자료: http://jkl123.com/sub5_1.htm?table=board1&st=view&page=50&id=2459&limit=&keykind=&keyword=&bo_class=
| |
| 글쓴이 | 신형철 | |||
| 파일 | 첨부파일없음 | |||
| 제목 | deadweight loss의 어원에 관하여.. | |||
박한업님의 조사를 토대로 생각해 본 결과, | ||||
2008년 9월 30일 화요일
deadweight loss의 어원에 관하여..(서울대 경제학부 이준구 교수 게시판에서)
2008년 9월 29일 월요일
자본이득에 대한 과세체계 비교연구 (조세연구원, 2002, 12월)
자료: 한국조세연구원, 자료
- 자본이득에 대해 과세우대를 찬성하는 자들은 종종 결집효과(bunching effect)를 완화하기 위한 것이라고 항변한다. 즉, 실현주의 원칙 때문에 납세의무자는 수년 간에 걸쳐 발생한 자본이득을 자산의 매각연도 한 해의 자본이득으로 집중되어 신고하도록 강요되었다는 것이다. 따라서, 자본이득이 매해 발생한 만큼씩 신고되었더라면 적용되었을 한계세율보다 높게 과세되므로, 세제상 우대하여야 한다는 것이다.
- 먼저, 결집효과라는 것은 다단계 세율체계(graduated tax rates)하에서만 나타나는 문제이고, 자본이득이 발생하던 보유기간 연도보다 처분연도에 더 높은 한계세율에 직면하게 됨에 따라 발생하게 된다는 점에 주의할 필요가 있다. 결집효과 주장의 가장 큰 약점은 발생주의과세가 아닌 실현주의과세로 납부세금을 연기받았던 이익을 감안하지 않았다는 점이다. 특정한 상황하에서는 실현주의과세로 인한 납세연기 혜택의 크기가 결집효과에 따른 불이익을 완전히 상쇄할 수도 있다.
- 일반적으로 개인소득세체계는 종합과세 유형(global approach, comprehensive base taxation)과 분리(분류)과세 유형(schedular approach)으로 나누어진다. 두 가지 이론구조모형 중에서 종합과세형은 소득의 성격을 불문하고 모든 소득에 대해 하나의 동일한 조세가 부과되는 소득세 구조이다. 미국의 연방 내국세법(Internal Revenue Code)은 제61조(a)에서 ‘총소득은 원천에 관계없이 모든 소득을 의미한다’(gross income means all income from whatever source derived.)고 규정하여 가장 전형적인 포괄주의 소득과세를 채택하고 있음을 보여준다6). 순수한 포괄주의 과세기준하에서는 소득유형(category of income, income classification)이라는 개념이 별 의미가 없게 된다. 왜냐하면, 소득의 유형별로 소득 창출을 위해 필수적으로 부담하는 비용들을 서로 대응(match)시킬 필요없이 모든 소득과 비용들을 함께 고려하여 하나의 순소득을 도출하여 과세하기 때문이다. 또한, 헤이그－사이몬 소득 개념에 충실한 포괄적 소득세제(comprehensive income tax)하에서는 일정기간 동안의 ① 실제소비의 시장가치 ② 잠재적으로 소비가능한 자산 순증을 모두 과세베이스로 삼는 당위론에 따라, 소득세 과세대상 여부 측면에서는 통상소득의 일부분인 자본소득과 구분할 필요가 없게 된다.
- 그러나 실제로 많은 나라들이 종합과세형을 유지하면서도 소득유형별 과세금액(taxable amounts)을 확인, 정의하기 위해 일종의 소득구분 구조(schedular structure)를 갖고 있는 경우를 현실에서 더 많이 발견하게 된다. 예로써, 독일, 오스트리아, 벨기에, 프랑스, 스페인, 영국, 캐나다, 일본 등이 있다7).
