자료: SSRN, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=646044
András Simonovits
Hungarian Academy of Sciences - Institute of Economics
December 2004
CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1370
Abstract:
The traditional approach to flexible retirement (e.g. NDC) neglects the impact of asymmetric information on actuarial fairness (neutrality). The mechanism design approach (e.g. Diamond, 2003) gives up the requirement of neutrality and looks for a redistributive second-best benefit-retirement-age schedule. Trying to combine the two approaches, the present paper determines the neutral (redistribution-free) second-best solution. This neutral solution is, however, often Pareto-dominated by the redistributive one.
Keywords: flexible retirement, asymmetric information, actuarial fairness (neutrality), mechanism design
JEL Classifications: D82, D91, H55
※ 메모:
Increasing life expectancy notwithstanding, people retire earlier nowadays than they did decades ago. A
common explanatin for this phenomenon is that pension benefit rules are poorly designed in many
countries(e.g. Gruber and Wise, eds., 1990), which, among other things, endangers the sustainabilit of
social security systems. ...
Most of the literature assumed that the government and the individuals have the same information
regarding life expectancies, and only the individuals' disutilities of labor are not known to the
government(asymmetric information). Then there is a plausible benefit rule, called "actuarially fair" in
the literature:
pay a life annuity equaling to the ratio of the lifetime contribution to the remaing life expectancy.
Fair systems have recently been introduced in several European countries(Sweden, Italy and Poland) under
the name of "notionally defined contribution system(NDC)".
To avoid any confusion, we shall speak of a "neutral" scheme if the expected benefit is equal to the contribution for any type, and add the adjective "traditional" to the so-called fair systems.
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