2012년 10월 20일 토요일

Dic: be that as it may

  • ‘Is he still just as fat?’--‘I wouldn't know,’ continued her mother, ignoring the interruption,  ‘and be that as it may, he has made a fortune.’ 
  • Be that as it may, I still think he should come. 
  • Building a new children's home will cost a lot of money but, be that as it may, there is an urgent need for the facility.
  • ‘He was only joking.’ ‘Be that as it may, silly remarks like that can do a lot of harm.’
  • I know that he tries hard; be that as it may, his work just isn't good enough.

* * *

How can its usage de defined:

COBUILD▶ You say `Be that as it may' when you want to move onto another subject or go further with the discussion, without deciding whether what has just been said is right or wrong.

COLLINS▶ in spite of that: a sentence connector conceding the possible truth of a previous statement and introducing an adversative clause

CALD▶ (SLIGHTLY FORMAL) used to mean that you accept that a piece of information is true but it does not change your opinion of the subject you are discussing.

LDOCE▶ formal. used to say that even though you accept that something is true, it does not change a situation

OALD▶ despite that (synonym nevertheless)

CF. conceding a point and making a counterargument (OALD)

Dic: bank rate (or discount rate)

Bank rate, also referred to as the discount rate, is the rate of interest which a central bank charges on the loans and advances to a commercial bank.  (... ...)

bank rate: Interest rate at which a central bank will advance short term loans to commercial banks. Changes in bank rate are reflected in the prime lending rates offered by commercial banks (to their best customers), which in turn affect investments such as bank deposits, bond issues, mortgages. This term has largely been replaced by newer terms base-rate andprime rate.

Read more: http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/bank-rate.html#ixzz29p7oZ7V7

bank rate: The rate of discount established by a country's central bank. (... The American Heritage )

discount rate or bank rate: Interest rate charged by a central bank for loans of reserve funds to commercial banks and other financial intermediaries. The discount rate is one important indicator of the condition of monetary policy in an economy. Because raising or lowering the discount rate alters the rates that commercial banks charge on loans, adjustment of the discount rate is used as a tool to combat recession andinflation.

For more information on discount rate, visit Britannica.com. Britannica Concise Encyclopedia. Copyright © 1994-2008 Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.

2012년 10월 19일 금요일

Dic: not nearly (nowhere near; not at all; much less than..)

▶ not nearly : nowhere near; not at all  .... COLLINS

▶ 3 [PHRASE] PHR adj/adv, PHR n △You use not nearly to emphasize that something is not the case. (= nowhere near)

  • Father's flat in Paris wasn't nearly as grand as this... 
  • Minerals in general are not nearly so well absorbed as other nutrients...
  • British car workers did not earn nearly enough money to buy the products they were turning out.
▶ not nearly: much less than; not at all
  • It's not nearly as hot as last year.
  • There isn't nearly enough time to get there now.
..... OALD
▶ not nearly: not at all
  • He's not nearly as good-looking as his brother. 
  • We've saved some money, but it's not nearly enough .
..... LDOCE

CF. almost, nearly

2012년 10월 16일 화요일

Dic: [set] be set in your ways

▶ If you say that someone is set in their ways, you are being critical of the fact that they have fixed habits and ideas which they will not easily change, even though they may be old-fashioned.

▶ be set in your ways: to have habits or opinions that you have had for a long time and that you do not want to change

▶ set: (usually postpositive) rigid or inflexible

▶ [OPINIONS/HABITS ETC] not likely to change

▶ (4) not willing to change your opinion or way of doing things. (4a) used about people's ideas or behavior:

  • People had very set ideas about how to bring up children.
  • Mark was 65 and rather set in his ways (=habits) .
  • be set in your ways: He's old and stubborn and set in his ways.
  • She has very set ideas about how to raise children.

Dic: fight your corner, argue your corner

▶ BrE. to try very hard to defend yourself in a discussion or argument, or to do this for someone else
▶ (British) to defend something that you believe in by arguing

  • You'll have to be ready to fight your corner if you want them to extend the project.
  • My line manager supports me, and says she's willing to fight my corner.
.... ... LDOCE, Cambridge Idioms

▶ argue your corner
  • Working out what you're worth before you attend your appraisal will arm you with the information you'll need to argue your corner and get the wage settlement you deserve. (... http://work.chron.com/discuss-salary-performance-appraisals-2240.html
  • But in retrospect, it was a clarifying moment, it made me understand that it was a mistake to go down that road of appeasement. It made me clearer — no more apologies, no more excuses, no more appeasements, no more compromises. I am just going to say my piece, argue my corner, and try and stand up for what I believe in. And if people don’t like it, tough. (... ‘There is no right not to be offended’  ) 
  • This has been the case for all of my working life time, so the idea that we need to argue our corner is not new. What is new is that funding agencies now demand evidence of impact, a demand that can only grow as pressure on resources intensifies. (... http://www.aontas.com/blog/2011/11/15/making-a-case-for-community-education/

2012년 10월 15일 월요일

Dic: 껄끄럽다, 껄껄하다


1. (꺼칠한 것이 살갗에 닿는 느낌이) 거칠고 부드럽지 못하다.

  • 작자가 뒤집어쓰고 있는 우의의 껄끄러운 감촉이 몸 속까지 전해오는 듯했다.
  • 나는 털옷은 껄끄러워서 잘 안 입는다.
2. 미끄럽지 못하고 껄껄하다.
  • 혀끝에 바늘이 돋은 듯 껄끄러웠다.
  • 흙 부스러기가 눈썹 위에 껄끄럽게 묻어났다.

[Ⅱ] 마음에 썩 내키지 않고 불편하다. 마음에 걸려 불편하다.
  • 눈치를 보게 되고 종업원 얼굴 보기도 왠지 껄끄러운 것이다.
  • 자네가 데리고 있는 것이 껄끄럽다면 내 아들 성환이와 같이 있게 해 주게

CF. 껄껄하다【형용사】

[Ⅰ] (살갗에 닿는 느낌이) 부드럽거나 매끈하지 못하다.
  • 앞다리에는 껄껄한 가시 다섯 개가 밖으로 나와 있었다.
  • 삼베는 감촉이 껄껄해서 여름 옷을 해 입으면 아주 시원하다.
[Ⅱ] 물기가 없이 메말라 닿는 느낌이 부드럽지 못하다.
  • 어느 가을날, 하루는 나의 오른쪽 눈이 이상하게 뻣뻣하고 껄껄한 느낌이 들었다.
  • 한동안 술을 입에 대지 않았더니만 당최 목이 껄껄하다.
  • 목이 껄껄한 것이 물 생각이 간절하다.
..... 연세한국어사전

CF. 꺼끌꺼끌 [부사] 표면이 매우 거칠고 껄끄러운 모양. (CF. 까끌까끌)
.... 표준국어대사전(국립국어원)

2012년 10월 14일 일요일

Dic: 매무새

■ 매무새【명사】옷이나 머리 따위를 가꾼 모양.

