자료: http://www.iwallerstein.com/wp-content/uploads/docs/THEORY.pdf
출처: J. Berger & M. Zelditch, Jr., eds. New Directions in Contemporary Sociological Theory, 2002
* * *
The term 'theory' tends to evoke for most people the concept of a set of interconnected ideas that are coherent, rigorous, and clear, and from which one may derive explantions of empirical reality. The term 'theory' however also denotes the end of a process of generalization and there for of closure, even if only provisional. In the construction of adequate of plausible explanations of complex phenomena, proclaiming that one has arrived at a theory often imposes premature closure on scientific activity, and therefore can be counterproductive. (...) What I believe it is often better to do in such cases is to explore empirical reality using spectacles that are informed by theorectical hunches but not bounded by them. It is because I believe this is eminently the case in the explanatin of historical systems, which are large-scale and long-term, that I have long resisted the appellation of world-sysstems ^theory^ for the kind of work I do, insisting that I was engaged in world-system ^analysis^. This is thus a story of the itinerary and growth of a non-theory, which I call world-systems analysis.(...) What I discovered in Braudel was two concepts that have been central to my work ever since: the concept of the world-economy and the concept of the longue durée. What I discovered in Malowist (and then of course iother Polish and Hungarian authors) was the role of eastern Europe as an emergent periphery of the European world-economy in the 16th century. I should elaborate on the three discoveries.
What Braudel did in The Mediterranean was to raise the issue of the unit of analysis. He insisted that the Mediterranean world was a "world-economy." He got this term from its use in the 1920s by a German geographer, Fritz Roeig, who spoke of Weltwirtschaft. Braudel translated this term not as économie mondiale but as économie-monde As both he and I were to make explicit many years later, this distinction was crucial: between économie modiale meaning the "economy of the world" and "économie-monde" meaning an "economy that is a world" (see Braudel 1984, esp. pp. 21-24. [브로델의 이 용어 출처로 누누이 반복 지적되는 《물질문명과 자본주의》 제3권의 1장 중]).
I then took Braudel's concept of the "world-economy" and combined it with Polanyi's notion that there were three modes of economic behavior, which Polanyi had called reciprocity, redistribution, and exchange (see Polanyi 1957, 1967, and finally a very clear version, 1977).
I faced a second problem in orthographics. Both Braudel and I believed that world-economies were organic stuctures that had livesㅡbeginning and ends. Therefore, there had to have been multiple world-economies (and of course multiple world empires) in the history of humankind. Thus I became careful to speak not of world-system analysis but of world-systems analysis. This may seem obvious, except that it would become the cornerstone of a fierce attack by Andre Gunder Frank in the 1990s, when he argued that there had been only one world system ever and that it had been covering the Euroasiatic ecumene for 25 hundred years at least and the entire world for the last five hundred years (hence no need for either a hyphen or a plural). Obviously, different criteria were being used to define the boundaries of a system. Along with these different criteria came the assertion that the concept of capitalism was irrelevant to the discussion (it either having always existed or never)[주11]
[주11] By now Frank has published these arguments in many texts. See especially the early version, Frank(1990), and the mature version, Frank(1999). For my critique of ^ReOrient^, see Wallerstein(1999b). The same issue of ^Review^ also contains critical reveiws of Frank by Samir Amin and Giovanni Arrighi. [Wallerstein(1999b): "Frank Proves the European Miracle." ^Review^ 22: 355-71.]
If the appropriate unit of analysis of the modern world is that of a world-system, and if there had been multiple world-systems in human history, then Braudel's concept of multiple social temporalities became immediately central. Braudel had built ^The Mediterranean^(1949) around an elementary architecture. He would tell the story three times in terms of three temporailities, the short term, the middle term, and the long term. It was only later, however, that he explicitly theorized this fundamental decision in a famous article published in 1958, entitled "History and the Social Sciences: The longue duree"(Braudel 1958)[주12]
In this article, Braudel speaks not of three temporalities, as we might expect, but rather of four, adding the "very long term." He had conceptual names for the four.
