자료 1. Keynes and His Battles, by Gilles Dostaler (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007)
p. 141 ~ :
Paris Conference and the Treaty of Versailles
The Conference started on 18 January 1919. ( ... ) Keynes arrived in Paris on 10 January as chief Treasury representative of the British delegation. He attended the meetings of the Council of Ten on at least four occasions. He also became the British representative on the Supreme Economic Council. His first job was to try to obtain supplementary financial aid from the United States, when American loans were constitutional only during times of war. ( ... )
On 12 January, the Supreme Council of Supply and Relief, formerly known as the Supreme Economic Council, decided to supply Germany with food on the condition that it hand over its ships as spelled out in the Treaty of Versailles. ( ... )
( ... ... ) This man was Carl Melchior, a lawyer and banker. Keynes and Melchior immediately got on well and obtained from their respective delegations the permission to engage in one-on-one talks aimed at resolving the situation: 'He and I were, I think, the very first two civilians from the opposed camps to meet after the War in peaceful and honourable intercourse'(1932-3, p. 47). Keynes would relate these events in one of his most appealing writings, 'Dr. Melchior: a defeated enemy', quoted here before the paragraph, read before the Bloomsbury Memoir Club in February 1921 an published on his request after his death in 1949 with 'My Early Beliefs'. Melchior and Keynes remained in contact until the former's death in 1933. Throughout this discussions, Melchior and his colleagues tried to convince the Allies not to require payments in gold, which would have a disastrous effect on Germany's financial situation, while recognizing that 'they were therefore in our hands as regards the means of payments'(1919-2, p. 398): 'The general demeanour of the German representatives was strikingly conciliatory and even submissive... Dr Melchior himself showed great ability in the conduct of the proceedings'(ibid., p. 402). It would take three more meetings, at Trier, Spa and Bruxelles, to finally authorize deliveries of food to Germany on 14 March, when famine threatened the country. It was at Spa that Keynes and Melchior obtained authorization to discuss one-on-one. A meeting between them and another British delegate made possible the final settlement. Keynes would maintain these contracts, not only with Melchior, but also with the other German delegates. He would be largely responsible for the success of negotiations aimed at providing aid to Austria then threatened by famine.
Another complicated debate in which Keynes would play a central role concerned a request for financial assistance on the part of France, following the United States' refusal to help that country. ( .... )
CF. Keynes Hayek: p. 10.
( ... ) In a secret meeting specifically forbidden by the Allies, the two men[Keynes and Melchior] concocted a deal whereby food supplies would start making their way to Germany if the German merchant marine fleet surrendered to the Allies. In May 1918, Keynes made a plea on behalf of the starving women and children of Austria. According to the minutes of the meeting that set up the Melchior deal, " ( ... a quote from R. Skidelsky's biography of JMK ... )
자료 2. Maynard Keynes: An Economist's Biography, by Donald Moggridge (Routledge, 2002)
p.300 ~ :
Almost immediately on his arrival in Paris, Keynes became involved in the negotiations for the renewal of the Armistice with Germany. On 11 January, he learned from Norman Davis of the American Treasury that the French were going to introduce new financial matters, including the disposition of the Reichsbank's gold and the control of the German note issue, into the negotiations. Another financial matter intruded because the original Armistice terms had included a provision for the allies to relax their naval blockade to allow food supplies through to Germany. Germany would have to pay for the food: the question was with what, particularly as any assets so used would not be available for later transfer to the allies in the form of reparations. Before the negotiations, the Supreme Council of Supply and Relief had agreed that food would be supplied on the condition that the Germans handed over their merchant marine. The Council was unable to agree on the matter of finance, but the Supreme War Council agreed that relief supplies should be a first charge on German assets, although the French, who had strenuously opposed the British and American s on this point, retained the right to re-open the matter two months later.
Keynes and Dudley Ward attended the negotiations at Trier as the British Treasury representatives. The American, French, and Italian treasuries were represented by Norman Davis, Comte de Lasteyrie and Professor Attalico.