  • 나는 옷의 먼지를 털고 옷 매무새를 고쳤다.
  • 그는 헝클어진 머리카락에 수염마저 송송 나 있는 데다가 옷매무새가 말이 아니었다.

CF. 사리다 (2) 몸의 일부분이나 옷 매무새 따위를 가다듬다.
  • 아내는 설레이는 기색을 감추며 가만히 무릎을 사려 앉았다.
  • 입꼬리를 사리며 도문 스님이 다시 말했다.

..... 연세한국어사전

■ 매무새: [명사] 옷, 머리 따위를 수습하여 입거나 손질한 모양새.
  • 양반 매무새
  • 매무새가 흐트러지다
  • 몸 매무새가 단정하다
※ ‘매무새’와 ‘옷매무새’가 모두 널리 쓰이므로 둘 다 표준어로 삼는다.

..... 표준국어대사전(국립국어원)

2012년 10월 10일 수요일

서평: 『화폐와 신용의 이론』

자료: www.cfe.org의 어느 URL 

(... ...) 이 책에 담긴 미제스의 독창적 기여는 두 가지로 요약될 수 있다. 그 첫째는
미시적 기초(micro-foundation)위에 세운 화폐이론을 선 보였다는 것이다. 이
것이 경제학 발전에 어떤 의미를 갖는 공헌인지는 1970년대 이래 지금까지도
계속되고 있는 주류 경제학에서의 거시경제학의 미시기초를 찾으려는 노력을
보면 짐작이 갈 것이다. 두 번째는 빅셀(Knut Wicksell)의 이자율이론과 영국
통화학파 이론에 오스트리아학파의 자본이론을 접목시킨, 즉 자본재 시장과
소비재 시장 간의 자원배분의 왜곡이라는 불황채널을 포함하는 새로운 오스
트리안 경기순환이론을 제시했다는 것이다.

(... ...) 고전파, 신고전파 경제학에서 공히 화폐는 실물경제의 분석과는 별도로 취급
되어 왔다. 한계효용이나 가격이론의 틀이 아니라 피셔(Fisher)의 교환방정식
이 통화이론의 기초가 되어왔다. 주류 경제학자들은 화폐와 금융의 문제를 통
화 공급, 화폐의 유통속도, 국민총생산, 가격수준 등 거시경제변수들로 얘기한
다. 그리고 달러, 유로, 파운드, 프랑 등 각국 통화는 정부가 자의적으로 정해
놓은 회계단위로 취급되고 있다. 화폐는 국가의 창조물이고, 그래서 거시경제
의 대상이다. 이 같은 주류경제학의 분석틀에서 소비자와 기업 같은 경제주체
들의 화폐에 대한 수요가 설 자리를 잃은 것이다. 미제스의 화폐이론의 미시
적 기초 세우기는 로빈스교수(Lionel Robbins)의 표현을 빌리자면 “가치의
순수이론의 일반적 범주들에 화폐이론을 통합시킨” 것이다. 쉽게 풀어서 말하
자면, 일반 재화의 수요와 시장가격을 설명하기 위해서 한계혁명의 주역들이
세워놓은 한계효용이론을 그대로 화폐에 대한 수요와 화폐의 가치를 설명하
는 데에 사용한 것이다.

미제스는 본격적으로 그의 이론을 제시하기 전에 먼저 화폐의 개념과 본질을
명확히 하는 것으로부터 시작한다. 그의 논의의 출발점은 화폐가 본래 상품화
폐였다는 사실이다. 그러니까 일반 상품들 중 특별한 기능, “교환의 공통매
개물로 작용함으로써 시장에서의 경제활동을 용이하게 만들어 주는”(46쪽)
기능을 가진 상품이라는 말이다. 그래서 화폐의 본질은 교환의 매개라는 기능
에서부터 오는 것이고, 화폐의 다른 기능들 - 가치저장, 지불수단 등 - 은 교
환의 매개 기능으로부터 도출되는 이차적 기능들이다.

이어서 주관적 사용가치는 어떤 종류의 측정도 허용하지 않기 때문에 화폐가
가치의 척도라는 생각이 오류임을 지적한다. “오늘날 모든 상품은 화폐로 표
시될 수 있는 하나의 가격을 가지고” 있기 때문에 “화폐는 가격지수가 된다.”
는 의미에서 가치척도라는 용어를 사용하는 것은 용어의 남용이라는 말이다.

화폐의 개념을 명확히 하기 위해 화폐와 화폐 대용물을 구분하고, 화폐는 상
품화폐, 법정화폐, 신용화폐로 분류한다. 역사적으로 화폐분야에 대한 국가 간
섭의 목표와 의도는 단지 개인들로 하여금 그들이 받는 금의 중량과 순도를
테스트하는 일이 필요 없도록 해 주는 데 있었다. 그리고 그 이상의 화폐시스
템에 대한 국가 영향력의 한계를 보여준다. 법의 권위, 그 상업적 지위, 무엇
보다도 화폐주조의 통제자이기 때문에 국가가 교환의 상업적 매개물 선택에
중요한 영향력을 행사해 왔던 것이 사실이다. 그러나 때로는 국민들이 국가가
선택한 화폐시스템이 아닌 다른 수단들을 선택한 역사의 사례들은 ‘화폐가 법
과 국가의 창조물이 아니고’(106쪽), “상업세계에서의 사용만이 어떤 상품을 교환의 공통된 매

개물로 만들 수 있음”(120쪽)을 보여준다.

(...) “화폐의 경제적 문제에서 핵심적 요소는 화폐의
객관적 교환가치, 소위 화폐의 구매력이다. … 다만 이것이 화폐이론에서 다
른 분야에서보다 주관적 가치가 덜 중요하다는 뜻으로 이해되지 말아야 한다.
개인의 주관적 추정치들은 여타 재화들의 가치평가에서와 마찬가지로 화폐의
경제적 가치평가의 기초이다” (...) 그리고는 화폐의 가치분석에 한
계효용이론을 적용한다. 그러나 우리는 그가 어떻게 한계효용이론 위에 화폐
이론을 세웠는가를 살펴보기 전에, 무엇이 한계주의 혁명을 이끈 신고전파 주
류 경제학자들이 일찍이 그 같은 이론을 만드는 것을 가로막았는지 그 이유
를 밝혀야 한다.