The most immediate impact on me of this Braudelian imperativeㅡabout the priorities scholars should give different social temporalitiesㅡwas in the conception of how I would write ^The Modern World-System^. It became not the search for the eternal truths of comparative organizational analysis, which was the norm in post-1945 sociology (including political sociology), but rather the story of a singular phenomenon, the modern world-system, informed by a mode of explanation I was calling world-systems analysis. Braudel called this ^histoire pensee^. Braudel's insistence on multiple social times would also lead me later to larger epistemological concerns as well.
What Malowist (and then the larger group of east European historians) did for me was to give sudden flesh to the concept of periphery, as had been initially adumbrated by the the Latin American scholars grouped around Raul Prebish in tne Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). The term "second feudalism" to describe what took place in Europe "east of the Elbe" in the 16th to 18th centuries had long been commonplace. What had not been commonplace, perhaps still isn't, is to see that the "second" feudalism was fundamentally different from the "first" feudalism, and that sharing a common descrpitor has done a great disservice to analytic thought. (...)
In the "first" feudalism, the manorial units produced for their own consumption and perhaps for that of surrounding small zones. In the so-called "second feudalism," the estates were producing for sale in distant markets. The view that such units were part and parcel of the emerging capitalist world-economy became one of the fundamental thems of my book, and of world-systems analysis. (...) For a long time, capitalism had been defined in terms of an imagery drawn from the history of 19th century western Europe, of wage-workers in factories (often newly proletarianized and not "owning the means of production") receiving wages (which was their entire income) from an employers who was seeking profits in the market. So strong this imagery that most analysts refused to categorize as capitalist any enterprise organized in any other mode of labor compensation. Hence, it followed that most of the world could not be considered to be capitalist, or rather was said not ^yet^ to be capitalist.
Rejecting this 19th-century view was a crucial step in the development of world-systems analysis. The classical liberal-Marxist view was based on a theory of stages of development that occurred in parallel ways in units of analysis called states (or societies or social formations). It missed what seemed to us the obvious fact that capitalism in fact operated as a system in which there were ^multiple^ modes of compensating labor, ranging from wage-labor which was very widely used in the richer, more cental zones to various forms of coerced labor very widely used in the poorer, more peripheral zones (and many other varieties in-between). If one did one's analysis state by state, as was the classical method, it would be observed that different countries had different modes of compensating labor and analysts could(and did) draw from this the conclusion that oneday the poorer zones might replicate the structure of the richer zones. What world-systems analysis suggested was that this differential pattern across the world-economy was exactly what permitted capitalists to pursue the endless accumulation of capital and was what in fact made the richer zones richer.[주14] It was therefore a defining structural element of the system, not one that was transitional or archaic.
(...)
There were two kinds of fundamental theoretical attacks. One came from a Marxist stance, arguing that I had grossly understood the fundamental importance of the class struggle and misdefined capitalism. This was the Brenner critique, suggesting that my view had a "market" bias (sometimes called "circulationism") rather than being a properly "class-based" view of capitalism.[주19] In his article, Brenner had attacked not only me but Paul Sweezy and Andre Gudner Frank as well. (...)
At the same time, a second fundamental critique came from what might be called the Otto Hintze camp. Both Theda Skocpol and Aristide Zolberg launched polemics arguing that world-systems analysis puts into a single arena political and economic phenomena, and that analytically they were separate arenas, operating on separate and sometimes contradictory presmises.[주20] Of course, they were right about what I had done, but I did not think this was an error. Rather I considered it a theroretical virtue. (...)
My substantive answer to both theoretical critique is to be found in Volume II of ^The Modern World-System^, which bore the subtitle ^Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the World-Economy, 1600-1750^(Wallerstein 1980). I sought to show in it that, contra a Brenner version of Marxixm, there were not multiple forms of capitalismㅡmercantile, industrial, financialㅡbut rather that these referred to alternate ways for capitalists to make profits, which were better or worse for particular capitalists according to conjunctural shifts in the operations of the world-economy. Furthermore, I argued that the itinerary of Dutch hegemony incarnated a necessary sequence. It was made possible by first achieving supremacy (in terms of efficiency) in productive activities, which led to supremacy in commercial activities, which then led to supremacy in the financial arena; and that the decline of the Dutch followed the same sequence. As for the supposed separate logics of the market and the state, I sought to show that, on the contrary, a singular logic operated in the world-system as a whole and in all of its partsㅡthe core zones, the periphery, and the semiperiphery (whether rising or declining).[주21]
(...)
