─ Introducing Diet Coke in 1983
─ Ford Ranger in 1984
2018년 1월 31일 수요일
Dic/ chorus line
─ . 코러스 라인 (뮤지컬 무대에서 주연급과 코러스를 구분하는 선) ... YBM
. 코러스 라인 (주역급 배우만이 넘을 수 있는 무대 전면의 백선) ... 슈프림
. 코러스 라인 (주연급 배우만이 넘을 수 있는, 무대 전면의 백선) ... 동아프라임 ( all via Naver )
─ 코러스 라인 (극 등에서 무대 위에서 나란히 서서 노래하고 춤추눈 출연진) .... 그랜드 영한사전 ( via DAUM )
─ a group of people who stand in a straight line and sing and dance together in a show or film ..... LDOCE
─ a row of people dancing and sometimes singing in an entertainment ..... Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary
─ a group of performers in a musical play or movie who stand in a straight line and sing and dance ..... MacMillan English Dictionary
─ a chorus line is a large group of dancers who together perform synchronized routines, usually in musical theatre. Sometime, singing is also performed..... .... Wikipedia
─
Dic: spoken/ well and good.
─ used to indicate calm acceptance, as of a decision.
─ If you say that something is all well and good, you are suggesting that it has faults or disadvantages, although it may appear to be correct or reasonable.
- It's all well and good for him to say he's sorry for dropping you, but has he told you why he did it?
- If they arrive before I leave, well and good. If not, the responsibility will be mine.
- This is all well and good, but we have to look at the situation in the long term.
- Going off on foreign holidays is all well and good, but you've got to get back to reality sometime.
...... Collins, COBUILD, LDOCE
[명칭] Better Business Bureau
※ A nonprofit organization, namely a NGO, now seemingly relevant in the US, Canada, and Mexico.
* * *
※ 발췌 (excerpts):
출처 0: https://www.bbb.org/en/us/about-bbb
출처 1: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Better_Business_Bureau
The Better Business Bureau (BBB), founded in 1912, is a nonprofit organization focused on advancing marketplace trust ( ... ... ) The Better Business Bureau is not affiliated with any government agency. Businesses that affiliate with the BBB and adhere to its standards do so through industry self-regulation. ( ... ... )
출처 2: 하와이 소비자보호센터 BBB (하와이 토백이의 진짜 하와이 이야기들, 2013년 2월)
혹시 하와이 상점 문에 위와 같은 마크 보신적 있으신가요? 이마크의 의미는 Better Business Bureau 즉, 좋은 비지니스를 할수있게 관리해주는 기관입니다. 혹, 하와이 계시면서 핸드폰요금이라던지, 구입하셨던 차량에 문제가 있었는데 제대로 고쳐주지 않았던지 물건을 샀는데 불량품인것 같은데 교환을 안해준다던지, 이런 문제가 생겼을때 한국분들 거의 당한다고 생각이 듭니다. 그런데, 미국 하와이에도 한국처럼 소비자보호센터라는 곳이 있습니다. 거의 10년전쯤 아시는분이 모핸드폰사에서 터무니없는 금액이 나왔다고 해서 회사에 직접 전화를 여러번 했었는데 결국 터무니없이 나온 금액을 지불해야 하는 상황이 왔었는데 BBB에 컨플레인(항의) 편지를 보냈고, 일주일정도 후에 모핸드폰사에서 사과 전화와 함께 일년치 무료 통화요금을 해줬다고 하더군요.
출처 3: GetConnectedToday.com (시기 불명)
거래 개선국[???]: Better Business Bureau(BBB)는 공정하고 정직한 상행위를 위한 높은 기준을 설정하고 고수함으로써, 소비자와 비즈니스를 돕는 편견 없는 비영리 기관입니다. BBB의 인정을 획득하는 기업은 계약서를 통해 거래개선국의 높은 윤리적 거래행동 표준에 동의하고 준수해야 합니다. BBB의 인정 기준에 충족하면 기장을 받게 되는데, 이를 전시해 놓은 회사와의 거래는 안전함을 의미합니다.
출처 4: 북미 소비자들의 '수호천사'…100년 전통 'BBB' 아시나요 (미주 중앙일보, 2013년 12월)
밸리에 거주하는 50대 한인 이모씨는 최근 크레딧 카드 신청을 권유하는 우편물을 받았다. '유니온 워커스 크레딧 서비스(UWCS)란 이름의 회사가 발송한 이 홍보물은 "37달러의 비용만 지불하면 1만 달러의 크레딧 라인 제공을 개런티한다"는 내용을 담고 있었다. 좋은 조건에 솔깃해진 이씨는 곧바로 카드를 신청하려다 혹시나 싶어 북미 최대 규모의 소비자보호기관[???] '베터 비즈니스 뷰로우(Better Business Bureau)' 웹사이트에서 UWCS에 대해 검색을 해봤다. 검색 결과는 놀라웠다. BBB는 UWCS에게 'D-(마이너스)' 평점을 매겼다. BBB는 또 UWCS가 발급하는 카드는 메이저 크레딧 카드가 아니며 이 회사가 취급하는 물품을 카탈로그를 통해 구매할 때 사용할 수 있는 것이라고 밝혔다.
한인들에게는 생소한 편이지만, BBB는 북미 지역 영어권 소비자들에게는 '수호천사'나 다름없는 비영리기관으로 잘 알려져 있다. 1912년 설립된 BBB는 미국과 캐나다 각지에 113곳의 지부를 두고 있다. 각 지부는 독립적으로 운영되지만 워싱턴DC의 BBB위원회의 지침에 따른다. ( ... ... ) 피해를 입은 소비자가 불만사항을 접수하면 BBB는 해당 업소에 답변 및 소명 기회를 주면서 소비자의 불만을 해결하도록 유도한다. 비록 법적 구속력은 없지만 적지 않은 소비자가 BBB를 참고하기 때문에 불만 신고가 많이 접수될수록 해당 업체에겐 손해다. 따라서 어지간한 업체들은 BBB의 중재에 적극적으로 응하는 편이다.
출처 5: 리틀 시스터 - 필립 말로 시리즈 5 (레이먼드 챈들러 지음. 북하우스 2005)
경영 개선 협회[???](Better Business Bureau, BBB): 1912년에 미국과 캐나다를 기반으로 해서 설립된 협회로 불공정 거래에 대한 소비자 불만 신고를 받고 조정하는 업무를 하는 기관.
출처 6: [미국/캐나다] BBB (Better Business Bureaus) 컴플레인 (클리앙, 2008년 10월)
미국에서 생활하면서.. 가끔씩 자주 당하는 업체들의 횡포에서 살아남기 위에서 언제부터인지 BBB를 이용하게 되었습니다. BBB는 대부분의 미국 주요 도시에 있으며, 일급 소비자 “보호” 단체들 중 하나입니다. 거기에서는 소비자 교육 자료를 제공하고 질문에 답해주며, 답변을 하지 않았다든지, 해결되지 않은 불만들 또는 다른 시장 문제 등 회사에 대한 필요한 정보를 제공합니다. 또한 중재는 물론, 업체에 대한 구매자/판매자들의 불만을 해결하는데 도움을 줍니다. 그들은 또한 사람들로부터 기부금을 받기 원하는 자선단체와 공공기관들에 대한 정보도 가지고 있습니다.
출처 7: 해외광고 심의 (한국광고자율심의기구 KARB, 시기 불명)
미국의 광고 자율 규제는 1971년 광고주협회(ANA), 대행사협회(AAAA), 미국광고연맹(AAF)과 경영개선협회[???](Better Business Bureau, BBB) 이사회가 공동으로 전국광고심의기구(National Advertising Review Council: NARC)를 설립, 운영했으나, 이미 1911년에 ( ... ... )
출처 8: 소비자 보호 단체 BBB, 불만 신고 많이 접수된 이사 업체 공개 (미주 중앙일보 밴쿠버, 2016년 7월)
밴쿠버의 소비자 보호 단체 BBB(Better Business Bureau)가 불만 신고가 많이 접수된 이삿짐 운송 회사 상호와 신고 사례를 공개했다. 해당 업체는 '밴쿠버 밴 라인(Vancouver Van Lines)'으로 BBB는 이 업체에 대해 'F 등급을 매겼다'고 밝혔다. 공개된 불만 신고 내용 중에는 '물건을 옮겨놓고도 트럭 차량에 싣지 않았다'와 '고객인 나에게 직접 짐을 옮기라고 했다' 등이 있었다. 컬터스 레이크(Cultus Lake)에 거주하는 한 여성은 "지난 해에 서비스를 신청했었는데 이용료 반을 선불로 요구해서 지불했다. 그런데 이사 당일 아무리 기다려도 나타나지 않고 연락도 원활하지 않아 결국 우리 가족이 짐을 모두 옮겼다. 그런데 앞서 지불한 돈을 돌려받는데 1년이 넘게 걸렸다"고 말했다.
... ...
2018년 1월 30일 화요일
[발췌: Some context] Codes of the Underworld
※ 발췌 (excerpts):
출처 1: Ray Fisman and Tim Sullivan, The Inner Lives of Markets, Public Affairs, 2016. p. 68.
Why do gangs in particular resort to such extreme measures? ( ... ... ) Online shoppers have nothing on the aspiring criminal mastermind in their need for credible signals. Suppose you want to rob a bank and need someone on the inside to help you with the job. Or you want to trade a few spare bars of enriched uranium that you grabbed in the chaos of the Soviet Union's collapse for an appropriate sum of money. How do you figure out which bank teller will be a trustworthy partner and which will contact the police? Which prospective buyers are fronting for the North Koreans and which ones are fronting for interpol? As Gambetta writes , "Given these propensities, one wonders how criminals ever manage to do anything together."
출처 2: Diego Gambetta, Codes of the Underworld: How Criminals Communicate, Princeton University Press, 2009. 구글도서.
Introduction, pp.ⅷ~
( ... ... ) Yet economists, who have developed sophisticated theoretical means to model information, have enough troubles collecting data on the world of ordinary business to bother with the underworld.
The study of criminal communications has also fallen between the stools of two common views, which reinforce each other. One pertains to how communication is understood in general. It is still all too frequent, even among scholars, to think of communication as symbolic communication or, more narrowly still, as linguistic communication. Words are set in opposition to actions, thereby inserting a bogus demarcation, as if actions could be undertaken only for tangible purposes rather than or communicative ends. ( ... ... ) Yet, even violent acts, as I hope to show, often have communicative purpose.
Because of the nature of their business, criminals have a lot to lose by misreading signs or emitting signals that are misread (unless they want them to be misread). They are thus driven to draw from a large repertoire of communicative options, some of which will come as a surprise to law-abiding readers. For instance, an insurance salesman who wishes to know whether a certain establishment is already insured can just as. But a mafioso who wants to discover whether a certain bar or restaurant is already "mobbled up"─under someone's protection, that is─cannot risk asking directly. He must look for subtle signs. FBI agent Joe Pistone, who infiltrated the mob under the same Donnie Brasco, wrote that Benjamin "Lefty Guns" Ruggiero "would size the place up, look for little things":
( ... ... )
Criminals face severe constraints on communication imposed by the action of the law, and, unlike the rest of us, cannot easily develop institutions aimed at circumventing them. This central feature of criminal lives makes communication and above all ^reliable^ communication exceptionally hard to sustain. ( ... ... )
Chapter 2 The Power of Limits, pp.30~
The problem of trust faced by all kinds of businesses, intensified, haunts the underworld. How does one know whether to trust others, and, conversely how does one persuade others that one is trustworthy (whether this is true or not)? Both questions are ceaselessly pressing for criminals, and if the reader takes a mental step into a criminal's boots, it is not difficult to see why. First, criminals operate under greater ^constraints^ that can force them to default on their agreements even if they do not want to, simply because the end up in prison or have to go on the run. In this sense they are not so much untrustworthy as unreliable, more likely to have "accidents." Next, they have greater ^opportunities^ to renege on their agreements. While the secrecy in which they operate acts as a constraint, it can also be turned to their advantage, as they can vanish more easily. Cheats, furthermore, do not have to fear the law when they dupe other criminals, for the dupes have no access to legal protection. Third, they are more likely to have ^motivations^ to defect than most ordinary people do, as they are driven by selfish goals and disregard the property or even the lives of others. Fourth, they are more likely to have the ^dispositions^ to defect, for they are more prone than most to take risks. They are alos likely to feel bound by norms and be deterred by punishment than law-abiding citizens are.