이는 후일 ‘오스트리아학파 순환논법(Austrian circle)'으로 불리게 된 문제
때문이었다. 헬페리히(Helfferich)는 “한계효용이론을 화폐의 문제에 적용하는
데 극복할 수 없는 장애물이 있다는 의견”을 제기했다(185쪽). 소비재의 가치
는 그 재화의 직접사용으로부터 나오고, 소비재들의 가치의 상대평가는 시장
가격의 결정과는 무관하게 가격결정이전에 이루어진다. 그러나 사람들은 화폐
를 직접 소비를 위해 수요 하는 것이 아니라, 미래에 직접 소비할 다른 재화
들과 언젠가 교환하기 위한 현금잔고를 유지하기 위해 수요 한다. 그리고 “화
폐는 주관적으로 그 것을 주고 획득할 수 있는 소비 가능한 재화들의 수량에
따라, 혹은 지불을 하기 위해 필요한 화폐를 획득하기 위해 주어져야 할 여타
경제재들의 수량에 따라 그 가치가 부여된다. 어떤 개인에게 화폐의 한계효용
… 은 어떤 화폐의 교환가치를 이미 전제하고 있다. 그래서 후자는 전자로부
터 도출될 수 없다.”(185-6쪽) 이 같은 순환논리의 함정이 한계주의 경제학
자들을 가로막았던 것이다.

이 문제에 대해 미제스가 내놓은 해결책이 회귀정리(regression theorem)이
다. 그도 “화폐의 주관적 가치평가가 이미 존재하는 객관적 교환가치를 전제
하고 있는 것은 사실”임을 인정하기 때문에 그가 해야 할일은 “전제되어야
할 그 가치는 설명되어야 할 가치와 동일하지 않다”는 것을 보여주는 것이다.
이 정리로 “전제되어야 할 것은 어제의 교환가치”이지 오늘의 교환가치가 아
니라는 것을 보여주고, 그는 당당히 “오늘의 교환가치의 설명에 어제의 교환
가치를 사용하는 것은 매우 적절하다”고 말한다(187쪽). 이제 그의 논리를 따
라가 보자. 오늘의 화폐 구매력은 오늘의 화폐공급과 오늘의 개인들의 화폐의
한계효용에 의해서 결정되는 화폐수요와의 상호작용으로 결정된다. 오늘 한
개인의 화폐에 대한 수요(혹은 현금 잔고)는 어제 화폐가 구매력을 가졌다는
사실에 기초한다. 그 사실로부터 그는 화폐가 오늘도 또 내일도 다른 재화와 서비스로 교환될 수

있으리라는 것을 알기 때문이다. 그러니까 오늘의 개인들
의 화폐의 한계효용은 화폐의 어제의 구매력에서 나온 것이라는 말이다. 그러
면 어제의 화폐의 구매력은 무엇이 결정했느냐? 물론 어제의 화폐공급과 어
제의 개인들의 화폐의 한계효용에 의해서 결정되는 화폐수요와의 상호작용으
로 결정된 것이다. 다시 한번 어제의 개인들의 화폐의 한계효용은 그 전날의
화폐구매력에서 나온 것이다. 그렇지만 이 회귀가 끝없이 이어진다면, 이는
순환논리의 해결책이 아닌 또 다른 함정일 뿐이겠지만, 끝이 있다.

“만약 이런 방식으로 우리가 계속 과거로 나아간다면, 우리는 마침내 화폐의 객관적
교환가치 속에서 교환의 공통된 매개물로서의 화폐의 기능에 근거한 가치평가로부터
발생하는 구성요소를 더 이상 발견할 수 없는 시점에 도달할 것임에 틀림없다. 그 시
점에서는 화폐의 가치는 화폐로서보다는 다른 어떤 용도로 유용한 어떤 대상의 가치
에 다름 아닐 것이다. 그러나 이 시점은 이론의 수단적 개념에 불과한 것이 아니라
간접교환이 시작될 순간에 실제로 등장했던 경제사의 한 현상이다.”(187-8쪽)

미제스가 마침내 이 회귀의 끝에 도착한 시점은 상품화폐, 예를 들어 금이 공
통의 교환의 매개물로 사용된 첫날이다. 그 날의 금에 대한 수요도 그 전날의
금의 구매력에 기초하는 것은 마찬가지이다. 그러나 그 전날의 금의 구매력은
더 이상 화폐로서의 기능을 평가한 부분이 들어있지 않은 오로지 상품으로서
의 금이 직접교환(barter)에서 갖은 구매력이다. 이 구매력의 결정에서 더 이
상 어제의 금의 구매력이 필요치 않다.

이제 미제스는 왜 화폐이론이 미시적 기초를 필요로 하는지를 화폐수량설에
대한 비판을 통해 보여준다. (...) “만약 우리가 화폐수량설에 대한 공정한 평가에
도달하고자 한다면, 우리는 현대적 가치이론의 조명 아래 그것을 고려해야 한
다. 현대 가치이론의 핵심은 화폐의 공급과 그에 대한 수요 양자 모두가 그
가치에 영향을 준다는 명제에 있다. 이 명제는 아마도 가격들에 있어서의 커
다란 변화들을 설명하는 충분히 훌륭한 가설이라고 할 수 있다.”(201쪽) 그래
서 그는 “화폐에 대한 수요와 그것의 화폐 스톡과의 관계가 화폐의 객관적
교환가치의 변동에 대한 설명의 출발점이다”라고 선언한다. 그런데 “만약 개
인의 관점이 아니라 공동체의 관점으로부터 화폐의 수요를 설명하려고 시도
하는 공식으로부터 출발한다면, 우리는 화폐의 스톡과 모든 경제활동의 기초
인 개인의 주관적 가치평가들의 관계를 발견하는데 실패할 것이다.”(208쪽)


2012년 10월 7일 일요일

Dic: make sth out to be the case, make out a case for sth

3. [PHRASAL VERB] V P that, V n P to-inf, V P △If you make out that something is the case or make something out to be the case, you try to cause people to believe that it is the case.

