길가에 피는 철쭉.
다 피지 못한 망울들을 만져 보면 끈끈한 기운이 달라붙는다.
꽃잎이 만개하기 전에 충분한 체액을 보내기 바쁜 탓일 것이다.
활짝 핀 꽃잎들을 만져 보면 뽀송뽀송하면서도 촉촉한 기운이 흐른다.
한참 동안 만져 보고 또 다른 꽃잎을 만져 봐도 똑같은 느낌이다.
때늦은 오월에 피는 꽃잎이 꼭 여인의 속살 같아
그 추운 한겨울을 어떻게 견뎠느냐 말을 건다.
2013년 4월 30일 화요일
[발췌] Contrasting Concepts of Capital: Yet Another Look at the Hayek-Keynes Debate
지은이: Steven Horwitz
Prepared for the 2011 APEE meetings in Nassau, Bahamas, March 2011.
※ 발췌(excerpts):
* * *
The Great Recession of recent years has rekindled an economic debate that first erupted around 80 years ago between Hayek and Keynes. (...) The general idea is that Hayek had much more confidence in the self-correcting powers of markets while Keynes was more focused on the ways in which those processes could break down. In turn, the Hayekian perspective on recessions has seen the boom that precedes the bust as being the period that deserves the most attention, as it is there that government manipulation of the monetary system leads to intertemporal discoordination and the mistaken investments that are eventually revealed as the boom turns to bust. Keynesians, by contrast, have devoted their energy to the bust phase of the cycle (...).
Although these differences are certainly real and meaningful, they only scratch the surface of what I would argue is the most fundamental difference between Hayek and Keynes. To understand why they disagreed on the degree to which markets were self-correcting and therefore the degree to which governments were needed and able to improve on the outcomes market produced, we need to get behind the broad visions of self-adjustment and the role of government to their actual economics. (...) However, the differences are unlikely to be found at the level of, say, the Austrian business cycle theory as such versus the Keynesian income-expenditure model as such. Those "macro" models rest on very different visions of the underlying ^microeconomic^ processes. Each thinker's view of the stability of the macroeconomy is really a reflection of how they understood the coordination processes of the microeconomy.
More specifically, I will argue that it is how each thinker understood, or failed to understand, the role of capital in the market economy that is at the bottom of their contrasting visions of the economy as a whole. These contrasting conceptions of capital are crucial for their understanding of the broader issue of whether the market is capable of generating intertemporal coordination or whether it is prone to systematic failures in this regard. Keynesianism has long believed the latter and I will argue that Keynes's flawed view of capital can help to explain why, and why his view of intertemporal coordination is mistaken. Finally, I will look at how these views of capital contribute to how Hayek and Keynes saw the business cycle and especially policy during the bus phase.
The Austrian Conception of Capital
(...) Austrian capital theory begins where the Austrian school began, with Carl Menger's (1981[1871]) ^Principles of Economics^. Specifically, it is Menger who delineated the difference between goods of the "first order" and goods of the "higher order." First-order goods are those devoted to the direct satisfaction of consumer wants. Goods of higher orders are those that contribute to the making of first-order goods. The piece of bread I eat for breakfast is a first-order good, while the flour, eggs, milk, etc. that went into making it are second-order goods. The inputs that went into making the flour or the milk (...) are third-order goods, and so on. For Austrians, capital can be understood generally as any input that contributes to the production of a first-order good, either directly or indirectly. That is, capital is all of the goods higher orders.
Another way of viewing the question of what makes something capital is to see it as a matter of function. Capital is what capital does: contribute to the plans of entrepreneurs. This observation's importance is that the same good can be capital in one situation and not another. The identical ham sandwich would be a consumer good and not capital if I have prepared it at home for the purpose of direct consumption. However, If I had taken that exact same sandwich and put it in a picnic basket and then sold it in my store, it is now a capital good as it is an "unfinished" element of my plan to sell complete picnic lunches. What makes the sandwich capital or not is its relationship to other goods and services and the plan of actors. It is context or, better yet, the place a good sits in the structure or network of production that determines its capital quality. The Austrian theory of capital denies that one can look at a good or service, or even a non-material asset, standing alone and determine whether or [not] it is capital. It is not the physical qualities of the good that make that determination but where it sits in the network of plans of actors. This is why Ludwig Lachmann(1956: 4) continually refers to the ^structure^ of capital:
Because being capital depends upon a good's location within a plan, it is possible, and quite likely, that the same good can serve as capital in more than one imaginable plan. Any single good has what Lachmann(1956: 2) calls "multiple specificity," which is the quality of being used in more than one, but yet a still limited, number of uses. What is central for the Austrian theory is that capital is not homogeneous; capital goods are not perfect substitutes for one another. Any given good can only serve in a limited number of production plans, and it is not possible to create any given production plan out of any given capital goods. Goods ae not infinitely substitutable, and not all goods have the requisite complementarity necessary to be part of any particular production plan. This emphasis on the "heterogeneity" of capital distinguishes Austrian capital theory from many of its predecessors, especially those, most obviously Knight's "Crusonia plant" or Solow's "shmoo," that viewd capital as a homogeneous fund of resources from which equally useful "ladles" could be applied to any production processes.
Recognizing that capital is heterogeneous in this way suggests the importance of the complementarity and substitutability of capital. When viewed as part of a production plan, the various capital inputs must "fit together" in order for that plan to be executed. How well varioius capital inputs can be fit together in this fashion is their degree of complementarity. What entrepreneurs do in constructing their plans is to integrate complementary capital inputs. In the mind of the entrepreneur at the moment the plan is put in motion, the various capital inputs are all in a comlementary relationship to one another. Substitution, by contrast, is a feature of capital goods when we consider dynamic change. The plans of entrepreneurs are always constructed in a world of uncertainty and may fail to play out as intended. When plans fail to one degree or another, entrepreneurs may choose to reshuffle their capital inputs and formulate a new plan. At this point, the central question is the degree to which one capital good can substitute for another in the plan. The substitutability of capital is what matters when change is necessary.
What guides this process of plan formulation, deconstruction, and reconstruction is monetary calculation. In a market economy where capital goods have money prices, those prices enable entrepreneurs to prospectively formulate budgets and retrospectively calculate profits and losses. Budget based on those prices are what enable entrepreneur to decide which capital goods will effectively serve as complements in an integrated production plan. After that plan has been executed, profits and losses signal owners of capital whether or not the plan was successful, which enable them to decide whether the uses of capital were, in fact, sufficiently complementary to continue. (...)
The process of entrepreneurship and monetary calculation is one of constant plan creation, execution, and revision with the corresponding consideration of the complementarity and substitutability of the capital inputs into those plans. The result of this ongoing process is the production of a capital structure that is an unintended consequence of the various decisions being made by entrepreneur. Although each individual entrepreneur is consciously and intentionally fitting together complementary capital items into production plans, the degree of integration and complementarity in the capital structure of the economy as a whole is an emergent outcome of the interplay between intra-plan complementarity and inter-plan substitution.
In this Austrian vision, the economy is something like a large, jigsaw puzzle with capital goods serving as the individual pieces and no final picture to guide the various independent efforts to create meaningful image. For Hayek and the other Austrians, those pieces are each uniquely shaped though still able to interlock with some finite number of other pieces to form a potentially meaningful pattern when joined in the right ways. If we further imagine that jigsaw puzzle "tells" us that we have joined pieces together correctly by emitting a pleasurable sound when we do so and a very unpleasant one when we do not, we have a fairly good analogy to the market. Those beeps serves as the analogy to profits and losses and help to guide all of us trying to, each working our own area, construct this puzzle without a picture to guide us. From this perspective, the capital structure and the process of monetary calculation that drives it is the fundamental coordinating process of the market economy. Fitting those pieces together as correctly as possible, in response to knowledge and incentives produced by the pleasuable and unpleasurable beeps of profit and loss, is what ensures ongoing economic coordination and growth. Capital is central to the idea that markets do not require outside intervention to be sufficiently coordinated.
Capital in Keynes
Keynes's conception of capital could not have been more different. In general terms, Keynes treated capital as either an undifferentiated aggregate, seeing capital as part of the broader "factors of production' in A Treatise on Money in 1930, or in terms of capital assets to be invested in The General Theory in 1936. In many ways the problem is that Keynes does not really have a theory of capital in the sense that Hayek and the Austrians use the term. As Hayek points out in his review of the Treatise, what Keynes was doing in that book was trying to tell a Wicksellian story about investment, savings and the price level but without the Austrian(via Bohm-Bawerk) theory of capital on which Wicksell's original argument rested. Specifically, Hayek(1995[1931]: 125) argues that Keynes's treatment of the process by which current output is produced is flawed precisely because he views that process as "an integral whole in which only the prices paid at the beginning for the factors of production have any bearing on its profitableness." In other words, Keynes does not recognize that production comes in stages and capital goods sit in specific places in that staged process, or, in Menger's terms, that capital goods can occupy different orders in the structure of production.
Keynes argues as if changes [in] investment are sufficient to explain changes in the production process because of their effects on the aggregate capital of the community. Compared to the Austrian focus on the underlying adjustment processes among the stages of production and the specific capital goods that occupy them, Keynes is operating too high of a level of aggregation where he cannot distinguish among those stages of production. As Hayek points out, it is changes in the price differential between goods in those different stages (i.e., good of different orders) that determine the flow of resources in the production process. Keynes's "neglect" of the "possibility of fluctuation between these stages" is what Hayek sees as leading him to trouble in his discussions of the role of investment and his understanding of "macroeconomic" phenomena. This is the context for one of Hayek's most quoted lines about Keynes, which comes from Hayek's (1995 [1931]: 128) review of the Treatise: "Mr. Keynes's aggregate conceal the most fundamental mechanisms of change." From an Austrian perspective, it is the disaggregated structure of capital and the movement of resources and specific capital goods, and the labor complementarity to them, among the various stages of production that is the foundation of any understanding of larger scale "macroeconomic" changes.[1]
keynes's aggregative view of capital is also clear in a brief footnote in The General Theory that discusses the work of Frank Knight. Hayek and Knight had long sparred over their own contrasting conceptions of capital, with Hayek strongly criticizing the Knightian view that capital was best understood as an undifferentiated, homogeneous aggregate out of which "dollops" could be applied to the production of particular consumer goods. This was quite the opposite from the Austrian view of capital as differentiated, heterogeneous and embodied in specific goods. In the chapter on "The Classical Theory of Interest," Keynes (1936: 176) footnotes approvingly a 1932 article of Knight's which Keynes claims "confirms the soundness of the Marshallian tradition as to the usefulness of Bohm-Bawerk analysis." In the appendix to that chapter, Keynes has an explicit discussion dismissing Mises and Hayek's theory of interest as linked to the relative prices of capital goods and consumption goods. Keynes admits that "it is not clear how this conclusion is reached" and tries to reconstruct the argument. He eventually accuses Mises of "confusing the marginal efficiency of capital with the rate of interest' (1936: 1930. However, the concept of the "marginal efficiency of capital" would have been foreign to the Austrian precisely because treating capital as a whole that has a "marginal efficiency" ran against their conception of the capital structure. The question is always about the value productivity of specific assets given their place in the structure of production.
This overly aggregated concept of capital and its inability to see movements among the stage of production poses another problem for Keynes. It makes it difficult for him to understand how capital can lose value without change in its physical character. In the only real mention of the Austrian view of capital in The General Theory, Keynes(1936: 76) says:
(...) Keynes seems puzzled by the Austrian claim that capital can be "consumed" even though there is no net decrease in physical capital. The answer to the puzzle is that capital, for Austrians, is about value not about the physical object itself. If we build a machine in anticipation of some specific future demand and then discover our expectations were wrong, the machine will drop in value (which is a form of capital consumption) but it does not crumple into dust. Capital good are valued in terms of the (discounted) value of the future consumption goods they will produce. If consumer demand changes, the value of the capital good changes (assuming it is insufficiently versatile to produce whatever new product is now in demand) and capital value is lost, thus capital has been consumed even though the physical stock of capital has not changed. This point will be important in our later discussion of the business cycle.