[Regarding] "^historical^ capitalism[,]" [t]he adjective was crucial to me, since I wanted to argue that there was no point in defining in our heads what capitalism is and then looking around to see if it was there. Rather I suggested we should look at how this system actually worked. Furthermore, I wanted to argue that there has only ever been ^one^ capitalist system, since the only valid unit of analysis was the world-system, and only world-economy survived long enough to institutionalize a capitalist system. This is of course the same issue as that discussed above in my rejection of wage-labor as the defining feature of a capitalist system. Is the system a ^world^-system or are there as many capitalist systems as there are states?
[cf. Wallerstein(1995a) ^Historical Capitalism, with Capitalist Civilization^ London: Verso.] This book is the closest effort I have ever made to what might pass as systematic theorizing.
(...) We insisted instead on the term ^historical system^, by which we meant an entity that was simultaneously systemic (with boundaries and mechanisms or rules of functioning) and historical (since it began at some point, evolved over time, and eventuall came into crisis and ceased to exist). The term ^historical system^ involved for us a more precise specification of the concept of the longue duree.
(...) We realized some twenty years ago that if one wished to reconstruct the way the analysis of the contemporary world was done, it was insufficient to present data or, even to present data undergirded by a solid theoretical explanation. We had to tackle the question of how one knows what one purports to know, or more properly the appropriate epistemology for social science.
In the 1980s, a second challenge to our work raised its head, coming from tat broad current some call cultural studies and others postmodernism or post-other things. For thses critics, it was not that we had too few disprovable hypotheses, but that we had far too many. World-systems analysis was said to be just one more "grand narrative," to be cast into the dustbin however recently it had been constructed. We may have had the illusion that we were challenging the status quo of world social science; for these critics we incarnated that status quo. We were said to have committed the fatal sin of ignoring culture.[주26]
(...) Prgogine is a chemist by training. The historic relationship of chemist to physicists is one in which the physicists reproached the chemists for being insufficiently Newtonian, that is, for being in fact insufficiently positivist. Chemists were constantly describing phenomena in ways, such as the second law of themodynamics, that seemed to contradict the premises of classical dynamics, for example, by seeming to deny time-reversibility. Physicists argued that these descriptions/laws must be considered interim formulations, essentially the result of incomplete knowledge, and that eventually what the chemists were analyzing would come to be descibed in more purely Newtonian terms. (...) He is now saying quite clearly that equilibrium processes are a very special, an ^unusual^ case, of physical reality, and this can be demonstrated in the heartland of classical physics itself, dynamical systems.[주27]
(...) What became central for my own analysis, and in my opinion for social science as a whole, are two interrelated elements of the Prigogine construct. The first is the fundamental indeterminacy of all realityㅡphysical and therefore social. One should be clear what one means by indeterminacy. It is ^not^ the position that order and explanation do not exist. Prigogine believes that reality exist in a mode of "deterministic chaos." That is, he takes the position that order always exists ^for a while^, but then inevitably undoes itself when its curves reach points of "bifurcation" (that is, points where there are two equally valid solutions for the equations), and that choice actually made in a bifurcation ^intrinsically^ cannot be determined in advance. It is not a matter of our incomplete knowledge but of the ^impossibility^ of foreknowledge.
I have since argued that Prigogine's position is the call for an "unexcluded middle" (determined order and inexplicable chaos) and is, in this regard, absolutely parallel to that of Braudel, who also rejects two extremes presented as the exclusive antinomies of particularism and eternal universals, insists on orders (structural time) that inevitably undo themselves and come to an end (Wallerstein 1998b). Prigogine's position had two consequences for world-systems analysis: one was psycologico-political, and the second was intellectual. (...)