Thus, by solving the problem discussed in chapter 1 and identifying each other as bona fide criminals, they also unavoidably let each other know that they have those constraints, opportunities, motivations, and dispositions, thereby landing themselves in what we may call the villain's paradox: a criminal needs partners who are also criminals, but these are typically untrustworthy people to deal with when their self-interest is at stake. To be more precise, one may be able to trust a criminal partner in certain respect─to act rationally under pressure and keep his sangfroid, for example, and to respond violently or even kill if necessary. One can trust one's partner to be a competent robber. But when it comes to sharing the booty, when interests are in conflict, it is hard to trust one criminal to show concern for another. While citizens can hope to find trustworthy-making features in other people's characters, villains typically cannot. Criminals embody ^homo economicus^ at his rawest, and they know it. In keeping with the evidence that people who are untrustworthy are also more likely to think that others are untrustworthy,[주]1 criminals are more inclined to distrust each other than ordnary people do. ( ... ... ) for instance that 58 percent of inmates agreed with the statement "one cannot be too careful in one's dealing with other people," while in the control group only 28 percent agreed.[주]2
Crime fiction, whether in writing or film, often exploits the tensions that arise from distrust (which may further enhance distrust among real criminals, who, as we shall see in chapter 10, are affected by fiction). ( ... ... )
The evidence for loyalty in the real underworld, however, is close to nonexistent. True, there is a bias due to the fact that when things go wrong we are more likely to hear about them than when they go smoothly. Yet the evidence of cheating and betrayal is just too large to think that the problem of untrustworthiness troubles the underworld in merely the same way as it does ordinary business. Criminals dupe each other, all too easily yielding to their raw self-interest. Among a group of bid drug dealers in the Netherlands who were the object of research based on a very large documentation, "betrayal and double-crossing were habitual for many of the criminal entrepreneurs, leading to mutual distrust and returning flicks of paranoia."[주]5 The lives of British career criminals recounted by Dick Hobbs are replete with episodes of mistrust and cheating.[주]6 When offered the right incentives, even many mafiosi, allegedly the most loyal of the lot, have turned state's evidence and betrayed their former friends, bothe in the United States and in Italy.
Given these propensities, one wonders how criminals can ever manage to do anything together. This puzzle has long been recognized. In Plato's ^Republic^ Socrates asks Trasymachus, who claims that injustice is a source of strength, "please [tell me] whether you think that a city, or an army, or a band of robbers or thieves, or any other company which pursue some unjust end in common, would be able to effect anything if they were unjust to one another?" If they had been thoroughly unjust─Socrates concludes─they could not have kept their hands off one another. Clearly they must have possessed justice of a sort, enough to keep them from exercising their injustice on each other at the same time as on their victms. ... the throrough villains who are perfectly unjust, are also perfectly incapable of action."[주]7 Yet, while many have raised the issue, the explanations of what could possibly support some "justice of a sort" are not often satisfactory, and merit a fresh look.
In this chapter I do not have the ambition to cover all the ways in which criminals solve or circumvent the problem of trust. Here I discuss mostly a very odd way in which a trustee can persuade a truster that it is in the trustee's own interest to be trustworthy─by displaying his own incompetence. In the next chapter, I will explore how the same goal can be achieved by revealing information about one's own bad deeds. First, however, I approach the matter from the point of view of the truster, the criminal who is worried about his partner's trustworthiness. What can he do?
VIOLENCE AND ITS DRAWBACKS (on p. 33)
( ... ... )
[약식 서평: Diego Gambetta's] Codes of the Underworld: How Criminals Communicate
출처: Codes of the Underworld: How Criminals Communicate (Tyler Cowen, 2009년 8월)
※ 발췌 (excerpt):
That's the new book by Diego Gambetta and it is the best applied book on signaling theory to date. Gambetta's task is well summarized by a single sentence:
Given these propensities, one wonders how criminals ever manage to do anything together.
The signaling problems faced by criminals are unusual in the following regard. On one hand they wish to signal a certain untrustworthiness, namely that they are criminals in the first place. This is useful for both meeting other criminals and also for intimidating potential victims. On the other hand, the criminals wish to signal that they are potentially cooperative, for the purpose of working with other criminals. Sending these dual signals isn't easy and Gambetta well understands the complexity of the task at hand. As Henry points out, facial tattoos are one particular effective method of signaling that one is a criminal for life.
Here is a passage which I found striking: ( ... ... )
Gambetta wonders whether women in prison resort to violence so frequently because they have fewer alternative means of signaling toughness.
[기사 발췌] 농축 우라늄, 고농축 우라늄
※ 용어: 농축 우라늄(enriched uranium), 고농축 우라늄(highly enriched uranium)
※ 발췌:
출처 1: 고농축 우라늄, 소름돋는 이야기 (한겨레21, 2006년 10월)
사진(우측): 이런 연구용 원자로는 고농축 우라늄을 사용한다. 원자로 임계조절장치에 쓰이는 원반형 우라늄 함유 장치
고농축 우라늄의 세계적 보급은 미국과 소련이 남긴 유물이다. 양국은 1960년대 후반까지 평화적 이용을 내세우며 경쟁적으로 자국에 연구용 원자로를 건설하고 정치적 목적에 따라 해외에 보급했다. 당시 1800여 톤의 고농축 우라늄이 전세계에 퍼진 것으로 추산된다.
미국은 ( ... ) 어디에서든 고농축 우라늄의 사용을 억제하고 누적된 재고를 없애려고 한다. 지난 2004년 발족된 '세계 위협 제거 이니셔티브(GTPI)'에 따라 각국에서 고농축 우라늄을 회수하고 있다. ( ... ) 이 우라늄은 조잡한 대포형 폭발 장치만 이용해도 도시를 불태우는 공격용 핵무기로 바뀔 수 있다. 미국이 주도적으로 회수 프로그램을 진행하는 이유가 여기에 있다.
임계치 조절 장치는 새로운 원자로를 만들기 전에 노심이 설계자의 의도대로 분열해 연쇄 반응을 일으키는지를 시험하는 실물 모형이다. 마치 알루미늄 피복을 입혀 원반처럼 생긴 이 장치는 소량의 무기급 우라늄을 함유하고 있지만 ( ... ) 현재 러시아의 다양한 원자력 연구 시설에는 지름 2인치의 우라늄 원반이 수만 개씩 보관되어 있다.
출처 2: Bar stock (위키피디아)
Bar stock, also (colloquially) known as blank, slug or billet,[1] is a common form of raw purified metal, used by industry to manufacture metal parts and products. Bar stock is available in a variety of extrusion shapes and lengths. The most common shapes are round (circular cross-section), rectangular, square and hexagonal or hex.
출처 3: Enriched uranium (위키피디아)
A billet (bar stock) of highly enriched uranium metal:
출처 4: Armenian Nationals Arrested in Georgia for Alleged Smuggling of Highly-Enriched Uranium (2010년 11월)
According to the Georgian Interior Ministry, the suspects were arrested in Tbilisi last March with 18 grams (0.6 ounces) of uranium hidden in a cigarette pack which they tried to sell, for $1.5 million, to an undercover police agent posing as a Turkish Islamist radical. Ministry representatives say the uranium was nearly 90 percent enriched and useable in a nuclear warhead.
... ...
2018년 1월 29일 월요일
[참고, 발췌] 마이클 스펜스의 신호 모형 등
※ 발췌:
출처 1: 현대 경제학의 6가지 주요 이론: 1. 정보 비대칭 (Isaac의 생각저장 창고, 2016년 8월)
이코노미스트지에서 현대 경제학의 여섯가지 주요 이론을 정리해 연재 중이다. 지난주는 ‘레몬 마켓과 정보 비대칭’에 대해서. 6주에 걸쳐 진행될 이 연재는 앞으로 하이먼 민스키 모델, 스톨퍼 사무엘슨 정리, 케인즈 승수, 내쉬 평형, 먼델 플레밍 모형을 다룰 예정이다. ( ... ...)
Information asymmetry – Secrets and agents (the economist, 2016년 7월 23일자)
경제학 관련 연재 이전 포스트 : 현대 경제학의 6가지 주요이론
목차
– 정보 비대칭: 레몬시장 문제
– 금융시장의 불안정성: 민스키 모멘트
– 세계화와 보호 무역: 스톨퍼-사무엘슨 정리
– 끝나지 않는 논쟁 – 케인즈 승수
– 내쉬 균형
– 세마리 토끼 잡기 – 먼델 플레밍 모형
출처 2: 교육의 신호 기능과 소득 양극화 (윤정열/홍기석 지음. 사회과학연구논총, 2012년 6월)
( ... ... ) 본 연구에서는 교육의 신호(signaling) 기능에 기초하여 빈곤 계층에 대한 교육 기회의 제한이 동일 생산성 근로자들 간의 학별별 소득 격차를 더욱 확대시킬 수 있음을 보이고자 한다. ( ... ... ) 본 연구와 관련된 선행 연구는 주로 신호(signaling) 이론 및 판별(screening) 이론 등의 역선택(adverse selection) 이론과 교육-소득 분배 관계에 관한 실증적 연구들이라 하겠다.
출처 3: 신호 보내기 게임(signaling game)과 반값등록금 (2011)
뭐랄까 굉장히 사회의 일반적인 관념과는 비껴나가 있는 이야기일지도 모르겠지만 여하간 스펜서는 하버드 재학 시절 겪었던 이러한 진지한 고민의 결과로 정보 경제학에서 노동시장에서의 신호 보내기 게임(job market signaling,1973)이라고 불리우는 부분을 창안해 내었고, 이 성과로 2001년 노벨 경제학 상을 수상할 수 있었다(찾아보니 1981년 클라크 메달도 땄다).
신호 보내기 게임의 모형에서 가정하고 있는 것들은 다음과 같다. ( ... ... )
출처 4: 2010년 국회직 8급 경제학
노동시장에서 교육의 신호이론(signaling theory)에 관한 다음 <보기>의 설명 중 옳은 것은?
가. 교육은 한계 생산성이 낮은 노동자의 생산성을 향상시킨다.
나. 교육은 그 사람의 사회적 위치에 대한 신호이다.
다. 천부적인 능력에 따라 한계 생산성이 결정된다.
라. 높은 학력은 높은 한계 생산성을 가진 사람이 보내는 신호이다.
① 가, 나
② 다, 라
③ 가, 라
④ 나, 다
⑤ 가, 다, 라
(정답은 2번이라고 함.)
Mirror: usages/ an example of 'generic you'
In the first example below, the writer employs expressions of 'generic you' twice: 'your resume' and 'presenting yourself'. And something seemingly awkward happens in the later part of the same sentence: the cost of writing 'your' resume and the cost of presenting 'yourself' is higher for some applicants than for others.
The second sentence looks better.
