar to that of Britain and France, and well below China's 1.9), and this has been achieved with no coercion, but mainly through the emergence of new values─a process in which political and social dialogues have played a major part. The high level of literacy of the Kerala population, especially female literacy, which is higher than that of every province of China, has greatly contributed to making such social and political dialogues possible (more on this in the next chapter).

  Miseries and deprivations can be of various kinds─some more amenable to social remedy than others. The totality of the human predicament would be a gross basis for identifying our "needs." For example, there are many things that we might have good reason to value if they were feasible─we could even want immortality, as Maitreyee did. But we don't see them as "needs." Our conception of needs relates to our ideas of the preventable nature of some deprivations, and to our understanding of what can be done about them. In the formation of these understanding and beliefs, public discussions play a central role. Political rights, including freedom of expression and discussion, are not only pivotal in inducing social response to economic needs, they are also central to the conceptualization of economic needs themselves.


6.8  Working of Democracy  (p. 154)

  The intrinsic relevance, the protective role and the constructive importance of democracy can indeed be very extensive. However, in presenting these arguments on the advantages of democracies, there is a danger of overselling their effectiveness. As was mentioned earlier, political freedoms and liberties are permissive advantages, and their effectiveness would depend on how they are exercised. Democracy has been especially successful in preventing those disasters that are easy to understand and where sympathy can take a particularly immediate form. Many other problems are not quite so accessible. For example, India's success in eradicating famines is not matched by that i eliminating regular undernutrition, or curing persistent illiteracy, or inequalities in gender relations (as was discussed in chapter 4). While plight of famine victims is easy to politicize, these other deprivations call for deeper analysis and more effective use of communication and political participation─in short, fuller practice of democracy.

  Inadequacy of practice applies also to some failings in more mature democracies as well. For example, the extraordinary deprivations in health care, education, and social environment of African Americans in the US help to make their mortality rates exceptionally high (as discussed in chapter 1 and 4), and this is evidently not prevented by the working of American democracy. Democracy has to be seen as creating a set of opportunities, and the use of these opportunities calls for analysis of a different kind, dealing with the ^practice^ of democratic and political rights. In this respect, the low percentage of voting in American elections, especially by African Americans, and other signs of apathy and alienation, cannot be ignored. Democracy does not serve as an automatic remedy of ailments as quinine works to remedy malaria. The opportunity it opens up has to be positively grabbed in order to achieve the desired effect. This is, of course, a basic feature of freedoms in general─much depends on how freedoms are actually exercised.


6.9  The Practice of Democracy and the Role of Opposition  (p. 155)

  The achievements of democracy depend not only on the rules and procedures that are adopted and safeguarded, but also on the way the opportunities are used by the citizens. Fidel Valdez Ramos, the former president of the Philippines, put the point with great clarity in a November 1998 speech at the Australian National University:

Under dictatorial rule, people need not think─need not choose─need not make up their minds or give their consent. All they need to do is to follow. This has been a bitter lesson learned from Philippine political experience of not so long ago. By contrast, a democracy cannot survive without civic virtue. ... The political challenge for people around the world today is not just to replace authoritarian regimes by democratic ones. Beyond this, it is to make democracy work for ordinary people. [n.8]

  Democracy does creates this opportunity, which relates both to its "instrumental importance" and to its "constructive role." But with what strength such opportunities are seized depends on a variety of factors, including the vigor of multiparty politics as well as the dynamism of moral arguments and of value formation.[n.9]  For example, in India the priority of preventing starvation and famine was already fully grasped at the tme of independence (as it had been in Ireland as well, with its own experience of famine under British rule). The activism of political participants was very effective in preventing famines and in sharply condemning governments for allowing open starvation to occur, and the quickness and force of this process made preventing such calamities an inescapable priority of every government. And yet successive opposition parties have been quite docile in not condemning widespread illiteracy, or the prevalence of non-extreme but serious undernourishment (especially among children), or the failure to implement land reform programs legislated earlier. This docility of opposition has permitted successive government to get away with unconscionable neglect of these vital matters of public policy.

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6.10  A Concluding Remark  (p. 157)

Developing and strengthening a democratic system is an essential component of the process of development. The significance of democracy lies, I have argued, in three distinct virtues: (1) its ^intrinsic importance^, (2) its ^instrumental contributions^, and (3) its ^constructive role^ in the creation of values and norms. No evaluation of the democratic form of governance can be complete without considering each.

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