2009년 8월 31일 월요일

Dic: In one's prime, In the prime of life, Past someone's prime

in one's (or its) prime: Fig. at one's or its peak or best time.
  • The building was in its prime back in the Fifties, but it has not been well maintained.
  • I could work long hours when I was in my prime.
in the prime of life: Fig. in the best and most productive and healthy period of life.
  • The good health of one's youth can carry over into the prime of life.
  • He was struck down by a heart attack in the prime of life.
past someone's (or something's) prime: Fig. beyond the most useful or productive period.
  • Joan was a wonderful singer, but she's past her prime now.
  • This old car's past its prime. I'll need to get a new one.

lay(put) something on the line

  • I feel pretty strongly about the matter, but I'm not going to lay my career on the line for it.
  • She laid her job on the line when she told the boss that he was wrong.

be on the line : if something is on the line, it is in a situation in which it could be lost or harmed.
lay(put) something on the line : expose to a chance of loss or damage.

Dic: of its own accord, of your own accord

  • In many cases the disease will clear up of its own accord.
  • He did not quit as France's prime minister of his own accord.

6. PHRASE : PHR after v | If something happens of its own accord, it seems to happen by itself, without anyone making it happen.

7. PHRASE : PHR after v | If you do something of your own accord, you do it because you want to, without being asked or forced. (= voluntarily)

.... Cobuild

2009년 8월 30일 일요일

Dic: common touch

  • Despite being one of the richest and most famous women in the world, she never lost the common touch.
  • an effective administrator and also an effective leader, with a common touch. (Christian Science Monitor).
  • Cf. This room needs a woman's touch.

  1. the ability of a powerful or famous person to talk to and understand ordinary people.
  2. the ability to appeal to the interests and sensibilities of the ordinary person.
  3. PHRASE : usu PHR after v | If you say that someone has the common touch, you mean that they have the natural ability to have a good relationship with ordinary people and be popular with them.
... OALD, The American Heritage, Cobuild

Dic: cut both ways

  • This publicity cuts both ways. It focuses on us as well as on them.
  • Remember that your suggestion that costs should be shared cuts both ways. Your division will have to reduce its budget as well.
  • The Internet cuts both ways–it not only opens borders, it draws boundaries between the people who have it and those who do not.
  1. PHRASE : V inflects | If you say that something cuts both ways, you mean that it can have two opposite effects, or can have both good and bad effects.
  2. to affect both sides of an issue equally.
  3. have both advantages and disadvantages (= work both ways)

... Cobuild, McGraw-Hill Idioms, Cambridge American Idioms

Dic: skit, skittish

  • clever skits on popular songs.
  • Some people found the skit funny and a fair depiction of Muslim ideas and actions.
  • The declining dollar gave heart to skittish investors.
  • his relentlessly skittish sense of humour.
N-COUNT | A skit is a short performance in which the actors make fun of people, events, and types of literature by imitating them.

1. ADJ | If you describe a person or animal as skittish, you mean they are easily made frightened or excited.(= nervous)

2. ADJ | Someone who is skittish does not concentrate on anything or take life very seriously.

... Cobuild

Dic: work off

  • She went for a brisk walk to work off her frustration.
  • If I've had a bad day I'll work it off by cooking.
  • The report proposes that students be allowed to work off their debt through community service.
  • There were heavy debts. It would take half Edward's lifetime to work them off.
  • The market was skittish and illiquid, but slowly the trader managed to work the postion off and in doing so moved the market against himself and depressed prices further. (modulated slightly from another source)
1. PHRASAL VERB | If you work off energy, stress, or anger, you get rid of it by doing something that requires a lot of physical effort.

2. PHRASAL VERB | If you work off a debt, you repay it by working.

.... Cobuild

Dic: slash, slash and burn

1. slash: If you slash something, you make a long, deep cut in it.

2. slash and burn
  • Traditional slash and burn farming methods have exhausted the soil.
  • The small farmers' slash-and-burn technique destroyed thousands of acres of forest.
  • The new manager's method was strictly slash and burn. He looks decisive to his boss and merciless to the people he fires.
(1) Lit. of a farming technique where vegetation is cut down and burned before crops are planted.
(2) Fig. of a crude and brash way of doing something.

... Cobuild, McGraw-Hill Dictionary of American Idioms and Phrasal Verbs

Dic: crisp (as an adjective)

  • Bake the potatoes for 15 minutes, till they're nice and crisp.
  • crisp bacon.
  • crisp lettuce.
1. ADJ | Food that is crisp is pleasantly hard, or has a pleasantly hard surface.

  • a crisp autumn day.
4. ADJ | Weather that is pleasantly fresh, cold, and dry can be described as crisp.

  • I slipped between the crisp clean sheets.
  • crisp banknotes.
  • crisply ADV | his crisply pressed suit.
5. ADJ : usu ADJ n | Crisp cloth or paper is clean and has no creases in it.

........ Cobuild

Dic: feel a longing for, look longingly at

  • He felt a longing for the familiar.
  • Imelda spoke of her longing to return home.
  • Claire looked longingly at the sunlit gardens outside the window.

N-VAR : oft N for n, N to-inf | If you feel longing or a longing for something, you have a rather sad feeling because you want it very much.

ADV : ADV with v | If you look longingly at something you want, or think longingly about it, you look at it or think about it with a feeling of desire.

... Cobuild

第二十七事, 雷虛

雷虛, 誠之不忘 二十三用

雷虛者 誠心 纏于耳聞
以雷聲之大 自虛而不聞也

학이시습: 얽힐/묶을(전)

第二十六事, 在目

在目, 誠之不忘 二十二用

在目者 不思誠之所在而 常在於目也
目之於視物 無物不見
但 誠意在目 則
近物不知名 遠物如畵圖

학이시습: 다만(단)

2009년 8월 29일 토요일

Dic: screw someone or something up

  • Try again and don't screw it up this time.
  • You really screwed up my brother by not being on time.
  • Please don't screw me up again!
  • This is the chef's screw-up, not mine.
  • One more screw-up like that and you're fired.
Inf. to mess up someone or something.
Inf. to confuse someone mentally.

... McGraw-Hill Dictionary of American Idioms and Phrasal Verbs

Cf: screw up

1. PHRASAL VERB | If you screw up your eyes or your face, you tighten your eye or face muscles, for example because you are in pain or because the light is too bright.
  • She had screwed up her eyes, as if she found the sunshine too bright.
  • Close your eyes and screw them up tight.
  • His face screwed up in agony.
2. PHRASAL VERB | If you screw up a piece of paper, you squeeze it tightly so that it becomes very creased and no longer flat, usually when you are throwing it away.[BRIT]
  • He would start writing to his family and would screw the letter up in frustration.
  • He screwed up his first three efforts after only a line or two.
..... Cobuild

Dic: do something for kicks

  • They made a few small bets for kicks.
8. PHRASE : PHR after v
If you say that someone does something for kicks, you mean that they do it because they think it will be exciting.[INFORMAL]

... Cobuild

Dic: speak with a plum in your mouth

  • All I can remember is that he was overweight and spoke with a plum in his mouth.
(British & Australian)
if someone speaks with a plum in their mouth, they speak in a way that shows they are from a very high social group.

... Cambridge Idioms Dictionary,

Dic: in a heartbeat

  • If I had the money, I would go back to college in a heartbeat.
  • Just tell me that you need me and I'll come there in a heartbeat.
Fig. almost immediately.

... McGraw-Hill Dictionary of American Idioms and Phrasal Verbs,

Dic: incumbent (upon someone to do something)

  • I felt it was incumbent on us all to help.
  • It is incumbent on them to pay their own debts.
  • It is incumbent upon all of us to make an extra effort.
Latin incumbere: to lie upon.
incumbent-: from Latin, present participle of incumbere.
Middle English, holder of an office from Medieval Latin incumbens.
adj 1. Imposed as an obligation or duty; obligatory.
adj 2. Lying, leaning, or resting on something else: incumbent rock strata.
adj 3. Currently holding a specified office: the incumbent mayor.
noun. A person who holds an office or ecclesiastical benefice: The incumbent was reelected to another term.

..... The American Heritage, Collins Essential, Cobuild

[책과 서평] A Demon of Our Own Design: Markets, Hedge Funds, and the Perils of Financial Innovation

Bookstaber CoverA Demon of Our Own Design: Markets, Hedge Funds, and the Perils of Financial Innovation
by Richard Bookstaber

Sep 2007

In recounting his time as risk manager at a number of prominent houses (Morgan Stanley, Salomon Brothers, Citigroup etc.), Bookstaber completes the i-banking trifecta. First there was the Michael Lewis classic, Liar's Poker, detailing the juvenile bravado and macho antics of the trading floor. Then Jonathan Knee gave an intimate portrait of the i-banker deal making culture with The Accidental Investment Banker.