1. The cost of adding a credential to your resume or presenting yourself in a particular way at an interview is higher for some applicants than for others.
2. the cost of adding a credential to a resume or presenting oneself in a particular way at an interview is higher for some applicants than for others.
Dic: 용례/ putting together a college application
─ In addition to taking either the SAT or Act, you can help put together a flexible college application by taking two SAT subject tests. Why? Some colleges (esp selective one) require or recommend SAT Subject Tests as part of applications. For ex., Princeton recommends two SAT Subject Tests. Harvard does not officially require them, but highly recommends tham unless you have extenuating circumstances .... link
─ Advice on Putting Together Your Application: Students commonly want to know what part of the college application "carries the most weight." The truth is, there are many parts to your application, and together they help us discover and appreciate your particular mix of qualities. .... link
─ See more strategies for putting together a winning college application. .... link
─ Putting together your college application file is a lot like baking a cake: you need right ingedients (grades, courses, test scores, recommendations), you have to watch the time (deadlines), and your goals is to pass the "taste test" (decision to admit or deny). Here are the common college application file ingredients: ... ... link
─ 5 Biggest Mistakes Applicants Make When Putting Together Their College Lists: Okay, you're a senior and getting ready to apply to colleges, but the question is ... which college? Some students begin thinking about college as early as their freshman and sophomore years, but many students don't do anything about it until they're seniors. ..... link
2018년 1월 28일 일요일
[발췌] Frederick Taylor's remark
출처: Michael J. Handel 편집. The Sociology of Organizations: Classic, Contemporary, and Critical Readings, Sage 2003. Chapter 3, "The Degradation of Work in the 20th Century"
※ 발췌 (EXCERPT):
SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT
The classical economists were the first to approach the problems of the organization of labor within capitalist relations of production from a theoretical point of view. They may thus be called the first management experts, and their work was continued in the latter part of the Industrial Revolution by such men as Andrew Ure and Charles Babbage. Between these men and the next step, the comprehensive formulation of management theory in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, there lies a gap of more than half a century during which there was an enormous growth in the size of enterprises, the beginnings of the monopolistic organization of industry, and the purposive and systematic application of science to production. The scientific management movement initiated by Frederick Winslow Taylor in the last decades of the 19th century was brought into being by these forces. Logically, Taylorism belongs to the chain of development of management methods and the organization of labor, and not to the development of technology, in which it role was minor.[주]1
Scientific management, so-called, is an attempt to apply the methods of science to the increasingly complex problems of the control of labor in rapidly growing capitalist enterprises. It lacks the characteristics of a true science because its assumptions reflect nothing more that the outlook of the capitalist with regard to to conditions of production. It starts, despite occasional protestations to the contrary, not from the human point of view but from the capitalist point of view, from the point of view of the management of a refractory work force in a setting of antagonistic social relations. It does not attempt to discover and confront the causes of this condition, but accepts it as an inexorable given, a "natural" condition. It investigates not labor in general, but the adaptation of labor to the needs of capital. It enters the workplace not as the representative of science, but as the representative of management masquerading in the trappings of science.
[ ... ]
It is impossible to overestimate the importance of the scientific management movement in the shaping of the modern corporation and indeed all institutions of capitalist society which carry on labor processes. The popular notion that Taylorism has been "superseded" by later schools of industrial psychology or "human relations," that it "failed"--because of Taylor's amateurish and naive niews of human motivation or because it brought about a storm of labor opposition or because Taylor and various successors antagonized workers and sometimes management as well--or that it is "outmoded" because certain Taylorian specifics like functional foremanship or his incentive-pay schemes have been discarded for more sophisticated methods: all these represent a woeful misreading of the actual dynamics of the development of management.
Taylor dealt with the fundamentals of the organization of the labor process and of control over it. [ ... ] If Taylorism does not exist as a separate school today, that is because, apart from the bad odor of the name, it is no longer the property of a faction, since its fundamental teachings have become the bedrock of all work design.[주]2 [ ... ]
[ ... ] Control has been the essential feature of management throughout its history, but with Taylor it assumed unprecedented dimensions. The stages of management control over labor before Taylor had included, progressively: the gathering together of the workers in a workshop and the dictation of the length of the working day; the supervision of workers to ensure diligent, intense, or uninterrupted application; the enforcement of rules against distractions (talking, smoking, leaving the workplace, etc.) that were thought to be interfere with application; the setting of production minimums; etc. A worker is under management control when subjected to these rules, or to any of their extensions and variations. But Taylor raised the concept of control to an entirely new plane when he asserted as an ^absolute necessity for adequate management the dictation to the worker of the precise manner in which work is to be performed^. That management had the right to "control" labor was generally assumed before Taylor, but in practice this right usually meant only the general setting of tasks, with little direct interference in the worker's mode of performing them. Taylor's contribution was to overturn this practice and replace it by its opposite. Management, he insisted, could be only a limited and frustrated undertaking so long as it left to the worker any decision about the work. His "system" was simply a means for management to achieve control of the actual mode of performance of every labor activity, from the simplest to the most complicated. To this end, he pioneered a far greater revolution in the division of labor than any that had gone before.
Taylor created a simple line of reasoning and advanced it with a logic and clarity, a naive openness, and an evangelical zeal which soon won him a strong following among capitalists and managers. His work began in the 1880s but it was not until the 1890s that he began to lecture, read papers, and publish results. His own engineering training was limited, but his grasp of shop practice was superior, since he had served a four-year combination apprenticeship in two trades, those of patternmaker and machinist. The spread of the Taylor approach was not limited to the United States and Britain; within a short time it became popular in all industrial countries. In France it was called, in the absence of a suitable word for management, "l'organisation scientifique du travail" (later changed, when the reaction against Taylorism set in, to "l'organisation rationnelle du travail"). In Germany it was known simply as ^rationalization^; the German corporations were probably ahead of everyone else in the practice of this technique,even before World War I.[주]3
[ ... ]
The issue here turned on the work content of a day's labor power, which Taylor defines in the phrase "a fair day's work." To this term he gave a crude physiological interpretation: all the work a worker can do without injury to his health, at a pace that can be sustained throughout a working lifetime. (In practice, he tended to define this level of activity at an extreme limit, choosing a pace that only a few could maintain, and then only under strain.) Why a "fair day's work" should be defined as a physiological maximum is never made clear. In attempting to give concrete meaning to the abstraction "fairness," it would make just as much if not more sense to express a fair day's work as the amount of labor necessary to add to the product a value equal to the worker's pay; under such conditions, of course, profit would be impossible. The phrase "a fair day's work" must therefore be regarded as inherently meaningless, and filled with such content as the adversaries in the purchase-sale relationship try to give it.
Taylor set as his objective the maximum or "optimum" that can be obtained from a day's labor power. "On the part of the men," he said in his first book, "the greatest obstacle to the attainment of this standard is the slow pace which they adopt, or the loafing or 'soldiering,' marking time, as it is called." In each of his later expositions of his system, he begins with this same point, underscoring it heavily.[주]4 The causes of this soldiering he breaks into two parts: "This loafing or soldiering proceeds from two causes. First, from the natural instinct and tendency of men to take it easy, which may be called natural soldiering. Second, from more intricate second thought and reasoning caused by their relations with other men, which may be called ^systematic soldiering." The first of these he quickly puts aside, to concentrate on the second: "The natural laziness of men is serious, but by far the greatest evil from which both workmen and employers are suffering is the systematic soldiering which is almost universal under all the ordinary schemes of management and which results from a careful study on the part of the workmen of what they think will promote their best interests."
The greater part of systematic soldiering is done by the men with the deliberate object of keeping their employers ignorant of how fast work can be done.
So universal is soldiering for this purpose, that hardly a competent workmen can be found in a large establishment, whether he works by the day or on piece work, contract work or under any of the ordinary systems of compensating labor, who does not devote a considerable part of his time to studying just how slowly he can work and still convince his employer that he is going at a good pace.
The causes for this are, briefly, that practically all employers determine upon a maximum sum which they feel it is right for each of their classes of emloyés to earn per day, whether their men work by the day or piece.
( ... ... )
2018년 1월 26일 금요일
[탐색] Excerpts: Ray Fisman & Tim Sullivan, A. M. Spence
※ 발췌 (excerpts):
출처 1: Ray Fisman and Tim Sullivan, The Inner Lives of Markets, Public Affairs, 2016. p. 64.
[Spence] was impressed with Akerlof's work not because it was news to him that sometimes market participants had information that others didn't: he and his advisors had a reading group where they discussed exactly this set of issues on a weekly basis. Rather, as Spence explained in his 2001 Nobel lecture, what Akerlof had done was to go beyond the mere existence of lemons to elucidate and analyze the consequences for how markets worked and, equally importantly, how they failed.[Note 3]
─ Note 3 refers to A. M. Spence's Nobel lecture, which encourages someone to look for source 3 below (the Nobel lecture) to see how Spence explained, in his lecture, what Akerlof had done, including Spence's description of Akerlof's "go[ing] beyond the mere existence of lemons to elucidate and analyze the consequences for how markets worked and ... how they failed."
출처 2: The Case for Neck Tattoos, According to Economists (Ray Fisman and Tim Sullivan 지음. The Atlantic, 2016년 6월 13일)
When it comes to demonstrating commitment, talk is cheap. Stamping a symbol where anyone can see it isn't.
( ... ... )
It's easy to think of an Ivy League credential as a useful signal, but a gang tattoo is doing much the same job as a Harvard degree.
( ... ... )
In the early 1970s, an economist named Michael Spence proposed a theoretical model that explains how people manage to go beyond cheap talk and that also, perhaps in advertently, helps to illuminate why Robert Torres ended up with San Fer tattooed across the back of his neck (even though Spence, a very proper and vaguely aristocratic Rhodes Scholar, probably never contemplated the issue of neck tatoos).
CF. ( ... ) By the time [Michael Spence] defended his thesis in 1972, he'd provided an answer to the cheap talk problem that also, perhaps inadvertently, helps to explain why Robert Torres ended up with San Fer tattooed across the back of his neck (even though we're sure Spence, a very proper and vaguely aristocratic Rhodes Scholar never contemplated the issue of hand and neck tattoos). [Same authors, The Inner Lives of Markets, Public Affairs, 2016. p. 63.]Spence was interested in phenomena that appeared contrary to the predictions of standard economic models. Why, for instance, do prospective employees waste time at company recruiting events? It's sure not because they're learning much about McKinsey or Microsoft by doing so. And why do companies recruit out of so many universities that provide their students with esoteric knowledge that won't make them any more productive in the working world?
CF. Spence was interested in phenomena that appeared contrary to the predictions of standard economic models. Why, for instance, do prospective employees waste time at company recruiting events? It's sure not because they're learning much about McKinsey or Microsoft by doing so. And why do companies recruit out of so many universities that provide their students with esoteric knowledge that won't make them any more productive in the working world? [Same authors, The Inner Lives of Markets, Public Affairs, 2016. p. 64.]
In Spence's formulation, hiring a worker is essentially a spin of the roulette wheel: Depending on what comes up, you might get a conscientious, productive worker or an incompetent, shirking one. There are plenty of steps that employers can and do take to make the hiring decision less of a gamble. They consider, consciously or not, whether the applicant is short or tall, black or white, male or female. Based on prior experiences or stereotypes they've formed, recruiters may make a positive or negative judgment of what the applicant would probably be like once he or she starts showing up for work. Whether it's legal or moral (or even correct), everyone judges people based on all sorts of characteristics that a person is essentially born into.
