※ 발췌 (excerpts):
출처 1: Ray Fisman and Tim Sullivan, The Inner Lives of Markets, Public Affairs, 2016. p. 64.
[Spence] was impressed with Akerlof's work not because it was news to him that sometimes market participants had information that others didn't: he and his advisors had a reading group where they discussed exactly this set of issues on a weekly basis. Rather, as Spence explained in his 2001 Nobel lecture, what Akerlof had done was to go beyond the mere existence of lemons to elucidate and analyze the consequences for how markets worked and, equally importantly, how they failed.[Note 3]
─ Note 3 refers to A. M. Spence's Nobel lecture, which encourages someone to look for source 3 below (the Nobel lecture) to see how Spence explained, in his lecture, what Akerlof had done, including Spence's description of Akerlof's "go[ing] beyond the mere existence of lemons to elucidate and analyze the consequences for how markets worked and ... how they failed."
출처 2: The Case for Neck Tattoos, According to Economists (Ray Fisman and Tim Sullivan 지음. The Atlantic, 2016년 6월 13일)
When it comes to demonstrating commitment, talk is cheap. Stamping a symbol where anyone can see it isn't.
( ... ... )
It's easy to think of an Ivy League credential as a useful signal, but a gang tattoo is doing much the same job as a Harvard degree.
( ... ... )
In the early 1970s, an economist named Michael Spence proposed a theoretical model that explains how people manage to go beyond cheap talk and that also, perhaps in advertently, helps to illuminate why Robert Torres ended up with San Fer tattooed across the back of his neck (even though Spence, a very proper and vaguely aristocratic Rhodes Scholar, probably never contemplated the issue of neck tatoos).
CF. ( ... ) By the time [Michael Spence] defended his thesis in 1972, he'd provided an answer to the cheap talk problem that also, perhaps inadvertently, helps to explain why Robert Torres ended up with San Fer tattooed across the back of his neck (even though we're sure Spence, a very proper and vaguely aristocratic Rhodes Scholar never contemplated the issue of hand and neck tattoos). [Same authors, The Inner Lives of Markets, Public Affairs, 2016. p. 63.]Spence was interested in phenomena that appeared contrary to the predictions of standard economic models. Why, for instance, do prospective employees waste time at company recruiting events? It's sure not because they're learning much about McKinsey or Microsoft by doing so. And why do companies recruit out of so many universities that provide their students with esoteric knowledge that won't make them any more productive in the working world?
CF. Spence was interested in phenomena that appeared contrary to the predictions of standard economic models. Why, for instance, do prospective employees waste time at company recruiting events? It's sure not because they're learning much about McKinsey or Microsoft by doing so. And why do companies recruit out of so many universities that provide their students with esoteric knowledge that won't make them any more productive in the working world? [Same authors, The Inner Lives of Markets, Public Affairs, 2016. p. 64.]
In Spence's formulation, hiring a worker is essentially a spin of the roulette wheel: Depending on what comes up, you might get a conscientious, productive worker or an incompetent, shirking one. There are plenty of steps that employers can and do take to make the hiring decision less of a gamble. They consider, consciously or not, whether the applicant is short or tall, black or white, male or female. Based on prior experiences or stereotypes they've formed, recruiters may make a positive or negative judgment of what the applicant would probably be like once he or she starts showing up for work. Whether it's legal or moral (or even correct), everyone judges people based on all sorts of characteristics that a person is essentially born into.
CF. In Spence's classic formulation, hiring a worker is essentially a spin of the roulette wheel: depending on what comes up, you might get a conscientious, productive worker or an incompetent, shirking one. (It's often hard to distinguish incompetent from delibertate obstructionism, and on some level it doesn't matter to the employer─either way not much gets done[note 4]
There are plenty of steps that employers can and do take to make the hiring decision less of a gamble. They may consider, consciously or not, whether the applicant is short or tall, black or white, male or female. Based on prior experiences or stereotypes they've formed, recruiters may make a positive or negative judgment of what the applicant would probably be like once he starts showing up for work. Whether it's legal or moral (or even correct), we judge people based on all sorts of characteristics that a person is essentially born into. [Same authors, The Inner Lives of Markets, Public Affairs, 2016. p. 65.]Then there are the choices candidates make in presentening themselves to a prospective employer: Whether short or tall, black or white, male or female, one needs to decide whether to wear a suit or jeans, or to show up clean-cut or shaggy, or like Torres, covered in tattoos. On a resume one can choose to offer up one's undergraduate GPA, and mention that it was from an Ivy League institution, or one can avoid saying much of anything about one's educatio at all.
CF. Then there are the choices we make in presenting ourselfves to a prospective employer: short or tall, black or white, male or female, you need to decide whether to wear a suit or jeans, or to show up clean-cut or shaggy, or, like Torres, covered in tattoos. On your resume you can choose to offer up your undergraduate GDP, and mention that it was from an Ivy League institution, or you can avoid saying much of anyting about your education at all. [same authors, Ibid, p. 65]It could be argued that lots of these aren't exactly choices: Harvard chooses its students, not the other way around. Acing advanced calculus is similarly something that is out of reach for many, so not everyone can be a math majr with a 4.0 GPA.