And now, in A Demon of Our Own Design, we get a glimpse at the risk management side of things... a sort of master plumber's walking tour through the bowels of the system, with technical descriptions of exactly what happens when pipes burst and boilers explode. (Some will find Bookstabers' level of detail intolerably dull; others will find it quite fascinating. I was in the fascinated camp.)

Nature of the beast

In describing the finer points of risk arbitrage, Bookstaber explains why it's normal—expected even—for trading desks to take a good whack every so often. The nature of the beast is to make relatively steady profits, month in and month out, and then give back a chunk of those profits when something goes haywire. (That's how you move huge sums on an arb desk; grind out small bets that are almost guaranteed to work, juice up the returns with leverage, and try not to be in the vicinity when the rare position goes kablooey.)

In light of this general modus operandi, perhaps it isn't surprising that the "quant" funds recently took a major hit (as of September 2007). They had been minting money for an extraordinarily long period, had the leverage to show for it, and now, after the recent "oops," seem to be generally back in business.

In fact it appears natural for much of Wall Street to work in this "make a little, lose a lot" fashion... the key idea being that all the little updrafts make up for the once-in-a-blue-moon downdrafts. (Such calculus works better for the fee collectors than the fee payers, but that's a different kettle of fish.)

Bookstaber's detail-rich description of the various trades that investment houses put on, many of them lasting years, is also enlightening. The details seem to confirm that, by and large, Wall Street is a gigantic, slow moving, conventional-returns type machine. (And what else could it be, really, with such an ocean of capital to allocate and so many jobs to fill? There is only so much creativity and contrarianism to go round.)

A dangerous combination

Risk manager war stories aside, Bookstaber's goal is to hammer home a key philosophical point regarding risk. He wants readers to understand that financial markets are inherently unstable, and this reality places limits on how far we (or anyone) should go in pursuit of outsized returns.

To make his point, Bookstaber uses various analogies to describe how the market is a highly complex, tightly coupled system... and to explain why the combination of high complexity and tight coupling is particularly dangerous.

The counterexample Bookstaber gives of a highly complex, loosely coupled system is the US Postal Service. The USPS has countless potential points of failure and myriad moving parts, but there are no catastrophic linkages involved. A lost package does not set off a disastrous daisy chain of events in which millions of packages are lost.

In contrast, the classic example of a highly complex, tightly coupled system is a nuclear reactor. The reactor is tightly coupled because any point of failure can lead to a knock-on chain reaction; one small thing going wrong can set the entire mechanism on a path to disaster. Being a highly complex, tightly coupled system, the market is less like the postal service and more like the nuclear reactor, in that the combination of aggressive leverage, complex methodologies and heavily interlocking parts leads to significant potential for catastrophe.

Exquisitely adapted

Another serious problem is Wall Street's deeply ingrained tendency to push the envelope. (Richard Lowenstein put it exceptionally well in his book Origins of the Crash: "Finance has its own Peter Principle, by which a successful model will be adapted to progressively riskier causes until it fails.")

In this habit of fighting for every inch of profit, Wall Street is like a self-evolving animal overquick to embrace the particulars of its immediate environment. The more precisely an animal is attuned to a particular "fitness landscape," the better that animal can thrive... in the short term at least, as long as everything stays just so. To be exquisitely adapted (as opposed to robustly adapted) is to be vulnerable to the slightest change.

Thus when the fitness landscape DOES change (as it inevitably will), the heavily specialized competitors tend to get crushed (if not go extinct). If a strategy-gone-sour broadsides a large enough group of market participants, the entire financial ecosystem can be thrown into turmoil. When the turmoil from this upheaval spills into the broader economy, wreaking havoc in its wake, the "demon" spoken of in the book's title is unleashed. (As this reviewer interprets it anyway.)

Wisdom of the cockroach

So the problem, in sum, is Wall Street's tendency to ‘overadapt' to every appealing landscape it encounters, building up complexity and leverage to dangerous levels in doing so.

Bookstaber's suggestion is to heed the wisdom of the cockroach.

The cockroach has survived a longer time span, and a wider variety of harsh environments, than humans could ever match. It is one of the creatures man cannot wipe out no matter how hard he tries. And yet, the cockroach's key risk management strategy is embarrassingly simple... simpler, even, than putting in a stop loss. The deeper point is that simple equals robust; by refusing to get fancy, and sticking with the tried-and-true, the cockroach ensures its reign as champion survivor.

Bookstaber uses the cockroach (and other examples from nature) to argue that we, too, should consider cutting back on our excessively specialized ways. The cost of a rough-edged strategy is forgoing excess profits in accomodative environments... but the benefit is increased likelihood of survival in a much wider range of environments, including the truly harsh ones. (As Jim Grant likes to joke, if so many of these credit-driven vehicles can barely handle prosperity, how are they supposed to fare when adversity hits?)

Harrumphs all round

Bookstaber's finger-wagging solution (be less fancy; take less risk) has the ring of common sense to it, especially in the way it frustrates all those market participants determined to have their cake and eat it too.

For those who seek to wring every last nickel out of the market (as LTCM used to brag of doing), Bookstaber argues persuasively that flying too close to the sun will always be perilous. The commitment to leveraging every edge on a broad scale inevitably leads to disaster-prone configurations, no matter how smart the players.

For those who think the answer is greater regulation of markets, i.e. more rules, Bookstaber shows how extra layers of bureaucracy can actually bring about the exact opposite of the intended affect. Perversely, layers of red tape can (and often do) make a situation more risky, by increasing confusion and complacency simultaneously.

Nor is greater information disclosure the answer.If the market's traditional liquidity providers (traders, market makers, speculators etc.) are forced to disclose their positions to the world in real time, they will react in the manner of poker players forced to play their hands face-up. To the extent that disclosure resolves uncertainty, it also drives market participants from the game. And because "liquidity is a coward" as the old saying goes, always running away when you need it most, strict disclosure rules would likely make bad market conditions worse at the least opportune times.

Some left smiling

Two groups in particular may be left smiling at the end of this book—value investors and trend followers. In both the theory and practice of their normal operations, value investors and trend followers intuitively embraced Bookstaber's message a long long time ago, favoring longevity and robusticity over the temptations of adjusting to the moment.

It is perhaps not surprising, then, that value investors and trend followers are arguably the most profitable market participants by far on an absolute-dollar basis, hauling in hundreds of billions in profit over the course of many decades. They are champion survivors too... with a touch more class than the cockroach.


[책] Macro trading and investment strategies: macroeconomic arbitrage in global markets

자료: google books

저자 Gabriel Burstein
발행인 John Wiley and Sons, 1999
ISBN 0471315869, 9780471315865
길이 228페이지
※ 메모: 
Trading and investment based primarily (but not exclusively!) on macroeconomic information and macroeconomic views are known as macro trading and investment. The distinction we make here between trading and investment is based on the difference between short- and medium-term trading and long-term investing.

  • Strategies with such predominant macroeconomic motivation are called macro strategies. These are top-down bets on macroeconomic themes using liquid assets in large volumes. 
  • Hedge funds following this approach are called macro hedge funds, and they are characterized by a macro style of trading and investment overlayed on other globally diversified strategies. 
It is important to understand that the portfolio of strategies of a global macro hedge fund is much wider than just global macro strategies. This book deals with intrinsic global macro strategies and not with global macro hedge fund styles as a whole. In the universe of assets of hedge funds, macro style has the largest asset allocation among all other strategies of styles, such as market neutral, relative value arbitrage, merger arbitrage, and distressed securites, as shown in Figure 2.1.