CF. In Spence's classic formulation, hiring a worker is essentially a spin of the roulette wheel: depending on what comes up, you might get a conscientious, productive worker or an incompetent, shirking one. (It's often hard to distinguish incompetent from delibertate obstructionism, and on some level it doesn't matter to the employer─either way not much gets done[note 4]
There are plenty of steps that employers can and do take to make the hiring decision less of a gamble. They may consider, consciously or not, whether the applicant is short or tall, black or white, male or female. Based on prior experiences or stereotypes they've formed, recruiters may make a positive or negative judgment of what the applicant would probably be like once he starts showing up for work. Whether it's legal or moral (or even correct), we judge people based on all sorts of characteristics that a person is essentially born into. [Same authors, The Inner Lives of Markets, Public Affairs, 2016. p. 65.]Then there are the choices candidates make in presentening themselves to a prospective employer: Whether short or tall, black or white, male or female, one needs to decide whether to wear a suit or jeans, or to show up clean-cut or shaggy, or like Torres, covered in tattoos. On a resume one can choose to offer up one's undergraduate GPA, and mention that it was from an Ivy League institution, or one can avoid saying much of anything about one's educatio at all.
CF. Then there are the choices we make in presenting ourselfves to a prospective employer: short or tall, black or white, male or female, you need to decide whether to wear a suit or jeans, or to show up clean-cut or shaggy, or, like Torres, covered in tattoos. On your resume you can choose to offer up your undergraduate GDP, and mention that it was from an Ivy League institution, or you can avoid saying much of anyting about your education at all. [same authors, Ibid, p. 65]It could be argued that lots of these aren't exactly choices: Harvard chooses its students, not the other way around. Acing advanced calculus is similarly something that is out of reach for many, so not everyone can be a math majr with a 4.0 GPA.
CF. You might counter that lots of these aren't exactly choices either: Harvard chooses you, not the other way around. Acing advanced calculus is similarly something that is out of reach for many, so not all of us can be a math major with a 4.0 GPA. [same authors, Ibid, p. 65]That's correct, sort of. But it can also be thought of this way: the cost of adding a credential to a resume or presenting oneself in a particular way at an interview is higher for some applicants than for others. In an sense, the "cost" for many of getting into Harvard and making it to graduation is infinite─it's just not within the realm of possibility. For a math whiz or a music prodigy, it may not be that difficult to get in and cost through whatever the Harvard curriculum might throw at them. A driven, conscientious, and reasonably bright young person might also put together a Harvard-worthy college application without too much trouble, relatively speaking.
CF. That's correct, sort of. But you can also think of it this way: the cost of adding a credential to your resume or presenting yourself in a particular way at an interview is higher for some applicants than for others. In a sense, the "cost" for many of getting into Harvard and making it to graduation in infinite─it's just not within the realim of possibility. For a math whiz or a music prodigy, it may not be that difficult to get in and coast through whatever the Harvard curriculum might throw at them . A driven, conscientious, and reasonably bright young person might also put together a Harvard-worthy college aplication without too much trougle, relatively speaking. [same authors, Ibid, p. 65]
( ... ... )
It's easy to think of an Ivy League degree as a useful signal and why people would want to get one if they could. Less so for Roberto Torres's San Fer gang tattoo, even though it's doing much the same job as the Harvard degree. What makes it hard for most people to think of a prominent tattoo in this way is that they're focused on the awful cost of having to go through life with dimmed employment prospects and possibly even a crosshairs on your chest.
CF. ( Many applications are downright counterintuitive. ) It's easy to think of an Ivy League degree as a useful signal and why you'd want to get one if you could. Less so for Roberto Torres and his San Fer gang tattoo. But it's doing much the same job as the Harvard degree. What makes it hard for most of us to think of it in this way is that we're focused on the awful cost of having to go through life with dimmed employment prospects and possibly even a crosshairs on you chest. [Ibid, p.67]( ... ... )
출처 3: A. Michael Spence, “Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets,” Prize Lecture, December 8, 2001.
INTROUCTION
( ... ... ) In the course of that seminar there were discussions of statistical discrimination and many other subjects that relate to the incompleteness of information in markets. One of my advisers came in one day with the strong suggestion that I read a paper he had just read called "The Markets for Lemons" by George Akerlof.[주]2 ( ... ) I was quite electrifying. There we all found a wonderfully clear and plausible analysis of the performance characteristics of a market with incomplete and asymmetrically located information. That, combined with my puzzlement about several aspects of the discussion of the consequences of incomplete information in job markets, pretty much launched me on a search for things that I came to call signals, that would carry information persistently in equilibrium from sellers to buyers, or more generally from those with more to those with less information.[주]3 The issue, of course, was that signals are not terribly complicated things in games where the parties have the same incentives, i.e., where there is a commonly understood desire to communicate accurate information to each other. ( ... ... )
I was asked recently by a somewhat incredulous questioner (actually a journalist) whether it was true that you could be awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics for simply noticing that there are markets in which certain participants don't know certain things that others in the market do know. I thought it was pretty funny. It was as if this had somehow been closely guarded secret up until about 1970, at least in economics. I clearly cannot speak for those who make decisions about the Nobel Prize, but I suspect that the correct answer to that question is no. What did blossom at that time was a serious attempt by many talented economists to capture in applied microeconomic theory a whole variety of aspects of market structure and performance. That work produced a partial melding of theory, industrial organization, labor economics, finance and other fields. An important early part of that effort was the attempt to capture ^informational^ aspects of market structure to study the ways in which markets adapt, and the consequences of informational gaps for market performance.
Therefore, in answer to the question, we noticed that there are many markets with informational gaps. ( ... ) These informational gaps were widely acknowledged and those of us who taught applied microeconomic theory, freely admitted that these gaps might change some of the performance characteristics, not to mention the institutional structure, of markets in which they appear. But I think it is fair to say that we did not have much systematic knowledge based on theory of what those changes might be. ( ... ... )
The plan for this lecture ( ... ) first, the simplest model that I can devise that illustrates in reasonably general form the definitions and properties of signaling equilibria.[주]6 Next, we will allow the signal (in this case education in the job market context), to contribute directly to the productivity of the individual as well as functioning as a signal. Following that, the paper examines a market in which there is signaling and both separating and pooling in the equilibrium.
( ... ... )
THE SIMPLEST JOB OF MARKET SIGNALING MODEL
The idea behind the job market signaling model is that there are attributes of potential employees that the employer cannot observe and that affect the individual's subsequent productivity and hence value to the employer on the job. Let us suppose that there are just two groups of people. Group 1 has productivity or value to any employers of 1, and Group 2 has productivity of 2. In this example, these productivity values do not depend on the level of investment in the signal. If there were no way to distinguish between people in these two groups then if both groups stay in the market, the average wage would be 2－α, where α is the fraction of the population in group 1, and everyone would get that wage. If the higher productivity group through disatisfaction or for any other reason, exits this labor market, the average productivity and the wage drops to 1. This phenomenon when it occurs is sometimes called the adverse selection problem, a label most commonly applied to insurance markets. It is structurally the same problem that Akerlof described in his famous paper on used cars (lemons).
( ... ... )
[발췌] 로즈 장학생
※ 발췌 (excerpts):
출처 1: Rhodes Scholars, Oxford, and the Creation of an American Elite (Thomas J. Schaeper, Kathleen Schaeper 지음. Berghahn Books, 2010)
Each year 32 seniors at American universities are awarded Rhodes Scholarships. These students then spend two or three years studying at the University of Oxford in Britain. The scholarships were founded by Cecil Rhodes, the British colonialist and entrepeneur, who died in 1902. This program has become the most famous academic scholarship in the world. It is the "glittering prize," and the lucky students are "golden boys" (and since 1976, "golden girls") who reputedly have a "ticket to success" for the rest of their lives. Over the decades the winners have included scientists such as Edwin Hubble, writers such as Robert Penn Warren, jurists such as Byron White, and politicians such as J. William Fullbright and Bill Clinton. ( ... ... )
( ... ... ) We spent most of each summer observing how our American students adapted to Oxford--and how Oxford adapted to them. We were curious to see if any detailed study had ever been done on Rhodes Scholars. Outside of the many short newspaper and magazine articles that have appeared regularly throughout the century, we found that there was no recent, thorough book on the subject. ( ... ... )
We therefore concluded that the time had come for an extended examination of this subject. What kinds of people have won the scholarships? What did these students do in Oxford? What did they achieve in their later careers? ( ... ... )
( .... ... ) We focus on American Rhodes Scholars, who have made up roughly 40% of the total. As far as we know, no one yet has done a thorough study of Rhodes Scholars from Canada, Australia, India, and the other countries participating in the program. ( ... ... )
We hope that Rhodes Scholars will forgive two small liberties that we take throughout the following pages. Among Rhodes Scholars, the sentiment is, "once a Rhodes Scholar, always a Rhodes Scholar." One is never a "former" scholar. However, in order to avoid confusion, we use "former" when we refer to those who have completed their studies in Oxford and begun their careers. Also, among Rhodes Scholars, the proper way to identify oneself is to give one's state, Oxford College, and class year. Students who try for the scholarship have the option of applying to the selectin committee in either their home state or in the state where they will graduate from college. Bill Clinton, for example, had the option of applying from Arkansas or, as a student at Georgetown University, from Washington, DC. He chose the former. In Oxforf he studies at University of College. Therefore his proper Rhodes Scholar identification is "Arkansas and University 1968." For the sake of brevity, throughout this book we eliminate the state and college. At the first mention of a person we will give his or her class year.
출처 2: http://digitalassets.lib.berkeley.edu/roho/ucb/text/ball_markham_2014.pdf
( ... ... ) Every time the American Secretary of the Rhodes Trust would come to Oxforf, my wife and I would be invited to tea or sherry at Rhodes House and we would chat with the warden of Rhodes House and the American secretary. Obviously the question on their minds, not articulated, of course, to us, was does getting married ruin the capacity of one of our scholars to be a proper Rhodes Scholar? The answer was no, it did not impair, and I think it was the year after we left that Rhodes Scholars could be married.
출처 3: http://www.koreadaily.com/news/read.asp?art_id=4803452 (2016년 11월)
세계적인 장학 프로그램인 로즈 장학생(Rhodes Scholar)에 하버드 대학에 재학중인 한인 학생이 선정됐다. 로즈 장학재단은 하더브 4학년생인 낸시 고(21)씨가 미국에서 선정된 32명의 장학생 중 한 명에 포함됐다고 지난 19일 발표했다. 브루클린 출신인 고씨는 올해 로즈장학생 중 유일한 한인이며, 하버드대에서는 고씨를 포함해 총 4명이 뽑혔다.
고씨는 본지와의 전화 인터뷰에서 "장학생으로 선발될 것으로 기대하지도 않았는데 뜻밖의 결과를 얻어 기쁘고 감격스럽다"고 소감을 밝혔다. 현재 역사와 중동학을 복수전공하고 있는 고씨는 내년 봄 하버드대를 졸업한 후 옥스퍼드 대학에서 중동 근대사 연구석사(MPhil) 과정을 밟을 계획이다.
2018년 1월 25일 목요일
Dic/ show me the money
─ Used as a humorous urging that a statement be backed up. A key catchphrase in the US in the late 1990s.
- TIDWELL: It's a very personal, very important thing. It's a family motto. So I want to share it with you. You ready?
- JERRY: Yes. TIDEWEKK: Here it is. "Show me the money." Show. Me. The. Money. ─ Jerry Maguire, 1996.
...... 링크
─ 1. ( ... ... ) In the literal sense, this is a request to back up talk with cash. In the figurative sense it is a request to back up talk with substantive action.