- 분리과세형 접근방법은 소득의 종류 및 원천별로 기본적인 차이가 존재하고 이 차이에 기초하여 차별과세를 하는 것이 필요하다는 생각을 전제로 한다. 특히 자본이득을 분리과세하는 경우 자본이득과 그 이외의 통상소득(ordinary income) 간에 여러 가지 기준에서의 구분이 가능하다는 주장이다. 먼저, 앵글로색슨계 조세체계에서는, 개인이 투자 목적으로 보유한 자본재산(capital asset)으로부터 매매업자(dealer)로서 하는 사업행위가 아니라, 비정기적 또는 우발적으로 발생하는 자본이득에 대해 과세를 하는 경우라도 통상적인 소득흐름에 비해 가볍게 과세한다는 것이 기본원칙이었다. 그 배경에는 투자소득(investment income) 대 영업소득(income from business or trade)8) 등 소득유형간 회계적 차이를 인정하여 분리 과세하겠다는 것이다. 이는 자본이득의 실현주체에 따라 소득의 종류를 다르게 보겠다는 발상이다.
- 이러한 앵글로색슨계 법체계 전통은, 신탁(trust)의 개념상 원본(corpus)에 배분, 귀속되는 이득(gain)과 원본으로부터 정기적으로 발생하는 소득(income)을 구분하여 회계 관리하는 전통이 강하여 자본소득과 자본이득을 구분하여 과세하는 경향과도 맥락을 같이한다. 1965년부터 1987년까지 22년간 운영된 30% 단일비례세율의 영국 자본이득세에서 그 전형을 볼 수 있다.
California recall election, 2003
자료: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_California_recall
he 2003 California recall election was a special electionpermitted under California law. It resulted in voters replacing incumbent Democratic Governor Gray Davis with RepublicanArnold Schwarzenegger. The recall effort spanned the latter half of 2003. Other California governors, including Pat Brown,Ronald Reagan, Jerry Brown, and Pete Wilson, had faced recall attempts, but these attempts were unsuccessful.
After several legal as well as procedural efforts failed to stop it, California's first-ever gubernatorial recall election was held onOctober 7, and the results were certified on November 14, 2003, making Davis the first governor recalled in the history of California, and just the second in U.S. history. (The first was North Dakota's Lynn Frazier in 1921. A common misconception is that Arizona governor Evan Mecham was recalled in 1988. However, he was impeached before this qualified recall election could occur.) California is one of only 15 states that allows recalls.
California law
Any elected official may be the target of a recall campaign. To trigger a recall election, proponents of the recall must gather a certain number of signatures from registered voters within a certain time period. The number of signatures must equal 12% of the number of votes cast in the previous elections. For the 2003 recall elections, that meant a minimum of 900,000 signatures, based on the November 2002 statewide elections.
........ (continued on the source above)
OECD 교육정책 보고서(Education Policy Analysis) 2004
2008년 9월 27일 토요일
Rat race
Rat race
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
A rat race is a term used for an endless, self-defeating or pointless pursuit. It conjures up the image of the futile efforts of a lab rattrying to escape whilst running around a maze or in a wheel. In an analogy to the modern city, many rats in a single maze run around making a lot of noise bumping into each other, but ultimately achieve nothing (meaningful) either collectively or individually.
The rat race is a term often used to describe work, particularly excessive work; in general terms, if one works too much, one is in the rat race. This terminology contains implications that many people see work as a seemingly endless pursuit with little reward or purpose. Not all workers feel like this. It is the perceived Conventional Wisdom, for example, that those who work for themselves are generally happier at work.
The increased image of work as a "rat race" in modern times has led many to question their own attitudes to work and seek a better alternative; a more harmonious Work-life balance. Many believe that long work hours, unpaid overtime, stressful jobs, time spentcommuting, less time for traditional family life, has led to a generally unhappier workforce/population unable to enjoy the benefits of increased economic prosperity and a higher standard of living.
Escaping the rat race can have a number of different meanings:
- A description of the movement, of either the Home or Work Location, of previously City Dwellers or Workers to more rural locations, possibly beyond the "urban growth boundary".
- Retirement in general or no longer needing / having to work.
- Moving from a high pressure job to a less intense role either at a different company or within the same company at an alternative location or department.
- Changing to a different job that does not involve working 9 to 5 and a long commute.