  • The typical instruments used to implement such strategies are currencies, bond and stock index futures, commodities, and interest rate futures
  • Traditionally, the main macroeconomic themes focused on interest rates, inflation consumer price index(CPI), producer price index(PPI), gross domestic product(GDP), exchange rates, and money supply. 
  • Simplifying matters just for the moment, a typical example of macro trades is that whatever macroeconomic indicator or variables one watches(CPI, PPI, retail sales, GDP, employment), one gernerally ends up drawing a conclusion on the trend of interest rates based on growth and inflation
  • From here one infers either bullish or bearish directional conclusions on currencies(exchange rates), stock indices, and bonds
It is important to note from this early stage that a macroeconomic indicator like retail sales was used thus far as an intermediary tool to assess inflation and almost never as a direct theme for a macro trade. One of the main contributions of this book will be to ^refocus the macro style on all the auxiliary macro indocators and variables and to generate new strategies using assets directly related to these^(example: retailer stocks trades based on retail sales mispricing in stock markets as opposed to stock index futures trades based on inflation expectations using retail sales as a variable in the thinking process leading to views on inflation).
Macro trading and investment strategies started and developed historically as directional strategies, when one typically buys an asset because several macroeconomic variables and indicators lead to macroeconomic views favorable to that asset. This is why macro has high volatility and high returns (see Figure 2.2). It was probably in fixed-income markets that macroeconomic information was first used to lead to nondirection long/short macro trades and investments when, simultaneously with buying an asset, a second related similar asset was also sold against the first one, based on relative performance expectations given by macroeconomic views. Examples of this would be selling a government bond of one country based on relative interest-rate expectations and selling long term bonds against bonds with shorter maturities(known as ^yield curve trades^) based, for example, on the pattern of growth. Long/short macro trades have lower returns than directional trades do, but also lower volatility. .... (생략)
도서 개요
Some of the most successful and well-known hedge funds have long profited from a trading strategy that applies macroeconomic views to global markets: global macro. Pioneered by hedge fund managers such as George Soros and Julian Robertson, this strategy has led to enormous profits. By placing directional bets on liquid assets, it is particularly suited for trending markets. In Macro Trading and Investment Strategies: Macroeconomic Arbitrage in Global Markets, Gabriel Burstein defines and rigorously analyzes this investment style. He then proposes macro arbitrage as an original alternative to trading subjective macroeconomic views at times when markets are either trending or are extremely volatile, lacking direction, and in crisis, such as during the Asian, Russian, and Latin American economic and financial collapses of the late 1990s. Macro arbitrage is introduced as a new, lower-risk, long/short macro strategy that is based on detecting objective macroeconomic mispricings in global markets. Burstein shows how this trading strategy works in stock market sector spreads (food retailers/general retailers, banks/utilities), stock index spreads (Italy/Spain, Sweden/Finland), and with the European Monetary Union (EMU) ahead of its 1999 single-currency final stage. In Macro Trading and Investment Strategies, Burstein presents, with examples, the framework for traditional global macro strategies, then shows how to use macroeconomic mispricings in global financial markets to design innovative global macroeconomic arbitrage strategies for trading and investing. Packed with revealing trading case studies, examples, explanations, and definitions, this comprehensive work covers:
* Global directional macro, long/short macro, and macroeconomic arbitrage trading and investment strategies
* Causes of macroeconomic mispricings in markets; tackling secondary macroeconomic variables in trades
* The importance of technical timing in macro arbitrage
* Volatility of macro arbitrage strategies versus volatility of relative-value strategies
* Mispricing opportunities due to the effect of the Asian crisis on global markets
* Macro arbitrage of the EMU convergence mispricing in equity markets
* Mispricings of retail sales, GDP, industrial production, interest rates, and exchange rates in stock markets
In-depth and timely, Macro Trading and Investment Strategies covers an area of intense interest to today's trading and investment community and shows new opportunities. It is invaluable reading for those seeking new ways to tackle today's volatile global markets.

2009년 8월 28일 금요일

3장. 분출하는 주택거품의 위협

딘 베이커 *)

1990년대 말 전대미문의 주식시장 상승세가 미국 경제를 불붙게 하더니, 2000년대 중반에 들어선 지금은 전대미문의 주택가격 상승세가 최근 경제회복세에 박차를 가하고 있다. 주식거품과 다를 바 없이 주택거품도 결국 터질 것이다. 그럴 수밖에 없다. 그 거품이 터질 때가 되면, 경제는 깊은 경기후퇴의 늪으로 빠져들 것이고, 주택가격이 떨어지리라고는 상상도 못했을 수천만의 주택 소유자들은 심각한 난국에 부딪치게 될 것이다.

믿기지 않을 정도의 주택가격 상승

주택시장의 기본은 확고하다. 즉 품질 차이를 조정한 주택가격은 보통 전반적인 물가상승률을 따라간다는 점이다. 하지만 최근 8년 동안 [그림 34.1]에서 보는 바와 같이 주택가격은 불변가격(즉 물가상승률을 공제한 실질가격)으로도 50 퍼센트 가까이 상승했다. 이런 상승세가 모든 지역에서 나타났던 것은 아니다. 미국 대부분의 지역에서는 주택가격은 불변가격으로 봤을 때 거의 상승하지 않았다(남부와 중서부 지역 대부분이 특히 그렇다). 반면, 거품지역(서해안, 워싱턴 DC 북쪽의 동해안, 플로리다)의 가격 상승세는 불변가격으로도 80 퍼센트에 육박했다.

주택거품은 경제에 직접적인 활력으로 작용한다. 주택의 건설과 증개축이 늘고 주택 판매량이 늘기 때문이다. 또 주택거품은 소비를 자극하고 지탱해주는 효과가 있어서 간접적으로도 경제의 활력으로 작용한다. 그동안의 주택가격 상승세는 주택가격이 정상적인 상승경로를 따랐을 때에 비해 5조 달러 이상의 부동산 가치를 새로 만들어냈다. 주택가격 상승으로 유발되는 ‘부의 효과wealth effect’에 대한 전통적인 추정치는 100분의 5로, 주택가격이 100이 올랐다면 연간 5만큼의 돈이 소비지출로 나온다는 것이다. 주택거품으로 5조 달러의 부가 새로 생겼으니, 그 5 퍼센트인 2,500 달러(GDP 대비 비율로 2 퍼센트)의 연간 소비지출이 거품이 없었을 때보다 늘어났다고 볼 수 있다.

[그림 34.1] 주택 매매가와 임대료 추이(물가상승 조정) (그림 생략)

자료: 노동통계국(BLS), 경제분석국(BEA), 연방주택기획감독청(OFHEO) 주*)
주: *) 이 통계에서 임대료 지수는 1953년부터 1982년까지는 소비자물가지수(CPI)에 들어가는 임대료 지수를 취했고, 1982년부터는 주택 소유자 관점의 임대수입 지수(임차인에게 제공되는 편의시설 비용이 제외된다)를 활용했다. 주택 매매가 지수는 1975년까지 노동통계국 소비자물가지수(CPI)의 주택가격지수home price index를 활용했고, 1975년부터 1982년까지는 소비자물가지수와 OFHEO 주택가격지수House Price Index(HPI)의 변동률을 활용했고, 1982년부터는 HPI를 활용했다. 모든 수치에서 물가상승분을 공제할 때는 GDP 디플레이터GDP deflator를 활용했다.

펀더멘털에 따른 것인가, 아니면 투기적 거품인가?

주택가격이 급등했다는 사실을 의심하는 사람은 없다. 문제는 왜 가격이 올랐냐는 것이다. 펀더멘털에 따른 상승인가, 아니면 투기적 거품에 따른 상승인가?

펀더멘털을 점검해보면, 이 문제에 대한 의혹은 금세 풀릴 것이다. 수요 측면에서 보면, 소득이나 인구가 특별나게 빨리 성장한 현상은 없었다. 1997년 이래 일인당 실질소득 수준은 연 2 퍼센트의 준수한 속도로 성장했지만, 주택가격이 급등하지도 않았던 1953년~1973년 기간의 연 2.8 퍼센트에 비하면 상당히 낮은 수준이다. 더욱이 평균 가계소득(중앙값)은 2000년 이래 하락하고 있는 상태다.

인구 추이를 봐도 주택 수요가 급증할 만한 요인은 없었다. 가구의 숫자는 1995년에서 2004년 사이에 연평균 140만 가구씩 증가했다. 이것은 베이비붐 세대가 처음으로 가정을 꾸리던 시기인 1970년대에 연평균 280만 가구씩 늘었던 것에 비하면 아주 낮은 속도다. 주2) 연령층 분포도 주택수요의 급증을 뒷받침하지 않는다. 다시 말해, 베이비붐 세대의 주택수요가 정점에 달했다가 떨어지는 기간에 주택가격이 급등하는 현상이 나타난 것이다. .... (중략) .... 펀더멘털이 주택가격 급등의 요인이 아님을 말해주는 가장 명확한 증거는 임대료가 그에 버금갈 정도로 상승하지 않았다는 점이다. 주택가격이 오르기 시작한 초기에는 임대료가 전반적인 물가상승률보다 좀 더 빠르게 상승했지만(그림 34.1을 보라), 마지막 수 년 동안에는 물가상승률 밑으로 떨어졌다. 주택수요와 주택공급의 펀더멘털에 의해 주택가격이 급등하는 경우라면, 매매시장이나 임대시장 모두에서 큰 폭의 가격 상승이 나타나야 한다. 매매시장에서만 이례적인 가격 상승이 나타났다는 사실은 이 가격 상승이 펀더멘털이 아니라 투기적 수요에 따른 것임을 뒷받침한다.

거품은 결국 터지기 마련이다

주택가격이 투기적 거품이라면, 결국 가격은 주택의 사용가치를 반영하는 정상 수준으로 돌아갈 것이다. 최근 몇 년 동안 신규 주택 착공이 역사상 최고치에 육박할 정도로 급증했다. 이러한 공급 속도는 주택가격이 최고치 근방에서 유지되는 동안에는 계속 유지될 것이다. 지금은 이러한 초과공급을 투기자들이 흡수해주고 있고, 임대시장에서는 기록적인 공실률로 나타나고 있는 상태다. 그러나 결국 초과공급이 매매가를 짓누르게 될 때가 되면, 투기적 수요는 종적을 감추게 될 것이다. (주택의 초과공급이 매매가에 하락 압력으로 작용할 때 나타나는 부분적인 현상은 임대 물량으로 나온 주택이 매매시장의 매물로 나오는 것이다.)