2. Don't make promise and exaggerate the complexity of things, just come up with what is expected or required. ( ... ... )
- ‘Money is the problem,’he [NY Governor Rockerfeller] said. The Governor was skeptical of Federal efforts, asserting there was a great deal of talk but little action. ‘Show me the money,’ he demanded. ─ NYT, 5 Feb 1970.
- Bernhard came to court yesterday ready to defend his client in what he thought would be the start of a first-degree murder trial. ‘Either they are ready or they are not ready,’ Bernhard argued. ‘Show me the money, get your cards on the table. Get ready for trial’... ─ WP, 29 Mar 2005.
- CNN anchor Jack Cafferty: Wolf, Barack Obama's speech today on race may turn out to have been a blessing in disguise. Perhaps the biggest question surrounding the senator from Illinois was whether he had the stomach for the kind of bare-knuckle campaign he's likely to face at the hands of the Republican if he's the nominee. Pastor Jeremiah Wright gave Obama the chance to show us the money. CNN: Situation Room, 18 Mar 2008.
Music/ Teen Daze's Glacier
Take a look and listen here to this nice composer's music: https://teendaze.bandcamp.com/
His full album, Glacier, on Youtube:
Dic/ club music
※ 발췌 (excerpts):
출처 1: 2017년 클럽에서 가장 많이 들어봤던 곡 (유튜브, 2017년 9월 5일)
출처 2: The 25 best club tracks of 2017 (Gabe Meier, The Fact Magazine, 2017년 12월 14일)
Gabe Meier ... selects the year's biggest, best and most innovative tracks from shifting world of ^underground club music^.
2017 proved once again that club music is thriving across the globe, as brand new artists and legends alike turned in material destined for classic status. While our monthly ^For Club Use Only^ ( http://www.factmag.com/tag/for-club-use-only/ ) column proved that fresh artists, labels and styles continue to emerge across the world, the past year also saw labels like Hyperdub, Planet Mu and Local Action embrace an eclectic release strategy that appealed to both younger fans of ^club music^ and other heads alike.
In Lisbon, the Principe crew ( ... ... ). In the UK, Night Slugs and Swing Ting ( ... ... ). In New York and New Jersey, familiar names like DJ Jayhood and MikeQ in continued to impress while younger artists such as AMG and DJ Yae pushed Jersey and Baltimore club into faster, more extreme territor.
출처 3: Baltimore Club Music (Urban Dictionary)
A type of house music that has 130 BPM, influences from R&B, rap, crunk, 80s synths, techno, and rock, samples that one wouldn't expect to make a song from, such as President Bush's stutter in a recent speech of his, and allows people to dance their pain away while inticing fights and moshipits at the same time. ( ... ... )
출처 4:
2018년 1월 22일 월요일
[발췌] Tender Offer
※ 발췌 (excerpts):
출처 1: 공개매수의 정의와 범위에 관한 고찰 (서완석 지음. 성균관법학 17권 3호, 2005년 12월)
( ... ... ) 미국의 경우, 회사 인수 방법들 중에서 공개 매수의 이용이 증가하면서 투자자 보호의 문제가 대두되자 미 의회는 이에 대한 대응책을 마련하기 위해 1934년 법을 수정한 Williams Act를 통과시켰다. 그러나 동태적인 증권 시장의 특성상 장래 다양한 형태의 거래가 등장할 것을 예상하여 '공개 매수'에 관한 정의 규정을 동 법에 두고 있지 않다.[주]4 따라서 Williams Act[주]5 하에서 이루어지는 대부분의 소소은 '공개 매수'의 개념(meaning)을 둘러싸고 일어나고 있다고 해도 과언이 아닌 것 같다.[주]6 그런데 주요국들 주에서 한국과 일본을 제외하고 공개 매수에 관한 정의 규정을 두고 있는 나라는 거의 없는 것으로 보인다.
[주]5. ( ... ... ) 1934년 법에 다섯 개 규정을 추가시켰고, 이 중 §14(d)와 §14(e) 두 개가 공개 매수를 규율하는 규정이다.
[주]6. Rusty A. Fleming, "A Case of "When" rather than "What:" Tender Offers under the Williams Act and the all holders and best price rules," .... , 2003.
한국 증권거래법은 공개 매수를 "불특정 다수인에 대하여 주식 등의 매수(다른 유가증권과의 교환을 포함한다)의 청약을 하거나 매도(다른 유가증권과의 교완을 포함한다)의 청약을 권유하고 유가증권 시장 및 코스닥 시장 밖에서 당해 주식 등을 매수하는 것"이라고 정의해 놓고 있다(증권거래법 21조 3항). 이는 일본 증권거래법을 본따 만들어진 것이다. 일본의 증권거래법이 공개 매수의 개념을 법정해놓고 있는 있유는 공개 매수의 성립 범위를 명확히 하여 공개 매수를 통한 증권 거래의 법적 안정성을 기하려는 데 있다고 할 수 있을 것이고, 한국 증권거래법의 입법 취지 또한 그러하다 할 것이다.
출처 2: The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 86. No. 7. May 1973. pp. 1250-1281)
Section 14(d) and 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act (1934 Act) regulate "tender offer," but at no point do they define what a "tender offer" is. As a result the Securities and Exchange Commission, courts, and practitioners have had the task of determining, in a increasing number of instances, whether particular securities transactions are tender offers and thus subject to the rather extensive regulatory requirements of these sections. A number of practitioners have argued that Congress intended to regulate only those transactions conforming to the conventional understanding of tender offer in 1968, when sections 14(d) and 14(e) were enacted as part of the Williams Act.[주]3 But several judicial and SEC staff interpretations have rejected that contention, classifying securities transactions that are clearly inconsistent with the conventional understanding as tender offers within the meaning of the 1934 Act.
This note first considers the conventional understand of a ( ... ... )
출처 3: Negotiated Acquisitions of Companies, Subsidiaries and Divisions (Lou R. Kling 지음. Law Journal Press, 2016)
※ 발췌 (excerpt): Overview of the Acquisition Process
This chapter will provide an overview of the acquisition process. Specifically, we will discuss many of the basic questions relating to the acquisition process. How does an acquisition get done? What are the steps in the process? What are the different ways of structuring a transaction? What does an acquisition agreement look like generally? What are its component part? What are the parties' roles?
Threshold questions, of course, relate to the motivation and economics of any particular transaction. Whay acquire this particular company? What price should be paid? Should the form of consideration be cash, common stock, preferred stock, short or long term debt securities, warrants or anything else? Does the purchase price need to be adjusted post-closing? Should there be an earn-out? These issues are often answered, at least withing certain basic parameters, before the lawyers for either side become involved. However the resolution of these questions can have significant corporate, tax, and structuring implicatins an it is not at all unusual for any number of these basic decisions to be again examined once the lawyers are brought into the process.[주]1 The Authors will not deal with these economic questions,[주]2 except insofar as they affect legal, structuring or tax issues.
Acquisition Methods
If one corporation("P") wishes to acquire the business of another[주]1 ("T"), there are essentially three different methods which could be used:
(1) a stock purchase;
(2) an asset purchase; and
(3) a merger under state law.[주]2
It makes no difference whether T is a subsidiary of another corporation, privately owned by individuals, trusts or other entities, or a public corporation;[주]3 any of the three methods may be used. Similarly, it makes no difference whether the purchase price is payable in cash, common or preferred stock, debentures, notes, bonds, warrants or other properties.[주]4 Moreover, virtually the same contractual representations and warranties, covenants, conditions and indemnities can be built into any of the three methods.[주]5
[1] Stock Purchases
In many respects, the stock purchase is the simplest method of acquisition. P purchases the stock of T from its shareholders. Each shareholder makes its own decision whether or not to sell. The acquisition agreement is a stock purchase agreement between P and the shareholders of T; there may be a different agreement with each shareholder, one agreement signed by all of the T shareholders or anything in between.[주]6 Indeed, a purchaser can acquire less than the entire equity interest in T by not purchasing all of the outstanding T stock.[주]7 T may, but need not, itself be a party to the agreement.[주]8 T will continue in existence as a corporation following the acquisition as a subsidiary of P, wholly owned if all of its stock were acquired. T's shareholders will directly receive the purchase price, be it cash, securities or other property, from P.
[2] Asset Purchases
Instead of acquiring the outstanding stock of T, P could acquire the business conducted by T by purchasing all of T's assets and assuming all of its liabilities and obligations.[주]9 Again, T continues in existence as a corporation. However, the situation is different from the purchase of stock of T discussed above in two important respects. First, T is still owned by its prior shareholder; it has not become a subsidiary of P. Similarly, P now owns, directly, what had formerly been T's assets, and P is now responsible for the liabilities and obligations of T assumed by it.[주]10 T, by contrast, no longer holds what had been its assets or (to the extent P has agreed to take them) its liablities (although, absent third party releases, T generally will remain liable for its obligations, with rights against P if it fails to discharge them). Second, the purchase price has been paid to T, not to the shareholders of T. If these shareholders wish to receie such cash amounts or other property, they will have to liquidate T, have T declare a dividend on its outstanding stock or obtain such consideration in some other manner.
[3] Mergers
Mergers are creatures of state corporate law. Unlike purchases of stock or assets, the ability of two companies to merge is solely a function of a statutory enabling provision.[주]11
A merger of T into P results, as a matter of statutory definition, in P automatically succeeding to all of T's assets and all of T's liabilities.[주]12 Thus, at the ^corporate^ level, a merger is similar to a sale of all the assets of T to P and assumption of all of T's liabilities by P. The only difference in legal effect[주]13 is that, in the latter case, T remains in existence, still owned by its former shareholders; by contrast, in a merger, again as a result of the applicable corporate statute, T disappears. T simply goes out of existence or, perhaps more accurately, disappears into P.[주]14 From the viewpoint of the shareholders of T, however, the merger operates more like a stock purchase in which they all participate (except to the extent any such shareholder exercises in the merger any available disseters' appraisal rights [주]15). The T stock held by the T shareholders is converted in the merger, again as a result of the operation of the applicable state statute, into the consideration to be paid by P in the transaction. This consideration could under the law of most states be securities, including stock, of P (or of any other entity), cash or other property.[주]16 The two companies merging, often referred to as the "constituent corporations," are both parties to the acquisition agreement. Sometimes (particularly in a three-party subsidiary merger transaction discussed below) the acquiring parent will also be a party to the agreement.[주]17
[4] Three-Party Mergers. ( ... ... )
[5] Binding Share Exchanges. ( ... ... )
[6] Short-Form Mergers. ( ... ... )
[7] Reversing the Structure. ( ... ... )
[8] Some Variations
[a] Mergers of Equals. ( ... ... ) a number of merger transactin structures are possible:
(1) P can merge into T,
(2) T can merge into P;
(3) P can merge into S, a subsidiary of T;
(4) S can merge into P, which becomes a subsidiary of T;
(5) T can merge into Q, a subsidiary of P; and
(6) Q can merge into T, which becomes a subsidiary of P.
( ... ... )
[b] Target Repurchase as Part of the Acquisition Structure. On occasion it may be advantageous for the acquisition to be structured as an acquisition of stock (either from an existing shareholder or of newly issued shares directly from the target) by the acquiror, coupled with a repurchase of some or all of its remaining shares outstanding by the target. If the target is public, the repurchase will be accomplished as an issuer tender offer. If fewer than all of the outstanding shares are repurchased, the transaction will leave outstanding some of the shares owned by the former target shareholders. In this case the transaction arguably resembles a recapitalization more closely than an acquisition, although even in this case control can be acquired. ( ... ... )
[9] Acquisition of Less than an Entire Company. ( ... ... )
[10] Acquisition of Partnerships and Limited Partnerships. ( ... ... )
[11] Issues to be Considered in the Different Structures. ( ... ... )
The Purchase Price: Cash v. Non-Cash; Adjustment Mechanisms and the Effect of Seasonality
( ... ... )
* * *
Chapter 16. Acquisitions of Public Companies
16.01 Introduction
16.02 Multistep Transactions
[1] Basic Transaction
[2] Stock Purchase and Option Agreements
[3] Tender Offer
[4] The Merger
( ... ... )
2018년 1월 20일 토요일
[발췌] The Winner's Curse in Bilateral Negotiations
참고: Ray Fisman and Tim Sullivan, The Inner Lives of Markets, Public Affairs, 2016. pp. 55-57.