What Braudel did in The Mediterranean was to raise the issue of the unit of analysis. He insisted that the Mediterranean world was a "world-economy." He got this term from its use in the 1920s by a German geographer, Fritz Roeig, who spoke of Weltwirtschaft. Braudel translated this term not as économie mondiale but as économie-monde As both he and I were to make explicit many years later, this distinction was crucial: between économie modiale meaning the "economy of the world" and "économie-monde" meaning an "economy that is a world" (see Braudel 1984, esp. pp. 21-24. [브로델의 이 용어 출처로 누누이 반복 지적되는 《물질문명과 자본주의》 제3권의 1장 중]).
- The difference was first of all conceptual. In the latter formulation, the world is not a reified entity that is there, and within which an economy is constructed; rather, the economic relationships are defining the boundaries of the social world.
- The second difference was geographic. In the first usage, "world" equals the globe; in the second usage, "world" means only a large geographic space (within which many states are located), which however can be, and usually is, less extensive than the globe (but also can encompass the entire globe).
I then took Braudel's concept of the "world-economy" and combined it with Polanyi's notion that there were three modes of economic behavior, which Polanyi had called reciprocity, redistribution, and exchange (see Polanyi 1957, 1967, and finally a very clear version, 1977).
- I decided that reciprocity referred to what I called minisystems (that is, small systems that were not world-systems), and that redistribution and exchange referred to what I called the two varieties of world-systems, world-empires, and world-economies.[주10]
- I then argued [:]
(1) that the modern world-system was a capitalist world-economy,
(2) that capitalism could only exist within the framework of a world-economy, and
(3) that a world-economy could only operate on a capitalist principles. I make this case throughout my writings. The earliest(and most widely read) version is Wallerstein (1974b, reprinted in 1979a).
I faced a second problem in orthographics. Both Braudel and I believed that world-economies were organic stuctures that had livesㅡbeginning and ends. Therefore, there had to have been multiple world-economies (and of course multiple world empires) in the history of humankind. Thus I became careful to speak not of world-system analysis but of world-systems analysis. This may seem obvious, except that it would become the cornerstone of a fierce attack by Andre Gunder Frank in the 1990s, when he argued that there had been only one world system ever and that it had been covering the Euroasiatic ecumene for 25 hundred years at least and the entire world for the last five hundred years (hence no need for either a hyphen or a plural). Obviously, different criteria were being used to define the boundaries of a system. Along with these different criteria came the assertion that the concept of capitalism was irrelevant to the discussion (it either having always existed or never)[주11]
[주11] By now Frank has published these arguments in many texts. See especially the early version, Frank(1990), and the mature version, Frank(1999). For my critique of ^ReOrient^, see Wallerstein(1999b). The same issue of ^Review^ also contains critical reveiws of Frank by Samir Amin and Giovanni Arrighi. [Wallerstein(1999b): "Frank Proves the European Miracle." ^Review^ 22: 355-71.]
If the appropriate unit of analysis of the modern world is that of a world-system, and if there had been multiple world-systems in human history, then Braudel's concept of multiple social temporalities became immediately central. Braudel had built ^The Mediterranean^(1949) around an elementary architecture. He would tell the story three times in terms of three temporailities, the short term, the middle term, and the long term. It was only later, however, that he explicitly theorized this fundamental decision in a famous article published in 1958, entitled "History and the Social Sciences: The longue duree"(Braudel 1958)[주12]
In this article, Braudel speaks not of three temporalities, as we might expect, but rather of four, adding the "very long term." He had conceptual names for the four.
- The short term is histoire événementielle,
- the middle term is histoire conjoncturelle, and
- the long term is histoire structurelle.
- About the very long term he says: "If it exists, it must be the time of the sages" (Ibid: 76).