아무 가치도 없던 인터넷 회사들의 주식 공급이 결국 수요를 압도해버렸던 것처럼, 주택 공급도 결국 주택가격에 충분한 하락 압력으로 작용할 것이고, 거품 가격은 더 이상 유지될 수 없을 것이다. 이런 일이 얼마나 빨리 일어나느냐는 주택담보대출 금리가 얼마나 빨리 오르느냐에 달려 있다. 아직은 이 금리 수준이 이례적으로 낮은 수준에 머물러 있다.

이렇게 시작될 조정 과정이 달가운 모습일 리 없다. 주택 건설은 GDP의 6 퍼센트를 웃도는 큰 경제 비중을 차지하고 있는데, 경기후퇴기에는 건설 경기가 갑자기 뚝 떨어진다. 일례로, 1970년대 중반에 건설업은 40 퍼센트 가량이 줄었고, 1980년대 초에는 약 30 퍼센트가 줄었다. 지난 5년 동안 건설 물량이 폭증했던 점을 감안하면, 이 정도의 깊은 하락폭을 피할 수는 없을 것 같다. 게다가 주택가격이 조정되면서 거품이 꺼지기 시작하면, 소비지출도 급격히 줄어들게 된다. 만약 5조 달러로 뻥튀기된 거품 재산이 전부 사라지게 되면, 이 마이너스 ‘부의 효과’로 인한 소비 감소폭은 연 2,500억 달러에 달할 것이다. GDP의 2 퍼센트에 해당하는 소비 규모다.

주택거품 붕괴가 빚을 또 하나의 결과는 채무 불이행이 연쇄적으로 급증해서 금융시장이 혼란에 빠지는 것이다. 전국적으로, 주택 소유자들의 채무-순자산 비율은 거의 역사상 최고치에 도달했다. 이 수치만으로도 경악할 일이다. 최근 주택가격의 급등으로 인해 주택 소유자들의 순자산이 그만큼 높게 평가된 상태인 데도, 채무가 그보다 더 빨리 늘어난 셈이기 때문이다. 다시 말해, 사람들은 주택가격이 오르자, 값이 오른 이 주택을 담보로 돈을 빌렸다는 이야기다. 또 주택을 매입한 신규 매수자들 가운데 많은 사람들이 여벌의 새 주택을 매수하는 데 나서고 있다. 정상적인 수준보다 훨씬 적은 선불금만으로도(즉 주택담보대출을 끼고) 살 수 있기 때문이다. 따라서 주택가격이 하락 방향으로 돌아서면, 주택 소유자들 다수의 주택담보대출 채무가 그들의 주택가치보다 커지게 된다. 이때가 되면 이들의 채무 불이행이 급증할 것은 뻔하다. 주택 소유자들의 채무 불이행이 늘면, 이들의 채무를 거대한 규모로 보유하고 있는 금융기관들도 위험진다. ..... (중략) .....

거품은 빨리 터뜨리는 것이 미루는 것보다 낫다

주택거품의 붕괴를 막을 수 없고 이로 인해 경제와 금융시스템이 큰 타격을 입을 전망이기 때문에, 미리 선제적인 타격으로 거품을 터뜨리는 게 옳다. 정부는 시장 붕괴를 막을 수 없다. 거품을 그대로 끌고 가면 거품은 갈수록 불어나서, 나중에 닥칠 붕괴는 더욱 처참해질 것이다. 정부는 거품이 이 정도로 불어나지 않도록 조치를 취해야 했다. 그 단계를 넘어선 지금, 최선책은 거품이 더 커지기 전에 터뜨리는 일이다. 그냥 놓아두면 더 큰 재앙을 부르는 일이 된다.

거품을 터뜨리는 가장 쉽고도 좋은 방법은 (거품이 터질 거라고) 말하는 것이다. 연방준비제도 이사회Federal Reserve Board(FRB)와 재무부 고위 당국자들이 기초 자료를 취합해서 장기 추세를 이탈한 현 주택가격의 부적합성을 국민들에게 설명하면, 당연히 이러한 경고는 대중매체를 타고 널리 보도될 것이다. 주택매수에 나설 개인들이 이런 정보를 듣게 되면, 이들에게 주택 물량을 떠넘기는 전국의 영업 인력도 이 문제를 언급하지 않을 수 없을 것이다. 주택 매수자들 대부분이 이런 경제논리를 전혀 이해하지 못하더라도, 공직자들이 미래 주택가격에 대해 경고하고 있다는 사실은 집을 사야겠다는 이들의 열망을 식혀주기에 충분할 것이다.

과연 이런 경고가 금융거품을 터뜨릴 수 있을 것인지는 미지수다(아직 시도된 적이 없다). 하지만 말하는 데 돈이 드는 것도 아니니, 거품을 공격할 첫 번째 무기로 정보의 위력을 사용하지 말아야 할 이유는 없다. 이 경고가 실패한다면, FRB가 동원할 두 번째 무기가 있다. 바로 금리 인상이다. 낮은 주택담보대출 금리는 주택가격이 급등하는 데 기름을 부어준 연료다. 만약 담보대출금리가 좀 더 정상에 가까운 수준(예컨대, 7~8 퍼센트)으로 돌아가면, 주택가격이 급락할 것은 거의 확실하다.

의도적으로 수 조 달러 대로 불어난 재산을 파괴하는 일은 고약한 정책으로 보일지 모른다. 하지만 그 고약한 일을 해야 할 상황임을 분명히 인식하는 게 중요하다. 주택가격 급등이 마냥 지속될 수 없는 일이라면, 문제는 가격이 ^떨어지느냐 아니냐^가 아니라, ^언제^ 떨어지느냐는 것이다. 실제로 존재하는 재산을 파괴하는 게 아니다. 환상을 파괴하는 것일 뿐이다.

가격 하락을 빨리 겪는 게 뒤늦게 겪는 것보다 경제에도 더 나은 일이고, 수천만의 주택 소유자들에게도 더 나은 일이다. 거품이 오래 가면 갈수록, 거품은 자꾸만 불어난다. 또 거품이 불어날수록, 결국에는 다른 경제 부문으로 되돌아가야 할 자원이 주택건설과 매수에 더 많이 쏠리게 된다. 또한 거품이 유지되는 시간만큼, 거품이 끌어들인 채무도 불어나고, 그로 인한 채무 불이행도 불어나게 된다. 또 거품이 유지되는 시간이 길어질수록, 주택가격 붕괴에 뒤따를 경기후퇴도 더욱 혹독해지기 쉽다.

거품이 유지되는 시간이 한 달 한 달 지날 때마다, 거품 붕괴로 타격을 입을 주택 소유자들도 늘어난다. 15년 전에 주택을 샀던 사람이 주택가격이 세 배로 올랐다가 고점에서 40 퍼센트 하락하는 모습을 지켜보고만 있었다면 최고가에 팔지 못한 것을 안타까워하겠지만, 그렇다고 이 사람이 피해를 입는 것은 아니다. 하지만 거품이 한껏 불어난 고가에 주택을 매수하는 가정은 주택가격이 33 퍼센트 정도만 하락해도 심각한 타격을 입게 된다. 매년 800만 명이 넘는 사람들이 신설 주택이나 기존 주택을 매수하고 있다. 이렇게 많은 사람들 대부분이 거품 가격에 매수하고 있는 것이다.

게다가 수천만의 베이붐 세대가 은퇴 연령에 다가서고 있다. 이들은 소유 중인 주택의 가격이 지금의 가격을 유지하거나 심지어 오르지 않겠냐는 가정 하에 은퇴기를 기다리고 있다. 주택가격을 믿는 만큼, 현금 저축은 적게 하게 된다. 주택거품(또 이전에 있었던 주식거품)을 믿고 있다가 은퇴연령에 들어서면, 이 사람들 모두가 혹독한 처지에 내몰릴 것이다. 이 문제 또한 거품이 한 달 한 달 지날 때마다 점점 심각해진다.

연방준비제도 이사회(FRB)는 거품 문제를 떠맡아야 한다

FRB는 거품은 왔다가 지나가는 현상일 뿐, 그들이 맡아야 할 일은 아니라는 견해를 취해왔다. 이런 견해는 금융거품이 불어났다가 꺼질 때 미치는 어마어마한 영향을 생각하면 정당화되기 곤란한 입장이다. 지난 20년 동안 FRB는 물가상승률 조절을 주된 관심사로 다루어왔지만, 물가상승률의 소소한 오르내림에 비하면 금융거품은 실로 엄청난 영향을 미친다.