Keynes's discussion of capital in the "Concluding Notes" chapter of The General Theory demonstrates a very different view of it than that held by the Austrians, and many others. (...) For the Austrians such as Hayek, capital was intricately connected with the process of economic calculation that required private ownership, exchange, and money prices (Mises 1920). On Hayek's view, Keynes radically misunderstood the nature of capital and its role in the market economy.
A few years after The General Theory appeared, Hayek was highly critical of just this part of the argument. He claimed that Keynes had provided an "economics of abundance" in which the scarcity of capital good was irrelevant because he had ignored the relative price mechanism, preferring instead to treat the value of capital only as a discounted flow of future services based on a monetarily determined rate of interest. In such a world, sufficiently expansionary monetary policy could reduce interest rates so low as to make capital seem abundant. As Hayek noted (2007 [1941]: 343):
( ... ... )
Contrasting Visions of Intertemporal Coordination
Austrians such as Hayek have long argued that one cannot understand why an economy goes into recession without first understanding how economies work when they are healthy. With that understanding, Austrians tend to look for disruptions in the processes that normally keep an economy "healthy" as a way to explain how they might get sick. More specifically, they look for explanations of recessions or "busts" by asking if the bust was preceded by a boom. A boom is not a necessary condition for a recession but it is sufficient, and Austrians argue that a preceding boom is the most frequent cause of a bust. Key to understanding that boom-bust cycle is how the capital structure gets distorted in the boom, which also helps to understand how Austrians view the bust.
One of the fundamental differences between Hayek and Keynes was the question of whether markets were capable of generating intertemporal coordination on their own. Hayek and the Austrian were working from a classical loanable funds theory of the interest rate. On this view, the interest rate was the price of time, emerging from the supply of loanable funds from the savers and the demand for loanable funds by investors. Should the public wish to save more, this would increase the supply of loanable funds and push down the interest rate, encourage more borrowing/investing to make use of that new savings. (...) In contemporary terms, the Consumption and Investment terms of total income traded off against each other to keep total income stable even as people's savings preferences changed. Hayek also saw this process as maintaining intertemporal coordination as the lower time preference of savers were matched by the lengthening of production processes and the investment in higher order capital goods that the resulting lower interest rate and larger quantity of loanable funds supplied made possible.
Keynes in contrast, denited that there was such a nexus that coordinated savins and investment. In The General Theory, Keynes(1936: 21) wrote:
(... ...)
Another way of viewing the question of what makes something capital is to see it as a matter of function. Capital is what capital does: contribute to the plans of entrepreneurs. This observation's importance is that the same good can be capital in one situation and not another. The identical ham sandwich would be a consumer good and not capital if I have prepared it at home for the purpose of direct consumption. However, If I had taken that exact same sandwich and put it in a picnic basket and then sold it in my store, it is now a capital good as it is an "unfinished" element of my plan to sell complete picnic lunches. What makes the sandwich capital or not is its relationship to other goods and services and the plan of actors. It is context or, better yet, the place a good sits in the structure or network of production that determines its capital quality. The Austrian theory of capital denies that one can look at a good or service, or even a non-material asset, standing alone and determine whether or [not] it is capital. It is not the physical qualities of the good that make that determination but where it sits in the network of plans of actors. This is why Ludwig Lachmann(1956: 4) continually refers to the ^structure^ of capital:
It will be our main task in this book to study the changes which this network of capital relationships, within firms and between firms, undergoes as the result of unexpected change. To this end we must regard the 'stock of capital' not as a homogeneous aggregate but as a structural pattern. The Theory of Capital is, in the last resort, the morphology of the forms which this pattern assumes in a changing world.This emphasis on relationships and unexpected change also highlight the dynamic nature of the theory.
Because being capital depends upon a good's location within a plan, it is possible, and quite likely, that the same good can serve as capital in more than one imaginable plan. Any single good has what Lachmann(1956: 2) calls "multiple specificity," which is the quality of being used in more than one, but yet a still limited, number of uses. What is central for the Austrian theory is that capital is not homogeneous; capital goods are not perfect substitutes for one another. Any given good can only serve in a limited number of production plans, and it is not possible to create any given production plan out of any given capital goods. Goods ae not infinitely substitutable, and not all goods have the requisite complementarity necessary to be part of any particular production plan. This emphasis on the "heterogeneity" of capital distinguishes Austrian capital theory from many of its predecessors, especially those, most obviously Knight's "Crusonia plant" or Solow's "shmoo," that viewd capital as a homogeneous fund of resources from which equally useful "ladles" could be applied to any production processes.
Recognizing that capital is heterogeneous in this way suggests the importance of the complementarity and substitutability of capital. When viewed as part of a production plan, the various capital inputs must "fit together" in order for that plan to be executed. How well varioius capital inputs can be fit together in this fashion is their degree of complementarity. What entrepreneurs do in constructing their plans is to integrate complementary capital inputs. In the mind of the entrepreneur at the moment the plan is put in motion, the various capital inputs are all in a comlementary relationship to one another. Substitution, by contrast, is a feature of capital goods when we consider dynamic change. The plans of entrepreneurs are always constructed in a world of uncertainty and may fail to play out as intended. When plans fail to one degree or another, entrepreneurs may choose to reshuffle their capital inputs and formulate a new plan. At this point, the central question is the degree to which one capital good can substitute for another in the plan. The substitutability of capital is what matters when change is necessary.
What guides this process of plan formulation, deconstruction, and reconstruction is monetary calculation. In a market economy where capital goods have money prices, those prices enable entrepreneurs to prospectively formulate budgets and retrospectively calculate profits and losses. Budget based on those prices are what enable entrepreneur to decide which capital goods will effectively serve as complements in an integrated production plan. After that plan has been executed, profits and losses signal owners of capital whether or not the plan was successful, which enable them to decide whether the uses of capital were, in fact, sufficiently complementary to continue. (...)
The process of entrepreneurship and monetary calculation is one of constant plan creation, execution, and revision with the corresponding consideration of the complementarity and substitutability of the capital inputs into those plans. The result of this ongoing process is the production of a capital structure that is an unintended consequence of the various decisions being made by entrepreneur. Although each individual entrepreneur is consciously and intentionally fitting together complementary capital items into production plans, the degree of integration and complementarity in the capital structure of the economy as a whole is an emergent outcome of the interplay between intra-plan complementarity and inter-plan substitution.
In this Austrian vision, the economy is something like a large, jigsaw puzzle with capital goods serving as the individual pieces and no final picture to guide the various independent efforts to create meaningful image. For Hayek and the other Austrians, those pieces are each uniquely shaped though still able to interlock with some finite number of other pieces to form a potentially meaningful pattern when joined in the right ways. If we further imagine that jigsaw puzzle "tells" us that we have joined pieces together correctly by emitting a pleasurable sound when we do so and a very unpleasant one when we do not, we have a fairly good analogy to the market. Those beeps serves as the analogy to profits and losses and help to guide all of us trying to, each working our own area, construct this puzzle without a picture to guide us. From this perspective, the capital structure and the process of monetary calculation that drives it is the fundamental coordinating process of the market economy. Fitting those pieces together as correctly as possible, in response to knowledge and incentives produced by the pleasuable and unpleasurable beeps of profit and loss, is what ensures ongoing economic coordination and growth. Capital is central to the idea that markets do not require outside intervention to be sufficiently coordinated.
Capital in Keynes
Keynes's conception of capital could not have been more different. In general terms, Keynes treated capital as either an undifferentiated aggregate, seeing capital as part of the broader "factors of production' in A Treatise on Money in 1930, or in terms of capital assets to be invested in The General Theory in 1936. In many ways the problem is that Keynes does not really have a theory of capital in the sense that Hayek and the Austrians use the term. As Hayek points out in his review of the Treatise, what Keynes was doing in that book was trying to tell a Wicksellian story about investment, savings and the price level but without the Austrian(via Bohm-Bawerk) theory of capital on which Wicksell's original argument rested. Specifically, Hayek(1995[1931]: 125) argues that Keynes's treatment of the process by which current output is produced is flawed precisely because he views that process as "an integral whole in which only the prices paid at the beginning for the factors of production have any bearing on its profitableness." In other words, Keynes does not recognize that production comes in stages and capital goods sit in specific places in that staged process, or, in Menger's terms, that capital goods can occupy different orders in the structure of production.
Keynes argues as if changes [in] investment are sufficient to explain changes in the production process because of their effects on the aggregate capital of the community. Compared to the Austrian focus on the underlying adjustment processes among the stages of production and the specific capital goods that occupy them, Keynes is operating too high of a level of aggregation where he cannot distinguish among those stages of production. As Hayek points out, it is changes in the price differential between goods in those different stages (i.e., good of different orders) that determine the flow of resources in the production process. Keynes's "neglect" of the "possibility of fluctuation between these stages" is what Hayek sees as leading him to trouble in his discussions of the role of investment and his understanding of "macroeconomic" phenomena. This is the context for one of Hayek's most quoted lines about Keynes, which comes from Hayek's (1995 [1931]: 128) review of the Treatise: "Mr. Keynes's aggregate conceal the most fundamental mechanisms of change." From an Austrian perspective, it is the disaggregated structure of capital and the movement of resources and specific capital goods, and the labor complementarity to them, among the various stages of production that is the foundation of any understanding of larger scale "macroeconomic" changes.[1]
keynes's aggregative view of capital is also clear in a brief footnote in The General Theory that discusses the work of Frank Knight. Hayek and Knight had long sparred over their own contrasting conceptions of capital, with Hayek strongly criticizing the Knightian view that capital was best understood as an undifferentiated, homogeneous aggregate out of which "dollops" could be applied to the production of particular consumer goods. This was quite the opposite from the Austrian view of capital as differentiated, heterogeneous and embodied in specific goods. In the chapter on "The Classical Theory of Interest," Keynes (1936: 176) footnotes approvingly a 1932 article of Knight's which Keynes claims "confirms the soundness of the Marshallian tradition as to the usefulness of Bohm-Bawerk analysis." In the appendix to that chapter, Keynes has an explicit discussion dismissing Mises and Hayek's theory of interest as linked to the relative prices of capital goods and consumption goods. Keynes admits that "it is not clear how this conclusion is reached" and tries to reconstruct the argument. He eventually accuses Mises of "confusing the marginal efficiency of capital with the rate of interest' (1936: 1930. However, the concept of the "marginal efficiency of capital" would have been foreign to the Austrian precisely because treating capital as a whole that has a "marginal efficiency" ran against their conception of the capital structure. The question is always about the value productivity of specific assets given their place in the structure of production.
This overly aggregated concept of capital and its inability to see movements among the stage of production poses another problem for Keynes. It makes it difficult for him to understand how capital can lose value without change in its physical character. In the only real mention of the Austrian view of capital in The General Theory, Keynes(1936: 76) says:
It seems probably that capital formation and capital consumption, as used by the Austrian school of economists, are not identical either with investment and disinvestment as defined above or with net investment and disinvestment. In particular, capital consumption is said to occur in circumstances where there is quite clearly no net decrease in capital equipment as defined above. I have, however been unable to discover a reference to any passage where the meaning of these terms is clearly explained. The statement, for example, that capital formation occurs when there is a lengthening of the period of production does not much advance the matters.