  • They were trying to make out that I'd actually done it...
  • I don't think it was as glorious as everybody made it out to be... 
  • He was never half as bad as his teachers made out.
4. [PHRASAL VERB] V P n (not pron) for/against n, also V n P △If you make out a case for something, you try to establish or prove that it is the best thing to do.
  • You could certainly make out a case for this point of view...

CF. make out: vb (adverb)
  1. (tr) to discern or perceive: can you make out that house in the distance? 
  2. (tr) to understand or comprehend: I can't make out this letter.
  3. (tr) to write out: he made out a cheque.
  4. (tr) to attempt to establish or prove: he made me out to be a liar.
  5. (intr) to pretend: he made out that he could cook.
  6. (intr) to manage or fare: how did you make out in the contest?
  7. (intr; often foll by with) informal. chiefly US and Canadian. to engage in necking or petting: Alan is making out with Jane.

2012년 10월 5일 금요일

[읽기목록] Bradford DeLong's list of "THINGS TO READ BY KEYNES" (2008)

출처: http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2008/12/things-to-read.html

Following is an excerpt from a post of Professor J. Bradford DeLong's blog:

* * *
Tyler Cowen writes:
Marginal Revolution: New MR book club - Keynes's General Theory: I will go through the book [Keynes's General Theory], chapter by chapter, with an eye toward a deeper understanding of what Keynes wrote and why it is, as Greg says, so important. I'm not yet sure what kind of pace I can maintain but order your copy here, now. The Kindle version is only $3.96. We'll do chapters 1 and 2 by next Monday, eight days from now.
The Marxists.org version of the General Theory is free:

I am of a different view than Tyler. I think that the most important things by Keynes to read do not include the General Theory. My list of General Theory-length reading from Keynes is this:

 ▷ Keynes (1919), The Economic Consequences of the Peace
 ▷ Keynes (1924), A Tract on Monetary Reform No etext
 ▷ Keynes (1932), Essays in Persuasion No etext
  • Keynes (1919), "Inflation" 
  • Keynes (1923), "Social Consequences of Changes in the Value of Money" 
  • Keynes (1925), "The Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill" 
  • Keynes (1926), "The End of Laissez-Faire"  
  • Keynes (1930), "The Great Slump of 1930"  
  • Keynes (1931), "The Consequences to the Banks of the Collapse in Money Values"
 ▷ Keynes (1932), "The World Economic Outlook
 ▷ Keynes (1933), "An Open Letter to President Roosevelt
 ▷ Keynes (1938), "A Private Letter to President Roosevelt

and I am tremendously annoyed at the absence of etext versions of the Tract on Monetary Reform and Essays in Persuasion.

Special bonus:
Jacob Viner (1936), "Mr. Keynes on the Causes of Unemployment"

* * *

Many thanks to professor DeLong for his offering the reading list.
And I found some more etext sources of J. M. Keynes, including a link where a PDF of A Tract of Monetary Reform is provided, though this version is lacking pp. 156-157 in Chapter 4.  (May 19, 2013)

2012년 10월 4일 목요일

Dic: someone's fortunes

▷4. N-PLURAL : with poss If you talk about someone's fortunes or the fortunes of something, you are talking about the extent to which they are doing well or being successful
  • The electoral fortunes of the Liberal Democratic party may decline.
  • The company had to do something to reverse its sliding fortunes.
* * *

▷3. [countable, usually plural, uncountable] the good and bad things that happen to a person, family, country, etc. [OALD]
  • the changing fortunes of the movie industry
  • the fortunes of war
  • a reversal of fortune(s)
▷3.【WHAT HAPPENS TO YOU】 [C usually plural] the good or bad things that happen in life [LDOCE]
  • a downturn in the company's fortunes
  • This defeat marked a change in the team's fortunes.
  • The geographical position of the frontier fluctuated with the fortunes of war (=the things that can happen during a war) .
▷4. your overall circumstances or condition in life (including everything that happens to you); destiny, fate, luck, lot, circumstances, portion [WordNet]
  • whatever my fortune may be
  • deserved a better fate
  • has a happy lot
  • the luck of the Irish
  • a victim of circumstances
  • success that was her portion
▷2. fortunes. The turns of luck in the course of one's life. [The American Heritage]

▷3. fortunes [plural] the things that happen to someone or something and the changing degree to which they are successful [MacMillan English Dictionary-American]
  • a career that illustrates the changing fortunes of the Democratic Party
  • The new board will work to restore the company's fortunes.

2012년 10월 3일 수요일

Dic: portent

noun. (cf. portend: verb)

  1. a sign or indication of a future event, esp a momentous or calamitous one; omen
  2. momentous or ominous significance: ex) a cry of dire portent 
  3. a miraculous occurrence; marvel

  1. An indication of something important or calamitous about to occur; an omen.
  2. Prophetic or threatening significance: ex) signs full of portent.
  3. Something amazing or marvelous; a prodigy
.... COLLINS, The American Heritage


2012년 10월 2일 화요일

[자료] Capitalism and Social Progress: The Future of Society in a Global Economy

지은이: Phillip Brown, Hugh Lauder
출판: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001

Chapter 6. The End of Consensus

[발췌] Economic Philosophy (Joan Robinson)

자료: Joan Robinson, Economic Philosophy
출판: Transaction Publishers, 2006 (재판)



* * *

IV. Keynsian Revolution

Some of Keynes's contemporaries and seniors dislike the expression “the Keynesian Revolution”. There was nothing, they say, so vey new in the ^General Theory^[1] Of course everything can be found in Marshall, even the ^General Theory^. But we know what Marshall's pupils who had gone into the Treasury believed, from the famous White Paper of 1929[2] which was an example of neo-classical theory in action. In the General Election of that year Llyod George was fighting his campaign on a promise to abolish unemployment which had long been above 10 percent(it rose later 20 percent) by a programme of public works. The Treasury (very improperly from a constitutional point of view) was asked to show why this was impossible. Their argument is very simple. The total fund of saving is given, and if more is used for home investment, foreign lending, and consequently the export surplus, would be reduced correspondingly; there would be no advantage to the economy as a whole.[3]

Nowadays this seem merely laughable. It is not necessary now to repeat the familiar tale of the hard-fought victory of the theory of effective demand; we are concerned rather to see the relevance of the new line to the themes that we have been discussing.

