[발췌: W. Easterly's] Benevolent Autocrats (2011)

출처: William Easterly, Benevolent Autocrats, NYU/NBER/BREAD, August 2011
자료: http://williameasterly.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/BenevolentAutocrats.pdf


※ 발췌 (excerpts):

Abstract: Many high growth episodes are associated with autocrats. A large literature attributes this to the higher variance of growth rates under autocracy than under democracy. The literature offers alternative explanations for this stylized fact:

• (1) leaders don't matter under democracy, but good and bad leaders under autocracy cause high and low growth,
• (2) leaders don't matter autocracy either, but good and bad autocratic systems cause greater extremes of high or low growth,
• or (3) democracy does better than autocracy at reducing variance from shocks from outside the political system.

This paper details further the stylized facts to test these distinctions.

• Inconsistent with (1), the variance of growth within the terms of leaders swamps the variance across leaders, and more so under autocracy than under democracy. 
• Country effects under autocracy are also overwhelmed by within-country variance, inconsistent with (2).
• Explanation (3) fits the stylized fats the best of the three alternatives. 

The empirical variance of growth literature has also identified many correlates of autocracy as equally plausible determinants of high growth variance. Stories of benevolent autocrats (either explanation (1) or (2)) have not held up well in the contemporary empirical growth literature. Cognitive and political biases help explain why benevolent stories nevertheless remain popular in policy discussions.

( ... ... )

Now, to analyze the variance for autocracies and democracies a bit more formally, consider a standard decomposition of the annual growth rates for country i and period t into a cross-country(µ_i) and within-country (ε_it) component for a panel of countries, along with year dummies (γt): ( ... ... )