금융거품을 무시하는 입장은 금융시스템의 안정성을 주된 관심사로 삼았던 FRB의 예전 입장과도 합치되지 않는다. 1987년 주식가격 붕괴 때 FRB가 유동성 공급에 적극 나섰던 일이나, 보다 최근에는 헤지펀드인 롱텀캐피탈매니지먼트Long-Term Capital Management의 붕괴 위기 때 FRB가 수습에 나섰던 명분은 금융시스템의 안정성을 지키는 것이었다. 금융시스템의 안정성을 지키기 위해 행동해야 한다고 FRB도 인정하고 있으므로, 엄청난 파괴력을 가진 금융거품이 경제를 장악하려고 할 때 가만히 보고만 있는 것은 정당화되기 어렵다. 주택거품의 붕괴와 그로 인한 엄청난 피해를 겪고 나서야, 국가의 정책 결정자들이 이 문제를 다시 점검해봐야 한다는 생각을 하게 될지도 모르겠으니 안타까운 일이 아닐 수 없다.

주: *) 딘 베이커Dean Baker는 경제정책연구센터Center for Economic and Policy Research(CEPR)에서 공동 이사를 맡고 있다. 베이커 박사는 그의 평소 견해대로 워싱턴 DC 도심의 본인 소유 아파트를 2004년 5월에 매도했다.

다음 글에서 일부를 발췌함. "The Menace of an Unchecked Housing Bubble," in Joseph E. Stiglitz, Aaron S. Edlin, J. Bradford DeLong eds., 《경제학자들의 목소리The Economists' Voice》. 한국어판 3장 (원서 34장).

Dic: undoing

  • His lack of experience may prove to be his undoing.
  • In the end, drink was his undoing.
One may compare the two different ways of approach to explain the expression:
  1. N-SING : with poss | If something is someone's undoing, it is the cause of their failure. (= downfall)
  2. be somebody's undoing: to cause someone's shame, failure etc.
.... Cobuild, LDOCE

Dic: be chasing your tail

  • I've been chasing my tail all morning trying to fix a day when everyone can attend.
to be very busy doing a lot of things, but achieving very little.

..... Cambridge Idioms,

Dic: Go fly a kite!

  • Harry was tired of John’s advice and told him to go fly a kite.
Go fly a kite!
Go clime a Tree!
Go fry an egg!
Take a walk!
Go chase your tail!

Dic: undeterred by something

  • Undeterred by his early failures, he decided to keep writing.
  • Even though most traders thrived under these autonomous conditions, there were few formal management constraints for those undeterred by the firm's culture. (modulated from another source)
If you are undeterred by something, you do not allow it to stop you doing what you want.

Dic: 잘나가다

[동사]사회적으로 계속 성공하다.
  • 그는 요즘 회사에서 한창 잘나가고 있다.
... 네이버국어(국립국어원)

Dic: leave somebody to their own devices

  • Students were left to their own devices for long periods.
Means that they were left alone and allowed to do whatever they wanted for long periods.

Dic: let somebody get on with it

  • She wanted to decorate her room, so I just let her get on with it.
  • The trading manager's genius and his weakness was that he believed in hiring the best people and letting them get on with it, as long as he is kept informed. (modulated from another source)
[informal] to let someone do something on their own, and not help them or tell them what to do.

cf 1: get on with it! [spoken] used to tell someone to hurry:
  • Will you lot stop messing around and get on with it!
cf 2: like somebody
  • I've always got on well with Henry.
  • The two boys get on well most of the time.
cf 3: progress
  • How is George getting on at school?
  • How are you getting on with your essay?
  • I don't know how we'll get on without Michael.
cf 4: continue doing something
  • Be quiet and get on with your work!
cf 5: be successful
  • You'll have to work hard if you want to get on.
.... All the sources are the same as the first

2009년 8월 27일 목요일


자료: http://www.set.or.th/setresearch/files/demutualization/ResearchPaper_2002_ADB.pdf

© Asian Development Bank 2002


Governance, Finance and Trade Division,

East and Central Asia Department,
Asian Development Bank


The transformation from the mutual member-based to demutualized exchange involves issues of transferability of ownership from members to nonmembers. There are various ways that dilution of membership can be achieved. Sequentially, it involves conversion of
existing member seats by monetizing these and assigning a certain value per seat. Once the valuation is done, the members can opt to convert their membership to share ownership or to sell off their interest to nonmembers. In most cases of demutualization of exchange, members have opted to retain their share ownership. A listing of equity shares in the exchange facilitates the unlocking of the members' equity and buy out of the interest of the traders, while leading to the monetization of the value of the members' seats. An entity with freely transferable shares, rather than membership rights, can form equity-swap-based strategic alliances or mergers with other exchanges, domestically or in other countries or time zones. Such alliances are stronger and offer greater credibility than pure cooperation agreements.

Membership may be open to any persons who satisfy stipulated requirements or it may be closed. If membership of an exchange is acquired through seats on the exchange, the seats are usually not freely transferable.

TSE became the Toronto Stock Exchange Inc. (TSE Inc.), a for-profit corporation. Each member of the pre-demutualization TSE received 20 common shares of TSE Inc. per seat. Each common share carries one vote; however, the new corporation’s by-laws prohibit any person or combination of persons acting jointly to beneficially own or control more
than 5% of TSE Inc. without the prior approval of the Ontario Securities Commission.

Today some exchanges have been transformed into for-profit shareholder-owned companies and many more are considering such a demutualization. Some demutualized exchanges have become public companies and listed on their own or other boards. Others have remained privately held companies but intend to go public in the future. This
chapter will discuss the United States experience and perspective with regard to why exchanges and similar entities have demutualized, how seats are transformed into shares and post demutualization models.

Also, before the merger of the exchanges, the two Exchanges performed four different roles (market operator, membership association, regulator and public body) that, sometimes in practice, conflicted with one another, compromised their conduct and, to a certain extent, impaired their overall performance. The growth of the securities market
was impeded by restrictions on access, including the maximum number of trading seats available.

Membership is a prerequisite to exchange market access. Only members have permission to purchase trade seats in stock exchanges and access to the central match computer system. Every member should purchase at least one trading seat. Currently, there are 5,391 seats in Shanghai2 and 1,545 in Shenzhen. Trading seats can be transferred among

ellipsis of possessive pronoun as a semantic subject

Let's take a note for a more watchful reading and better understanding of English.

Below is the taken sentence slightly modulated from a source:
Many second-guessed the firm's judgment in dealing with the disgraced tycoon and questioned its image of honesty and staking the moral high ground.
The subject Many is predicated with the verbs, second-guessed and questioned. With respect to the second predicate verb, perhaps it seems to me that one can read like below:
Many questioned its image of honesty and (its) staking the moral high ground. ... (1)
If the sentence above is rewritten as below,
Many questioned the firm's image of honesty and its staking the moral high ground. ........... (2) ,
Can the third sentence below be understood as a sentence of the same meaning as (2) ?
Many questioned the firm's image of honesty and staking the moral high ground. .......... (3)
It's really uncomfortable to find that this prior writing is not at all adequate to make my question point. Going back to the starting point, is such an ellipis of "its" obligatory, or can we treat it as a writing option? ....(September 3, 2009)

Dic: the high ground, the moral high ground

  • The President must seek to regain the high ground in the political debate.
1. N-SING : the N, oft the adj N
If a person or organization has the high ground in an argument or dispute, that person or organization has an advantage.[JOURNALISM]

  • The Republicans took the moral high ground with the message that they were best equipped to manage the authority.
2. PHRASE : PHR after v
If you say that someone has taken the moral high ground, you mean that they consider that their policies and actions are morally superior to the policies and actions of their rivals.

.... Cobuild,

Dic & search: toffee-nosed, hard-nosed, tough-nosed

1. toffee-nosed:
Cobuild_ADJ: If you say that someone is toffee-nosed, you disapprove of them because they have a high opinion of themselves and a low opinion of other people.[BRIT, INFORMAL ] (= stuck-up)

2. hard-nosed:
Cobuild_ADJ : usu ADJ n: You use hard-nosed to describe someone who is tough and realistic, and who takes decisions on practical grounds rather than emotional ones.[INFORMAL] (= unsentimental)
  • If nothing else, Doug is a hard-nosed businessman.
3. tough nosed:
Cf. Cobuild_nose: 4. VERB.
If a vehicle noses in a certain direction or if you nose it there, you move it slowly and carefully in that direction.
  • He could not see the driver as the car nosed forward.
  • Ben drove past them, nosing his car into the garage.

The president described Mr. Bolton as a tough-nosed reformer who will be able to shake up the scandal-plagued world body. "It makes sense to put somebody who's skilled and who's not afraid to speak his mind at the United Nations," he said.
... source

And luck has something to do with it. The Mavericks know that their reward for having the best record in the NBA last season was very unlucky – meeting the athletic, tough-nosed Warriors in the first round. Whether or not the basketball gods smile favorably on them this year, nobody will know for about eight months. That's when most of the questions will get answered.