First of all, Keynes brought back something of the hard-headedness of the Classic. He saw the capitalist system as a system, a going concern, a phase in historical development. Sometimes it filled him with rage an despair but on the whole he approved of it or at any rate he felt it worthwhile trying to patch it up and make it work tolerabley well. But like Adam Smith's, his defense was based on expediency --

For my part, I think that Capitalism wisely managed, can probably be made more efficient for attaining economic ends than any alternative system yet in sight, but that in itself it is in many ways extremely objectionable. Our problem is to work out a social organisation which shall be as efficient as possible without offending our notions of a satisfactory way of life.[1]

Secondly, Keynes brought back the moral problem that ^laissez-faire^ theory had abolished. It is true that in Cambridge we had never been taught that economics should be ^wertfrei^ or that the positive and the normative can be sharply divided. We knew that the search was for fruit as well as light. But the anodyne of ^laissez-faire^ had worked pretty thoroughly even in Cambridge. Marshall, certainly, was a great moralizer, but somehow the moral always came out that whatever is, is ^very nearly^ best. Pigou set out the argument of his ^Economics of Welfare^ in terms of exceptions to the rule that ^laissez faire^ ensures maximum satisfaction; he did not question the rule. Readjustments were needed here and there to make the distribution of resources between uses the most efficient possible. The inequality of the distribution of the product raised doubts, but they were easily deflected into Utopian daydreams. Even Keynes, as we have just seen, while he did not much like the profit motive, thought (in the Twenties) that it provided a better mechanism than any other “yet in sight” for operating the economic system, with the reservation that it did not necessarily make the best possible use of its resources.

In the Thirties a large part of its resources were not being used for anything at all; Keynes diagnosed the cause as a deep-seated defect in the mechanism, and thereny added an exception to the comfortable rule that every man in bettering himself was doing good to the commonwealth, so large as completely to disrupt the reconciliation of the pursuit of private profit with public beneficence.

The whole elaborate structure of the metaphysical justification for profit was blown up when he pointed out that capital yields a return not because it is ^productive^ but because it is ^scarce^.[1] Still worse, the notion that saving is a cause of unemployment cut the root of the justification for unequal income as a source of accumulation.

What made the ^General Theory^ so hard to accept was not its intellectual content, which in a calm mood can easily be mastered, but its shocking implications. Worse than private vices being public benefits, it seemed that the new doctrine was the still more disconcerting proposition that private virtues (of thriftiness and careful husbandry) were pubic vices.

We have seen our way through this now. When full employment is going to be maintained in any case, saving is certainly more desirable than spending from a public point of view. Saving is only bad when investment fails to make use of it. But at the time Keynes seemed to be upholding a "licentious system" that was even more objectionable than Mandeville's had been to Adam Smith. And, of cource, Keynes, like Mandeville, was a dreadful tease. He preferred not to coat his tart pills with any soothing sugar. The nastier, the more good they would do.

By making it impossible to believe any longer in an automatic reconciliation of conflicting interests into a harmonious whole, the ^General Theory^ brought out into the open the problem of choice and judgment that the neo-classicals had managed to smother. The ideology to end ideologies broke down. Economics once more became Political Economy.

Thirdly, Keynes brought back ^time^ into economic theory. He woke the Sleeping Princess from the long oblivion to which "equilibrium" and "perfect foresight" had condemned her and led her out into the world here and now.

This release took economics a great stride forward, away from theology towards science; now it si no longer necessary for hypotheses to be framed in such a form that we know in advance that they will be disproved. Hypotheses relating to a world where human beings actually live, where they cannot know the future or undo the past, have at least in principle the possibility of being set out in a testable form.


Keynes was very sceptical of econometrics(it is by no means certain that the work done in the last twenty years would have laid his doubts); but it was he who made the new statistical work possible. In ^How to Pay for the War^ he used first National Income tables set out in the modern manner by double entry, in a knock-up which Erwin Rothbarth made for him, and under his influence the method was officially accepted and is now unversally established.

The descent into time has brought economic theory also into touch with history. Keynes himself lacked the scruple of a scholar. He would pick up any example to illustrate a thesis, and if one betrayed him he could always find another. He made wild suggestions, such as that Shakepeare's genius could have flourished only in an age of inflation,[1] or that civilisation cannot be found except where there were earthquakes to lead from time to time to a reconstruction boom.[2] These light-hearted arguments were only superficial ornaments to point the paradoxes of analysis. (He planned to take up economic history seriously at the age of seventy, and we cannot know how he would have turned out at it.) Though Keynes himself was no historian, the ^General Theory^ has opened up a great field for an analytical survey of economic history. Formerly there was almost no link between history and theory except the now discredited interpretation of price movements in terms of supply of gold.

In history, we learned that the mainspring of development was technical inventions; in theory, most of the exercises were in terms of a "given state of knowledge." Inventions were a special, difficult question; even when it was tackled, the argument was conducted by comparing two propositions, with different states of knowledge, each already in equilibrium. (Schumpeter, who brought a bowdlerized edition of Marx into academic doctrine, made his system hinge on inventions, but he was some way from the centre of orthodoxy; it was only after Keynes had broken the bounds that he could find a place in it.) In history, we learned of the growth and decay of economic systems; in theory, there was one set of principles that governed life on Roninson Crusoe's island, and among the mystical peasants who bartered cloth for wine, as much as in the City of London or in Chicago.

In history, nations are of various shapes and sizes, with various geographical features and social traditions; in theory there were only A and B, each with an endowment of factors indentical in all respects except their relative quantities, trading in idential goods.

In history, every event has its consequences, and the question What would have happened if that event had not occurred? is only an idle speculation; in theory there is one position of equilibrium that a system will arrive at, no matter where it starts.

The ^General Theory^ broke through the unnatural barrier and brought history and theory together again. But for theorists the descent into time has bot been easy. After twenty years, the awakened Princess is still dazed and groggy.

Keynes himself was not quite steady on his foot. His remark about the timeless multiplier[1] is highly suspicious. And the hard core of analysis, round which his flashing controversy wheels, is based upon comparisons of static short-period equilibrium positions each with a given rate of investment going on, though it purports to trace the effect of a change in the rate of investment taking place at a moment of time.

Keynes was interested only in very short-period questions (he used to say: "The long period is a subject for undergraduates") and so for him the distinction between making comparisons of the structure of different positions and tracing the consequences of change was perhaps not so very important, though thre was a tremendous amount of bally-ragging between him and Sir Dennis Robertson over the point.[2] But when it comes to long-run questions the distinction is indispensible, and those who learned to float in the smooth waters of equilibrium find the requirements of historical analysis very uncomfortable. We are still slipping and floundering about like ducks who have alighted on a pond and found it frozen over.