The negotiations gave Keynes his first glimpse of Germany since 1912, as well as extensive opportunities for playing bridge. The morning after their arrival, they met the German financial delegation consisting of Dr Kaufmann, the President of the Reichsbank; three German Foreign Office representatives; Dr Ratjen, the German financial representative to the Armistice Commission and, lastly a member of the Hamburg banking firm Warburg. Keynes later described them:
( ... ... )
This was Dr Carl Melchior, who acted as the German spokesman during the negotiations. By the time he first met Keynes at 47 he had already several careers. He had been a lawyer before, in 1902, joining M.M. Warburg as counsel, where he gained a high reputation not only for his skills but also for his objectivity, his cultivated mind and his approachability. He fought in the war as a captain, but after a would moved to the civilian front as director of the central food-purchasing agency until anti-Semitism led to his resignation in 1917, when he became the first non-family member to become a partner in Warburgs. With the post-Armistice Weimar Government he was the representative of the German Treasury on the delegation concerned with the Peace terms.
The first meeting covered a number of issues of which the first was currency. The French, in light of violent Spartacist disturbances in Germany, were concerned with the safety of Germany's gold reserves and hoped to get them transferred to Frankfurt in the French occupation zone. The British and Americans suspected French motives and with German assurances that the reserves were widely dispersed but secure left matters as they were. The French, also, having agreed to exchange marks for francs at pre-war par in Alsace Lorraine and contemplating similar policies for the areas they controlled on the left bank of the Rhine, worried about the depreciation of the mark and, therefore, control of the German note issue. Again, the Germans provided information as to the present position and matters remained as they were. The discussions moved to the matter of food supplies. As noted above, the allies had decided that they would offer food supplies as a means of gaining control of the German merchant marine, which they intended to take as a part of reparations and which would prove useful in the interim given the shortage of shipping. However, as representatives of the German shipping lines were not at Trier and as the Germans had no instructions on the issue, the discussion concerned payment for the foodstuffs with the Germans pleading for a credit which would be dealt with as a part of the final settlement at the Peace Conference (a variant on earlier French proposals) and the allies insisting on cash. The Germans eventually acknowledged that they might find a small sum for fats and condensed milk. On the shipping issue, even after the arrival of the German shipping representatives, there was no progress. Both sides agreed to adjourn.
By the time the delegation returned to Paris, Keynes was feeling distinctly unwell. ( ... influenza ... )
Keynes returned to Paris on 10 February, in response to a telegram from Dudley Ward, for another journey to Trier, another Armistice renewal, and another go at the ships and food issues. Beyond renewing the Armistice, the meeting accomplished next to nothing, for the Germans refused to surrender the ships without an arrangement over food; the French, despite the earlier decision of the Supreme War Council, refused to allow the Germans to use gold to pay for food; and the allies refused to provide credit for food.
March saw something of a breakthrough. The meeting between allies and the Germans at Spa in Belgium had been preceded by concerted planning to provide for a shipment of substantial quantities of breadstuffs and pork products. The allies had prepared the ground by agreeing to some concessions to the Germans and assistance to them in getting the food from abroad. As yet, however, there was no agreement over finance and the whole offer was conditional on the Germans' surrendering their merchant marine. The meeting was deadlocked. Keynes then obtained permission to speak to Melchior privately and explained to him informally now the ground lay in the hope that the Germans could get fresh instructions. In his memoir, Keynes set the interview out dramatically, stating that 'In a sort of way, I was in love with him'ㅡa remark that has caused speculation as the the nature of their subsequent relationship.[f] The intervention failed: the allied delegation returned to Paris that evening.
The return to Paris brought the matter to a meeting of the Supreme War Council. The Anglo-American proposal before the Council was that the allies would inform the Germans that they were bound to deliver the ships, that Germany would be able to use her liquid asset, including gold, to pay for the food, and that Germany might, with a limited lifting of the naval blockade, export goods and purchase food in neutral countries. The debate was prolonged and dramatic, with a telegram delivered in the middle of it from General Plumer, head of the British occupying forces, asking for food without delay owing to civilian distress and possible unrest. It concluded with Lloyd George's humiliation of the French Finance Minister, Louis-Lucien Klotz, as he attempted to prevent the Germans from using their gold. In the end, the proposals went through with the rider that the Germans would have to give up their ships before they knew the allies' terms.
