2009년 3월 19일 목요일

Accountability impasses: dilemmas and alternatives of political representation

자료: http://socialsciences.scielo.org/pdf/s_rsocp/v2nse/scs_a03.pdf


By Luís Felipe Miguel,
University of Brasília

※ ABSTRACT: 
One crucial element of electoral democracies is accountability, which guarantees the connection
between those who represent and those who are represented. Nonetheless, the expectations that have been deposited in it find but its pale reflection in political practice. The ability that
constituents have to supervise their representatives is limited, due to factors that include the
complexity of public issues, weak incentives for political qualification and control over agendas.
In light of this situation, proposals for the radical transformation of the mechanisms of
representation that redeem the idea of "descriptive representation" and either weaken or abolish accountability have emerged. This is notably the case for the representation of groups and the substitution of elections with a lottery system. Although lacking in formal instruments for the responsiveness of those who govern to those that are governed, the forms that have been proposed would generate a body of representatives more similar to the population in its entirety and would increase the rotativity of decision-making positions. The present article analyzes proposals for descriptive representation through the prism of the relationship between representatives and the represented. Although they often suffer from serious fragilities and do not seem viable for effective implementation, these proposals do incorporate important criticisms and ones that deserve consideration regarding the functioning of electoral representation and, in particular, accountability.

Keywords: political representation; democracy; accountability.

***
※ 메모: 

The problems of political representation faced by electoral democracies have given rise to
innovative proposals, such as the introduction of a certain degree of randomness in choosing
representatives or the reserving of special space for groups that have been marginalized or denied privileges (quotas). In general terms, those proposals aim at one or more of the following
objectives:
  1. greater mimetic representation of the decision-making body, that is the attempt to make those who govern appear more like the governed;
  2. presence of a greater plurality of voices and perspectives in decision-making spheres;
  3. greater political power for traditionally marginalized groups; and,
  4. greater rotation in decision-making positions, in the hope of avoiding the rise of a political elite.

....

Of all the proposals to change the mechanisms of selection of representatives, the lottery is the
one that most decidedly advances toward the four objectives mentioned above, though at the cost of a greater loss of authority by the common citizen.though not insignificant, impact on the fourth objective – an increase in rotation between the governed and those who govern. Contrary to random selection, which would improve mimetic representation of decision-making bodies but whose first step brings citizens’ atomization, quotas are connected with the idea of group representation

One of the biggest problems identified in contemporary political representation has to do with the under-representation of certain social groups. The group of those who govern, in relation to the whole of the population, tends to be more male, richer, better educated, and whiter – an
observation that is valid for Brazil and for electoral democracies in general. The expansion of
suffrage rights and the rise of new groups, such as women, workers, and the illiterate, to political
citizenship status, has not substantially changed the situation. As Anne Phillips has observed
(1999, p. 35), it is not enough to bring down the barriers to inclusion, as in the liberal model;
rather, marginalized groups must be explicitly incorporated to the political body.

The acknowledgement of the political relevance of all social groups leads to a rupture from the
abstract individualism that marks liberal thought – and on which western democracies are
constitutionally structured. The break with this tradition is theorically supported by a myriad of
thinkers, who, nevertheless, oscillate between exalting group differences, and abandoning any
unifying perspectives, such as Iris Marion Young (1990), to committing to civic republicanism,
and emphasizing the need for people to notice the limits to their own space in “ the broader
community to which we all, at last, belong”, which is Phillips’s (1993, p. 106) own opinion on
the matter.

The main mechanism for promoting the political participation of subordinate groups is the
adoption of electoral quotas (MIGUEL, 2000b; 2001). Though they are adopted, at times, to
protect ethnic minorities, especially indigenous groups, most experiments with electoral quotas
benefit women, who then have a reserve of seats in parliament or of candidacies for election, as is
the case in Brazil. The effectiveness of this measure – that is, the real increase in the number of
women present in deliberative assemblies – is influenced by various factors, particularly by the
electoral system[14].

There is a clear connection between this perspective and what, in her classic study, Hanna Pitkin
(1967) described, and criticized, as “ descriptive representation”, which understands parliament as a sort of map on which one may see a perfect, though scaled-down image of society. Thus, what representatives do loses importance in relation to who they are; also, elected officials’
responsiveness to their voters – a key aspect of political representation – is cast aside.
As she defends what she prefers to call a “ politics of presence” from the criticisms of Pitkin and
others, Anne Phillips (1995) admits that it is born of the disappointment with vertical
accountability, which has shown itself incapable of protecting minorities. Nonetheless, one must
note that the rupture promoted by the adoption of quotas is much less drastic than that posed by random selection. Reserving slots for members of certain social groups does not rule out the need for all representatives to go through the electoral process and answer to the common citizen. 

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