- Working from home.
- Becoming financially independent from an employer.
- Becoming a hobo or hippie.
- Graduating from an academic institution, see College or University.
- Simple living or Voluntary Simplicity.
[edit]Quote
- The trouble with the rat race is that even if you win, you're still a rat. — Lily Tomlin
2008년 9월 26일 금요일
연금수리적 공정성: Neutral or Fair? Actuarial Concepts and Pension-System Design (OECD, 04-Dec-2006)
계리적 연금채무(actuarial liability)란 계리인이 적립된 연금자산에 대응하여 해당 연금기금의 계산기초와 기금적립방식을 이용하여 산정한 바람직한 수준의 부채를 말한다. 이렇게 산정된 부채를 연금수리에서는 "표준부채" 라고도 한다. 생명보험의 순보험료식 책임준비금과 유사한 개념이다.
- 연금채무에서 "계리적 또는 보험수리적(actuarial)" 이란 의미는 위험요소를 반영한다는 의미이며, 현재가치(present value)란 이자율로 할인된 가액(dicounted value)으로서 화폐의 시간가치(time value of money)를 반영하였다는 의미이다.
- 본문에서 언급되는 모든 "연금채무"는 "계리적 연금채무"를, "연금채무의 현재가치" 는 "연금채무의 계리적 현재가치"를 의미하는 것으로 한다. 성주호·김진억(1998), p .92., OECD (1998), p .80.
연금 가입자 개인이 평생 동안 불입하는 기여금 총액의 현재가치가 평생 지급받을 연금급여 총액의 현재가치와 같다.
- Actuarial fairness, which requires that the present value of lifetime contributions equals the present value of lifetime benefits. Actuarial fairness relates to the entire lifetime of contributions and benefits
- Actuarial neutrality, which requires that the present value of accrued pension benefits for working an additional year is the same as in the year before (meaning that benefits increase only by the additional entitlement earned in that year). Conversely, retiring a year earlier should reduce the pension benefit both by the entitlement that would have been earned during the year and by an amount to reflect the longer duration for which the pension must be paid. Actuarial neutrality is a marginal concept, relating to the effect of working an additional year.
- An actuarially fair pension is one that equalises lifetime individual pension entitlements to lifetime individual pension contributions. By definition, therefore, there is no redistribution towards or away from any individual: what you get out in retirement is the same as what you paid in when working, together with any interest that was earned before retirement. To examine actuarial fairness, we obviously need to measure lifetime contributions and benefits.
- The second “actuarial” concept is actuarial neutrality. This concept is based on a comparison of entitlements conditional on different ages of withdrawal of pension benefits. Actuarial neutrality is a central concept both to equity between individuals who retire at different ages and to incentives to retire.7
- Actuarial neutrality, as defined here, requires that pension wealth for retiring a year later is the same as pension wealth when retiring today plus whatever pension is accrued during the additional year of work. Actuarial neutrality therefore relates to the pension already accrued at the beginning of the year and not to the extra pension earned during the year.
- Having introduced the actuarial concepts, this section presents a taxonomy of four different types of pension schemes. The analysis focuses on “insurance-oriented” pension plans, which target some level of earnings replacement during retirement. Actuarial concepts are less useful when it comes to schemes with very little or no link between contributions and benefits, such as minimum pensions, resource-tested retirement income programmes and basic pensions.12
- Some 17 OECD countries have public, defined-benefit (DB) plans, making them by far the most common form of pension-insurance provision in OECD countries. In DB schemes, the amount a pensioner will receive depends on the number of years of contributions made throughout the working life and on some measure of individual earnings from work. As for private DB plans, these are mandatory (or quasi-mandatory) in Iceland, the Netherlands and Sweden. There is widespread coverage of voluntary, DB, occupational plans in Canada, Germany, Ireland, Japan, the United Kingdom and United States.
- The next most common form of pension-insurance provision is the defined-contribution (DC) plan. In these schemes, each worker has an individual account in which contributions are saved and invested, and the accumulated capital is usually converted into a pension-income stream at retirement; lump-sum withdrawals are rarely permitted. Typically, the capital has to be used to buy an annuity, i.e. a guaranteed pension payment until death, which meets certain conditions (such as indexation of benefits and provision of survivors’ benefits). Six OECD countries have mandatory DC pensions: Australia, Denmark, ....