원출처: William F. Samelson and Max H. Bazerman, “The Winner's Curse in Bilateral Negotiations,” Working Paper. September 1984. Boston University & Alfred P. Sloan School of Manangement, MIT.
※ 발췌 (excerpts):
원출처를 제공하는 자료 1: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/38009562_The_winner%27s_curse_in_bilateral_negotiations
1. INTROUCTION
( ... ... ) However, Bazerman and Neale (1983; Bazerman, 1983) have provided substantial evidence that negotiators deviate from rationality in systematically predictable ways. Short of the ideal of fully rational behavior, how will negotiations proceed? How should an individual negotiate when only imperfect or limited informatin about the negotiation setting is available? When he or she has worse informatin than the other side and both know it? What negotiating procedures are successful in reaching mutually beneficial agreements?
This paper addresses these questions and presents experimental evidence on bilateral bargaiing behavior under uncertainty. A main finding is that [:]
- under asymmetric information, negotiators systematically deviate from normative behavior and, consequently, fall prey to the "winner's curse"--that is, they consistently (and voluntarily) enter into loss-making purchases and forego profit-making opportunities.
- These losses results because subjects act as if the other party has the same information as themselves. For example, many uninformed buyers make expected losses on transactions because they fail to anticipate the informed opponent's profit-making bargaining behaviour.
- In turn, informed sellers, when given the opportunity to make price offers, fail to take full advantage of their information advantage.
- In short, both negotiators--informed and uninformed party alike--fail to recognize the force of information asymmetry.
The additional research supports the more general conclusion that competitive decision makers systematically ignore the impact that the decisions of other parties can have with respect to their optimal behavior. A good example is the dollar auction exercise (Shubik, 1971; Teger, 1980) in which the highest bidder in an oral auction pays its bid and receives the dollar, and the second highest bidder pays its bid and receives nothing in return. The common result in this auction is an escalating pattern in which individuals bid far in excess of a dollar and which produces significant profits for the auctioneer. Why do bidders get involved? One explanatin is that individuals see the potential for profit early in the auction, and fail to take the perspective of what the auction will look like to other bidders. If the bidder considers the dollar auction from the point of view of both competitors, it is easy to see the benefit of staying out of the auction. Overall, there is substantial evidence that competing decision makers fail to consider the impact of the conditional behavior of the other parties in making decision.[주]2
The analysis of the winner's curse in the negotiation setting relies on the follw[ing] example:
One firm (the acquirer) is considering making an offer to buy out another firm (the target). The complication is that the acquirer is uncertain about the ultimate value of the firm. Though it has reason to believe that the target will be worth more under its management than under present ownersip, the acquirer (even after making its best estimates) does not know the target's ultimate value. Target management, on the other hand, has an accurate estimate of the value and so shares none of the acquirer's uncertainty. In these circumstances, (1) what final price offer should the acquirer make for the target? (2) Alternatively, if the target company has the opportunity to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer, what price should it name? Should the acquirer accept it?
Two features are present in the example above. First, the aspect of the problem of greatest interest to economists is the opportunity for mutual gain. The fact that the company is more valuable in the hands of the acquirer than under present management means that ex post there is a price at which both sides can profit from the sale. Second, the value of the transaction is uncertain, and one side has has different (better or worse) informatin about the uncertain value than the other. For example, the target firm's management ordinarily has proprietary information about its operations which is not available via published accounting reports or in other forms to the acquirer or other outsiders. (Of course, the acquirer may also have information about the firm's value under new management which the target doesn't have.)
This asymmetry of information should put the less well-informed party on guard. For instance, the management board of the acquiring firm might reason as follows:
The first fact is that we are uncertain about the ultimate value of the target. If we extend an offer to target management and it is accepted, are we going to be sold a ‘bill of goods’? After all, it is more likely that target management will unload an ailing company than a healthy one. By making a low offer, will we simply be getting what we paid for or even less than what we paid for? What constitutes a profit-making offer? Indeed, is there any offer which, if accepted, will provide a positive expected profit from the transaction?
This paper presents the results of a series of bargaining experiments designed to test equilibrium and naive models of bargaining behavior under uncertainty, where, as in the example above, one party is less well-informed than the other. Our approach and conclusions are both normative and positive in nature. The normative analysis offers a prescription for a rational individual's optimal bargaining strategy and examines the welfare implications of such behavior. As will be shown, even very simple bargains under uncertainty require individuals to make subtle probabilistic inferences about the potential value of the transaction. Moreover, in contrast to agreements under certainty, bargains under uncertainty present a direct conflict between individual self-interest and group welfare. Optimal bargaining behavior may preclude the attainment of mutually beneficial agreements even when it is common knowledge that such agreement exist. In short, a normative analysis identifies imperfect information as a potential barrier to mutually beneficial transactions.
A positive analysis investigates the actual bargaining behavior of individuals under laboratory conditions. ( ... ... ) Indeed, in one bargaining experiment, the vast majority of subjects actually pursued bargaining strategies predicted to generate expected losses on average--a strategy which no rational (risk neutral or risk averse) bargainer would voluntarily pursue. Similarly, informed sellers, when given the opportunity to make price offers, failed to take full advantage of their information advantage.
A final result is that actual subject bargaining behavior, though individually suboptimal, is collectively advantageous. Because observed bargaining strategies are more "cooperative" than the normative benchmark, the frequency of agreements exceeds that which would pertain in equilibrium. ( ... ... )
Section 2: three different versions of the basic negotiation model used throughout the paper.
Section 3: normative and "naive" analysies of each version.
Section 4: an experimental test of the negotiation model. ( ... ... )
2. THE NEGOTIATION MODEL
The basis for the experiments that were conducted consists of three versions of a short bargaining exercise entitled “Acquiring a Company”, which are reproduced in the appendix. The generic elements of the bargaining model underlying the exercise can be formally described as follows:
A target and potential acquirer are negotiating over the sale of a good of uncertain value. Denote the monetary value of the good to the target by v. This value is known by the target but not by the acquirer who regards v as a random variable with cumulative probability distribution F(v). In turn, denote the value of the good to the acquirer by w(v). This functional notation indicates that the value of the good to the target may vary with the value to the acquirer. Whatever the value of v, the good is always worth at least as much to the acquirer than to the target--that is, [w(v)- v]?? for all possible v. Both sides know the functions F(v) and w(v), but only the target knows the specific values of v and w. Concerning these last two values, the acquirer has only the probabilistic information given by F(v).
In the experiments, three different versions of the negotiation exercise were used. These were created by varying slightly the parameters of the negotiation situation. Employing the notation introduced above, the main features of each of the versions can summarized as follows:
Version 1. w(30) = 30 0 for v < 30
and F(v) = 1/2 for 30 ≤ v ≤ 60
w(60) = 130 1 for v ≥60
Version 2. w(v) = v + 30 and F(v) = v/100 , for v ∈ [0, 100]
Version 3. w(v) = 1.5v and F(v) = v/100 , for v ∈ [0, 100]
Version 1 is the simplest of the three and employs a discret probability distribution over two values of v. Note that the acquirer's value is strictly greater than the target's value only in the case that v = 60. In turn, verions 2 and 3 shae a uniform distribution of possible values but differ in the functional form describing the acquirer's 'absolute advantage' for the good, w(v)-v. In version 2, the acquirer's advantage is constant for all v. In version 3, the advantage is proportional to v.[주]3
The bargaining procedures employed in the experiments are of a very simple kind. One party, either the acquirer or the target, makes a "fist and final" price offer which the other can accept or reject.[주]4 If the offer is accepted, a sale takes place at the offer price. If not, there is no sale, and no money changes hands. In corprate acquisitions, the most common practice is for the acquiring company to make a tender offer which the target can accept or reject. Alternatively, the target management, cognizant of the firm's true value, could name a "buy out" price. In the experiments, both procedures, acquirer and target offers, were used.
3. NORMATIVE AND NAIVE HYPOTHESIS
The analysis of the experimental results relies on two competing hypotheses about subject bargaining behavior. Under normative behavior, subjects correctly account for the presence of informatin asyemmetry and employ optimal (i.e., equilibrium) bargaining strategies. Under naive behavior, bargainers employ simpler strategies which ignore the information asymmetry. Specifically, naive model predicts that bargainers will act as if the opponent has the same information as themselves. We examine both normative and naive hypotheses under 1) acquire "bids" and 2) target offers.
Acquirer Bids (Normative Behavior). First, consider the acquiring company's choice of bid. What price should it name for the target company's shares in each of the three versions of the bargaining model? Given the facts of Version 1, the management board of the acquiring company should reason as follows:
Any price bid between $30 and $60 will be accepted only by a low valued company worth $30. In the range, no profit is possible and the higher the price bid the larger is the possible loss. However, a price in excess of $60 per share will ^always^ be accepted by the target. Since the average acquisition value is (1/2)(30) + (1/2)(130) = $80 per share, a profit is possible at any price in the range $60 to $80 per share. Clearly, the most profitable bid is $60 per share (or if necessary, $60 + ε where ε is in the positive neighborhood of zero).
( ... ... )
Similar reasoning can be applied to determine the acquirer's optimal bid in Version 2. The management board reasons as follows:
Suppose we make a bid of (let us say) $30 per share. How often will this bid be accepted? The answer must be 30% of the time, since the target will accept if and only if the value under current management v is less than the bid. (All values between $0 and $100 per share are equally likely). What is the average value under curent management of companies thus sold? $15 per share, since all values between $0 and $30 are equally likely. The average value under our (the acquirer's) management? $45 per share, since the company is worth $30 per share more in our hands. Thus, in the event of an agreement, the average profit is $45 - $30 = $15. In turn, the acquirer's overall expected profit is (0.3)(15) or $4.5 per share.
There is a subtle but significant differences between the second and third versions of the bargaining experiment. In Version 3, the company, whatever the target's value, is worth 50% per share more to the acquirer that to the target, i.e., w(v) = 1.5v for all v. With this modification and employing a line of reasoining analogous to that of Version 2, the acquiring company's management board reasons as follows:
A bid of (let's say) $60 per share will be accepted 60% of the time by targets with an average value of $30 per share. Thus, the average acquisition value of such a company is 50% more or $45 per share. If accepted, our profit from this bid is, thus $45 - $60 or -$15 per share. Consequently, a $60 per share bid is ill-consdered.It's not hard to see that the same kind of reasoning applies to ^any^ positive price bid the acquirer might consider making. On average, the acquirer obtains a company wot 25% less than the price it pays. Thus, the acquirer's best bid is $0 per share, wiich, of course, is tantamount to making no bid.
Version 3 offers a graphic illustration of the tension between the opportunity for mutual gain and the impact of asymmetric informatin in simple bargaining situatins. Even though in all circumstances the firm is worth 50% more to the acquirer than to the target, any tender offer that the acquiring firm might make results in a loss on average. Indeed, the source of this barrier to trade stems from the presence of adverse selectin. A given bid will be accepted only by "low-value" companies with the result that the average value of acquisition falls short of the purchase price.