The most immediate impact on me of this Braudelian imperativeㅡabout the priorities scholars should give different social temporalitiesㅡwas in the conception of how I would write ^The Modern World-System^. It became not the search for the eternal truths of comparative organizational analysis, which was the norm in post-1945 sociology (including political sociology), but rather the story of a singular phenomenon, the modern world-system, informed by a mode of explanation I was calling world-systems analysis. Braudel called this ^histoire pensee^. Braudel's insistence on multiple social times would also lead me later to larger epistemological concerns as well.
What Malowist (and then the larger group of east European historians) did for me was to give sudden flesh to the concept of periphery, as had been initially adumbrated by the the Latin American scholars grouped around Raul Prebish in tne Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). The term "second feudalism" to describe what took place in Europe "east of the Elbe" in the 16th to 18th centuries had long been commonplace. What had not been commonplace, perhaps still isn't, is to see that the "second" feudalism was fundamentally different from the "first" feudalism, and that sharing a common descrpitor has done a great disservice to analytic thought. (...)
In the "first" feudalism, the manorial units produced for their own consumption and perhaps for that of surrounding small zones. In the so-called "second feudalism," the estates were producing for sale in distant markets. The view that such units were part and parcel of the emerging capitalist world-economy became one of the fundamental thems of my book, and of world-systems analysis. (...) For a long time, capitalism had been defined in terms of an imagery drawn from the history of 19th century western Europe, of wage-workers in factories (often newly proletarianized and not "owning the means of production") receiving wages (which was their entire income) from an employers who was seeking profits in the market. So strong this imagery that most analysts refused to categorize as capitalist any enterprise organized in any other mode of labor compensation. Hence, it followed that most of the world could not be considered to be capitalist, or rather was said not ^yet^ to be capitalist.
Rejecting this 19th-century view was a crucial step in the development of world-systems analysis. The classical liberal-Marxist view was based on a theory of stages of development that occurred in parallel ways in units of analysis called states (or societies or social formations). It missed what seemed to us the obvious fact that capitalism in fact operated as a system in which there were ^multiple^ modes of compensating labor, ranging from wage-labor which was very widely used in the richer, more cental zones to various forms of coerced labor very widely used in the poorer, more peripheral zones (and many other varieties in-between). If one did one's analysis state by state, as was the classical method, it would be observed that different countries had different modes of compensating labor and analysts could(and did) draw from this the conclusion that oneday the poorer zones might replicate the structure of the richer zones. What world-systems analysis suggested was that this differential pattern across the world-economy was exactly what permitted capitalists to pursue the endless accumulation of capital and was what in fact made the richer zones richer.[주14] It was therefore a defining structural element of the system, not one that was transitional or archaic.
(...)
There were two kinds of fundamental theoretical attacks. One came from a Marxist stance, arguing that I had grossly understood the fundamental importance of the class struggle and misdefined capitalism. This was the Brenner critique, suggesting that my view had a "market" bias (sometimes called "circulationism") rather than being a properly "class-based" view of capitalism.[주19] In his article, Brenner had attacked not only me but Paul Sweezy and Andre Gudner Frank as well. (...)
At the same time, a second fundamental critique came from what might be called the Otto Hintze camp. Both Theda Skocpol and Aristide Zolberg launched polemics arguing that world-systems analysis puts into a single arena political and economic phenomena, and that analytically they were separate arenas, operating on separate and sometimes contradictory presmises.[주20] Of course, they were right about what I had done, but I did not think this was an error. Rather I considered it a theroretical virtue. (...)
My substantive answer to both theoretical critique is to be found in Volume II of ^The Modern World-System^, which bore the subtitle ^Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the World-Economy, 1600-1750^(Wallerstein 1980). I sought to show in it that, contra a Brenner version of Marxixm, there were not multiple forms of capitalismㅡmercantile, industrial, financialㅡbut rather that these referred to alternate ways for capitalists to make profits, which were better or worse for particular capitalists according to conjunctural shifts in the operations of the world-economy. Furthermore, I argued that the itinerary of Dutch hegemony incarnated a necessary sequence. It was made possible by first achieving supremacy (in terms of efficiency) in productive activities, which led to supremacy in commercial activities, which then led to supremacy in the financial arena; and that the decline of the Dutch followed the same sequence. As for the supposed separate logics of the market and the state, I sought to show that, on the contrary, a singular logic operated in the world-system as a whole and in all of its partsㅡthe core zones, the periphery, and the semiperiphery (whether rising or declining).[주21]
(...)
