[발췌: J. Shelton's] Money Meltdown: Restoring Order to Global Currency System (2009)

출처: Judy Shelton (2009). Money Meltdown: Restoring Order to Global Currency System. Simon & Schuster.
자료: 구글도서



※ 발췌 (excerpts): Legacy of Bretton Woods

p. 27.

( ... ... ) came to telling members how they were to conduct their monetary and financial affairs. The International Clearing Union would even reserve the right to change the value of the bancor relative to gold if its governing board deemed it useful; the very definition of the value of the international monetary unit would not be beyond the reach of the authorities empowered to managed the union. Member countries, too, would be able to make adjustments in their exchange rates as long as the governing board granted them permission to do so. Decisions could be changed on the basis of new information; rules would be tempered by collective wisdom and discretionary judgment. Indeed, Keynes suggested that during the five years after the inception of the system, the governing board should "give special consideration to appeals for adjustments in the exchange-value of a national currency on the ground of unforeseen circumstances." [n.20]

In short, Keynes wanted it both ways. The need to preserve international monetary stability should not get in the way of expansionist domestic policies. "There should be the least possible interference with internal national policies," he wrote in the preface to his April 1943 draft proposal, "and the plan should not wander from the international terrain."[n.21] Still, it was clear that some degree of national monetary sovereignty would have to be sacrificed if the plan were to work. The basic objective in setting up an International Clearing Union, after all, was to avoid the chaos of exchange rate manipulations that had characterized the interwar period.

Keynes was keenly aware of the need to establish an orderly system for handling balance of payments adjustments among trading nations, and he was eager to start the global rebuilding process. While Keynes knew that achieving international monetary stability demanded that member nations surrender the right to define their currency's rate of exchange to a supernational organization, he also understood it was a sensitive issue and sought to reassure governments they would still retain some control over their monetary fate. In any case, he was thoroughly convinced that global economic cooperation was vital for the preservation of peace. "A greater readiness to accept supernational arrangements must be required in the post-war world than hitherto," Keynes asserted. In his view, the proposal for an International Clearing Union was nothing less than a call for global "financial disarmament."[n.22]


p. 28.

WHITE'S BLUEPRINT

Compared to Keynes, who had a tendency to wax poetic in his proposals for international cooperation, Harry Dexter While was all business. When White's boss, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, asked him to prepare a paper outlining the possibilities for coordinated monetary arrangements among the United States and its allies, White responded quickly with a crisp, comprehensive proposal.

Morgenthau made the request to his subordinate on December 14, 1941, one week after the attack on Pearl Harbor. What Morgenthau had in mind, according to J. Keith Horsefield, who wrote the history of the International Monetary Fund, was the establishment of a stabilization fund to help provide monetary assistance to the Allies during the war and to hamper the enemy. Ideally, the fund would serve as the basis for setting up a postwar international monetary system and might evolve into some kind of "international currency."[n.23]

Just over two weeks later, White submitted a report entitled "Suggested Program for Inter-Allied Monetary and Bank Action." The objectives of the program, as laid out by White, were:

(1) To provide the means, the instrument, and the procedure to stabilize foreign exchange rates and strengthen the monetary systems of the Allied countries.

(2) To establish an agency with means and powers adequate to provide the capital necessary:

  (a) to aid in the economic reconstruction of the Allied countries;
  (b) to facilitate a rapid and smooth transition from a war-time economy to a peace-time economy in the Allied countries;
  (c) to supply short-term capital necessary to increase the volume of foreign trade─where such capital is not available at reasonable rates from private sources. [n.24]

A study in efficiency, the analysis was detailed and to the point. White felt, however, that stabilizing the international monetary system and supplying cheap loans to Allied countries were two different tasks. While a special multilateral bank could be set up to take care of the latter, White noted, "monetary stabilization is a highly specialized function calling for a special structure, special personnel, and special organization," [n.25] White suggested that two separate institutions would therefore be required: (1) an Inter-Allied Bank and (2) Inter-Allied Stabilization Fund.

The reaction to White's proposal was positive. Morgenthau was impressed and began laying the political groundwork for introducing what he sensed might well become a monumental international project. In April 1942, after some revisions and refinements, White's paper was circulated under the title "Preliminary Draft Proposal for a United Nations Stabilization Fund and a Bank for Reconstruction and Development of the United and Associated Nations." Among the primary purposes of the stabilization fund, White emphasized, was the need to stabilize foreign exchange rates among the United Nations countries and to encourage the flow of productive capital. He also wanted to promote sound note issuing and credit practices among the United Nations countries and to reduce barriers to foreign trade. [n.26]

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