어쩔 땐 행운이 우리와 함께 하기도 했고요. 매버릭스가 지난 시즌 최다승을 거둔 대가는 불행이었다. 하필 처음 부터 팔팔 뛰어다니고, 겁나 거친 워리어즈를 만난 거다. 이번 시즌 농구의 신이 그들에게 미소를 지을지 아닐지는 8 개월 후 알게 될 것이다. 그땐 대부분의 의문들이 풀린 후일 거다.
... source

Defenseman Stephen Duggan believes Melody's tough-nosed European soccer roots might be the source of his coaching philosophy. "It's a different game than when he played," Duggan said. "It used to be a lot more physical (back then)." "You're a product of your environment. That's the way I have been brought up," Melody said. "He likes tough-nosed football and likes us to play attacking football," Duggan said. "A lot of the teams we play like to pass the ball around and John wants us to get in amongst them and get them off their game."
... source

Dic: Synonyms: admonish, reprove, rebuke, reprimand, reproach

These verbs mean to correct or caution critically.

  • Admonish implies the giving of advice or a warning in order to rectify or avoid something:
    ... "A gallows erected on an eminence admonished the offenders of the fate that awaited them" (William Hickling Prescott). 
  • Reprove usually suggests gentle criticism and constructive intent:
    ... With a quick look, the teacher reproved the child for whispering in class
  • Rebuke and reprimand both refer to sharp, often angry criticism:
    ... "Some of the most heated criticism . . . has come from the Justice Department, which rarely rebukes other agencies in public" (Howard Kurtz).
    ... "A committee at [the university] asked its president to reprimand a scientist who tested gene-altered bacteria on trees" (New York Times). 
  • Reproach usually refers to regretful or unhappy criticism arising from a sense of disappointment:
    ... "Every other author may aspire to praise; the lexicographer can only hope to escape reproach" (Samuel Johnson).

... The American Heritage

[해외석학칼럼] 영국의 민영화

상기 자료출처(URL 포함)의 원작자나 발행인 혹은 제3의 권리자께서 본 게시물이 저작권 관련 피해 소지가 있음을 전자우편(우측 상단의 전자우편(Email me) 링크 참조)이나 덧글(하단 "Post a comment" 클릭)로 알려주시면 즉시 삭제할 것임을 밝힌다.

지은이: 마틴 스미스, 쉐필드대 교수

민영화는 마가렛 대처 정부(1979~90)의 유산 가운데 가장 오래 지속되고 있는 정책 중의 하나이다. 대처의 보수당 정부 주도로 이뤄진 민영화의 영향으로 영국 내 거의 모든 정부 소유 기업이 민간의 손에 넘어갔으며 민영화 개념은 전 세계로 확산되고 있다. 주목할 만한 점은 민영화는 시장경제의 꽃임에도 불구하고 좌·우익 할 것 없이 거의 모든 정부가 민영화 전략을 따르고 있다는 것이다.


기업의 국유화 또는 공유화는 전후 영국정부의 경제정책에 있어서 중요한 현상이었다. 노동당은 특히 국유화를 정부의 경제통제 강화, 산업의 근대화, 사회정의 구현을 위한 기제로 보았다. 초창기의 국유화는 석탄ㆍ철도ㆍ철강ㆍ석유 및 천연가스ㆍ상수도와 통신 시설 일부 등과 같은 주요 기간산업에만 국한되었다. 그러나 시간이 지날수록 기업 재정이 어렵다는 이유로 도로운임ㆍ자동차부품 제조ㆍ기타 분야 등 다양한 산업을 국유화의 대상에 포함시켰다. 이에 따라 국유화는 경제 계획 전략으로서가 아니라 점점 파산 위기에 몰린 산업을 구제하는 정책으로 변모하였다. 결과적으로 국유화된 산업의 경제적 성과는 하락세였다. 다시 말하면, 거대 독점기업이 정부 보조금을 받고 파산직전에서 구제받는 일이 비일비재하여 국유기업의 생산성은 아주 낮았고 고객서비스의 수준은 대개 형편없었다. 1970년대 영국이 광범위한 경제위기에 직면하게 된 것은 부분적으로 국유기업 관리가 제대로 이뤄지지 않은 결과이기도 하였다. 국유화는 변화하는 경제 시장에의 대응을 어렵게 만들었고, 노동비용과 파업일수의 급격한 증가 등을 초래하여 노사관계를 경색시켰다. 국유산업을 경제적 근대화의 지렛대로 사용하고자 했던 노동당의 비전은 실패한 것으로 평가되었다.

보수당 정부와 민영화

대처/메이저 행정부에서 관직에 몸담았던 대다수 보수주의자에게 민영화는 보수당 정부 18년간 실행했던 정책 가운데 가장 성공적인 정책이었다. 민영화의 물결은 이전 정권인 노동당 정부로 거슬러 올라간다. 1976년 IMF 구조조정의 일환으로 정부는 주요 재원이었던 국유기업인 영국석유회사(BP)의 주식을 강제로 내다 팔았다. 보수당 정부가 기꺼이 민영화를 지원한 이유는 국유화가 국가 경제경영에 효율적인 시스템이 아니라는 다수의 생각과 맞아떨어졌고 자유시장을 만들고자 하는 열망 때문이었다. 마가렛 대처(Margaret Thatcher) 전 총리가 볼 때 국가가 기업을 위해 할 일은 없었다. 대처리즘의 뚜렷한 특징 가운에 하나가 민영화이긴 하지만 발전양상은 비교적 임시방편적이었고 그 목표는 처음부터 제한적이었다. 대처 전 총리는 “1979년 성명서의 주제에 매우 신중을 기했다”고 썼다(1993: 677). 정부는 재원을 마련하기 위한 방편으로 BP주식을 추가 매도했고 정부는 소주주가 되었다. 유사한 전략으로 영국항공과 통신회사(C&W)를 매각했고 연이어 국가화물운송공사를 회사 경영진과 직원에게 매각했다(Management Buy-Out, 경영자 매수).
이후 정부가 직면한 문제는 팔고 남은 기업은 대형 독점기업이어서 주요 기관투자자가 대형 기업의 매입을 감당할 능력이 있는 지가 불확실했다. 따라서 정부는 기업을 일반인에게 매각하기로 결정했는데, 이는 민주주의의 이상과도 일치했다. [일반공개: public offering의 직역일 것이다. 공모발행으로 이해하면 되겠다. 이 독자] 광고 이후 240만 명이나 구매 신청을 하여서 구입수량에 제한을 두어야 할 정도였다. 그 다음 대규모 민영화 사례는 영국가스(BG)로 600만 명이 청약했다. 1992년까지 보수당 정부는 거의 대부분의 국영기업과 시설을 매각했다 ([표1] 참조). 유일하게 남은 영국석탄공사(BCC), 영국철도(BR), 우체국 가운데 석탄과 영국철도는 메이저 정부에서 민영화되었다.

민영화로 정부는 수많은 잠재적인 혜택을 얻었다.
- 정부는 공공지출과 세금 감면을 위해 사용 가능한 상당한 규모의 재원 마련
- 공공시설에 민간 투자 촉진
- 일반인 주주의 수가 크게 증가하고 (비록 대다수 주주가 자신의 주식을 팔아 지금은 기관 투자자의 손에 있기는 하지만) 민간 부문과 시장에도 연결
- 노조의 영향력 감소, 특히 독점 기업에서 두드러짐
- 수질문제에서부터 철도 운영에 이르기까지 광범위한 공공문제로부터 정부의 책임 경감(탈정치화 과정의 일부)

민영화로 인한 가장 큰 변화는 경제 거버넌스와 공공재 공급방식의 변화였다. 민영화는 원칙적으로 경제에 정부의 참여를 없애는 과정의 일부이며, 상수도• 가스•전력과 같은 공공서비스 제공에 가장 효과적인 도구가 시장이라고 정부는 주장한다. 일부 기업에서 정부는 적어도 일정 기간 동안 황금주를 보유하고 있었다. 이는 정부가 원한다면 상당한 영향력을 가질 수 있다는 뜻이다.