To sum up, the uninformed acquirer's optimal price bis are $60, $30, and $0 in the respective versions of the bargaining experiment.
( ... ... )
출처 2: Economics of Strategy (David Besank 외, John Wiley & Sons, 2009). 구글도서.
Identifying Undervalued Firms
Finally, a firm's shareholders may benefit from diversification if its managers are able to identify other firms that are undervalued by the stock market. Suppose, for ex., that firm B's stock is currently trading at $80 per share, but the manager of firm A determines that firm B is actually worth $100 per share. If firm A can purchase firm B for $80 per share, firm A will profit by $20 for each share of firm B purchased, even if no gains in efficiency are realized through the merger.
One can be somewhat skeptical of this justification for corporate diversification, esp. when the business of the acquired firm is unrelated to that of the acquiring firm. First, this argument requires that the market valuation of the target firm is incorrect ^and^ that no other investors have yet identified this fact. ( ... ... )
Second, announcement of merger proposal attract attention, frequently leading other potential acquirers to bid for the target firm. Bidding wars are not uncommon, and they serve to reduce the profit an acquiring firm can hope to earn through a merger. Consifer Verizon's February 2005 offer to purchase MCI for $6.75 billion. A rival telecom firm, Quest, quickly entered the bidding with an even higher offer. ( ... ) Verizon purchased MCI for $8.5 billion. ( ... ... )
Third, and perhaps most troubling, is the observation that successful bidders in auctions and similar sales arrangements tend to suffer from the "winner's curse." Consider a group of acquiring firms bidding for a target. Each bidder may have an estimate of the value of the target, and each will drop out of the bidding as the price surpasses that estimate. The firm with the most optimistic assessment of the target's value will win the bidding. Has the winner paid a price low enough that it can earn a profit from the purchase? Given that all other bidders' estimates of the target's value are below the final purchase price, it is likely that the winner has overpaid. As Max Bazerman and William Samuelson point out in their article "I Won Auction but Don't Want a Prize," unless diversifying firm knows much more about the target than other bidders do, it will probably pay too much to "win" the bidding.[주]13
출처 3: Anomalies: The Winner's Curse (Richard H. Thaler, Journal of Economic Perspective, Vol.2, No. 1. Winter 1988. pp. 191-202.)
( .... ... ) Next time that you find yourself a little short of cash for lunch, try the following experiment in your class. Take a jar and fill it with coins, noting the total value of the coins. Now auction off the jar to your class (offering to pay the winning bidder in bills to control for penny aversion). Chances are very high that the following results will be obtained: (1) average bid will be significantly less than the value of the coins (bidders are risk averse); (2) the winning bid will exceed the value of the jar. Therefore, you will have money for lunch, and your stuent will have learned first-hand about the "winner's curse."
The winner's curse is a concept that was first discussed in the literature by three Atlantic Richfield engineers, Capen, Clapp, and Campbell (1971). The idea is simple. Suppose many oil companies are interested in purchasing the drilling rights to a particular parcel of land. Let's assume that the rights are worth the same amount to all bidders, that is, the auction is what is called a ^common value^ auction. Further, suppose that each bidding firm obtains an estimate of the value of the rights from its experts. Assume that the estimates are unbiased, so the mean of the estimates is equal to the common value of the tract. What is likely to happen in the auction? Given the difficulty of estimating the amount of oil in a given location, the estimates of the experts will vary substantially, some far too high and some too low. Even if companies bid somewhat less than the estimate their expert provided, the firms whose experts provided high estimates will tend to bid more than the firms whose experts guessed lower. Indeed, it may occur that the firm that wins the auction will be the one whose experts provided the highest estimates. If this happens, the winner of the auction is likely to be a loser. The winner can be said to be "cursed" in one of two ways: (1) the winning bid exceeds the value of the tract, so the firm loses money; or (2) the value of the tract is less than the expert's estimate so the winning firm is disappointed. Call these winner's curse versions 1 and 2 respectively. Notice that the milder version 2 can apply even if the winning bidder makes profit, as long as the profit is less than expected at the time the bid was made. In either version the winner is unhappy about the outcome, so both definitions seem appropriate.
The winner's curse cannot occur if all the bidders are rational (see Cox and Isaac, 1984), so evidence of a winner's curse in marketing settings would constitute an anomaly. However, acting rationally in a common value auction can be difficult. Rational bidding requires first distinguishing between the expected value of the object for sale, conditioned only on the prior information available, and the expected value conditioned on winning the auction. Even if a bidder grasps this basic concept, version 2 of the winner's curse can occur if the bidder underestimates the magnitude of the adjustment necessary to compesate for the presence of other bidders.
In a first price auction there are two factors to consider, and they work in opposite directions. An increase in the number of other bidders implies that to win the auction you must bid more aggressively, but their presence also increases the chance that if you win, you will have overestimated the value of the object for sale--suggesting that you should bid less aggressively.[주]1 Solving for the optimal bid is not trivial. Thus, it is an empirical question whether bidders in various contexts get it right or are cursed. I will present some evidence, both from experimental and field studies, suggesting that the winner's curse may be a common phenomenom.
Experimental Evidence
The jar of coins example cited above has, in fact, been conducted under experimental conditions by Max Bazerman and William Samuelson (1983). Their subjects were MBA students taking microeconomics classes at Boston University. The objects auctioned off were jars of coins or other obects such as paper clips valued at four cents each. Unknown to the subjects, each jar had a value of $8. Subjects submitted sealed bids and were told that the highest bidder would receive the defined value of the object less his or her bid. A total of 48 auctions were conducted, 4 in each of 12 classes. No feedback was provided until the entire experiment was completed. Subjects were also asked to estimate the value of each jar (point estimates and 90% confience limits), and a $2 prize was offered for the best guess in each class.
The estimates of the actual values turned out to be biased downward. The mean estimates of the value of the jars was $5.13, well below the true value of $8.00. This bias, plus risk aversion, would tend to work against observing a winner's curse. Nevertheless, the mean winning bid was $10.01, producing an average loss to the winning bidder of $2.01. Clearly these experiments do not require large NSF granst!
Samuelson and Bazerman (1985) have run another series of experiments about the winner's curse in a different context. Try this problem yourself before continuing.
In the following exercise, you will represent Company A (the acquirer) which is currently considering acquiring Company T (the target) by means of a tender offer. You plan to tender in cash for 100% of Company T’s shares but are unsure how high a price to offer. The main complication is this: the value of the company depends directly on the outcome of a major oil exploration project it is currently undertaking.
The very viability of Company T depends on the exploration outcome. In the worst case (if the exploration fails completely), the company under current management will be worth nothing--$0 per share. In the best case (a complete success), the value under current management could be as high as $100 per share. Given the range of exploration outcomes, all share values between $0 and $100 per share are considered equally likely. By all estimates the company will be worth considerably more in the hands of Company A than under current management. In fact, whatever the value under current management, the company will be worth 50% more under management of Company A than under Company T.
The board of directors of Company A has asked you to determine the price they should offer for Company T's shares. This offer must be made now, before the outcome of the drilling project is known.
Thus, you (Company A) will not know the results of the exploration project when submitting your effort, but Company T will know the results when deciding whether or not to accept your offer. In addition, Company T is expected to accept any offer by Company A that is greater than or equal to the (per share) value of the company under its own management.
As the representative of Company A, you are deliberating over price offers in the range $0 /share to $150 / shre. What offer per share would you tender? (pp. 131-33)
※ 또 다른 원출처: William F. Samuelson and Max H. Bazerman (1985). "The Winner's Curse in Bilateral Negotiations," Research in Experimental Economics, 1985, 3, 105-137
The typical subject thinks about this problem roughly as follows: The firm has an expected value of $50 to Company T, which makes it worth $75 to Company A. Therefore if I suggest a bid somewhere between $50 and $75, Company A should make some money. This analysis fails to take into consideration the asymmetric information that is built into the problem. A correct analysis must calculate the expected value of the firm conditioned on the bid being accepted. If a bid B is accepted, the the company must be worth no more than B under current management for an average of B/2. Under new management, the average is 150% of this, or 3B/4, wihch is still less than B, so it is best not to bid at all. Thus, this problem produces an extreme form of the winner's curse in which any positive bid yields an expected loss to the bidder.
This experimentation was run in two conditins, one with monetary incentives and one without. The results, as shown in Table 1, are quite similar for the two conditions, with the bids in the condition with monetary incentives somewhat lower. In both conditions over 90% of the subects make positive bids, and a majority are in the range between $50 and $75.
Economists often respond to examples like this by hopothesizing that although people can be fooled once or twice by such a problem, they will figure out the trap with experience. Sheryl Weiner, Max Bazerman, and John Carrol (1987) have investigated this hypothesis by giving the "buy-a-firm" problem to 69 Northwestern MBA students via a microcomputer. All subjects repeated the experiment 20 times with financial incentives and feedback after each trial. The feedback included the "true" value of the company, whether their bid was accepted, and how much money they made or lost. Of the 69 subjects, 5 learned to bid one dollar or less by the end of the experiment. For these 5 subjects, the average trial in which they began to bid $1.00 or less was trial 8. There was no sign of any learning among the others; in fact the average bid drifted up over the last few trials. It may be possible to learn to avoid the winner's curse in this problem, but the learning is neither easy nor fast.
( ... ... )
출처 4: Game: The Winner's Curse
The winner's curse is a significant bidding problem that has been reported in many domains including bidding for oil leases, corporate takeovers, and baseball free agencies.[주]1 In a common value auction, the asset is worth the same amount to all the bidders. For example, when bidding on an oil lease, the value of the drilling rights are the same for all bidders. The bidders, however, might have different information on the value of the rights. Even if their estimates are, on average, unbiased, those with the highest expectatins are likely to bid the highest and, thus, are more likely to win the auction. In this situation the winner ends up a loser when the winning bid exceeds tha value of the drilling rights, leading to the bidder's profit being negative. Even in a less extreme situation in which the profit is positive, management may be disappointed if profits do not meet expectations. Note that the curse is potentially exacerbated when there are more bidders because the winning bid is likely to be even more extreme.
[주]1. For a review of the literature and in-depth discussion see Thaler, R.H., 1992, ^The Winner's Curse: Paradoxes and Anomalies of Economic Life^ (Princeton Univ. Press).Although researchers have shown that rational bidders will not fall prey to the winner's curse, to come up with the optimal bid is not an easy task, particularly in a new environment or as the number of bidders increases.[주]2 In addition, hubris or overconfidence may play a role in less than optimal bidding.[주]3
[주]2. On rational bidding, see Cox, J.C., and R.M. Isaac, 1984, "In search of the winner's curse," ^Economic Inquiry^ 22(4), 579-592.
[주]3. See Roll, R., 1986, "The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers," ^Journal of Business^ 59(2), 197-216.
A simple in-class exercise can be used to illustrate the winner's curse in a takeover game. All you need, in addtion to the one-page handout provided below, is a set of cards numbered 1-100. The exercise is from Samuelson and Bazerman who show that positive bids should not be submitted, though you will likely find that your students submit positive bids even with repetition.[주]4
[주]4. Samuelson, W. F., and M. H. Bazerman, 1985, “The winner’s curse in bilateral negotiations,” ^Research in Experimental Economics^ 3, 105-137.