- Some countries have earnings-related schemes that do not follow the “traditional” DB model. There are four points systems in OECD countries: French occupational plans and the German, Norwegian and Slovak public schemes. Workers earn pension points based on their individual earnings for each year of contributions. At retirement, the sum of pension points is multiplied by a pension-point value to convert them into a regular pension payment.
- The final variant of earnings-related schemes is notional accounts, found in three OECD countries: the public plans of Italy, Poland and Sweden. These schemes record each worker’s contributions in an individual account and apply a rate of return to the accounts. The accounts are “notional” in that both the incoming contributions and the interest charged to them exist only on the books of the managing institution. At retirement, the accumulated notional capital in each account is converted to a stream of pension payments using a formula based on life expectancy at the time of retirement. Since they are designed to mimic the features of funded, defined-contribution plans, they are often called “notional defined-contribution” schemes.
- The three kinds of public, earnings-related pension plan – DB, points and notional accounts – are closely related. All take an input – individual earnings in different years over the career – and turn it into an output, a pension entitlement. The difference is in the parameters that are used in the benefit calculations.
2008년 9월 25일 목요일
Designing Benefit Rules for Flexible Retirement with or without Redistribution
자료: SSRN, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=646044
András Simonovits
Hungarian Academy of Sciences - Institute of Economics
December 2004
CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1370
Abstract:
The traditional approach to flexible retirement (e.g. NDC) neglects the impact of asymmetric information on actuarial fairness (neutrality). The mechanism design approach (e.g. Diamond, 2003) gives up the requirement of neutrality and looks for a redistributive second-best benefit-retirement-age schedule. Trying to combine the two approaches, the present paper determines the neutral (redistribution-free) second-best solution. This neutral solution is, however, often Pareto-dominated by the redistributive one.
Keywords: flexible retirement, asymmetric information, actuarial fairness (neutrality), mechanism design
JEL Classifications: D82, D91, H55
※ 메모:
Increasing life expectancy notwithstanding, people retire earlier nowadays than they did decades ago. A
common explanatin for this phenomenon is that pension benefit rules are poorly designed in many
countries(e.g. Gruber and Wise, eds., 1990), which, among other things, endangers the sustainabilit of
social security systems. ...
Most of the literature assumed that the government and the individuals have the same information
regarding life expectancies, and only the individuals' disutilities of labor are not known to the
government(asymmetric information). Then there is a plausible benefit rule, called "actuarially fair" in
the literature:
pay a life annuity equaling to the ratio of the lifetime contribution to the remaing life expectancy.
Fair systems have recently been introduced in several European countries(Sweden, Italy and Poland) under
the name of "notionally defined contribution system(NDC)".
To avoid any confusion, we shall speak of a "neutral" scheme if the expected benefit is equal to the contribution for any type, and add the adjective "traditional" to the so-called fair systems.
SMOKE AND MIRRORS, PART 2 (Washington Monthly, 2004년 12월 8일)
자료: Washington Monthly, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2004_12/005280.php
SMOKE AND MIRRORS, PART 2....In my previous post I mentioned in passing that it's hard to come up with future projections in which (a) economic growth is bad enough that Social Security goes bust in 2042 but (b) economic growth is good enough that private accounts have investment returns of 7% annually — and thus are lucrative enough to save Social Security. This point is worth expanding on a bit.
Every year the Social Security trustees produce a 75-year financial estimate. To do this, they make estimates of population growth, life expectancy, economic performance, and so forth, and then add them all up into an overall estimate of long-term solvency. In fact, they make three estimates (see chart on right), and the one you hear about in the news is the middle one, or "intermediate projection." In that projection, Social Security starts running a deficit in 2042. The key assumptions in the intermediate projection from 2015 forward are the following:
Labor force growth: 0.2% per year.
Productivity growth: 1.6% per year.
Average hours worked: no change.