그러나 보다 중요한 것은 민영화 과정 그 자체만으로 경쟁이 유발되지 않는다는 것이다. 민영화된 기업은 주주에게 배당금을 지불하지만 적어도 민영화 초기에 이들은 독점기업에서 민영화되었다. 그래서 정부는 두 가지 전략을 세웠다.
  • 첫째는 규제를 통한 전략이다, 정부는 수질 규제를 위해 OFWAT를, 정보통신 규제를 위해 OFTEL을, 전력 규제를 위해 OFGEN등 감독기관을 설립했다.
  • 규제담당관은 기본적으로 RPI-x 수식(상수도의 경우 실제 사용하는 RPO+K수식을 사용하여 효율성 배당 및 필요한 경우 추가 예산 투자를 고려한다(Saal and Parker 2001))을 사용하여 가격을 결정하며 민간기업은 인플레이션(RPI) 수준을 결정하고 예상 원가절감액을 차감한 후 요금을 부과한다. 따라서 물가가 5% 인상되고 규제담당관이 효율성 3% 증가로 예상할 경우 5-3=2, 즉 규제감독관이 적용할 수 있는 가격 인상률은 2%이다.
  • 문제는 케이(J, Kay) 교수가 지적하듯이, x값을 결정하는 과정은 규제감독관과 민간기업의 협의 가운데 하나이며 본래 x값은 협상을 통해 정해졌다. 그렇다면 기업, 특히 정보통신 기업은 예상보다 높은 생산성을 달성함으로써 실질적으로 상당한 이득을 올릴 수도 있었을 것이다.
  • 그러나 상수도의 경우 민영화 이후 규제가 너무 느슨해져 결과적으로 효율성으로 인한 이득은 크게 얻지 못했다고 잘(Saal) 교수와 파커(Parker) 교수는 설명한다.
이 때문에 민영화에 공공 부문에서 민간부문으로의 이동에서 경쟁 유발이라는 두 번째 조치가 도입된다. 정부는 이전 독점기업에 경쟁체제를 도입하려 했다. 가스•전력•수도와 같은 시설의 경우 국영기업을 여러 기업으로 나누어 소비자들이 공급업체를 선택하도록 하는 것을 말한다. 물론 전력과 가스의 경우는 가능하지만 상수도의 경우는 그렇지 못하다. 현재 가스와 전력공급업체간에 가격 경쟁은 어느 정도 존재한다. 다른 업체를 선택하면 비용이 들지만 점점 더 많은 소비자가 공급업체를 바꾸고 있다. 현재 영국 내 전력•가스 공급업체는 20여 개가 있는데 전체 소비자의 1/3에서 절반 정도가 공급업체를 바꾼 것으로 추정된다. 이 점이 가격하락을 유도했다고 보여진다.

민영화의 문제점

민영화가 경쟁 촉진, 효율성 증대, 가격 하락을 가져온다는 것은 의심할 여지가 없다. 그렇다고 해서 민영화의 과정에 문제가 없다는 것은 아니다. 핵심은 대다수 민영화된 기업이 공공 시설이며 따라서 서비스 제공에 문제가 발생하면 곧바로 정치 문제화된다. 서비스 제공에서 발생한 문제로 정부는 지속적으로 문제 해결에 깊이 관여해 왔기 때문에 민영화의 목표 중 하나는 정부가 기업과 서비스 제공에 따르는 문제에서 벗어나는 것이었다. 가장 비근한 예가 영국철도(BR)이다. 설립 이후 오랜 동안 국유기업이어서 투자도 조직축소도 없었다. 상황은 더욱 악화됐고 철도 문제는 점차 정치쟁점화 되어갔다. 민영화로 인해 가격은 상승하고 서비스 질은 저하된다고 비춰졌는지 일부 노선의 철도 승객은 요금을 내지 않는 방법으로 정치적 시위를 하기도 하고, 공적 자금은 지속적으로 증가했다.
영국철도(BG)가 안고 있는 문제는 복합적이다. 전체 과정의 이면을 볼 때 수년간 투자가 없었다는 말은 요금 인상과 공적 자금 없이 철도 인프라를 개선한다는 것은 불가능하다는 뜻이다. 더욱이 민영화의 과정은 무척 복합적이다. 민영화 초기단계에서 경쟁을 촉진시키기 위해서 규제기관 2개를 신설하고 노선 담당업체인 레일트랙(Railtrack)과 철도와 서비스를 제공하는 철도운영회사(TOCs)로 분리했다. TOC는 특정 노선에 서비스를 제공할 프랜차이즈를 모집할 수 있었고 레일트랙의 부채에 대한 정부 보증뿐만 아니라 운영자에 대한 이윤도 보장했다. 서비스 체계가 분산되어 열차시간표와 가격구조가 단일했던 이전만도 못하게 됐지만 그럼에도 불구하고 공적 자금은 계속 투입됐고, 원가절감과 맞물려 서비스 수준은 낮아졌다.
  • 문제가 더 심각해진 이유는 레일트랙이 직접적인 운영 책임을 지는 것이 아니라 수많은 계약업체가 이를 담당하고 있었다. 연이어 대규모 열차 사건이 터진 후에 노선관리가 효과적으로 이루어지지 않았다는 사실이 명백하게 밝혀지고 새로운 전략적 감독기관을 만든 노동당 정부는 레일트랙을 다시 국유화했다(Martin 2002).
  • 그럼에도 불구하고 서비스에 대한 불만은 계속되었고 요금 인상률은 인플레이션 보다 훨씬 높게 유지됐다.
영국철도(BR)은 아마 최악의 민영화 사례일 것이다. 그러나 케이 교수는 민영화된 기업 전체를 보아도 민간 부문보다 특별히 잘하지 못하고 있다고 지적했다(Kay 2002). 영국통신, 영국항공, 영국철강(현 코러스)과 같은 업체는 다른 민간 기업에 비해 성과가 낮으며 일부는 적자를 기록하고 있다. 케이 교수는 또한 주주인 고객은 민영화된 기업이 나아졌다고 보지만 그렇게 좋아졌다고는 보지 않으며 장기적 관점에서 소유 주식을 늘려나간 경우는 거의 없다고 지적한다.

민영화의 최근 현황

역사적으로 노동당은 국유화를 지지해 왔음에도 불구하고 [신보수당 정부]는 정강을 포기하고 민영화를 지지했다. 노동당은 항공교통관제를 황금주만 남기고 부분적으로 민영화했으며 영국국가보건서비스(NHS)의 공급업체인 NHS로직스도 민영화했다. 보다 흥미로운 점은, 정부의 주요 정책에 공공-민간 파트너십을 도입하여 민간 파이낸싱을 통해 공공부문 자금을 조달한다는 것이다([표1]참조)

[표1] 영국 내 주요 민영화 기업
Company Date of Privatisation
British Petroleum 1979
British Aerospace 1981
Cable and Wireless 1981
National Freight Corporation 1982
Britoil 1982
Amersham International 1982
Association of British Ports 1983
British Telecom 1983
Cable and Wireless 1983
Enterprise Oil 1984
Jaguar 1984
British Gas 1986
Rolls Royce 1987
British Airways 1987
British Airports Authority 1987
British Steel 1988
British Petroleum (second tranche) 1987
PowerGen 1988
National Power 1995
British Coal 1996
British Nuclear Power 1996
British Rail 1996
새 병원과 학교 대다수가 민간 자본을 사용하여 건설된다. 민간 부문은 학교를 소유하고 학교는 민간 부문으로부터 공적 권한을 임차한다.

여기서 가장 모범 사례로 꼽히는 사례는 아마도 런던 지하철 현대화를 위해 공공-민간 파트너십을 사용한 것일 것이다. 메트로넷은 주식을 받고 향후 30년간 지하철의 2/3를 업그레이드하고 유지관리하는 계약을 체결했다. 그러나 계약 당사자는 20억 파운드의 빚은 지고 도산했다. 따라서 정부는 공적자금을 투입하고 지하철에 대한 책임을 떠안게 되었다. 모순점은 이런 과정을 통해 실질적으로 정부는 기업을 다시 국유화하고 있다는 점인데, 미국 서브프라임 시장에 빌려준 대출금으로 실질적으로 도산한 모기지 업체, 노던록 은행의 국유화가 바로 그것이다.

민영화가 성공한 듯 보이지만 많은 질문을 던지고 있고, 민영화의 주창자가 말했던 것만큼의 성공은 아닌 듯 하다. 정부통제를 하나의 툴로 사용했던 것처럼, 정부가 경제의 핵심이라고 할 수 있는 민영화를 어느 정도의 통제와 국유화 없이 진행하는 것은 힘든 일이다.

Kay, J. (2002) ‘Twenty Years of Privatisation’, Prospect, 1 June 2002.
Martin B. (2002) ‘British Rail Privatisation: What went wrong?’,
Parker, D. and Saal, D. (2001) ‘The Impact of Privatisation and Regulation on the Water and Sewerage Industry in England and Wales’, Aston Business School Research Paper, 103.
Thatcher M. (1993) The Downing Street Years, London: Harper Collins.

U.S. Treasury bond scandal in 1991

자료 1: Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salomon_Brothers#Treasury_Bond_scandal

Treasury Bond scandal

In 1991, Salomon trader Paul Mozer was caught submitting false bids to the U.S. Treasury by Deputy Assistant Secretary Mike Basham, in an attempt to purchase more Treasury bonds than permitted by one buyer between December 1990 and May 1991. Salomon was fined $290 million, the largest fine ever levied on an investment bank at the time, weakening it and eventually leading to its acquisition by Travelers Group. CEO Gutfreund left the company in August 1991; a U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission(SEC) settlement resulted in a fine of $100,000 and his being barred from serving as a chief executive of a brokerage firm.[3] The scandal is covered extensively in the 1993 book Nightmare on Wall Street.
After the acquisition, the parent company (Travelers Group, and later Citigroup) proved culturally averse to the volatile profits and losses caused by proprietary trading, instead preferring slower and more steady growth. Salomon suffered a $100 million loss when it incorrectly bet that MCI Communications would merge with Sprint instead of Worldcom. Subsequently, most of its proprietary trading business was disbanded.
For some time after the mergers the combined investment banking operations were known as "Salomon Smith Barney", but reorganization has renamed this entity as "Citigroup Global Markets Inc." The Salomon Brothers name, like the Smith Barney name, is now a division and service mark of Citigroup Global Markets.