We have broken out of static equilibrium at least in connexion with the accumulation of capital. We have learned to distinguish the desire to save from the inducement to invest and (... page 79-81 ... )

(...) that the phenomenon of monopoly profit is not important, in spite of the fact that on every particular day that the sun shines, a number of monopolies that have not yet broken down will be merrily making hey. "In the long run we are all dear," but not all of us at once.

Long-run equilibrium is a slippery eel. Marshall evidently intended to mean by the long period a horizon which is always at a certain distance in the future, and this is a useful metaphor; but he slips into discussing a position of equilibrium which is shifted by the very process of approaching it and he got himself into a thorough tangle by drawing three-dimensional positions on a plance diagram.[1]

No one would deny that to speak of a tendency towards equilibrium that itself shifts the position towards which it is tending is a contradiction in terms. And yet it is still persists. It is for this reason that we must attribute its survival to some kind of psychological appeal that transcends reason.

Marshall was very well aware of the difficulty of making generalizations intended to apply to actual life in terms of timeless concepts. Normal price is the "value which economic forces would bring about if the general conditions of life were stationary for a run of time long enough to enable them all to work out their full effect."[2]

Sir Dennis Robertson, thinking it mere perversity in a critic not to be satisfied with this, indignantly repeats it.[3] But how if the economic forces present in a particular situation are mutually contradictory? Say, part of the investment that is being carried out is the result of expectations of profit which another part is going to make unobtainable? What is the equilibrium that the working out of these forces would lead to if it had time enough to get there? And in any case do "stationary conditions" apply to a given population and stock of capital, or a given rate of growth or a given acceleration of growth?

Even if these conundrums could be answered and a definite meaning given to the pasage through time of the normal point towards which the actual position is tending to move, we ought to inquire how far off from equilibrium the actual position tends to be - how fast is the reaction towards normal, compared to the speed of movement of the normal position? In what case is the gap growing, in what narrowing? These are interesting and important questions, but except in the special department - trade-cycle theory - where the Keynesian revolution commands the field, they are seldom posed, let alone answered. The argument stops when normal position has been described and the equilibrium lullably hushes further inquiry.


These are subsidiary reasons for the survival and revival of pre-Keynesian ideas. The main reason, as always, we must look for in the ideological sphere. Keynes brought back the moral problem into economics by destroying the neo-classical reconciliation of private egoism and public service. He also exposed another weakness. There is another conflict in human life, akin to the conflict between myself now and in the future. This conflict the neo-classical ideology did not really resolve; rather it was evaded. Prudence is something akin to virtue and needs the exercise of self-command. The concept of ^waiting^ as a sacrifice is connected with the view that any owner of wealth is under a constant temptation to consume it in "present gratifications" and interest is the "reward" that leads him to refrain.

Because the neo-classical system was always so hazy about an economy as a whole and kept the spotlight on relative prices, it was able to leave the crucial question of the proper rate of saving in this unsatisfactory state. If I discount the future, then, when that future day becomes the present, I shall kick myself. Is the optimum rate of saving for society to be trusted to such chuckle-headed types? And what about posterity? Family feeling is a weak prop, for it is precisely the bachelors who have the biggest margin for saving. It was partly as a refuge from these awkward questions that the stationary state in which accumulation has come to an end was so valuable to Marshall's successors.

Ten year before the ^General Theory^, Keynes had pronounced the funeral oration on ^laissez faire^ --

Let us clear from the ground the metaphysical or general principles upon which, from time to time, ^laissez-faire^ has been founded. It it ^not^ true that individuals possess a prescriptive "natural liberty" in their economic activities. There is ^no^ "compact" conferring perpetual rights on those who Have or on those who Acquire. The world is ^not^ so managed from above that private and social interest always coincide. It is ^not^ so managed here below that in practive they coincide. It is ^not^ a correct deduction from the Principles of Economics that enlightened self-interest always operates in the public interest. Nor is it ture that self-interest generally ^is^ enlightened; more often individuals acting separately to promote their own end are too ignorant or too weak to attain even these. Experience does ^not^ show that individual, when they make up a social unit, are always less clear-sighted than when they act separately.

We cannot, therefore, settle on abstract grounds, but must handle on its merits in detail, what Burke termed "one of the finest problems in legislation, namely, to determine what the State ought to take upon itself to direct by the public wisdom, and what it ought to leave, with as little interference as possible, to individual exertion." We have to discriminate between what Bentham, in his forgotten but useful nomenclature, used to term ^Agenda^ and ^Non-Agenda^, and to do this without Bentham's prior presumption that interference is, at the same time, "generally needless" and "generally pernicious."[1]

[1] ^Essays in Persuasion^, pp. 312-13.

In ^The End of Laissez-faire^ Keynes had only this to say on the question of accumulation --

My second example relates to Savings and Investment. I believe that some co-ordinated act of intelligent judgment is required as to the scale on which it is desirable that the community as a whole should save, the scale on which these savings should go abroad in the form of foreign investments, and whether the present organization of the investment market distributes savings along the most nationally productive channels. I do not think that these matters should be left entirely to the chances of private judgment and private profits, as they are at present.[1]

When the whole question of seeing that potential savings are not run to waste in unemployment, that the investible resources shall be used, is added to the ^agenda^, it seems as if there is precious little ^non-agenda^ left.

To disput the main point has become impossible. But Keynes himself had moments of nostalgia for the old doctrines.

"The Social Philosophy towards which the General Theory might lead" is markedly less radical than the arguments of the book has led the reader to expect -

Our criticism of the accepted classical theory of economics has consisted not so much in finding logical flaws in its analysis as in pointing out that its tacit assumptions are seldom or never satisfied, with the result that it cannot solve the economic problems of the actual world. But if our central controls succeed in establishing an aggregate volume of output corresponding to full employment as nearly as is practicable, the classical theory comes into its own again from this points onwards. If we suppose the volume of output to be given , i.e. to be determined by forces outside the classical scheme of thought, then there is no objection to be raised against the classical analysis of the matter in which private self-interest will determine what in particular in produced, in what proportions the factors of production will be combined to produce it, and how the value of the final product will be distributed between them.[2]

[1] Ibid., p. 318
[2] ^General Theory^, p. 378.

In this diminished kingdom ^laissez faire^ can still flourish; from this ground it can make sallies to recapture lost territory. It is this rallying of the old ideological forces round their oriflamme - the optimum distribution of resources in long-period equilibrium - that accounts for the slow progress that has been made in bringing the so-called theory of Value and Distribution into touch with historic time and the so-called theory of Welfare into touch with human life.