(...) Keynes seems puzzled by the Austrian claim that capital can be "consumed" even though there is no net decrease in physical capital. The answer to the puzzle is that capital, for Austrians, is about value not about the physical object itself. If we build a machine in anticipation of some specific future demand and then discover our expectations were wrong, the machine will drop in value (which is a form of capital consumption) but it does not crumple into dust. Capital good are valued in terms of the (discounted) value of the future consumption goods they will produce. If consumer demand changes, the value of the capital good changes (assuming it is insufficiently versatile to produce whatever new product is now in demand) and capital value is lost, thus capital has been consumed even though the physical stock of capital has not changed. This point will be important in our later discussion of the business cycle.
Keynes's discussion of capital in the "Concluding Notes" chapter of The General Theory demonstrates a very different view of it than that held by the Austrians, and many others. (...) For the Austrians such as Hayek, capital was intricately connected with the process of economic calculation that required private ownership, exchange, and money prices (Mises 1920). On Hayek's view, Keynes radically misunderstood the nature of capital and its role in the market economy.
A few years after The General Theory appeared, Hayek was highly critical of just this part of the argument. He claimed that Keynes had provided an "economics of abundance" in which the scarcity of capital good was irrelevant because he had ignored the relative price mechanism, preferring instead to treat the value of capital only as a discounted flow of future services based on a monetarily determined rate of interest. In such a world, sufficiently expansionary monetary policy could reduce interest rates so low as to make capital seem abundant. As Hayek noted (2007 [1941]: 343):
It is clear that if we want to understand at al the mechanism which determines the relation between costs and prices, and therefore the rate of profit, it is to the relative scarcity of the various types of capital goods and of the other factors of production that we must direct our attention, for it is this scarcity which determines their price.He followed that by noting that scarcity in this context can be understood as a good where an increase in demand will increase its price. Even if one, as Keynes does, assumes idle resources, on the Austrian view of capital, not every idle resource is a perfect substitute for another, thus the very heterogeneity of capital makes individual capital goods scarce. Hayek's clear implication is that Keynes was seriously mistaken about the nature of capital and its importance in generating economic coordination.
( ... ... )
Contrasting Visions of Intertemporal Coordination
Austrians such as Hayek have long argued that one cannot understand why an economy goes into recession without first understanding how economies work when they are healthy. With that understanding, Austrians tend to look for disruptions in the processes that normally keep an economy "healthy" as a way to explain how they might get sick. More specifically, they look for explanations of recessions or "busts" by asking if the bust was preceded by a boom. A boom is not a necessary condition for a recession but it is sufficient, and Austrians argue that a preceding boom is the most frequent cause of a bust. Key to understanding that boom-bust cycle is how the capital structure gets distorted in the boom, which also helps to understand how Austrians view the bust.
One of the fundamental differences between Hayek and Keynes was the question of whether markets were capable of generating intertemporal coordination on their own. Hayek and the Austrian were working from a classical loanable funds theory of the interest rate. On this view, the interest rate was the price of time, emerging from the supply of loanable funds from the savers and the demand for loanable funds by investors. Should the public wish to save more, this would increase the supply of loanable funds and push down the interest rate, encourage more borrowing/investing to make use of that new savings. (...) In contemporary terms, the Consumption and Investment terms of total income traded off against each other to keep total income stable even as people's savings preferences changed. Hayek also saw this process as maintaining intertemporal coordination as the lower time preference of savers were matched by the lengthening of production processes and the investment in higher order capital goods that the resulting lower interest rate and larger quantity of loanable funds supplied made possible.
Keynes in contrast, denited that there was such a nexus that coordinated savins and investment. In The General Theory, Keynes(1936: 21) wrote:
Those who think [that an act of individual saving inevitably leads to a parallel act of investment] are deceived... They are fallaciously supposing that there was a nexus which unites decisions to abstain from present consumption with decision to provide for consumption; whereas the motives which determine the latter are not linked in any simple way with the motives that determine the former.(...) The motives that determine each[saving and investment] are completely distinct, unlike the Hayekian conception in which the interest rate serves as the nexus that brings investment and savings together. With savings and investment cleaved in this way, Keynes can also show that the Consumption and Investment component of total income can move in the same direction.
(... ...)
[메모: 제1차 세계대전] 연합국(Allied Powers)과 관련국(Associated Powers)
■ 표제어: 연합국(Allied Powers 혹은 Allies)
제1차 세계대전 때는 동맹국(독일·오스트리아-헝가리·터키), 제2차 세계대전 때는 추축국(독일·이탈리아·일본)에 대항하여 연합한 국가들.
제1차 세계대전 당시 주요연합국은 영국, 프랑스, 러시아 제국으로 이들은 1914년 9월 5일 체결된 런던 조약에 의해 정식으로 제휴했다. 또한 위의 3국 중 1국 이상과 이미 조약을 체결했거나, 후에 조약을 체결한 국가들 또한 연합국에 포함되었다. 예를 들면 포르투갈과 일본은 영국과의 조약에 의해, 그리고 이탈리아는 영국·프랑스·러시아 3국과 1915년 4월 26일 런던 조약에 서명함으로써 연합국측에 가담했다. 1917년 4월 6일 참전한 미국을 비롯하여 동맹국에 반대하는 나라들은 연합국이 아닌 '관련국'(Associated Powers)이라 불렸는데, 미국의 우드로 윌슨 대통령은 미국의 자유재량권을 보존하기 위해 이 명칭을 강조했다. 전쟁을 종결시킨 베르사유 조약에 27개국의 '연합국과 관련국'이 열거되어 있는데, ( ... ... )
2013년 4월 29일 월요일
Dic: call as meaning ‘suggest’ or ‘describe’
- The speech was interrupted by members of the Conservative Party, who called him a traitor.
- She calls me lazy and selfish.
- He called it particularly cynical to begin releasing the hostages on Christmas Day.
- Anyone can call themselves a psychotherapist.
If you call someone or something a particular thing, you suggest they are that thing or describe them as that thing. [ V n n, V n adj, V it adj to-inf, V pron-refl n ]
.... cobuild
[발췌] German Social Policy (Sozialpolitik) in the Weimar Republic 1919-1933 (1982)
By John A. Moses
※ 발췌(excerpts):
What is regarded as an adequate social policy in a given country is largely a question of the ideological commitment of those in power, central to which is their concept of the State and society. In Australia, even before Federation, the egalitarian tradition had given rise to the assumption 'that the State had a responsibility to concern itself in a positive way with the social and economic life of the country'.[1] This did not mean that all Australians were persuaded that the State had an overriding obligation to guarantee the welfare of all citizens from the cradle to the grave. It was the labour movement which gave the higher priority to this concept. Non-Labour parties could not afford to neglect social policy, but as the record shows, they have been more inclined to promote such legislation when in their view the economy could sustain the added burden of expenditure. It would, therefore, be broadly valid to observe that whereas Labour was and is ideologically committed to the implementation of a far-reaching social policy, non-Labour parties treat social welfare legislation as a matter of political expediency.
The modern German experience provides an interesting confirmation of this generalisation. Otto von Bismark, the Prussian Junker who 'founded' the German Reich in 1871, a man of fiercely anti-socialist attitudes, is regarded as the father of German social welfare legislation, but his actions stemmed from political expediency and not from a belief that the State should protect its economically most vulnerable subjects. In fact the Reich Chancellor of the 1880s did not represent much of an advance on the thinking of the enlightened despot, Frederick the Great.
The durability of the Prussian concept of the State was ensured by Bismark through the Reich Constitution which he imposed on the German princes at unification. This is illustrated graphically when the assumptions of that constitution are contrasted with those which replaced it in 1919. And because the German quasi-revolution which gave birth to the Weimar Constitution had failed dislodge the old Wilhelmine power elite, the latter were able by 1933 successfully to repudiate the assumptions of Weimar and lay the foundations for the emergence of a system which the Nazis never tired of comparing with Friedrician Prussia. Certainly, 'human material' was regarded as expendable in the service of the all-demanding State whether it was under the Hohenzollern dynasty of Prussia or the masters of the Third Reich. By contrast, the frustrated architects of the Weimar Constitution had tried to implement a boldly new humanitarian concept of the State in Germany.
I.
( ... ... )
2013년 4월 28일 일요일
[Keynes's] Letter to Strachey about from the end 1919 to the beginning of 1920
p. 335~336 :
자료: Maynard Keynes: An Economist's Biography
Keynes ended his book by dedicating it 'to the formation of the general opinion of the future'(p. 189). The general view has been that he was in that extremely successfulㅡtoo successful for many tastes. As Joseph Schumpeter remarked, the book 'met with a reception that makes the word success sound commonplace and insipid'.[29] ( ... ... ) Keynes summed up the initial reaction as follows:
The book is being smothered ... in a deluge of approval; not a complaint, not a word of abuse, not a line of criticism; letters from Cabinet Ministers in every post saying that they agree with every word of it; etc, etc. I expect a chit from the PM at any moment telling me how profoundly the book represents his view and how beautifully it is put. Will it be my duty to refuse the Legion of Honour at the hand of Clemenceau. Well, I suppose this is their best and safest line.[33]
( ... ... )
[메모] In Just- (E.E. Cummings)
자료 1. in Just- E. E. Cummings ( 출처: 영시마을 )
|
자료 2. 어느 영문학 강의 소재
Cummings calls the balloon man "lame" (4), "queer" (11), and "goat-footed" (20). Supported by the first two adjectives, “goat-footed” alludes to Greek Satyrs, particularly to Pan, half-man, half-goat, the Greek god of nature and legendary inventor of the panpipes. When Pan blew his pipes in the spring, all the little creatures of the field and wood came running. Thus cummings's city scene reenacts ancient ritual, and “the queer old balloonman" ushers in the season that begins life anew as he has done each spring since the beginning.
This mythological allusion enriches the meaning of the poem by suggesting that beneath this simple world is a much more complex one.
- The goat-footedness implies something evil and seductive.
- The balloonman has a peculiar, ominous power over the children. They stop everything, running and dancing to see him. On one level, of course, it is not surprising for children to greet a neighborhood visitor who sells balloons.
- Yet Cummings’s allusion to the satyrs of Greek mythology is disturbing. Although it is accurate to think of Pan as celebrating the birth of spring, satyrs certainly carry other associations. These creatures, who enjoyed wild merrymaking, were humanlike gods with goats' features. The “wild merrymaking” they enjoyed was often of a sexual nature.
- The American Heritage Dictionary defines "Satyr" not only as a woodland creature depicted as having the pointed ears, legs, and short horns of a goat; but also as a lecher (hence the phrase "that old goat"). Indeed, it is the root word for the term to describe excessive and often uncontrollable sexual desire in a male: satyriasis.
[some snapshots of Keynes's description of] David Lloyd George
자료 1. Tethering the broomstick (Jose Harris, London Review of Books, 1985)
‘Who shall paint the chameleon, who can tether a broomstick?’ wrote J.M. Keynes of David Lloyd George in 1919. ‘How can I convey to the reader ... any just impression of this extraordinary figure of our time, this syren, this goat-footed bard, this half-human visitor to our age from the hag-ridden magic and enchanted woods of Celtic antiquity?’
This passage was left out of the original text of The Economic Consequences of the Peace, because Keynes felt that he had tried and failed to do justice to the British prime minister’s baffling complexity of character. Lloyd George has continued to dazzle and elude his numerous biographers ever since. Few statesmen have had their public and private lives so frankly exposed and picked over by friend and foe alike: yet few have so tantalisingly evaded the grasp of the historian. Was Lloyd George, as Keynes suggested, a chimera from the Celtic twilight: or was he on the contrary a pioneer of modernity, managerialism and administrative rationalisation? Was he a ruthless practitioner of power politics or a diplomatic femme fatale – endowed with an almost feminine lubricity and guile? Was he an adherent of high principle, or merely a virtuoso of grand rhetoric? Was he a genuine democrat and parliamentarian, or was he mainly concerned with concentrating the power and streamlining the efficiency of the modern centralised state? ( ... ... )
자료 2. Maynard Keynes: An Economist's Biography (Donald E. Moggridge, Psychology Press, 1992)
( ... ... ) In the fragment he published in 1933, Lloyd George received the status of a femme fatale.