Which leads to the following overall estimate:
GDP growth: 1.8% per year.
This growth is lower than we're used to, but that's because GDP growth = population growth + productivity growth. Since population growth is slowing down, so will GDP growth.
Still, what if you assume that things will be a little more robust than this? If you project GDP growth of around 2.6% per year, you end up with Estimate I, and in that scenario Social Securitynever runs out of money. In fact, if you project GDP growth just a few tenths higher than 1.8%, Social Security stays solvent for the next century.
In other words, if GDP growth averages, say, 2.2% over the next 75 years, Social Security is in fine shape and we don't have to do anything. We only need to "fix" it with private accounts if GDP growth is less than that.
So here's the puzzler: for private accounts to be worthwhile, they need to have long-term annual returns of at least 5%, and 6-7% is the number most advocates use. But are there any plausible scenarios in which long-term real GDP growth is less than 2% but long-term real returns (capital gains plus dividends) on stock portfolios are well over 5%?
Privatization enthusiasts are encouraged to leave their answers in comments.
—Kevin Drum 1:38 AM Permalink | Trackbacks | Comments (0SMOKE AND MIRRORS [aroung Social Security crisis] (Washington Monthly, 2004년 12월 7일)
자료: Washington Monthly, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2004_12/005279.php
SMOKE AND MIRRORS....I was emailing with WM's editor today about Social Security, and one of the things I mentioned is that I'm skeptical of "free lunch" proposals. A free lunch proposal is one that — when carefully examined — essentially proposes that we can fix Social Security without any tax increases or benefit cuts.
All of these proposals rely on at least one heroic assumption, and in the case of privatization the assumption is that the average return on private accounts will be about 7% per year. Is this reasonable? Over at MaxSpeak, Dean Baker is properly skeptical. The following prose is pretty impenetrable to financial non-gurus, but that's the way it goes with these things, and you should probably treat the numbers in the following paragraphs the same way you treat Russian names in Tolstoy novels:
I have a test of my own that I have been trying to get economists to take (thus far unsuccessfully), in which I ask proponents of privatization to write down the set of dividend yields and capital gains that will give them the 6.5-7.0 percent real stock returns that they conventionally assume. Such returns were possible in the past because the price to earnings (PE) ratios have historically been much lower and profit growth was much faster.
The price to earnings ratio averaged about 14.5 to 1 over the last seventy years, compared to more than 20 to 1 today. This is important, because if 60 percent of profits are paid out as dividends (or used for share buybacks), this gets you a dividend yield of over 4.0 percent with a PE ratio of 14.5 to one. It gets you just 3.0 percent with a PE ratio of 20 to 1, and of course less when the PE ratio is higher.
He goes on to suggest that profit growth (and thus stock appreciation) is likely to be about 1.4% in the future, which gives you a total return of about 4.4%. In other words, the first question you should ask about any privatization scheme is: What if average returns over the next 40 years are only 4.4% — or less?
It's a good question, because you can "fix" Social Security pretty easily if you're allowed to simply make any future growth assumptions you want. For example, if productivity growth and labor force growth are just a bit higher than the Social Security trustees currently assume, the system will remain solvent forever. Look ma, no crisis!
(On a related note, here's a variation on Dean Baker's question: please provide a projection of future economic growth rates that makes it reasonable to assume that (a) private accounts grow 7% a year but (b) Social Security as it's currently funded eventually becomes insolvent. You can probably do this if you're willing to fiddle with a spreadsheet long enough, but you'd have to twist your brain into a pretzel in the process.)
The fact is that there's nothing necessarily wrong with private accounts being part of a Social Security package, but only if they're based on reasonable assumptions about how much money they'll raise. If they're properly accounted for, tightly regulated, and honestly funded, they might be worth taking a chance on.
Needless to say, though, "properly accounted for, tightly regulated, and honestly funded" is not what we've come to expect from Bush administration economic policy. So unless you hear otherwise, you'd best keep your hands on your wallet when their actual proposal comes down the pike.
—Kevin Drum 6:56 PM Permalink | Trackbacks | Comments (0)
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