In some ways the unkindest cut of all was Keynes' repudiation of the doctrine that tariff must be harmful to the country that imposes them. He did not delve into the pure thoery and the Bickerdike argument. He was interested in the much simpler and more straightforward point that a tariff which deflects demand from foreign to home goods increases employment in home industries.

Keyens, brought up in the strictest sect of the Pharisees, had been a dogmatic Free-Trader in his day. With his usual lack of patriotism for his own past ideas he chooses himself in the ^General Theory^ as the exponent of the doctrine that he now wants to attack -


[발췌] 시장경제 설명자료

지은이: 미상
내부 소목차:
8. 시장경제와 정부 | 8.1 서론 | 8.2 시장경제에서의 정부의 역할 | 8.3 공공선택 이론: ... | 8.4 정부의 실패
9. 시장경제의 장기성장 | 9.1 용어 | 9.2 경제성장의 분석 
* * *


B.  정부의 역할에 관한 상반된 견해

Keynes:  “End of Laissez-Faire”

  • “The world is not so governed from above that private and social interest always coincide.  It is not so managed here below that in practice they coincide. 
    세상은 개인적 이익과 사회적 이익이 일치하도록  하늘로 부터 통치되지 않는다.  세상은 이들이 일치하도록 지상에서 관리되지도 않는다.
  • “It is not a correct deduction from the principles of economics that enlightened self-interest always operates in the public interest. 
    경제원리에 의하여서 따져보더라도 계몽된 이기심이 항상 사회적 이익에 따라 움직인다는 추론은 옳지 않다.
  • “Nor is it true that self-interest generally is enlightened; more often individuals acting separately to promote their own ends are too ignorant or too weak to attain even these…
    이기심이 일반적으로 계몽되어 있지도 않다.  자신의 이익을 위하여 개별적으로 행동하는 개인들은 흔히 너무 무지하거나 약하기 때문에 자신들의 이익을 성취할 수 조차 없다…

--Keynes, “The End of Laissez-Fair,” 1926.

시장경제는 자생적으로 완전고용에 도달 하지 못 할 수도 있다.  실제로 1930년대 초에 세계경제는 심한 공황에 시달렸다. 
이는 시장경제 체제 하에서 민간 소비자들과 투자자들의 총수요aggregate demand가 시장이 생산해 내는 소비재와 투자재의 생산량을 모두 수용하지  못 할 수 있음을 보여 주는 것이다.  이 경우, 물건을 팔리지 않고, 생산은 줄고, 실업은 늘 수 밖에 없다.
Keynes는 공황을 극복하기 위하여 정부가 적극적으로 재정지출을 늘려 소비와 투자를 늘려야 한다고 주장했다.   케인즈는 심지어 정부가 재정적자를 늘려서라도 지출을 늘여 총수요를 증가시킴으로써 국민경제의 총수요 부족을 메워야 한다고 주장했다.

Hayek의 Road to Serfdom과 Friedman의 Capitalism and Freedom

하이에크는 전체주의totalitarianism의 위험을 경고했다.  뿐만 아니라 사회주의socialism 체제에서의 경제의 중앙 집권화가 궁극적으로 민주주의체제를 붕괴시키리라고 보았다.
  • “The general endeavour to achieve security by restrictive measures, supported by the state, has in the course of time produced a progressive transformation of society—a transformation in which … Germany has led and the other countries have followed.
    국가의 제약에 의하여 안전을 성취하려는 일반적인 노력은 시간이 흐름에 따라 독일이 선도했고 다른 나라들이 따라서 이룬 사회의 [ 전체주의에로의 ] 점진적인 전환을 초래했다.

- Hayek, Road to Serfdom.

Friedman은 심지어 정부의 사회보장제도도 개인의 선택에 대한 침해라고 본다.
  • “The citizen of the United States who is compelled by law to devote something like 10 percent of his income to the purchase of a particular kind of retirement contract, administered by the government, is being deprived of a corresponding part of his personal freedom.”
    법에 의하여 소득의 10%를 정부가 관리하는 특정의 연금기금에 내도록 강요당하는 미국시민은 그만큼 그의 자유를 박탈당한다.

- Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom.

An excerpt from “The Clash of Economic Ideas”

출처: the introduction and chapter 1 of The Clash of Economic Ideas: The Great Policy Debates and Experiments of the Last  Hundred Years, by Lawrence H. White. Copyright © 2012

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(... 중략 ...)

Keynes and Hayek would come to play leading roles in the clash of economic ideas during the Great Depression. Their ideas have informed the fundamental debates in economic policy ever since. In 2010 and 2011 their intellectual rivalry even became the subject of two viral rap videos.

Keynes flatly rejected Adam Smith’s doctrine of the invisible hand. In the opening paragraph of a 1924 lecture published in 1926 as an essay entitled “The End of Laissez-Faire,” he declared: “The world is not so governed from above that private and social interest always coincide. It is not so managed here below that in practice they coincide. It is not a correct deduction from the principles of economics that enlightened self-interest always operates in the public interest.” Specifically, Keynes denied that decentralized market forces were adequate for determining the volumes and allocations of saving and investment: “I do not think that these matters should be left entirely to the chances of private judgement and private profits, as they are at present.” In his book The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1936) Keynes would emphasize his view that market forces could not be counted on to deliver a great enough volume of investment in the aggregate. An enlightened government should take control.

Keynes was a leading advocate of the view that government should take greater control over the economy. Hayek was a leading advocate of the view that government should interfere less with market forces. They serve as useful representatives of the opposing sides because of their wide influence, not because either took the most polar position available. Keynes did not want to abolish markets the way communist thinkers would. Keynes explicitly rejected Russian communism for three reasons: (1) It “destroys the liberty and security of daily life”; (2) its Marxian economic theory is “not only scientifically erroneous but without interest or application for the modern world” and its Marxist literature more generally is “turgid rubbish”; and (3) it “exalts the boorish proletariat above the bourgeois and the intelligentsia”—in other words, sneers at people like Keynes and his circle. Hayek did not want to abolish government the way anarcho-capitalist thinkers would. (Yes, there really are serious proponents of a stateless market economy.)

For most of the twentieth century, Keynes’s view that government should take on a greater role in the economy prevailed among opinion-makers. And the role of government grew. While Keynes was not an advocate of complete state planning, he did endorse greater planning. In a letter to Hayek, responding to Hayek’s critique of state planning in The Road to Serfdom (1944), Keynes wrote: “I should say that what we want is not no planning, or even less planning, indeed I should say that what we almost certainly want is more.”

