출처: Joanne Abel Goldman (1997). ^Building New York's Sewers: Developing Mechanisms of Urban Manangement^. Purdue University Press.
자료: 구글도서
※ 발췌 (excerpts): pp. 1~
Prologue to Policy
We have all been frustrated when potholes in roads are not repaired. We expect "the city" to fix them. We are intolerant when clear water does not come out of the tap. We expect "the city" to provide clean and safe water. The list continues. We expect "the city" to build sewers to receive our wastewater and carry it away. Similarly, we assume that "the city" should maintain professional police, fire, and health departments to keep our neighborhoods safe. Why do we have these expectations? These services were neither intrinsic to municipal charters nor implicit in their charge. Rather, at some point the city was given, and accepted, the responsibility for providing smooth roads, an ample and healthful supply of water, effective means of disposing of wastewater, and police and fire protection.
City services came to be assumed as perceptions and expectations of municipal institutions changed. Colonial cities did not generally provided water, sewerage facilities, or the utilities that come under rubric of public works. Collecting water and disposing of wasters as well as heating and lighting the home were responsibilities left to citizens themselves. Rather, the efforts of colonial governments were largely directed toward the regulation of commerce and business. City councils controlled wages and prices and monitored craft trades and manufacturing enterprises.[n.1] During the first half of the 19th century, the scope of city services broadened.[n.2] Many of the larger cities introduced new water supplies, facilitated the construction of comprehensive sewage systems, and increased the effort to monitor the public's health.
The 19th century was a particularly dynamic period for American cities, as demographic shifts and population growth transformed the comparatively sedate walking towns of the 18th century into the bustling urban centers of the 20th century. As the populations of cities swelled, burdening the built environment, it strained limited water supplies and taxed conventional patterns of waste disposal. Contemporaries complained that cities were degenerating into unhealthy and unsafe places, and increasingly throughout the 19th century, municipal institutions were called upon to respond to the perceived deterioration. Albeit at times reluctantly, city administrators responded and assumed a more active role in providing public services. To administer them, new mechanisms of city management were created. The 19th century marks a critical period in the evolution of the modern American city. By studying how municipalities incorporated public works into their agenda, we can identify the factors that shaped our current expectations for city services and the forces that determined how the city chose to accommodate expectations.
The book explores the process by which New York City came to construct a sewer system to discharge wastewater during the 19th century. The complexity inherent in the construction, maintenance, and management of New York City's system arose as a consequence of the decision to integrate the functions of water supply and wastewater disposal. Wastes flowed in a medium of water through a series of conduits to be discharged into nearby rivers. An effective water carriage system required a copious supply of water and a rational system of sewer pipes laid at a carefully calculated grade of declination to the point of outfall.
During the first half of the 19th century, New York's political institutions and traditional patterns of policy making precluded the constructin of the infrastructure necessary to accomplish adequate sewerage. The mechanisms of infrasturcture management themselves had to be transformed before a comprehensive sewer system could be build. ( ... ... )
The issue of waste disposal is as old as human civilization, but until the middle of the 19th century, it remained largely a private matter. In a fashion that was common for most American cities through the beginning of the 19th century, residents of Manhattan discharged their wastes into privies, which were subsequently removed or buried. The ^Minutes of the Common Council^ testify that there was always some fraction of the population that neglected the proper maintenance of these waste facilities, allowing underground sinks to fill and flood, contaminating groundwater, cellars, and streets. In contrast to the situation at midcentury, however, these complaints numbered comparatively few. While the putrefying wastes of this relatively small population was an occasional nuisance, the volume of waste generated as the population swelled during the 19th century created an alarming situation. The perceived deterioration of the environment, exacerbated by periodic epidemics and provocative theories of health that linked disease with unsanitary conditions, advanced the call for reform. Quite simply, urbanization presented the city with more waste than traditional methods of disposal seemed able to manage effectively.
The term "effectively" is a subjective one that warrants explanation. Certainly, 18th-century streets would have appeared dirty by 20th-century standards, so one could argue that sanitation was never "effectively" dealt with. Notwithstanding our present-day assessment, the issue here is how contemporaries viewed their environment. It seems clear that the intensity with which mid-19th-century New Yorkers called for sanitary improvement indicates either that conditions had deteriorated to unacceptable levels by contemporary standards or that those standards themselves became more rigorous. In either case, the widely perceived insalubrity of the city prompted the demands of reformers, who called for aggressive municipal action to improve the sanitary condition of the city.