( ... ... )
How can I convey to the reader, who does not know him, any just impression of this extraordinary figure of our time, this syren, this goat-footed bard, this half-human visitor to our age from the hag-ridden magic and enchanted woods of Celtic antiquity. One catches in his company that flavour of final purposelessness, inner irresponsibility, existence outside or away from our Saxon good and evil, mixed with cunning, remorselessness, love of power. ...
Lloyd George is rooted in nothing; he is void and without content; he lives and feeds on his immediate surroundings; he is an instrument and a player at the same time which plays on the company and is played on by them too; he is a prism, as I have heard him described, which collects light and distorts it and is most brilliant if the light comes from many quarters; a vampire and a medium in one.[21]The 'old man' was too experienced and too cynical to fall for the femme fatale, but non-conformist minister was hooked. 'No wonder', Keynes concluded, 'that in the eventual settlement the real victor was Clemenceau'.
These were the personalities of ParisㅡI forbear to mention other nations or lesser men: Clemenceau, aesthetically the noblest; the President, morally the most admirable; Lloyd George intellectually the subtlest. Out of their disparities and weaknesses the Treaty was born, child of the least worthy attributes of his parents, without nobility, without morality, without intellect.[22]
( ... ... )
[발췌: David A. Andelman's] A Shattered Peace
출처: A Shattered Peace By David A. Andelman
※ 발췌(excerpts):
of which: Chapter 9 1/2. Setting Up a Global Economy
( ... ... ) Meanwhile, Keynes had been doing his best to see if there was anything that could be salvaged from what he rightly predicted would be a truly devastating blow that the treaty’s reparation provisions would deal to the Western world’s economic system. Even before the treaty was signed on June 28, 1919, Keynes had left Paris, with one final
shot to Lloyd George:
Dear Prime Minister:
I ought to let you know that on Saturday I am slipping away from the scene of nightmare. I can do no more good here. I’ve gone on hoping even through these last dreadful weeks that you’d find some way to make of the Treaty a just and expedient document. But now it’s apparently too late. The battle is lost. I leave the [Heavenly] twins to gloat over the devastation of Europe, and to assess to taste [sic] what remains for the British taxpayer.
Sincerely yours,J. M. Keynes.
In fact, of course, the Heavenly Twins had not really had their way at all, but by now Keynes was determined to take his campaign against the reparations to the people. Friends urged him to put his concerns on paper – among them, Virginia Woolf, who on seeing him on July 18 was worried, as she confided to her diary: “He is disillusioned, he says. No more does he believe, that is, in the stability of the things he likes. Eton is doomed; the governing classes, perhaps Cambridge too. These conclusions were forced
on him by the dismal and degrading spectacle of the Peace Conference, where men played shamelessly, not for Europe, or even England, but for their own return to Parliament at the next election.”
The work Keynes finally produced – what some believe was truly his masterpiece, was certainly heavily influenced by Bloomsbury, especially Lytton Strachey’s magisterial 1918 work, Eminent Victorians. ( ... ... )
First, Keynes set up the context – chaos, madness, and confusion threatening to overwhelm the Western world’s economy and undermine its political foundations, leaving the way clear for the arrival of Bolshevism, even anarchy. The war, and the abortive attempts at a stable peace that followed, had all but destroyed the delicate balance that existed in those halcyon days before the outbreak of hostilities. Then he picked apart the economic planks of the treaty – particularly the capacity of Germany to pay and the needs claimed by each of the European powers. In each case they were vastly overrated; indeed, by many orders of magnitude. Certainly there was some considerable hyperbole at work here, but not enough to enable even Keynes’s sharpest critics on both sides of the Atlantic to discredit the work. Especially since Keynes offered a solution – an eminently reasonable one, in fact, that seemed on the surface to cut through all the rhetoric and various national self-interests. The formula that Keynes proposed was a simple one. First, cancel with one stroke all war debts. Second, cap German reparations at $10 billion, then deduct the value of various seized property like the German fleet, bringing the lump-sum total to $7.5 billion, to be repaid in thirty annual installments of $250 million beginning in 1923. This would allow the German economy to return to some semblance of stability. Finally, Britain must renounce all claims to this sum, turning her proceeds over to the “new states” of Central Europe, particularly Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, that were in far greater need. Some portions of the bonds issued by the “former enemy powers” to help satisfy the reparations must carry some financial guarantees from the Allies. “All this implies some generosity by the United States,” Keynes concluded.
The problem with this entire structure was simple. It would never work. It ignored the immediate political realities, as well as the deeply embedded passions, not only of rival political leaders, but of the peoples of most of these countries. With Wilson in the midst of a losing battle to win approval of the treaty and the League of Nations from a hostile Senate, he had no interest in forgiving U. S. debts to Britain. Recall the wartime financial loan scheme that Keynes hated at the time, but was forced to accept. Now as a result of this system, Britain had neither the interest nor the wherewithal to forgive the Continental Allies’ debts without receiving comparable concessions from Washington. Particularly galling was Europe’s new position with respect to the United States. Suddenly Europe, but especially Britain, was becoming a debtor region. For the political and financial leadership especially, it was demeaning to contemplate that for the first time, the colonies – the children, effectively – were holding the parents hostage.
Still, broad swaths of American and European readers embraced Keynes’s work. To make certain that each word appeared as he wrote it, Keynes himself financed its publication on both sides of the Atlantic. Felix Frankfurter – the young lawyer, Harvard Law professor, and a cofounder of The New Republic, who’d actually come to Paris to lobby for the Zionist cause – got the book published in America and serialized in his new magazine. Keynes, it appeared, had pointed out every flaw – of personality and structure – that bedeviled the entire peace process:
The campaign for securing out of Germany the general costs of the war was one of the most serious acts of political unwisdom for which our statesmen have ever been responsible. To what a different future Europe might have looked forward if either Mr. Lloyd George or Mr. Wilson had apprehended that the most serious of the problems which claimed their attention were not political or territorial but financial and economic and that the perils of the future lay not in frontiers or sovereignty but in food, coal and transport. Neither of them paid adequate attention to these problems at any stage of the Conference….The financial problems which were about to exercise Europe could not be solved by greed. The possibility of their cure lay in magnanimity. Europe, if she is to survive her troubles, will need so much magnanimity from America that she must herself practice it.
And this process, with the mechanisms it had created, was grinding inexorably onward. Keynes’s monumental work, despite the widespread praise it attracted, never had much concrete impact on the peace process. Germany managed to make its first payment on the war reparations before the burden of what amounted to Mafia-style vigorish came crashing down on it. Keynes had pointed out that even at 5 percent interest, the reparations burden would double every fifteen years so that by 1936, with $750 million in annual payments (triple the sum he had called for), the overall reparations debt would have exploded to $65 billion, an almost unimaginable sum to a nation that by then had suffered through more than a decade of hyperinflation, depression, and mass unemployment. There were projections that Germany would still be paying reparations until 1961 or beyond.
( ... ... )
2013년 4월 27일 토요일
[search for search about] Carl Melchior and J.M. Keynes
자료 1. Keynes and His Battles, by Gilles Dostaler (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007)
p. 141 ~ :
Paris Conference and the Treaty of Versailles
The Conference started on 18 January 1919. ( ... ) Keynes arrived in Paris on 10 January as chief Treasury representative of the British delegation. He attended the meetings of the Council of Ten on at least four occasions. He also became the British representative on the Supreme Economic Council. His first job was to try to obtain supplementary financial aid from the United States, when American loans were constitutional only during times of war. ( ... )
On 12 January, the Supreme Council of Supply and Relief, formerly known as the Supreme Economic Council, decided to supply Germany with food on the condition that it hand over its ships as spelled out in the Treaty of Versailles. ( ... )
( ... ... ) This man was Carl Melchior, a lawyer and banker. Keynes and Melchior immediately got on well and obtained from their respective delegations the permission to engage in one-on-one talks aimed at resolving the situation: 'He and I were, I think, the very first two civilians from the opposed camps to meet after the War in peaceful and honourable intercourse'(1932-3, p. 47). Keynes would relate these events in one of his most appealing writings, 'Dr. Melchior: a defeated enemy', quoted here before the paragraph, read before the Bloomsbury Memoir Club in February 1921 an published on his request after his death in 1949 with 'My Early Beliefs'. Melchior and Keynes remained in contact until the former's death in 1933.[38] Throughout this discussions, Melchior and his colleagues tried to convince the Allies not to require payments in gold, which would have a disastrous effect on Germany's financial situation, while recognizing that 'they were therefore in our hands as regards the means of payments'(1919-2, p. 398): 'The general demeanour of the German representatives was strikingly conciliatory and even submissive... Dr Melchior himself showed great ability in the conduct of the proceedings'(ibid., p. 402). It would take three more meetings, at Trier, Spa and Bruxelles, to finally authorize deliveries of food to Germany on 14 March, when famine threatened the country. It was at Spa that Keynes and Melchior obtained authorization to discuss one-on-one. A meeting between them and another British delegate made possible the final settlement. Keynes would maintain these contracts, not only with Melchior, but also with the other German delegates. He would be largely responsible for the success of negotiations aimed at providing aid to Austria then threatened by famine.
Another complicated debate in which Keynes would play a central role concerned a request for financial assistance on the part of France, following the United States' refusal to help that country. ( .... )
CF. Keynes Hayek: p. 10.
( ... ) In a secret meeting specifically forbidden by the Allies, the two men[Keynes and Melchior] concocted a deal whereby food supplies would start making their way to Germany if the German merchant marine fleet surrendered to the Allies. In May 1918, Keynes made a plea on behalf of the starving women and children of Austria. According to the minutes of the meeting that set up the Melchior deal, " ( ... a quote from R. Skidelsky's biography of JMK ... )
자료 2. Maynard Keynes: An Economist's Biography, by Donald Moggridge (Routledge, 2002)
p.300 ~ :
Almost immediately on his arrival in Paris, Keynes became involved in the negotiations for the renewal of the Armistice with Germany. On 11 January, he learned from Norman Davis of the American Treasury that the French were going to introduce new financial matters, including the disposition of the Reichsbank's gold and the control of the German note issue, into the negotiations. Another financial matter intruded because the original Armistice terms had included a provision for the allies to relax their naval blockade to allow food supplies through to Germany. Germany would have to pay for the food: the question was with what, particularly as any assets so used would not be available for later transfer to the allies in the form of reparations. Before the negotiations, the Supreme Council of Supply and Relief had agreed that food would be supplied on the condition that the Germans handed over their merchant marine. The Council was unable to agree on the matter of finance, but the Supreme War Council agreed that relief supplies should be a first charge on German assets, although the French, who had strenuously opposed the British and American s on this point, retained the right to re-open the matter two months later.
Keynes and Dudley Ward attended the negotiations at Trier as the British Treasury representatives. The American, French, and Italian treasuries were represented by Norman Davis, Comte de Lasteyrie and Professor Attalico.