Political Economy in America’s Progressive Era

Economic ideas supporting the expansion of government’s role in the economy certainly did not begin with Keynes. Indeed, they did not even begin in the twentieth century. In the late nineteenth century the United States, for example, entered a period of ideological change toward more active government, a period now called the Progressive Era. Numerous economists played important roles in the ideological and political movement, developing arguments and promoting legislation to increase the role of the federal government in the economy, from the Sherman Antitrust Act (1890) to the Pure Food and Drug Act (1906) to the Federal Reserve Act (1913).

In the late 1870s and 1880s young American economists were returning from graduate training in Germany with ideas and approaches that they developed into a school of thought that came to be known as institutionalist economics. In 1885 the 31-year-old Richard T. Ely of Johns Hopkins University led a group of these economists in founding the American Economic Association (AEA). The AEA quickly became (and remains) the leading professional organization of economists, but among its original missions was to organize economists opposed to laissez-faire ideas. The AEA’s initial Statement of Principles affirmed “the state as an agency whose positive assistance is one of the indispensable conditions of human progress.”

Ely and his compatriots saw themselves as a “new school” of dissenters from classical or neoclassical economics and from the doctrine of laissez faire. He described the “new school” thinkers as scientific truth-seekers whose historical investigations had uncovered the benefits of labor unionization and strikes, had found in socialism “important and fruitful truths which have been unfortunately overlooked,” and had “overthrow[n] many cherished dogmas” of orthodox finance. As a result there were now “political economists teaching different doctrines from the theories previously received by the more influential elements in society.” Ely explicitly tied the new school in America to the teachings of German historical economists.

That many economists before 1930 developed anti-laissez-faire arguments and supported Progressive causes may surprise those who think that professional economists have almost always favored leaving the market free, or at least did so before Keynes. Fortunately or unfortunately, the devotion of economists to the doctrine of laissez faire has been grossly exaggerated, both for economists before the Great Depression and for economists today. Keynes himself exaggerated the views of the earlier economists, as did Nobel laureate (2009) and New York Times columnist Paul Krugman, when he wrote in 2007 that “Until John Maynard Keynes published The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money in 1936, economics—at least in the English-speaking world—was completely dominated by free-market orthodoxy. Heresies would occasionally pop up, but they were always suppressed.”

In fact a large number of prominent English-speaking economists promoted “heresies” from free-market ideas during the five or six decades before 1936. They were not relegated to the fringes of the economics profession, and their ideas were not “always suppressed.” (To be sure, the profession has always marginalized heretical amateurs, but more for their amateur status than for their policy views.) Ely and other American institutionalists were prominent in economics. Fred M. Taylor’s 1928 presidential address to the AEA was even a proposal for “The Guidance of Production in a Socialist State.” Nor were the leading neoclassical theorists—like Henry Sidgwick, Alfred Marshall, and Arthur Pigou at Cambridge or Irving Fisher at Yale—marginalized or suppressed when they criticized laissez faire. Marshall in a 1907 speech declared that “Economists generally desire increased intensity of State activities for social amelioration,” while Fisher in the same year noted with satisfaction “the change from the extreme laissez faire doctrines of the classical economists to the modern doctrines of governmental regulation and social control” that had taken place over the previous decades.

The ongoing clash of economic ideas reflects not only deep-seated philosophical differences about the value of individual liberty but also theoretical differences about the relative merits of free markets and government for steering the economy. Are competitive markets, guided by impersonal forces of profit and loss, better than government command-and-control for directing investment toward the greatest prosperity? The key insight of economics as a discipline—its greatest contribution to understanding the social world and to avoiding harmful policies—is that, under the right conditions (property rights, rule of law, free entry), an economic order arises without central design that effectively serves the ends of its participants. In Adam Smith’s analysis and famous phrase, investors are “led by an invisible hand” that aligns their private pursuit of profits with (what is no part of their intention) the greatest contribution to the economy’s overall prosperity. This Smithian idea has ever since been reaffirmed and elaborated by a long line of economists. Though challenged by others, it has been repeatedly borne out by the experiences of the last hundred years.

[읽기목록] Bradford DeLong's notes for a class of 2009: "Thirty Glorious Years"

출처: http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2009/04/notes-for-april-29-econ-210a-class-thirty-glorious-years.html

■ John Maynard Keynes (1926), "The End of Laissez Faire" http://tinyurl.com/dl20090112ad

■  Paul Krugman, "Introduction" to John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money http://tinyurl.com/dl20090112z

■  Barry Eichengreen (1996), "Institutions and Economic Growth: Europe Since 1945," in Nicholas Crafts and Gianni Toniolo (eds), Economic Growth in Europe Since 1945 (Cambridge University Press), pp. 38-72 http://tinyurl.com/dl20090112x

■  Mancur Olson (1996), "The Varieties of Eurosclerosis: The Rise and Decline of Nations Since 1982," in Nicholas Crafts and Gianni Toniolo (eds), Economic Growth in Europe Since 1945, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), pp.73-94 http://tinyurl.com/dl20090112x

■  J. Bradford DeLong (1995), "America’s Only Peacetime Inflation: The 1970s," in Christina Romer and David Romer, eds., Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy (University of Chicago Press), pp.-, http://tinyurl.com/dl20090112v

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2012년 10월 1일 월요일

Dic: wax adj about/on..

  • He waxed lyrical about the skills and commitment of his employees... 
  • My mother waxed eloquent on the theme of wifely duty.
  • Journalists wax lyrical about the band.
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■ [VERB] V adj, V adj △If you say that someone, for example, waxes lyrical or waxes indignant about a subject, you mean that they talk about it in an enthusiastic or indignant way.

■ wax sentimental/eloquent/lyrical etc: to talk with extreme feeling, liking or pleasure about something - used humorously

  • The Marquis d'Argenson was the first man to wax passionate on the economic advantages of governments leaving trade alone. To govern less, he said, one must govern less('Pour gouverner mieux, il faudrait gouverner moins.') ─ J. M. Keynes, The End of Laissez-Faire (1926)

Dic: lay something at someone's door

  • The blame is generally laid at the door of the government.
  • The continued divisions within the party cannot be laid entirely at his door. 
  • Many illnesses are being laid at the door of stress.
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■ If you lay something at someone's door, you blame them for an unpleasant event or situation.

■ lay sth at the door of sb/sth (also lay sth at sb's door ): to blame something or someone for something.