CF. You might counter that lots of these aren't exactly choices either: Harvard chooses you, not the other way around. Acing advanced calculus is similarly something that is out of reach for many, so not all of us can be a math major with a 4.0 GPA. [same authors, Ibid, p. 65]That's correct, sort of. But it can also be thought of this way: the cost of adding a credential to a resume or presenting oneself in a particular way at an interview is higher for some applicants than for others. In an sense, the "cost" for many of getting into Harvard and making it to graduation is infinite─it's just not within the realm of possibility. For a math whiz or a music prodigy, it may not be that difficult to get in and cost through whatever the Harvard curriculum might throw at them. A driven, conscientious, and reasonably bright young person might also put together a Harvard-worthy college application without too much trouble, relatively speaking.
CF. That's correct, sort of. But you can also think of it this way: the cost of adding a credential to your resume or presenting yourself in a particular way at an interview is higher for some applicants than for others. In a sense, the "cost" for many of getting into Harvard and making it to graduation in infinite─it's just not within the realim of possibility. For a math whiz or a music prodigy, it may not be that difficult to get in and coast through whatever the Harvard curriculum might throw at them . A driven, conscientious, and reasonably bright young person might also put together a Harvard-worthy college aplication without too much trougle, relatively speaking. [same authors, Ibid, p. 65]
( ... ... )
It's easy to think of an Ivy League degree as a useful signal and why people would want to get one if they could. Less so for Roberto Torres's San Fer gang tattoo, even though it's doing much the same job as the Harvard degree. What makes it hard for most people to think of a prominent tattoo in this way is that they're focused on the awful cost of having to go through life with dimmed employment prospects and possibly even a crosshairs on your chest.
CF. ( Many applications are downright counterintuitive. ) It's easy to think of an Ivy League degree as a useful signal and why you'd want to get one if you could. Less so for Roberto Torres and his San Fer gang tattoo. But it's doing much the same job as the Harvard degree. What makes it hard for most of us to think of it in this way is that we're focused on the awful cost of having to go through life with dimmed employment prospects and possibly even a crosshairs on you chest. [Ibid, p.67]( ... ... )
출처 3: A. Michael Spence, “Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets,” Prize Lecture, December 8, 2001.
INTROUCTION
( ... ... ) In the course of that seminar there were discussions of statistical discrimination and many other subjects that relate to the incompleteness of information in markets. One of my advisers came in one day with the strong suggestion that I read a paper he had just read called "The Markets for Lemons" by George Akerlof.[주]2 ( ... ) I was quite electrifying. There we all found a wonderfully clear and plausible analysis of the performance characteristics of a market with incomplete and asymmetrically located information. That, combined with my puzzlement about several aspects of the discussion of the consequences of incomplete information in job markets, pretty much launched me on a search for things that I came to call signals, that would carry information persistently in equilibrium from sellers to buyers, or more generally from those with more to those with less information.[주]3 The issue, of course, was that signals are not terribly complicated things in games where the parties have the same incentives, i.e., where there is a commonly understood desire to communicate accurate information to each other. ( ... ... )
I was asked recently by a somewhat incredulous questioner (actually a journalist) whether it was true that you could be awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics for simply noticing that there are markets in which certain participants don't know certain things that others in the market do know. I thought it was pretty funny. It was as if this had somehow been closely guarded secret up until about 1970, at least in economics. I clearly cannot speak for those who make decisions about the Nobel Prize, but I suspect that the correct answer to that question is no. What did blossom at that time was a serious attempt by many talented economists to capture in applied microeconomic theory a whole variety of aspects of market structure and performance. That work produced a partial melding of theory, industrial organization, labor economics, finance and other fields. An important early part of that effort was the attempt to capture ^informational^ aspects of market structure to study the ways in which markets adapt, and the consequences of informational gaps for market performance.
Therefore, in answer to the question, we noticed that there are many markets with informational gaps. ( ... ) These informational gaps were widely acknowledged and those of us who taught applied microeconomic theory, freely admitted that these gaps might change some of the performance characteristics, not to mention the institutional structure, of markets in which they appear. But I think it is fair to say that we did not have much systematic knowledge based on theory of what those changes might be. ( ... ... )
The plan for this lecture ( ... ) first, the simplest model that I can devise that illustrates in reasonably general form the definitions and properties of signaling equilibria.[주]6 Next, we will allow the signal (in this case education in the job market context), to contribute directly to the productivity of the individual as well as functioning as a signal. Following that, the paper examines a market in which there is signaling and both separating and pooling in the equilibrium.
( ... ... )
THE SIMPLEST JOB OF MARKET SIGNALING MODEL
The idea behind the job market signaling model is that there are attributes of potential employees that the employer cannot observe and that affect the individual's subsequent productivity and hence value to the employer on the job. Let us suppose that there are just two groups of people. Group 1 has productivity or value to any employers of 1, and Group 2 has productivity of 2. In this example, these productivity values do not depend on the level of investment in the signal. If there were no way to distinguish between people in these two groups then if both groups stay in the market, the average wage would be 2－α, where α is the fraction of the population in group 1, and everyone would get that wage. If the higher productivity group through disatisfaction or for any other reason, exits this labor market, the average productivity and the wage drops to 1. This phenomenon when it occurs is sometimes called the adverse selection problem, a label most commonly applied to insurance markets. It is structurally the same problem that Akerlof described in his famous paper on used cars (lemons).
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