This demand for improved sanitation was not unique to New Yorkers. During the 1850s and 1860s, many city leaders across the United States and Europe responded to similar concerns, claiming that unsanitary conditions jeopardized the health of their citizens, and they supported the constructin of capital-intensive, technologically sophisticated city-wide sewer systems. Chicago and Brooklyn were at the vanguard of such reforms in the US, modeling systems for comprehensive sewerage on the British experience. New York City, on the other hand, remained reluctant to build such integrated facilities. This is particularly curious in light of the fact that New York was the largest and richest city in the US at mid-century. ( ... ... )
The growth and diversity that characterized New York City during the first third of the 19th century strained the institutions that managed the city. The mercantile ideology that formed the basis of the colonial city eroded at this time, and a decentralized ward orientation replaced it. The changing character of the city is the subject of chapter 1. The perceived coherence of New York City in 1800 fell into chaos by the second third of the century, which led to a demand for new public works, the subject of chapter 2 and 3. The demand for sanitary reform in the mid-19th century should be understood as a consequence of changing expectations of the quality of urban life. Rising standards for public health and new expectations of services prompted the construction of a complex sanitary infrastructure in New York. A necessary prerequisite to sanitary reform was the perception that improvement was warranted; existing practices were deemed inadequate for the protection of public health. ( ... ... ) The manner in which these questions were answered determined the nature of the facilities that were constructed.
In chapter 2 and 3, the haphazard fashion in which the city built individual sewer lines, adhering to local interests, is contrasted with manner in which the state water commissioners built, and the Croton Aqueduct Department managed, the Croton Aqueduct. The construction of this integrated and technically sophisticated aqueduct is the subject of chapter 2. Unexpectedly, the water that the aqueduct introduced into the city strained existing storm sewers, and the volume of standing water on the city streets increased. Furthermore, as the Croton Aqueduct could abundantly supply a medium through which sewage could flow, the water-carriage system became a viable alternative to prevailing methods of waste disposal. Together, the increased nuisance of flooding and the appeal of the water-carriage system of sewage disposal intensified the demand for sewage construction. The efforts of the Common Council to accommodate this new charge is the subject of chapter 3.
The introduction of public works into the city landscape pitted engineers against politicians, the city against the state, and the private interests against the public good. These issues are considered in chapters 4 and 5. In chapter 4 physicians and public-works engineers, the key lobbyists for comprehensive sanitary reform, joined ranks and waged a relentless campaign for the adoption of a new paradigm to provide city services. In the middle of the 19th century, they assumed a professional posture and demanded influence over the shaping of a reform agenda.
The state responded to this lobby as it took more active role in managing New York City. This is the subject of chapter 5. Through a series of charter revisions, between 1849 and 1857, the state tried to remove much of from the province of city politics and local politicians. This spirit of reform presented a window of opportunity for the physicians and engineers to place their priorities on the state docket. In the 1860s, the state confirmed their professional status and incorporated these experts into the mechanisms of city management.
( ... ... )
While the Croton Aqueduct effectively provided a fresh, clean, and copious supply of water to New York City, the city's sewers never shared the same success. The contrast between building and managing a water supply system and constructing and direct sewerage begun in the last chapter continues in this one, but now the focus is on sewers. The systemic process of aqueduct construction is contrasted with the piecemeal mode of building the sewers. The most significant distinction between water supply and sewerage was the very conception of the services. While the Croton Aqueduct was conceived of as a system from its inception, sewers continued to be viewed as individual conduits. Consequently, the mechanism that managed sewer construction, the sources that funded them, and the nature of their construction all confirmed the piecemeal character of the service. As the demand for sewers mounted after midcentury, new conduits were constucted and old ones were extended. Yet the concept of a system was still not embraced. Lacking any rational mode of integration, the effectiveness of these public works deteriorated.
The water that the Croton Aqueduct supplied provided a medium through which wastes could be conveyed to the nearby rivers for disposal. This raised the real possibility of introducing a comprehensive sewer system in New York. Indeed, sewers became the city's wastewater disposal of choice in 1845. Consequently, the demand for sewers increased. However, the inability of the Common Council to effectively manage the construction of a comprehensive, integrated sewer system lessened the anticipated benefits of this improvement. Although the sewer contract itself defined rules for construction, imposed standards for materials, and detailed a protocol for inspection and supervision of work, problems with sewers continued to surface. These exacerbated tensions between the Croton Aqueuct Department and the Common Council as they vied for control over infrastructure development.
In 1849, with the Croton Aqueduct project essentially complete up to the distribution network itself, the Water Commission was dissolved. In its place, mindful of the calls for coordinated water supply and sewage disposal, the state legislature combined these functions under a new Croton Aqueduct Department and charged it with the responsibility for maintaining, constructing, and managing water supply and sewage facilities in New York City. While the charge of the Croton Aqueduct Department now included the management of sewer construction, the Common Council retained its authority to determine where and when these facilities would be laid. It setting up overlapping authority for these two bodies, the state erred, for the priorities of the Common Council could not be reconciled with those of the Croton Aqueduct Department.