The negotiations gave Keynes his first glimpse of Germany since 1912, as well as extensive opportunities for playing bridge. The morning after their arrival, they met the German financial delegation consisting of Dr Kaufmann, the President of the Reichsbank; three German Foreign Office representatives; Dr Ratjen, the German financial representative to the Armistice Commission and, lastly a member of the Hamburg banking firm Warburg. Keynes later described them:
( ... ... )
This was Dr Carl Melchior, who acted as the German spokesman during the negotiations. By the time he first met Keynes at 47 he had already several careers. He had been a lawyer before, in 1902, joining M.M. Warburg as counsel, where he gained a high reputation not only for his skills but also for his objectivity, his cultivated mind and his approachability. He fought in the war as a captain, but after a would moved to the civilian front as director of the central food-purchasing agency until anti-Semitism led to his resignation in 1917, when he became the first non-family member to become a partner in Warburgs. With the post-Armistice Weimar Government he was the representative of the German Treasury on the delegation concerned with the Peace terms.[31]
The first meeting covered a number of issues of which the first was currency. The French, in light of violent Spartacist disturbances in Germany, were concerned with the safety of Germany's gold reserves and hoped to get them transferred to Frankfurt in the French occupation zone. The British and Americans suspected French motives and with German assurances that the reserves were widely dispersed but secure left matters as they were. The French, also, having agreed to exchange marks for francs at pre-war par in Alsace Lorraine and contemplating similar policies for the areas they controlled on the left bank of the Rhine, worried about the depreciation of the mark and, therefore, control of the German note issue. Again, the Germans provided information as to the present position and matters remained as they were. The discussions moved to the matter of food supplies. As noted above, the allies had decided that they would offer food supplies as a means of gaining control of the German merchant marine, which they intended to take as a part of reparations and which would prove useful in the interim given the shortage of shipping. However, as representatives of the German shipping lines were not at Trier and as the Germans had no instructions on the issue, the discussion concerned payment for the foodstuffs with the Germans pleading for a credit which would be dealt with as a part of the final settlement at the Peace Conference (a variant on earlier French proposals) and the allies insisting on cash. The Germans eventually acknowledged that they might find a small sum for fats and condensed milk. On the shipping issue, even after the arrival of the German shipping representatives, there was no progress. Both sides agreed to adjourn.
By the time the delegation returned to Paris, Keynes was feeling distinctly unwell. ( ... influenza ... )
Keynes returned to Paris on 10 February, in response to a telegram from Dudley Ward, for another journey to Trier, another Armistice renewal, and another go at the ships and food issues. Beyond renewing the Armistice, the meeting accomplished next to nothing, for the Germans refused to surrender the ships without an arrangement over food; the French, despite the earlier decision of the Supreme War Council, refused to allow the Germans to use gold to pay for food; and the allies refused to provide credit for food.
March saw something of a breakthrough. The meeting between allies and the Germans at Spa in Belgium had been preceded by concerted planning to provide for a shipment of substantial quantities of breadstuffs and pork products. The allies had prepared the ground by agreeing to some concessions to the Germans and assistance to them in getting the food from abroad. As yet, however, there was no agreement over finance and the whole offer was conditional on the Germans' surrendering their merchant marine. The meeting was deadlocked. Keynes then obtained permission to speak to Melchior privately and explained to him informally now the ground lay in the hope that the Germans could get fresh instructions. In his memoir, Keynes set the interview out dramatically, stating that 'In a sort of way, I was in love with him'ㅡa remark that has caused speculation as the the nature of their subsequent relationship.[f] The intervention failed: the allied delegation returned to Paris that evening.
The return to Paris brought the matter to a meeting of the Supreme War Council. The Anglo-American proposal before the Council was that the allies would inform the Germans that they were bound to deliver the ships, that Germany would be able to use her liquid asset, including gold, to pay for the food, and that Germany might, with a limited lifting of the naval blockade, export goods and purchase food in neutral countries. The debate was prolonged and dramatic, with a telegram delivered in the middle of it from General Plumer, head of the British occupying forces, asking for food without delay owing to civilian distress and possible unrest. It concluded with Lloyd George's humiliation of the French Finance Minister, Louis-Lucien Klotz, as he attempted to prevent the Germans from using their gold. In the end, the proposals went through with the rider that the Germans would have to give up their ships before they knew the allies' terms.
The final meeting in the sequence was at Bussels on 13-14 March. There Keynes, in the company of a Royal Navy captain, met Melchior again to tell him privately what the allies had decided. The proposals went through easilyㅡalthough in the end little food actually moved, for difficulties continued over payments.[35] The business had taken two months.
After Brussels, Keynes remained in frequent contact with his German counterparts. It became closer when he succeeded in getting a German delegation, including Max Warburg, to the Chateau de Villette near Compiegne. His contacts with Melchior were to continue into the 1930s.
Food for Germany was not Keynes's only concern. He was deeply involved in the discussion of the non-reparations, financial clause of the Treaty. He was involved in other relief discussions and policy with a ￡12.5 million Treasury grant to pay with. In typical Treasury fashion, he still had ￡1~￡1.5 million left as late as 22 May, despite 'large and incessant' demands.[36] He played a significant role in providing food for Austria.[37] Inter-allied financial problems continued. On 19 February he had formally to inform the French of the end of British financial assistance. Although the possibility had been in the wind for some months, this produced a crisis which saw Keynes flying to London for a War Cabinet meeting on 25 February. The aircraft lost its way and landed in a ploughed field a hundred miles off course.[38] The outcome was an advance of ￡2 million, later expanded to ￡6 million, while the Chancellor went to Paris to discuss the issue with the French on 8-10 March. Chamberlain' discussions resulted in an agreement that the French would sell gold held on French account in the Bank of England under a 1916 agreement in return for a credit of ￡30 million. After two more months, all credits would end. This arrangement fell apart when the Bank of France refused to release the gold and with the end of allied support the French ceased to support their exchange rate, a week before the British, having run through their American credit, did likewise. Thus the wartime pattern of exchange rates broke down. Stability would not return for over seven years. ( ... ... )
자료 3. The Immoral Moral Scientist. John Maynard Keynes (Nina Paulovicova, University of Alberta. 2007)
He is a naughty Jew boy covered with ink –that kind of Jew – the kind which has its head above water, the sweet, tender imps who have not sublimated immortality into compound interest. He was the nicest, and the only talented person I saw in all Berlin, except perhaps old Fuerstenberg, the banker Lydia liked so much, and Kurt Singer, two foot by five, the mystical economist from Hamburg. And he was a Jew; and so was Fuerstenberg
and so was Singer. And my dear Melchior is Jew too.
Yet if I lived there, I felt I might turn anti-Semite. For the poor Prussian is too slow and heavy on his legs for the other kind of Jews, the ones who are not imps but serving devils, with small horns, pitch forks, and oily tails. It is not agreeable to see civilization so under the ugly thumbs of its impure Jews who have all the money and the power and brains. I vote rather for the plump hausfraus and think fingered Wandering Birds. But I am not sure that I wouldn’t even rather be mixed up with Lloyd George than with the German political Jews.[66]
Three layers stand out from this particular Keynes’ utterance: a) Keynes’ anti-Semitism is articulated through his distaste for the acquisitive elements of society, which he ascribes to Jews as a part of their national stereotype; b) the notion of “impure thumbs” of the “impure Jews” reflects the racial theories of Keynes’ era that permeated him and his contemporaries in different modes of different intensity; c) finally, his comparison of the Jews to “serving devils” reflects Keynes’ fascination with irrational, dark forces in society. Hints of dark forces, religion, and magic seem to be a favorite descriptive element of Keynes in describing an individual in the context of national stereotyping of the Jews. When Keynes recognized Melchior`s[67] hatred of Russia, he acknowledged that the Jewish banker was obsessed with the “dark forces.” Upon this revelation Keynes understood that Melchior was - “a strict and upright moralist, a worshiper of the Tablets of the Law, a Rabbi.” [68] Keynes was aware of the categories of modern psychology. His life time experience demonstrated that reality was not the realm of reason but rather the world of unpredictable dark and mysterious forces.[69] Keynes was caught by the power of magic, which he seemed to seek behind any form of the extraordinariness.[70]
[67] More on Melchior and Keynes’ relationship see in: Elisabeth Johnson and Harry
Johnson, The Shadow of Keynes (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978), 45 – 61.
2013년 4월 26일 금요일
[직책용어] Financial Secretary to the Treasury
[1] ... He(Edwin Montagu) served under H. H. Asquith as Under-Secretary of State for India from 1910 t 1914, as Financial Secretary to the Treasury from 1914 to 1915 and again from 1915 to 1916 and as Chancellor of the Dutchy of Lancaster (with a seat in the cabinet) in 1915 and 1916. (...)
[2] Financial Secretary to the Treasury is a junior Ministerial post in the British Treasury. It is the 4th most significant Ministerial role within the Treasury after[:]
- (1) the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
- (2) the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, and
- (3) the Paymaster General.
CF. 재무부 금융장관(?) : Mark Hoban 英 재무부 금융장관(Financial Secretary to the Treasury)의 유럽금융시장협회(AFME) 연설(2011.2.3) .... 자본시장연구원(2011년)
[3] The Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury is a junior ministerial post in the British Treasury, ranked below[:]
- (1) the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
- (2) the Chief Secretary to the Treasury,
- (3) the Paymaster General [cf. 재무부 경리장관]and
- (4) the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, and alongside (4) the Economic Secretary to the Treasury.
Cf.1: A Parliamentary Secretary is a member of a Parliament in the Westminster system who assists a more senior minister with his or her duties.
In the parliamentary systems of several Commonwealth countries, such as the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia, it is customary for the prime minister to appoint parliamentary secretaries (in the Legislative Assembly of Ontario, "parliamentary assistants") from his or her political party in parliament to assist cabinet ministers with their work. The role of parliamentary secretaries has varied under different prime ministers. Originally, the post was used as a training ground for future ministers.
United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, Parliamentary Secretary (in full, usually Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State in those departments headed by a Secretary of State) is the third level of government minister, below Minister of State and Secretary of State (or another minister of Secretary of State rank, such as the Chancellor of the Exchequer). Not all departments have all three levels of minister.
A Parliamentary Private Secretary (PPS), on the other hand, is a Member of Parliament who acts as an unpaid assistant to an individual minister, but has no ministerial role, although is expected to support the government at all times. ( ... ... )
2013년 4월 25일 목요일
[World War I] Who Declared War and When
자료 1. http://www.firstworldwar.com/features/declarationsofwar.htm (출처: www.firstworldwar.com )
※ 제1차 세계대전 세계 각국의 선전포고 일지:
※ 발췌(excerpt):
United Kingdom:
- Declared war with Germany on 4 August 1914
- Declared war with Austria-Hungary on 12 August 1914
- Declared war with Turkey on 5 November 1914
- Declared war with Bulgaria on 15 October 1915
자료 2. The British Declaration of War (출처: History Learning Site )
On August 4th 1914, Great Britain declared war on Germany. It was a decision that is seen as the start of World War One. Britain, led by Prime Minister Herbert Asquith, had given Germany an ultimatum to get out of Belgium by midnight of August 3rd. In fear of being surrounded by the might of Russia and France, Germany had put into being the Schlieffen Plan in response to the events that had occurred in Sarajevo in June 1914. By doing this, the German military hierarchy had doomed Belgium to an invasion. Belgium’s neutrality had been guaranteed by Great Britain as far back as 1839. Asquith had a very simple decision to make – but one that would have a cataclysmic impact on British society. He could either turn a blind eye to a war in mainland Europe that might have little impact on Britain if she stood as a neutral. Or the British public could see Asquith as the man who stood up to the perceived bullying of Germany and who stood for righteousness and decency. A future Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, described the scene in London in the hours that led to the declaration of war. ( ... ... )
2013년 4월 24일 수요일
[발췌: 책] 존 메이너드 케인스 (로버트 스키델스키)
출처: 존 메이너드 케인스 (로버트 스키텔스키). 고세훈 옮김. 후마니타스 2009
※ 발췌:
제1부,
5장 "케임브리지 학부 시절"
1. 킹스 칼리지
( ... ) "킹스에는 펠로우와 교수 모두 합해 70명이 있었는데, 시기마다 한 쪽이 느는 만큼 다른 쪽은 줄어들었다. ... 빈자리가 생기면 이튼의 장학생 하나가 적절한 시기에 킹스로 옮겨 갔고, 팰로우가 됐으며, 시험 없이 학위를 땄고, 결혼하거나 직장을 잡지 않는다면, 소득과 권위가 늘어나는 것을 흡족해하며 평생 살아갈 수 있었다."[주]1 ( ... ) 19세기 전반기만 해도 킹스는, 아름답지만 인적이 끊긴, 장엄한 주책의 인상을 풍겼을 것이다. 각별한 위용을 자랑하던 두 건물, 곧 1515년에 완공된 예배당과 1725년부터 역사가 시작된 펠로우관, 즉 깁스(Gibbs)관은 멋진 공원과 잔디밭으로 둘려싸여 있었다. ( ... ) 강의 의무가 없는 펠로우들 대부분은 비거주자이면서도 칼리지가 소유한 부동산으로부터 막대한 배당금을 지속적으로 받았다. 교수들도 열두어 명 정도를 넘어선 적이 거의 없었다.