In the game the student represents a firm considering a potential takeover. ( ... ) the target is worth 50% more under the new management. Still, uncertainty exists regarding the value of the target and the target's management learns its value before deciding on whether to accept an offer. The target's value falls anywhere between 0 and 100. Suppose, for example that a student bids 50. Perhaps it seems like a conservative bid to him because the expected value is 50. The target will accept the bid only if its value is less than 50. Notice that the student's expected value is incorrect because it fails to take into consideration the information the target has about firm value. If the target accepts an offer, on average the value of the target is half the bid (25 in our example). Even though the average value to the bidder is 1.5*25 = 37.5, the mean profit is negative (50 - 37.5 = -12.5). Thus, the value to the bidder is, on average, negative and the bidder can expect to lose 0.25*the bid.[주]5
STUDENT INSTRUCTIONS
You represent Company A (the acquirer) which is currently considering acquiring Company T (the target) by means of a tender offer. ( ... ... )
( ... ... ) As representative of Company A, you are deliberating over offer prices in the range of $0 to $150 per share. Please indicate your offer for period 1 in the following table. After everyone has indicated their offers, the value of Company T will be determined by drawing a card from a set of cards numbered 0 to 100. You can then determine whether your offer is accepted and the profits for your company. We will then repeat these steps a period at a time for periods 2 through 5.
(1) Period : ...
(2) Your offer ($0 to $150) : ....
(3) Value of T under current management : ....
(4) Value of T to A [$0 if (2) < (3), otherwise (3)*1.5] : ....
(5) Your profit [$0 if (2) < (3), otherwise (4)-(2)] : ....
출처 5 : 생각을 경영하라(민재형 지음. 청림출판, 2014). pp. 263~269.
( ... ... ) 주의 부족이 일으키는 고질적인 판단의 덫으로 승자의 저주winner's curse 현상을 들 수 있다. 승자의 저주가 발생하는 이유는 현명한 판단을 위해 이용할 수 있는 모든 정보를 고려하지 않고 간과하는 데 있다. 다음은 세계 유수의 경영 대학원 수업에서 사용된 문제다.[주]7
회사 A(인수자)는 회사 T(목표물)를 인수하려고 한다. 당신은 A사의 인수 대리인으로 T사의 주식 전량을 현금으로 매입할 계획인데, 주당 가격을 얼마로 해야 할지 현재 확신이 서지 않는다. 주당 가격을 결정하기 어려운 주된 이유는 T사의 가치가 현재 진행 중인 대형 유전 탐사 프로젝트의 결과에 달려 있기 때문이다.
사실 T사의 생존 여부 자체가 이 프로젝트의 결과에 달려 있다고 해도 과언이 아니라. 이 프로젝트가 실패로 끝나면 현재의 경영진이 이끄는 이 회사는 아무런 가치가 없게 되고, 따라서 주가는 0달러가 된다. 그러나 이 프로젝트가 성공을 거두면, 현재의 경영진이 이 회사를 이끌더라도 이 회사의 가치는 급등해서 주가가 100달러까지도 상승할 수 있을 것으로 예측되고 있다. 이 경우 회사 T의 주가는 0달러와 100달러 사이의 어떤 값도 될 수 있으며, 각각의 확률은 동일하다.
그러나 T사는 현재의 경영진 수중에 있을 때보다 A사 경영진 수중으로 넘어가면 가치가 훨씬 높아진다. 사실 T사는 현 경영진 하에서 그 가치가 얼마든 상관없이 A사 경영진이 맡게 되면 그 가치는 50퍼센트 상승할 것으로 예측되고 있다. 물론 유전 탐사 프로젝트가 실패하면 T사의 주식은 휴지 조각이 된다. 하지만 현재 진행 중인 유전 탐사 프로젝트가 성공해 현재 경영진 수중에서 T사의 주가가 50달러가 될 경우, A사가 인수하면 그 가치는 상승해 T사의 주가는 75달러가 된다. 마찬가지로 T사의 주가가 현 경영진 하에서 100달러라면 A사에 인수될 경우, 주가는 150달러가 된다. 즉 A사가 인수하게 되면 T사의 가치는 1.5배로 상승한다.
이제 당신은 A사의 이사회로부터 T사 주식의 인수 가격을 결정해달라는 요청을 받았다. 아직 유전 탐사 프로젝트의 결과가 밝혀지지는 않았지만 지금 인수 제안을 해야만 하는 상황이다. 모든 정황으로 볼 때 T사는 A사 이외의 다른 회사에 의한 인수 합병은 피하고 싶다. 그러나 T사는 지금 당신이 인수 제안을 하더라도 거기에 대한 수락 여부를 유전 탐사 프로젝트 결과가 나올 때까지 미루다가 그 결과가 언론에 알려지기 직전에 결정을 내릴 것이다. 결국 A사는 유전 탐사 프로젝트의 결과를 모르고 인수 제안을 해야 하지만, T사는 프로젝트의 결과를 알고 수락 여부를 결정할 수 있는 상황이다. T사는 A사가 제안한 주가가가 현재 경영진 하에서의 주가보다 조금이라도 높으면 그 인수 제안을 받아들일 것으로 예상된다.
이제 당신은 A사의 요청에 따라 인수 가격을 주당 0달러에서 150달러 사이의 어떤 값으로 정해야 할지 숙고 중이다. 얼마를 제안하겠는가?
이 문제에 대해 서울의 한 대학 경영학과 학부생들과 경영 대학원 학생 240명이 응답한 결과는 [그림 7]과 같다.[주]8
[그림 7]을 보면 50퍼센트가 넘는 응답자의 인수 가격이 50달러에서 80달러 사이에 분포함을 알 수 있다. 이 결과는 기존에 시행된 시험 결과[주]9와도 그 분포가 유사하다. 그러나 이 문제의 정답은 '0'으로 T사를 인수하지 않는 것이다. 답을 맞힌 학생의 수는 240명 중 28명에 불과했다.
이 문제를 논리적으로 생각하면 다음과 같다. A사가 T사를 주당 X달러로 인수하겠다고 제안했다고 가정하자. T사가 A사의 그러한 인수 제안을 받아들인다는 것은 T사의 가치가 주당 X달러 이하라는 것이다. 따라서 T사의 기대가치는 일양분포(특정 범위 내에 존재하는 미지의 값들이 발생할 가능성이 동일한 분포)uniform distribution의 기댓값[주]10 논리에 따라 0.5X가 된다.[주]11 이제 A사가 T사를 인수하면 T사의 가치는 현재 가치의 1.5배가 되므로 A사가 인수한 후의 T사의 기대가치는 1.5×(0.5X) = 0.75X가 된다. 따라서 A사는 주당 X달러를 인수했으므로 X가 양(+)의 값일 경우에는 항상 0.25만큼의 손실(0.75X－X)이 기대된다. 결국 문제의 정답은 기댓값을 평가 기준으로 했을 때 A사는 T사를 인수해서는 안 된다는 결론이 나온다.
그러나 이 실험에서 응답자 수의 50퍼센트에 가까운 119명이 실제로 50달러에서 75달러 사이의 인수 가격을 제안했다. 그 이유는 인수하기 전의 T사의 가치의 기댓값은 50달러(0.5×100)이고, A사가 인수한 후의 T사 가치의 기댓값은 75달러(0.5×150)이므로 이 둘 사이의 값을 제안하면 A사나 T사 모두 득이 될 것이라고 섣불리 생각하기 때문이다.
이러한 결론은 정보의 비대칭성(A사와 T사가 가지고 있는 정보의 양과 질이 동일하지 않음)을 고려하지 않은 것으로, T사로서는 유전 탐사 프로젝트의 성공 여부를 보고 자사의 가치를 정확히 평가할 수 있지만, A사의 경우에는 프로젝트의 결과가 나오기 전에 인수 제안을 해야 하는 상황으로 양자가 같은 정보를 가지고 판단하지 않는다는 사실을 간과한 것이다.
승자의 저주는 보통 구매자가 판매자의 관점을 이해하지 못하고, 구매자와 판매자 간 이용할 수 있는 정보의 차이가 있기 때문에 발생한다.[주]12
[주]7. Samuelson, W. and M. Bazerman, "The Winner's Curse in Bilateral Negotiations," ^Research in Experimental Economics^ (1985), Vol. 3, pp. 105~137.
[주]8. 이 실험은 2009년 9월 서강대학교 경영학부 및 경영전문대학언 MBA 과정 학생을 대상으로 이뤄졌으며, 응답 시간은 5분을 주었다.
[주]9. Samuelson, W. and M. Bazerman, 앞의 자료. Ball, S., M. Bazerman, and J. Caroll, "An Evaluation of Learning in the Bilateral Winner's Curse," ^Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes^ (1991), Vol. 48, pp.1~22. Grosskoph, B.Y., Bereby-Meyer, and M. Bazerman, "On the Robustness of the Winner's Curse Phenomenon," ^Theory ad Decision^ (2007), Vol. 63, No. 4, pp.389~418.
[주]10. 기댓값은 장기적 관점에서의 평균값을 말한다. 불확실한 변수의 가치를 평가할 때 많이 사용하는 기준이다.
[주]11. T사의 가치를 확률변수 T라고 하자. 그러면 확률변수 T가 a에서 b사이의 값을 갖는 일양분포일 경우, 즉 T~U(a, b)일 경우, 확률변수 T의 기댓값 E(T) = (a + b)/2이다. 이 경우 T~U(0, X)이므로 E(T) = 0.5X이다.
[주]12. Caroll, J., M. Bazerman, and R. Murphy, "Negotiator Cognitions: A Descriptive Approach to Negotiator's Understanding of Their Opponents," ^Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes^ (1988), Vol. 41, No. 3, pp. 352~370. Grosskoph, B.Y., Bereby-Meyer, and M. Bazerman, 앞의 자료.
시세보다 비싼 경매 낙찰가
( ... ... ) 하지만 낙찰 가격은 거의 그 제품의 실제 가치보다 과대평가되었다는 것을 알고 있는가? 특히 해당 제품의 가치가 불확실하고, 많은 사람이 경매에 참여할 때 더욱 그렇다. 경매에 사람이 많이 모이면 해당 제품이 가치 있는 물건이라는 환상에 사로잡히게 되지만 실제로는 그러한 경매 참가자의 수 때문에 과대평가의 폭은 커질 수 있다. ( ... ... )
[그림 8]에서 오른쪽 그래프는 경매 참가자들이 실제로 생각하는 해당 제품의 평가액 분포를 나타내고, 왼쪽의 그래프는 경매 참가자들이 제시한 입찰가의 분포를 나타낸다고 하자.[주]14 그리고 참가들이 생각하는 평가액의 평균은 제품의 실제 가치와 동일하다고 가정하자. 그러면 모든 경매 참가자는 자신의 평가액보다 일정 금액 낮게 입찰가를 책정하므로(경매로부터 이득을 보아야 하므로) 왼쪽 그래프는 오른쪽 그래프를 좌측으로 일정 부분 이동시킨 것이라고 할 수 있다. 그러면 낙찰가는 왼쪽 그래프에서 오른쪽 꼬리 끝에 해당하는 가격이 되는데, 이 입찰가는 제품의 실제 가치(평가액의 평균)보다 높은 것을 알 수 있다.
따라서 경매의 낙찰가는 제품의 실제 가치보다 높은 것이 일반적이며 이에 따라 경매 주선 업체도 어느 정도의 이득을 볼 수 있는 것읻. 경매 시장에서 승자의 저주를 경험하지 않으려면 제품의 가치를 되도록 하향 평가해야 함과 동시에 자신이 생각하는 제품 가치의 평가액보다 훨씬 낮게 입찰가를 불러야 한다. 하지만 제품의 가치가 불확실할 때(이를테면 골동품, 그림 등) 경쟁의 승자가 되기 위해 매우 높은 입찰가를 부르는 경매 참가자가 있게 마련이고, 그 사람은 낙찰의 기쁨을 맛보는 동시에 승자의 저주에 의한 희생자가 된다.
( ... ... )
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