( ... ... )
The growth and diversity that characterized New York City during the first third of the 19th century strained the institutions that managed the city. The mercantile ideology that formed the basis of the colonial city eroded at this time, and a decentralized ward orientation replaced it. The changing character of the city is the subject of chapter 1. The perceived coherence of New York City in 1800 fell into chaos by the second third of the century, which led to a demand for new public works, the subject of chapter 2 and 3. The demand for sanitary reform in the mid-19th century should be understood as a consequence of changing expectations of the quality of urban life. Rising standards for public health and new expectations of services prompted the construction of a complex sanitary infrastructure in New York. A necessary prerequisite to sanitary reform was the perception that improvement was warranted; existing practices were deemed inadequate for the protection of public health. ( ... ... ) The manner in which these questions were answered determined the nature of the facilities that were constructed.
In chapter 2 and 3, the haphazard fashion in which the city built individual sewer lines, adhering to local interests, is contrasted with manner in which the state water commissioners built, and the Croton Aqueduct Department managed, the Croton Aqueduct. The construction of this integrated and technically sophisticated aqueduct is the subject of chapter 2. Unexpectedly, the water that the aqueduct introduced into the city strained existing storm sewers, and the volume of standing water on the city streets increased. Furthermore, as the Croton Aqueduct could abundantly supply a medium through which sewage could flow, the water-carriage system became a viable alternative to prevailing methods of waste disposal. Together, the increased nuisance of flooding and the appeal of the water-carriage system of sewage disposal intensified the demand for sewage construction. The efforts of the Common Council to accommodate this new charge is the subject of chapter 3.
The introduction of public works into the city landscape pitted engineers against politicians, the city against the state, and the private interests against the public good. These issues are considered in chapters 4 and 5. In chapter 4 physicians and public-works engineers, the key lobbyists for comprehensive sanitary reform, joined ranks and waged a relentless campaign for the adoption of a new paradigm to provide city services. In the middle of the 19th century, they assumed a professional posture and demanded influence over the shaping of a reform agenda.
The state responded to this lobby as it took more active role in managing New York City. This is the subject of chapter 5. Through a series of charter revisions, between 1849 and 1857, the state tried to remove much of from the province of city politics and local politicians. This spirit of reform presented a window of opportunity for the physicians and engineers to place their priorities on the state docket. In the 1860s, the state confirmed their professional status and incorporated these experts into the mechanisms of city management.
( ... ... )
Chapter 3
Building the Sewers
While the Croton Aqueduct effectively provided a fresh, clean, and copious supply of water to New York City, the city's sewers never shared the same success. The contrast between building and managing a water supply system and constructing and direct sewerage begun in the last chapter continues in this one, but now the focus is on sewers. The systemic process of aqueduct construction is contrasted with the piecemeal mode of building the sewers. The most significant distinction between water supply and sewerage was the very conception of the services. While the Croton Aqueduct was conceived of as a system from its inception, sewers continued to be viewed as individual conduits. Consequently, the mechanism that managed sewer construction, the sources that funded them, and the nature of their construction all confirmed the piecemeal character of the service. As the demand for sewers mounted after midcentury, new conduits were constucted and old ones were extended. Yet the concept of a system was still not embraced. Lacking any rational mode of integration, the effectiveness of these public works deteriorated.
The water that the Croton Aqueduct supplied provided a medium through which wastes could be conveyed to the nearby rivers for disposal. This raised the real possibility of introducing a comprehensive sewer system in New York. Indeed, sewers became the city's wastewater disposal of choice in 1845. Consequently, the demand for sewers increased. However, the inability of the Common Council to effectively manage the construction of a comprehensive, integrated sewer system lessened the anticipated benefits of this improvement. Although the sewer contract itself defined rules for construction, imposed standards for materials, and detailed a protocol for inspection and supervision of work, problems with sewers continued to surface. These exacerbated tensions between the Croton Aqueuct Department and the Common Council as they vied for control over infrastructure development.
In 1849, with the Croton Aqueduct project essentially complete up to the distribution network itself, the Water Commission was dissolved. In its place, mindful of the calls for coordinated water supply and sewage disposal, the state legislature combined these functions under a new Croton Aqueduct Department and charged it with the responsibility for maintaining, constructing, and managing water supply and sewage facilities in New York City. While the charge of the Croton Aqueduct Department now included the management of sewer construction, the Common Council retained its authority to determine where and when these facilities would be laid. It setting up overlapping authority for these two bodies, the state erred, for the priorities of the Common Council could not be reconciled with those of the Croton Aqueduct Department.
( ... ... )
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