[Regarding] "^historical^ capitalism[,]" [t]he adjective was crucial to me, since I wanted to argue that there was no point in defining in our heads what capitalism is and then looking around to see if it was there. Rather I suggested we should look at how this system actually worked. Furthermore, I wanted to argue that there has only ever been ^one^ capitalist system, since the only valid unit of analysis was the world-system, and only world-economy survived long enough to institutionalize a capitalist system. This is of course the same issue as that discussed above in my rejection of wage-labor as the defining feature of a capitalist system. Is the system a ^world^-system or are there as many capitalist systems as there are states?
[cf. Wallerstein(1995a) ^Historical Capitalism, with Capitalist Civilization^ London: Verso.] This book is the closest effort I have ever made to what might pass as systematic theorizing.
(...) We insisted instead on the term ^historical system^, by which we meant an entity that was simultaneously systemic (with boundaries and mechanisms or rules of functioning) and historical (since it began at some point, evolved over time, and eventuall came into crisis and ceased to exist). The term ^historical system^ involved for us a more precise specification of the concept of the longue duree.
(...) We realized some twenty years ago that if one wished to reconstruct the way the analysis of the contemporary world was done, it was insufficient to present data or, even to present data undergirded by a solid theoretical explanation. We had to tackle the question of how one knows what one purports to know, or more properly the appropriate epistemology for social science.
In the 1980s, a second challenge to our work raised its head, coming from tat broad current some call cultural studies and others postmodernism or post-other things. For thses critics, it was not that we had too few disprovable hypotheses, but that we had far too many. World-systems analysis was said to be just one more "grand narrative," to be cast into the dustbin however recently it had been constructed. We may have had the illusion that we were challenging the status quo of world social science; for these critics we incarnated that status quo. We were said to have committed the fatal sin of ignoring culture.[주26]
(...) Prgogine is a chemist by training. The historic relationship of chemist to physicists is one in which the physicists reproached the chemists for being insufficiently Newtonian, that is, for being in fact insufficiently positivist. Chemists were constantly describing phenomena in ways, such as the second law of themodynamics, that seemed to contradict the premises of classical dynamics, for example, by seeming to deny time-reversibility. Physicists argued that these descriptions/laws must be considered interim formulations, essentially the result of incomplete knowledge, and that eventually what the chemists were analyzing would come to be descibed in more purely Newtonian terms. (...) He is now saying quite clearly that equilibrium processes are a very special, an ^unusual^ case, of physical reality, and this can be demonstrated in the heartland of classical physics itself, dynamical systems.[주27]
(...) What became central for my own analysis, and in my opinion for social science as a whole, are two interrelated elements of the Prigogine construct. The first is the fundamental indeterminacy of all realityㅡphysical and therefore social. One should be clear what one means by indeterminacy. It is ^not^ the position that order and explanation do not exist. Prigogine believes that reality exist in a mode of "deterministic chaos." That is, he takes the position that order always exists ^for a while^, but then inevitably undoes itself when its curves reach points of "bifurcation" (that is, points where there are two equally valid solutions for the equations), and that choice actually made in a bifurcation ^intrinsically^ cannot be determined in advance. It is not a matter of our incomplete knowledge but of the ^impossibility^ of foreknowledge.
I have since argued that Prigogine's position is the call for an "unexcluded middle" (determined order and inexplicable chaos) and is, in this regard, absolutely parallel to that of Braudel, who also rejects two extremes presented as the exclusive antinomies of particularism and eternal universals, insists on orders (structural time) that inevitably undo themselves and come to an end (Wallerstein 1998b). Prigogine's position had two consequences for world-systems analysis: one was psycologico-political, and the second was intellectual. (...)
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