이튼과 킹스 두 왕립재단이 오랜 무력감에서 깨어난 것은 빅토리아 개혁이라는 마법의 지팡이 때문이었다 1850년대부터 시작된 킹스의 부흥은, 의회로부터의 외적 압력과, 개혁적 성향을 가진 이튼 학교 출신 신입생들로부터의 내적 압력이 결합된 결과였다. 메이너드가 입학했을 때, 킹스의 위상은 절정기를 누리고 있었다. ( ... ) 케인스가 진학할 무렵의 킹스에는 펠로우가 30명, 대학원생이 30명, 그리고 130명이 넘는 학부생들이 있었는데(케임브리지 대학 전체의 학부생 숫자는 3천 명이었다), 킹스보다 훨씬 규모가 큰 트리니티와 세인트존스만이 학문적·사회적 지위[에 있어서][에서] 킹스에 견줄 만했다. ( ... ) 19세기 말 킹스의 펠로우들은 학자라기보타는, 킹스 특유의 뛰어난 교사들이었다.
( ... ... ) '오 비'[오스카 브라우닝]가 71세가 되던 1908년에 그는 대학의 직위와 주간 훈련 학교의 교장직 모두에서 물러났다.{CF. '오 비'는 71세가 되던 1908년 대학의 직위와 주간 훈련 학교의 교장직 모두에서 물러났다.} 표면적으로는 고령이 이유였지만 내용적으로는 의무 태만 때문이었다. 그는 자신이 부당한 처벌을 받았다고 느꼈기 때문에, 여전히 킹스의 펠로우였음에도 불구하고, 로마로 거처를 옮겨서 1923년까지 ( ... ) 살았다.[주]4 그 무렵{ㅡ1909년(이 독자)ㅡ}역시 킹스의 펠로우가 되어 있던 메이너드는 '오 비'와의 교류를 소홀히 하지 않았으며 그의 세금 문제 처리를 거들어 주었다. ( ... ... )
2. 대학 1학년
( ... ) 메이너드는 ( ... ) 대학에 오자마자 엄청나게 책을 사들였고, 대학 조정반에도 가입했다. 무엇보다 클럽과 토론 모임의 세계ㅡ이들 대부분은 킹스와 트리니티에 본거지를 두고 있었다ㅡ에 발을 들여놓았다. ( ... ) [그런 모임들] 중에는 오스카 브라우닝의 '정치학회'와 디킨슨의 '토론회'도 있었다. '트리니티 에세이회(Trinity Essay Society)도 있었는데, 거기에서는 그는 1902년 11월 10일 리튼 스트레이치가ㅡ케인스의 표현에 따르면ㅡ"기독교에 대한 가장 눈부신 풍자"를 발표하는 것을 듣게 되는데, 당신 3학년 학부생이던 스트레이치를 본 것이 아마 그때가 처음이었을 것이다. 곧 메이너드는 토론회 네 곳의 회원이 되었고, 그 가운데 하나인 '디셈비리(Decemviri)'는 킹스와 트리니티에서서 특별히 초청된 학부생 열 명으로 구성되었다.
( ... ... )
메이너드는 지적으로 가치 있어 보이는 것은 무엇에나 열심이었다. 그리하여 두 번째 학기에는 역사를 전공하던 페이를 끌고 G.E. 무어의 윤리학 강의와 맥태거크의 형이상학 강의를 들으러 쫓아다녔다. 맥태거트가 다룬 주제는 시간의 형이상학적 측면이었다. 그리고 얼마 안 있어 메이너드는 킹스의 또 다른 모임인 '파리지애스트(Parrhesiasts)'에서 발표할, '시간과 변화'에 관한 논문 한 편을 쓰고 있었다. ( ... ... )
3. 사도들과 속인들
첫 학기 12월에 메이너드는 키가 큰 두 젊은이의 방문을 받았다. (...) 그들은 자신을 스트레이치와 울프라고 정중히 소개했다. (...) 그들은 메이너드가 케임브리지의 가장 배타적인 단체인 '케임브리지 대화회(Cambridge Conversazione Society)' 혹은 '사도들(Apostles)'의 회원이 되기에 적합한지 여부를 확인하러 온 것이었다. 이 단체는 자신의 존재를 외부에 드러내지 않으려고 했다. 사도가 되지 못한, 사도의 친구들의 반감을 피한다는 것도 한 가지 이유였지만 자기들만의 세계를 보호한다는 취지 때문이기도 했다. (...) 트리니티와 킹스 두 대학은 현역 사도와 은퇴한 명예 사도들로 넘쳤다. 메이너드는 이튼에서의 눈부신 명성, 탁월한 학업 성적, 그리고 네빌의 아들이라는 사실 때문에 그들 대부부에게 이미 익히 알려진 인물이었다. 그의 첫 번째 학기에 '천사들(angels)', 즉 은퇴한 사도들이었던 오스카 브라우님과 로스 디킨슨은 그를 유망한 후보로 점찍고 있었다. ( ... ... )
메이너드는 243번째 사도였다. 그 숫자는 1820년 사도회를 창설한 조지 톰린슨에서 시작되어 끊이지 않고 줄곧 이어진 번호였다. (...) 학기 중에 사도들은 매주 토요일 저녁, 간사의 방에서 문을 걸어 잠근 채 회합을 가졌다. 천사들도 종종 합류했지만 의무 사항은 아니었다. '사회자'가 이전 회의에서 합의된 주제에 관한 논문을 발표하면, 추첨에 의해 결정된 순서대로 (...) 자신의 의견을 말하는 토론이 뒤따르고, 의문 사항이 발생하면 투표에 부친다. 모임의 목적과 분위기는 오래 세월을 거치면서도 크게 변한 것이 없어 보였다. 시즈윅이 요약한 바에 따르면, 그것은 "일단의 친밀한 동료들의 절대적 헌신과 솔직함을 통해 진리를 추구하는"의 자리였다. ( ... ... )
( ... ) 얼마 안 있어 이들은 '블룸즈버리 그룹(Bloomsbury Group)'이라는 케임브리지 사도회의 런런 지파를 창설하는 데 핵심적인 역할을 하게 된다. ( ... )
(...) 메이너드 당시 사도회에는 화이트헤드, 맥태거트, 러셀, 무어가 포진해 있었는데, 이들은 모두 세계적으로 이름을 떨칠 철학자가 될 인물들이었다. (...) 그러나 이러한 철학적 수습기에 관련해서 중요한 것은 메이너드 세대를 포함한 일련의 사도들 세대가 스스로의 삶을 어떻게 영위할 것인가에 관한 진지하고도 강고한 이론들을 세상에 내놓았다는 사실이다. 메이너드가 사도회에 선출된 지 6개월 지나서 그의 인생에서 가장 중요한 책이 될 G.E. 무어의 <프린키피아 에티카>가 출판되었다. (...) 메이너드 시절의 사도회가 보여준 두 번째 중요한 관심사는 미학적인 것이었다. (...) 철학과 미학이라는 양대 물줄기는 메이너드 당시 사도회의 "진리를 위한 탐구"로 흘러들어갔으며, 메이너드가 사도회에서 발표한 논문들도 대체로 이 둘로 분류될 수 있다. 거기에 경제학이 비집고 들어갈 여지는 없었고, 정치학 또한 마찬가지였다.
( ... ... )
6장. "나의 초기 신념들"
1. G.E. 무어와 <프린키피아 에티카>
1938년 9월 9일 메이너드 케인스는 블룸즈버리의 회상록 클럽(Memoir Club)에서 "나의 초기 신념들(My Early Beliefs)"라는 제목의 에세이를 발표했다. (...) 1949년 그의 친구 가넷이 출판했고, 그의 전집 제10권에 재수록되었다. 그 에세이는 케인스의 한평생 작업을 이해하는 데 없어서는 안 될 문서이다. ( ... ... ) 철학은 케인스에게 삶의 기반을 제공했다. 그에게는 경제학 이전에 철학이 있었다. 목적의 철학이 수단의 철학보다 선행했던 것이다. 케인스의 철학은 1903년과 1906년 사이, 즉 학부 마지막 2년과 대학원 시절에 형성되었다. 이는 케인스가 사도들과의 교류를 통해 그드링 주로 관심을 가지고 있던 문제에 답하면서 구체화되었다. ( ... ... )
2. 케인스와 무어
3. 케인스의 철학 수습기
케인스의 초기 저작들을 이해하는 데 가장 좋은 길잡이는 그가 졸헙 시험 직후인 1905년 7월과 9월 사이에 썼던ㅡ그가 "윤리학 잡기(Miscellanea Ethica)"라고 부른ㅡ몇몇 기록에 나타나 있다. ( ... ... )
7장. 케임브리지와 런던
1. 난파
메이너드가 킹스에 온지 4년째가 되었다. 1905년 7월 16일 자 네빌의 일기에는 "우리는 아직 메이너드가 도덕과학 졸업 시험의 2부를 치러야 할지 경제학 졸업 시험을 치러야 할지를 결정하지 못했다"라고 적혀 있다. 메이너드는 알프레드 마셜의 주간 지도를 받기 시작했다. 그렇다고 그가 경제학자가 되기로 결정한 것은 결코 아니었다. 그의 주된 지적 관심은 여전히 도덕철학에 있었다. 스트레이치가 떠나고ㅡ그는 "트리니티의 사악한 교수들이 나를 펠로우로 받아들이지 않았어"라고 덩컨 그랜트에게 말했다ㅡ케인스가 그의 뒤를 이어 사도회 간사가 되었다. ( ... )
( ... ... )
메이너드는, 정서적으로는 거의 빈사 상태였지만, 지적 도전들에 대해서는 매우 적극적으로 대응했다. 그는 마셜과의 경제학 공부에 빠져 있었다. 이와 관련하여 '순수 경제학', '자본', '조세, '트러스트와 철도'에 관한 네 묶음의 노트와 에세이가 전해져 오고 있다. 이론 쪽으로는 제번스, 쿠르노, 에지워스뿐만 아니라 마셜의 미공개 논문 두 편(...)을 공부했다. ( ... ... )그리고 11월 23일의 편지에는 이렇게 적혀 있다. "마셜은 전문 경제학자로 진로를 바꾸라고 끊임없이 나를 들볶아. ( ... ... )."
스트레이치는 11월 27일에 답장을 썼다. "오, 안 되지. 케임브리지 경제학자가 된다는 것은 정말 미친 짓이야. 런던으로 와. 재무부에 취직하고, 나와 함께 살리을 차리면 되잖아. 파티도 같이 열고... ." 메이너드는 런던에서 스트레이치와 끝없이 수다를 떨 생각에 잔뜩 마음이 동했다. ( ... ) 돌아오자마자 [케인스]는 부모에게 경제학 졸업 시험을 포기하고 공무원 시험에 매달리겠다고 통보했다. 마셜은 그의 결정을 안타까워했다. ( ... ) 케인스는 생전에 경제학 학위를 받은 적이 없었다.