The final meeting in the sequence was at Bussels on 13-14 March. There Keynes, in the company of a Royal Navy captain, met Melchior again to tell him privately what the allies had decided. The proposals went through easilyㅡalthough in the end little food actually moved, for difficulties continued over payments. The business had taken two months.
After Brussels, Keynes remained in frequent contact with his German counterparts. It became closer when he succeeded in getting a German delegation, including Max Warburg, to the Chateau de Villette near Compiegne. His contacts with Melchior were to continue into the 1930s.
Food for Germany was not Keynes's only concern. He was deeply involved in the discussion of the non-reparations, financial clause of the Treaty. He was involved in other relief discussions and policy with a ￡12.5 million Treasury grant to pay with. In typical Treasury fashion, he still had ￡1~￡1.5 million left as late as 22 May, despite 'large and incessant' demands. He played a significant role in providing food for Austria. Inter-allied financial problems continued. On 19 February he had formally to inform the French of the end of British financial assistance. Although the possibility had been in the wind for some months, this produced a crisis which saw Keynes flying to London for a War Cabinet meeting on 25 February. The aircraft lost its way and landed in a ploughed field a hundred miles off course. The outcome was an advance of ￡2 million, later expanded to ￡6 million, while the Chancellor went to Paris to discuss the issue with the French on 8-10 March. Chamberlain' discussions resulted in an agreement that the French would sell gold held on French account in the Bank of England under a 1916 agreement in return for a credit of ￡30 million. After two more months, all credits would end. This arrangement fell apart when the Bank of France refused to release the gold and with the end of allied support the French ceased to support their exchange rate, a week before the British, having run through their American credit, did likewise. Thus the wartime pattern of exchange rates broke down. Stability would not return for over seven years. ( ... ... )
자료 3. The Immoral Moral Scientist. John Maynard Keynes (Nina Paulovicova, University of Alberta. 2007)
He is a naughty Jew boy covered with ink –that kind of Jew – the kind which has its head above water, the sweet, tender imps who have not sublimated immortality into compound interest. He was the nicest, and the only talented person I saw in all Berlin, except perhaps old Fuerstenberg, the banker Lydia liked so much, and Kurt Singer, two foot by five, the mystical economist from Hamburg. And he was a Jew; and so was Fuerstenberg
and so was Singer. And my dear Melchior is Jew too.
Yet if I lived there, I felt I might turn anti-Semite. For the poor Prussian is too slow and heavy on his legs for the other kind of Jews, the ones who are not imps but serving devils, with small horns, pitch forks, and oily tails. It is not agreeable to see civilization so under the ugly thumbs of its impure Jews who have all the money and the power and brains. I vote rather for the plump hausfraus and think fingered Wandering Birds. But I am not sure that I wouldn’t even rather be mixed up with Lloyd George than with the German political Jews.
Three layers stand out from this particular Keynes’ utterance: a) Keynes’ anti-Semitism is articulated through his distaste for the acquisitive elements of society, which he ascribes to Jews as a part of their national stereotype; b) the notion of “impure thumbs” of the “impure Jews” reflects the racial theories of Keynes’ era that permeated him and his contemporaries in different modes of different intensity; c) finally, his comparison of the Jews to “serving devils” reflects Keynes’ fascination with irrational, dark forces in society. Hints of dark forces, religion, and magic seem to be a favorite descriptive element of Keynes in describing an individual in the context of national stereotyping of the Jews. When Keynes recognized Melchior`s hatred of Russia, he acknowledged that the Jewish banker was obsessed with the “dark forces.” Upon this revelation Keynes understood that Melchior was - “a strict and upright moralist, a worshiper of the Tablets of the Law, a Rabbi.”  Keynes was aware of the categories of modern psychology. His life time experience demonstrated that reality was not the realm of reason but rather the world of unpredictable dark and mysterious forces. Keynes was caught by the power of magic, which he seemed to seek behind any form of the extraordinariness.
 More on Melchior and Keynes’ relationship see in: Elisabeth Johnson and Harry
Johnson, The Shadow of Keynes (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978), 45 – 61.
자료 4. Peace without Victory for the Allies, 1918-1932 (by Sara Moore): Jstor link
자료 5. ...