[edit]Liar's Poker

Salomon Brothers' success and then decline in the 1980s is documented in Michael Lewis' 1989 book, Liar's Poker. Lewis went through Salomon's training program and then became a bond salesman at Salomon Brothers in London. In the work, Lewis portrays the 1980s as an era where government deregulation allowed unscrupulous people on Wall Street to take advantage of others' ignorance, and thus grow extremely wealthy.
He traces the rise of Salomon Brothers through mortgage trading, when deregulation by the U.S. Congress suddenly allowed Savings and Loans managers to start selling mortgages as bonds. Lewis Ranieri, a Salomon Brothers' employee, had created the only viable mortgage trading section, so when the law passed, it became a windfall for the firm. However, Lewis believed that Salomon Brothers became too complacent in their new-found wealth and took to unwise expansion and massive displays of conspicuous consumption. When the rest of Wall Street wised up to the market, the firm lost its advantage.
Likewise, Lewis argued that Salomon Brothers improperly tried to "professionalize" itself. As he notes, Ranieri and his fellow traders lacked college degrees; one of the traders only had an eighth-grade education. Despite this lack of credentials, the group was extremely successful financially. However, the firm, in order to improve its "image," began to hire graduates of prestigious business and economics programs (a group which included Lewis himself). Because of his uncouth manners, Ranieri (along with many of his Italian colleagues) was eventually fired. By relying more on diplomas than on raw trading skill, Lewis argued that Salomon crumbled.
After mortgage bonds, Lewis examined junk bonds and how Michael Milken built junk bonds from nothing to a multi-trillion-dollar market. Because the demand for junk bonds was higher than its supply, Lewis argues that corporate raiders began to attack otherwise sound companies in order to create more junk bonds.
Lewis remarked in his conclusion that the 1980s marked a time where anyone could make millions, provided they were at the right place at the right time, as exemplified by Ranieri's success. (생략/ abbr.)

자료 2: New York Times: December 3, 1992


Published: Thursday, December 3, 1992

Correction Appended

After more than a year of investigation, the Government yesterday brought its first legal action against former Salomon Brothers executives involved in the firm's illegal bidding in Treasury auctions, charging a series of securities law violations that included insider trading.

The civil suit, brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission, accused two former managing directors, Paul W. Mozer and Thomas F. Murphy, of systematically submitting billions of dollars in phony bids in Treasury auctions held to finance the public debt.

Both men were accused of securities fraud for submitting the false bids and with creating false books and records at Salomon during Treasury auctions from August 1989 to May 1991. Mr. Mozer, the former head of the Government trading desk at Salomon, was also accused of insider trading and engaging in illegal trades to win Salomon phony tax losses. No Officials Named

The suit, which is being contested by both men, does not name any higher-ranking executives at the firm. John H. Gutfreund, the former chairman and chief executive, and other executives are being investigated by the S.E.C. for failing to supervise their employees. A complaint or a settlement is expected soon.

The scandal involved billions of dollars of illegal bids in the multitrillion-dollar Treasury market. By making such bids, Salomon was able to exert unusual control over the marketplace, even though the profits from those activities were comparatively negligible.

The firm said last year that its profits from the illegal bids were $3.3 million to $4.6 million, less than many of what the firm's traders earned in a single year.

Stanley Arkin, a lawyer for Mr. Mozer, said his client planned to fight the charges vigorously and asserted that the commission had taken the complaint too far.

"Their allegations are overreaching and reflective of the piling on that has characterized this investigation vis-a-vis Mr. Mozer since its inception," he said. "My view is that many of the charges have no substantiation."

Charles Carberry, a lawyer for Mr. Murphy, who was Mr. Mozer's top aide on the government trading desk, did not return a telephone call seeking comment. A spokesman for Salomon said the firm had no comment.

In its suit, the Government is seeking unspecified fines and injunctions that would prohibit the two men from committing further securities law violations. The Government is also seeking the return of about $1.7 million that it contends Mr. Mozer made in profits on the inside trading, as well as other fines. Possible Criminal Indictments

Both former Salomon executives face possible criminal indictments in the case. Mr. Mozer has offered information to the Government, including information that helped lead to the S.E.C.'s charge against him about tax trades, in an effort to avoid indictment and settle the charges. Mr. Arkin declined to comment on the criminal case.

The Treasury market scandal emerged in August 1991, after Salomon Brothers first announced that it was dismissing Mr. Mozer and Mr. Murphy for submitting false bids and bids in the names of customers without authorization in order to buy more than the 35 percent of the securities offered that the firm was allowed to buy.

The admission led Government officials to worry openly that questionable trading practices could discourage investors from participating in the Treasury market, where securities are sold by the Government in part to finance the budget deficit. With fewer investors, the costs of Government borrowing could go up, but those fears have proved unwarranted.

The scandal widened within days of the firm's announcement, when Salomon made a subsequent admission that three senior executives, including Mr. Gutfreund; Thomas W. Strauss, the firm's president, and John W. Meriwether, a vice chairman, had all been informed of one of the illegal bids but had failed to inform the Government. Led to Resignations

That led to the resignation of the top officers, and the replacement of Mr. Gutfreund by Warren E. Buffett, the Omaha investor who is Salomon's largest shareholder. Since then, Salomon succeeded in settling all charges against it stemming from the scandal by agreeing to pay $290 million in fines and penalties. Mr. Buffett has since turned the reins of the trading house over to Deryck C. Maughan, a longtime Salomon employee, who has worked to rebuild the firm's strength in trading.

After an initial rush at reforming the lightly regulated Treasuries market, Congress failed to adopt changes last year.

While yesterday's charges did not involve new disclosures, some members of Congress said the S.E.C. complaint might nudge Congress to pass legislation next year. The action "once again underscores the need for Congress to pass broad legislation that directly attacks the weakest areas of regulatory oversight," said Representative Edward M. Markey, Democrat of Massachusetts.

The commission is also continuing to investigate a number of others outside of Salomon, including some clients of the firm, regarding their actions in the Treasury market auctions. William R. McLucas, the head of enforcement for the S.E.C., said yesterday that "the investigation is continuing in a whole lot of different directions."

The insider trading charge against Mr. Mozer stemmed from his sale on Aug. 6, 1991, of 46,000 shares of Salomon stock, at prices ranging from $35.75 to $36.125 a share, realizing a total of more than $1.6 million. The first disclosure of Salomon's actions came on Aug. 9, and within two weeks the share price had fallen to $23.75, amid speculation that the scandal might destroy the firm. It has since recovered, and yesterday closed at $37.50, down 12.5 cents.

The S.E.C. said Mr. Mozer knew of the internal investigation into the Treasury bond bidding practices and was thus in possession of "material nonpublic information" that made it illegal for him to trade.

The Government did not specify how much Mr. Mozer saved by selling when he did, but it asked the court to force him to return that money and pay a penalty in addition. Such a penalty would normally be equal to the amount saved as a result of the trade.

After the scandal erupted, Salomon officials noted the trade and froze Mr. Mozer's account. As a result, he has never received the money from the trade.

The charges against Mr. Mozer relating to the tax violation referred to events in 1986 and are related to the Treasury bond scandal only because they came out in the subsequent investigation. Salomon admitted the tax violations in its own settlement.

The charges said that Salomon, as 1986 neared an end, had unrealized losses of $168 million stemming from having sold Treasury securities short. An unrealized loss is a loss on paper and not in actual cash. In this case, the loss was not realized because the short position had not been closed.

Salomon could have realized those losses -- and obtained a tax deduction legally -- by repurchasing the securities and closing out the position.

Instead, the S.E.C. said, Mr. Mozer engaged in pre-arranged trades with other firms to make it appear Salomon had closed the position and then re-established it by shorting the same securities.

Photo: Paul W. Mozer, a former executive at Salomon Brothers, was accused yesterday of securities fraud and insider trading by the Securities and Exchange Commission. (The New York Times) (pg. D2)
Correction: December 4, 1992, Friday A front-page headline in some copies yesterday about the Government's suit against two former executives at Salomon Brothers referred erroneously to the history of the case. The suit filed Wednesday by the Securities and Exchange Commission was the first against individuals involved in the improper bidding for Treasury securities. The Government has already settled its complaints against the firm itself.