출처: J. Stiglitz, NBER Working Paper, Jul 2015.
※ 발췌 (excerpt):
ABSTRACT:
This paper considers two central problems in our statistical frameworks which impair the ability to use wealth to assess economic sustainability or the impact of economic downturns. Some increases in wealth may reflect increased economic rents─in particular, land and exploitation rents─and their capitalized value, unrelated to an increase in the productive capacity of the economy. Another major problem in our wealth accounts is the "missing capital" required to explain the marked decrease in economic output, at the time of recession and in the years following, that cannot be fully accounted for by a decrease in measured inputs. When account is taken of this missing capital, the adverse effects of austerity appear much greater than suggested by the standard national income accounts.
INTRODUCTION
( ... ) These measurement problems have, in turn, led to confusion concerning the interpretation to be given to the dramatic increase in the wealth-output ration in recent decades.
The Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress emphasized the central role of wealth in the assessment of ^sustainability^. The proposition was simple: if wealth (with a growing population, wealth per capita), appropriately measured, was non-decreasing, then the given path of consumption could be sustained in the future.[n]1 Commission noted, however, that there might be significant problems in the valuation of assets─exemplified by real estate bubbles (which might give the impression that wealth was larger than it was and that, therefore, the economy was on a sustainable path when in fact it was not, as occurred in the 2008 financial crisis). ( ... ... )
But standard measures of "wealth" may not adequately reflects sustainability for other reasons, or more broadly an ^increase^ in measured wealth may not reflect the ability of the economy to sustain higher rates of consumption. Here, we focus on three key instances, in two of which an increase in wealth does not measure an increase in future productive capacities and in one of which our wealth metrics do not capture a diminution in the economy's productive potential.
Two anomalies [n]2
[n]2. The ideas in this section are elaborated upon in Stiglitz (2015a,b).
The possibility that there might not be a close correspondence between measured wealth and a variable ("K" for captial) that assesses the future productive potential of the economy helps explain a disquieting aspect of Piketty's recent book. [n]3: He showed that the wealth-output ratio increased enormously in recent decades. In spite of this, average wages did not increase, and interest rates did not fall. It is hard to obtain such results in any standard production function ^if we interpret wealth as capital.^
There is a second puzzle. It has been observed that the labor's share of income is decreasing. There is a wealth of evidence arguing that the elasticity of substitution is less than unity.[n]4 If wealth is increasing, relative to labor supply, then the share of labor should be increasing.
But these puzzles are immediately resolved if he measured wealth is not what is meant by productive capital. Wealth and capital are both aggregates, but they represent different aggregates. It is possible that wealth has gone up, but productive capital has not gone up commensurately, or may even have gone down. That appears to have been what has happened in several countries.[n]5
A quick look at some of the key sources of increases of wealth shows that some may not lead to an increase in the economy's productive potential─and some may even lead to a decrease in its potential.
I. Land
The most important source of the disparity between the growth of wealth and the growth of productive capital is land: much of the increase in wealth is an increase in the value of land─not associated with any increase in the ^amount^ of land (and, therefore, of the productivity of the economy). An increase in the value of land in the Riviera or in Southampton does not increase the productive capacities of land. Even if measured wealth has increased, if the value of 'K" has decreased, the economy's future productive potential has decreased: the amount of land is no greater now than it was fifty years ago.
Why the value of land might increase (and in particular, why it might have increased so dramatically in recent decades) is a question I discuss more extensively elsewhere. (See Stigliz, 2015a,b,c.) Note, for instance, that if the rents associated with land are fixed and last in perpetuity, then a slight decrease in the (long term real) interest rate can lead to a large increase in the value of land.[n]6 As we noted earlier, the Commission, deliberating as a housing bubble was forming in the United States, Spain, and many other countries, could not help observe that market prices of land and other assets may not represent "equilibrium prices," i.e. may not even provide an accurate assessment of the present discounted value of future rents to be derived from the asset. (That is why the Commission took the eclectic approach of suggesting a dashboard that would include along with value measures physical metrics, e.g. of the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases and changes in those numbers.)
[n]6. If R is the rent from the land, and r is the real interest rate, then the value of land Vt =R/r, so that there is an equiproportionate increase in the value of land from a permanent decrease in the real interest rate.
Bubbles are a pervasive and recurrent aspect of market economies. While recessions may represent "corrections", the economy may not fully correct the prices of real estate, so the economy simply moves from one bubble path to another.[n]7
The central point of this section is simple: an increase in wealth reflecting an increase in the value of real estate does not, in any way, measure an increase in the productive capacity of the economy.
II. Increased rents capitalized in financial assets.[n]8
[n]8. Some of the ideas in this section are elaborated on in greater length in Stiglitz 2015a.Some increases in wealth (as conventionally measured) may reflect increased economic rents, unrelated to an increase in the productive capacity of the economy. Rather, they reflect an increase in the ability of those in the financial sector, or more broadly, "capitalists", to exploit others─workers, consumers, and ordinary citizens. The result is that overall, changes in measured wealth in recent decades probably overstate true "capital" accumulation. ( ... )
Such would be the case if the average degree of monopoly in the economy increases─if, for instance, network economies became more important, so that the fraction of the economy in which monopolies or oligopolies dominate is increased.
While hard to quantify, and varying from country to country, in almost all countries these exploitive rents are significant, and in many countries they seem to have gone up significantly.
The effective degree of monopoly could increase as well if firms get better at exploiting whatever market power they have─if, for instance, firms get better in discriminating among different categories of customers.
Typically, the value of these rents gets capitalized into the value of financial assets─in the value of those who can lay claim to the monopoly rents. Such exploitation represents a redistirbution from workers to capitalists, not an increase in the productive capacity of the economy. ( ... ... )
But there are more subtle forms of "exploitation." Government allows too-big-to-fail banks. The value of those banks is higher than they otherwise would be, ^because of government risk-absorption^. But the contingent-liability of the government is not capitalized; it doesn't show up in the national balance sheet, and so it appears as if the wealth of the economy has increased. ( ... ... )
Although the capitalization of ^exploitive^ rents may perhaps represent the largest part of the increase in financial wealth associated with an increase in rents, changes in taxes and regulatory regimes can have similar effects.
What's missing?
( ... ... )
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