( ... ... ) 공무원 시험이 시야에서 사라지자, 펠로우십 논문을 쓰기 시작했다. 정확히 이미 5년 전에 그의 아버지가 작성한 일정에 따른 것이었다.
아버지와 답안 검토를 모두 마치고 나서 케인스는 상위 10등 안에는 들 것으로 예상했다. 그가 지원한 곳이 재무부와 인도청이었기 때문에 아주 좋은 성적이라고는 볼 수 없었다. 그러나 총전 6천 점 가운데 3,498점을 얻어 2등을 했다. 수석은 3,917점을 얻은 옥스퍼드 베일리얼 출신의 고전 전공자 오토 니마이어에게 돌아갔는데, 재무부를 택한 그는 케인스가 훗날 공격했던 경제정책의 옹호자가 될 사람이었다. ( ... )
2. 인도청
1906년 10월 16일 , 메이너드는 인도청 군무부에서 연봉 200파운드를 받는 하급 사무관으로 공무원 경력을 시작했다. 그가 맨 처음 맡은 일은 힘센 에어셔 황소 열 마리를 봄베이로 선적하는 것이었다. 인도청은 차관보들이 통솔하는 여섯 개 부서로 이루어져 있었[고,] 6명의 차관보, 8명의 상급 사무관, 10명의 하급 사무관, 그리고 76명의 말단 사무관들이 근무했다. 주요 업무는 인도로 오가는 연간 약 10만 편의 서류를 취급하는 것이었다. ( ... )
케인스가 인도청을 택했던 이유는 인도에 관심이 있었기 때문이 아니라 [인도청]이 두 개의 최상위 국내 부처 가운데 하나였기 때문이다. 분명 영국의 지배를 보는 [케인스]의 시각은 어느 모로 보나 전통적이었다. 그는 영국 정부가 포악한 고리대금업자로부터 빈자를 보호했고, 정의와 물질적 진보를 가져다주었으며, 식민 국가에 건전한 금융 체제를 정착시켰다고 믿었다. 요컨대 영국 정부는 자력으로는 좋은 정부를 발전시킬 수 없는 나라에 좋은 정부를 도입시켰다는 것이다. 식민 지배를 실론의 지방 관리라는 하급 직책을 통해 볼 수 있었던 레너드 울프와는 달리, 그리고 아시아를 두루 여행했던 E.M. 포스터와 로스 디킨슨과도 다르게, 메이너드는 언제나 영국 정부의 관점에서 인도 지배를 바라보았다. 그에게 제국주의 지배의 인도주의적·도덕적 함의 혹은 영국이 인도인들을 착취하고 있는지의 여부는 심각한 문제가 되지 못했다. 앞으로 그는 인도 문제에 관해 광범위하게 글도 쓰고 정책 자문도 하게 되겠지만, 그가 일찍이 가 보았던 가장 동쪽의 나라는 이집트였으며, 일찍이 만났던 인도인들은 케임브리지나 런던에서 보았던 사람들이 전부였고, 일찍이 일었던 인도에 관한 책은 오로지 금융 관련 전문서들뿐이었다. 이것은 19세기 매콜리와 밀 부자가 세운 전통이었는데, 여기서 인도를 잘 다스린다는 것은 지역에 대한 지식의 문제가 아니라 런던에 앉아서 건전한 공리주의 원칙을 [인도에] 잘 적용하는 문제였다.
( ... ... ) 처음에 플로렌스는 메이너드가 펠로우십 논문을 쓸 시간이 없을 것이라고 생각했다. 하지만 그것은 기우였다. 미결 서류함을 비우는 케인스의 일 처리 속도는 항상 놀라운 것이었다. 그는 업무 시간에 논문도 쓰고 개인 편지도 썼지만, 시간은 언제나 남아돌았다. ( ... )
그는 2년 계약으로 연간 집세가 90파운드인 하숙집을 었었는데 {인도 얘기 이후 나오는 이 이야기에서의 장소는 아마도 런던 같은데, 장면과 시기가 바뀌는 도입부가 전혀 없다.} (...) 주말마다 메이너드는 런던을 벗어나서 보통은 부모와 함께 케임브리지에 머물렀고, 사도회 모임에도 참석했다. ( ... ) 1907년 3월, 휴가의 계절이 찾아왔다. 메이너드, 제임스 스트레이치, 노튼은 덩컨 그랜드와 함께 긴 주말을 보내기 위해 파리로 건너갔다. ( ... )
(...) 인도청을 그만두기로 한 것은 그해 여름이었다. ( ... ... ) 메이너드는 1907년 10월 12일 토요일이 돼서야, 3주간의 휴가를 보내기 위해서 케임브리지로 돌아왔다. (...)
( ... ) 인도청으로부터 빨리 놓여나고 싶은 그의 바람은 킹스에서 우등 펠로우십을 따는 데 달려 있었다. 이제 그는 전적으로 확률론에 매달렸다. ( ... ) 1907년 12월 12일에 마침내 논문을 제출했다. 시험관은 W.E. 존슨과 알프레드 노스 화이트헤드였다.
1908년 2월 3일, 네빌은 존슨에게 메이너드의 합격 가능성에 대해 물어 보았다."대체로 [존슨]의 평가가 화이트헤드의 [평가]보다는 호의적인 것 같아." 네빌은 인도청을 떠나려는 메이너드의 간절한 마음에 결코 공감할 수 없었다. 우등 펠로우십의 지속 기간은 6년뿐이었다. 경력상으로 전망이 있는 것도 아니었지만, 인도청 근무를 하면서 유지할 수 있었다. ( ... ... )
다음 날 메이너드는 투표단 가운데 한 사람인 아서 피구에게, 만약 선발된다면 대학 내로 주거를 옮길 것이라고 말했다. 결정은 3월 17일에 있었다. 두 자리를 놓고 네 명의 후보자가 경합했다. 열다섯 차례의 투표를 거친 후에야 메이너드가 두 자리 중에서 어느 쪽도 채우지 못하게 될 것임이 분명해졌다. 두 명의 새 펠로우는 페이지와 돕스가 뽑혔다. 네빌의 일기이다. "우리는 무척 실망했고 실의에 빠졌다. 나는 메이너드가 인도청을 포기한 것에 대해 이미 마음을 추스른 상태였다. 케임브리지와 학생 생활로 복귀하고자 하는 마음이 너무나 확고해 보였기 때문이다." 메이너드는 실망했다기보다는 분노[했다]. 특히 불쾌했던 것은 그에게는 내년에도 기회가 있을 것이라는 게 거부된 이유 가운데 하나였다는 점이었다. ( ... )
케인스의 논문은 기본적으로 1904년 1월 사도회에서 발표했던 생각을 발전시킨 것이다. 그의 관심은 "모호한 논거와 불확실한 결론들"ㅡ이것들은 물론 합리적이고 객관적으로 보일 수 있다ㅡ에 적용할 수 있는 "새로운 종류의 논리"를 창안하는 데 있었다.[주]16
( ... 논문 1장의 케인스 인용 구절 ... )
( ... )
1908년 킹스 펠로우 선발에 실패한 것은 메이너드가 겪은 최악의 학문적 충격이었다. 그러나 그것은 단지 연기되었을 뿐이다. 그가 학생 신분을 다시 찾을 기회는 생각보다 일찍 찾아왔다. 펠로우십 '참사'가 있은 지 두 주 만에, 메이너드는 마셜로부터 은밀한 연락을 받았다. 마셜은 그동안 자신의 봉급에서 연간 1백 파운드를 들여 경제학 강좌 하나를 후원해 오고 있었다. 그런데 이러한 후원금의 수혜자가 막 리즈 대학에 자리를 얻었다. 마셜은 그 돈이 케인스에게 돌아가도록 할 수 있다고 조심스럽게 제안해 왔다. 그의 신중함은 이해할 만했다. 마셜은 은퇴를 코앞에 두고 있었고, 그 일로 자신의 후계자에게 부담을 줄 수는 없는 일이었다. 그러나 만일 그가 가장 선호하는 후보인 피구가 자신의 뒤를 잇는다면, 피구도 케인스에 대한 자신의 제안을 받아들일 것이라고 확신했다. 사실 마셜로 하여금 메이너드에게 연락을 취하도록 제안했던 사람이 바로 피구 자신이었다.
5월 30일, 피구가 애슐리, 캐넌 폭스웰을 누르고 마셜의 후계자로 선택되었을 때, 메이너드가 케임브리지로 복귀할 수 있는 첫 번째 조건이 충족되었다. 6월 30일, 네빌이 주관하는 경제학과 및 정치학과 이사회는 경제학 강사직 둘을 인가했는데, 하나는 메이너드에게, 다른 하나는 막 트리니티를 졸업한 월터 레이턴에게 돌아갔다. 계약에 따르면, 그들은 피구로부터 연간 1백 파우드를 받게 될 것이었다.{계약에는 그들 두 사람이 피구로부터 연간 1백 파운드를 받기로 되어 있었다}. 즉각 네빌은 메이너드에게 필요하지 않게 될 때까지 별도로 1백 파운드를 보조하겠다고 제안했다. 1908년 6월 5일, 메이너드는 25번째 생일에 인도청을 사직했다. ( ... )
( ... ... ) 케인스가 "경제문제를 행정가의 관점에서 보는 법"을 인도청에서 배웠다고 오스틴 로빈슨이 말했을 때, 그는 옳았다. ( ... )
* * *
252p: (...) 1909년 3월 16일, 메이너드는 자신이 킹스의 펠로우십을 받게 되었다는 소식을 들었다. (...)
제2부 벼랑에서
제9장 제1차 세계대전 이전의 경제적 관심
1. 경제학에 대한 태도
257p: (...) 경제 저널리스트로서의 그의 경력은 케임브리지 복귀와 거의 동시에 시작되었다. (...) 전문 경제학자로서 첫선을 보인 것은 1909년 3월자 <이코노믹 저널>에 실린 "인도에서의 최근 동향"이라는 논문을 통해서엿는데, 거기에서 그는 인도의 가격 동향을 금의 유출입과 연관시키려는 시도를 했다. (...)
케인스가 이 주제에 관해 본격적으로 학문적 탐구를 하게 된 계기는 1911년 10월ㅡ그의 아버지가 20년 전에 거절한 바 있던ㅡ<이코노믹 저널>의 편집장 직을 수락하면서부터였다. (...) 28세라는 나이가 편집장으로서는 너무 적다고 생각되었기 때문에 편집 자문 위원회라는 것이 구성되었지만, 그는 처음부터 독자적으로 일을 처리해 나갔다. (...)
(...) 케인스이 아버지가 1911년 10월 8일에 쓴 일기에는 , "많은 점에서 메이너드는 정치경제학 교수로서 피구의 일을 대신하는 것처럼 보인다"고 기록되어 있다. (...)
(...) 1909년 1월 19일 화요일 케인스는 "세계 각지에서 온 많은ㅡ내 생각으로는 적어도 15명은 되었다ㅡ청중 앞에서" 화폐, 신용, 가격에 대한 주 2회 강의를 시작했다.[주]9 (...)
메이너드는 자기 학생들을 끝까지 챙겼다. 1914년 킹스 펠로우십 선발을 위해 제출된, 지방세제에 대한 제럴드 셔브의 논문에 대해 피구와 에드워드 캐넌이 퇴짜를 놓는 보고서를 제출한 적이 있었다. 메이너드는 펠로우십 선발 위원회에 이의서를 회람시켰고, 그것은 클래펌이 "모욕적"이라고 생각할 정도로 심사자의 판단에 대해 적의를 드러낸 것이었다.
10장 사생활
11장 인더언 서머
( ... 1910년 11월 24일 덩컨에게 쓴 편지 ... ) 메이너드는 1910년 12월 경제학부의 5년 계약 거들러 강사직(Girdler's Lectureship)에 임명되었다. (...)
메이너드의 펠루우십은 그 다음 해 6월 그가 경제학부의 대학 강사로 임명되었을 때 사실상 영구적이 되었다. 그러나 학장이 제안한 대학의 재무행정 일은 메이너드가 이미 영향을 미치기 시작한 영역이었다. 재무행정과 관련된 것은 무엇이든지 그를 "즐겁게" 만들었다. 그리고 1909년에 대학 회계 업무의 검열관으로 임명된 적이 있기 때문에 이미 그것을 비판적인 눈으로 보기 시작한 상태였다. 1911년에는 부동산 위원회 위원으로 승진했다. (...) 메이너드는 딜윈 녹스를 포함한 젊은 펠로우들을 동원해 1912년 5월 11일에 열린 대학의 연례 교직원 총회에서 재무위원들의 정책을 폐기하는 데 성공했다. 성공한 반란자가 된 그는 자연스럽게 재무 위원회에도 선임되었다. 그가 재무위원장으로 올라가는 것은 이제 기정사실이 되었다. 1912년에는 펠로우십 선발자가 되었는데, 이는 매년 그가 어떤 주제와 관련된 것이든 간에 여러 편의 방대한 논문들을 읽어 내야 한다는 것을 의미했다. ( ... )
제4부 전쟁의 경제적 귀결
17장 1920년대의 케인스
4. 재산불리기
대부분의 블룸즈버리 친구들과는 달리 케인스에게는 상속받은 자산이 없었다. 따라서 교류 범위가 넓어진 생활 방식을 지탱하려면, 어떻게 하든 돈을 벌어야 했다. 이미 그는 대학 봉급을 보충하기 위해 전쟁 전에 투자를 시작한 바 있었다. 1915년 총 연간 소득은 1천 파운드를 약간 상회했는데, 이 가운데 30%는 투자 소득이었다. 1919~1920년 과 1928~1929년의 기간 동안 그의 평균 연간 소득은 5,068파운드에 달했다. 이 가운데 "지적 소득(academic income)"은 연간 2,372파운드 혹은 절반을 약간 밑도는 수치다. 그러나 "지적 소득"에는 "강의, 펠로우십, 시험 출제, 왕립경제학회, 책과 논문 그리고 케임브리지 킹스 칼리지 재무관으로서 그의 지위"로부터 오는 소득이 포함되어 있었다.[주]20
About his not owning professorship & 'indignity without emoluments'
※ Some searches about Keynes's position(s) or his way of operating at King's College, Cambridge at the time:
자료 1. Cambridge, Janus
... not accessible due to a Server error on April 24 2003
(...) He[J.M. Keynes] left the civil service in 1908, however, and [:]
- in 1909 was elected a fellow of King's College and remained so until his death.
- He was lecturer in Economics from 1911 to 1937 and
- in 1919 he also accepted the post of Second Bursar of the college. In 1924 he began his memorable tenure as first bursar, changing completely the philosophy by which the college managed its assets,
For fuller, and richer accounts of these matters, I would refer you all to Professor Austin Robinson's tribute to Keynes in the Economic Journal for March 1947 and to the late Sir Roy Harrod's Life of Keynes. ( ... ... )
Maynard Keynes was Bursar of King's College, Cambridge from 1919 until his death in 1946. Between 1919 and 1924 he served as Second Bursar; but thereafter, as First Bursar, he was in complete command. It should be understood that the office of Bursar in a Cambridge College is an immensely powerful one. For [:]
- not only does it put the incumbent in charge of the day-to-day financial operations of the College (dealing with such items as student fees and scholarships, Fellow's stipends, college staff wages, kitchen accounts and maintenance and repairs);
- but it also renders the incumbent effective control over the investment policy of the College. The sums to be dealt with in this area are often considerable and it is the responsibility of the Bursar to ensure that their development is effected in such a way as to promote and secure the financial well-being of the College in the future. As Bursar of King's, Keynes was to be primarily concerned with that long run in which (as he once said) we are all dead.
Of course, the difficulty of the job for Keynes must be kept in perspectiveㅡbetween 1915 and 1919 (during his time at the Treasury) he had been deeply involved with the external position of the country as a whole and in the 1920s he had begun to play a major role in the investment policies of the National Mutual and Provincial Insurance Companies. Indeed, he managed to increase the value of his own personal assets from near bankruptcy in 1919 (when his speculative activities cost him the whole of his accumulated savings of ￡6000) to ￡500,000 in 1937ㅡand this notwithstanding the slump of 1929-31 and the effect it had upon the value of his investments. His successes at King's were not less spectacular, and at his death he left the College with financial assets to match those of the other, previously more wealthy, colleges.* * *
1. [구글도서] Maynard Keynes as a teacher (A.F.W. Plumptre)
(...) The reference to reparations recalls an episode, or pairs of episodes, which could scarcely have occurred had our supervisor been anyone else. Early in November 1929, I wrote:Our group of four is to be movie-toned (talking-movie-pictured) with Mr Keynes in a film on the sights and sounds of Cambridge, this particular sight-and-sound being ^the^ Mr Keynes giving private supervision. We shall be picture-recorded in Keynes's private room with the Great Man in his own chair and ourselves lounging on the sofas discussing some weighty subject.That effort ended in failure; such was the state of the American art of the 'talkies' in those days that the light proved insufficient (the English November sun failed to provide adequate interior illumination) and the noise of the camera drowned the discussion. Accordingly, there was a repeat performance four months later. In order to ensure adequate lighting the scene was laid in the Fellow's garden of the College. So we found ourselves discussing German reparations against an idyllic vernal background; Lydia joined us and stood watching it all, amused and motionless, in a short black dress and red Russian boots. (...)footnote: The photographer was a typical uneducated Americanㅡvery pleased with himself and his machine. Some of his remarks to Keynes which I jotted down here: 'When I lower my hand, you give the answer, Professor, cold and sweet.' Again, to a subordinate daring to make a suggestion: 'Say, the Professor and I are running this show.' Keynes was rather bored, I think, and said to one of the men: 'Don't let them put "Professor" on the screen. I don't want the indignity without the emoluments'ㅡa typical Keynes remark.** Roy Harrod, op. cit.(^The Life of John Maynard Keynes^) p. 438, says that the first record of this riposte that he has discovered (about the indignity and emoluments of a Professor) occurred in 1931. I suspect that the episode which I described in 1930 was in fact the original; it had every appearance of spontaneity.
(...) Keynes had accepted an invitation by some screen news agency to take a movie of him, the famous expert and author of The Economic Consequences of the Peace, discussing reparations with a group of undergraduates. For some reasons the scenario was laid, not in his rooms, but in a summer house in the Fellow's Garden of King's College. There was a great deal of pother and to-do; the movie-man kept on telling the "professor" to do this and that and Keynes, who was not a professor in the Engish sense, remonstrated "You mustn't let them call me 'professor' in the film; I don't want the indignity without the emoluments."
(...) The Cambridge oral tradition preserves many anecdotes about Keynes. One story has the following exchange. 'Mr Keynes, if businessmen are quite so stupid as you appear to believe, how do you suppose that they make money?' 'By competing against each other, of course!' He thought it worth an hour a day of his time, poring over the financial pages and telephoning his stockbroker, pitting his wits against the market. He also served from 1921 to 1938 as chairman of the National Mutual Assurance Company.Keynes saw nothing wrong in making money. Nor did he see anything wrong in speculating or selling short, which he viewed as mechanisms for calibrating a market that would, as he well knew, punish those who read it wrongly. He had his share of disasters, amid which he remained remarkably detached and resilient. There were more ups than downs and he became wealthy in the process: if not seriously rich by the standards of the City of London then certainly by the standard of Bloomsbury or Cambridge.Little wonder that he did not live like the average professor of economics. Indeed he never became a professor in the British sense, and his riposte, when described as 'Professor Keynes', was to say that he would not accept the indignity without the emoluments. He could literally afford to say this because he did not need the emoluments after 1920. So he was able to buy his freedom of action by retaining his Fellowship at King's on much of his own terms. He escaped a lot of routines teaching but still offered lectures annually in the Economics Faculty. He also continued as editor of the Economic Journal, the leading British periodical in the field. He had been put into this post in 1912ㅡthe board was chaired by Marshallㅡat the age of twenty eight, at first with some oversight on account of his youth, but from 1919 to 1945 in undisputed command. This gave him great influence within the economics profession.
(...) To develop the theoretical implications further, however, I would need at the least an NEH grant and run the risk of being called a professor, and as John Maynard Keynes, who was just a bursar and not a fellow of his college at Cambridge once put it, "I will not accept the indignity without the emoluments."
cf. fellow: 6) (at Oxford and Cambridge universities) a member of the governing body of a college, who is usually a member of the teaching staff. 7) a member of the governing body or established teaching staff at any of various universities or colleges
Dic: stretch as a noun meaning ‘extension to or beyond the ordinary limit’
■ stretch: (5) extension to or beyond the ordinary limit:
- running at full stretch
- by no stretch of the imagination
- beyond any stretch of his understanding
...WordNet
- Her husband was not a womaniser by any stretch of the imagination...
- My family wasn't wealthy by any stretch of the imagination.
- It is not a great movie by any stretch of the imagination.
■ If you say that something is not true or possible by any stretch of the imagination, you are emphasizing that it is completely untrue or absolutely impossible.
■ by any stretch (of the imagination): spoken. used to emphasize that a negative statement is true.
■ not by any stretch of the imagination(by no stretch of the imagination): used for saying that you think something cannot be true or possible no matter how hard you try to imagine it.
... cobuild, ldoce, macmillan
2013년 4월 23일 화요일
Dic & terms: Moral science
자료 1: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_science (as of April 23, 2013)
( ... ) The term moral science was used by Hume in his Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals to refer to the systematic study of human nature and relationships. ( ... ) A variety of early thinkers in the humanistic sciences took up Hume's direction. Adam Smith, for example, conceived of economics as a moral science in the Humean sense.[6] ( ... ) Dilthey brought nineteenth-century attempts to formulate a methodology appropriate to the humanistic sciences together with Hume's term "moral science", which he translated as Geisteswissenschaft - a term with no exact English equivalent. Dilthey attempted to articulate the entire range of the moral sciences in a comprehensive and systematic way.[7] Meanwhile, his conception of “Geisteswissenschaften” encompasses also the abovementioned study of classics, languages, literature, music, philosophy, history, religion, and the visual and performing arts. He characterized the scientific nature of a study as depending upon:[7]
자료 2: Economics as a Moral Science (Kenneth E. Boulding, AER 1969)
( ...) Nevertheless, for many economists the very term "moral science" will seem like a contradiction. We are strongly imbued today with the view that science should be ^wertfrei^(value free) and we believe that science has achieved its triumph precisely because it has escaped the swaddling clothes of moral judgement and has only bee able to take off into the vast universe of the "is" by escaping from the treacherous launching pad of the "ought." ( ... ) Let me expain, then, what I mean by moral and by moral science. A moral, or ethical proposition, is a statement about a rank order of preference among alternatives, which is intended to apply to more than one person. A preference which applies to one person only is a "taste." Statements of this kind are often called "value judgments." ( ... ) A moreal proposition then is a "common value."
Every culture, or subculture, is defined by a set of common values, that is, generally agreed upon preferences. Without a core of common values a culture cannot exist, and we classify society into cultures and subcultures precisely because it is possible to identify groups who have common values.
( ... ... )
Let us return then to economics as a moral science, not merely in the sense in which all science is "affected with an ethical interest," but in the quite specific sense of asking whether economics itself can be of assistance in resolving ethical disputes, especially those which arise out of the continued increase of knowledge.
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