2013년 5월 7일 화요일

[발췌 4장: Keynes's “Tract on Monetary Reform”] #4. Alternative Aims in Monetary Policy

자료: J. M. Keynes, A Tract on Monetary Reform (1923)

※ This is a reading note with excerpts taken, and personal annotations and remarks added, in trying to understand the above text. So, visit the above source links to see the original.

※ 발췌 / excerpts of which: chapter 4, p.140 (p. 149 on PDF) ~
* * *

Chapter 4
Alternative Aims in Monetary Policy

Our first two chapters, on the evils proceeding from instability in the purchasing power of money and on the part played by the exigencies of Public Finance, have indicated the practical importance of our subject to the welfare of society.  In the third chapter an attempt has been made to lay a foundation of theory upon which to raise constructions. We can now turn, in this and the following chapter, to Remedies.

  The instability of money has been compounded, in most countries except the United States, of two elements:
  • (1) the failure of the national currencies to remain stable in terms of what was supposed to be the standard of value, namely gold;  [※ 가치척도로 간주하는 기준(즉, 본위화폐 금)으로 따진 통화가치(金 平價)의 불안정 ]
  • and (2) the failure of gold itself to remain stable in terms of purchasing power. [통화의 가치척도인 금 자체의 구매력의 불안정 ]
Attention has been mainly concentrated (e.g. by the Cunliffe Committee) on the first of these two factors. It is often assumed that the restoration of the gold standard, that is to say, of the convertibility of each national currency at a fixed rate in terms of gold, must be, in any case, our objective; and that the main question of controversy is whether national currencies should be restored to their pre-war gold value or to some lower value nearer to the present facts: in other words, the choice between Deflation and Devaluation.

  This assumption is hasty. If we glance at the course of prices during the last five years, it is obvious [:] 
  • that the United States, which has enjoyed a gold standard throughout, has suffered as severely as many other countries, 
  • that in the United Kingdom the instability of gold has been a larger factor than the instability of the exchange, that the same is true even of France, and that in Italy it has been nearly as large. 
  • On the other hand, in India, which has suffered violent exchange fluctuations, the standard of value, as we shall see below, has been more stable than in any other country.
  We should not, therefore, by fixing the exchanges[,] get rid of our currency troubles.  It is even possible that this step might weaken our control.  The problem of stabilisation has several sides, which we must consider one by one:
  1. Devaluation versus Deflation.  Do we wish to fix the standard of value, whether or not it be gold, near the existing value?  Or do we wish to restore it to the pre-war value?
  2. Stability of Prices versus Stability of Exchange.  Is it more important that the value of a national currency should be stable in terms of purchasing power, or stable in terms of the currency of certain foreign countries?
  3. The Restoration of a Gold Standard.  In the light of our answers to the first two questions, is a gold standard, however imperfect in theory, the best available method for attaining our ends in practice? 
  Having decided between these alternative aims, we can proceed, in the next chapter, to some constructive suggestions.

I. Devaluation versus Deflation

The policy of reducing the ratio between the volume of a country's currency and its requirements of purchasing power in the form of money, so as to increase the exchange value of the currency in terms of gold or of commodities, is conveniently called Deflation.
[※  I think ‘deflation’ here has a meaning at the same time of de facto ‘revaluation’ and ‘deflation’ directly caused by it, and Keynes described the way of giving his meaning of the term as conveniently]
  The alternative policy of stabilising the value of the currency somewhere near its present value, without regard to its pre-war value, is called Devaluation.

  Up to the date of the Genoa Conference of April 1922, these two policies were not clearly distinguished by the public, and the sharp opposition between them has been only gradually appreciated. Even now (October 1923) there is scarcely any European country in which the authorities have made it clear whether their policy is to stabilise the value of their currency or to raise it.  Stabilisation at the existing level has been recommended by International Conferences;[1] and the actual value of many currencies tends to fall rather than to rise.  But, to judge from other indications, the heart's desire of the State Banks of Europe, whether they pursue it successfully, as in Czecho-Slovakia, or unsuccessfully, as in France, is to raise the value of their currencies.  In only one country so far have practical steps been taken to fix the exchange, namely in Austria.
[1] Whilst the Conference of Genoa (April 1922) affirmed the doctrine in general, representatives of the countries chiefly affected were united in declaring that it must not be applied to them in particular. Signor Peano, M. Picard, and M. Theunis, speaking on behalf of Italy, France, and Belgium, announced, each for his own country, that they would have nothing to do with devaluating, and were determined to restore their respective currencies to their pre-war values. Reform is not likely to come by joint, simultaneous action. The experts of Genoa recognised this when they "ventured to suggest" that "a considerable service will be rendered by that country which first decides boldly to set the example of securing immediate stability in terms of gold" by devaluation.
  The simple arguments against Deflation fall under two heads.

  In the first place, Deflation is not desirable, because it effects, what is always harmful, a change in the existing Standard of Value, and redistributes wealth in a manner injurious, at the same time, to business and to social stability.  Deflation, as we have already seen, involves a transference of wealth from the rest of the community to the rentier class and to all holders of titles to money; just as inflation involves the opposite.  In particular it involves a transference from all borrowers, that is to say from traders, manufacturers, and farmer, to lenders, from the active to the inactive.

  But whilst the oppression of the taxpayer for the enrichment of the rentier is the chief lasting result, there is another, more violent, disturbance during the period of transition. The policy of gradually raising the value of a country's money to (say) 100 per cent above its present value in terms of goodsㅡI repeat here the arguments of Chapter 1ㅡamounts to giving notice to every merchant and every manufacturer, that for some time to come his stock and his raw materials will steadily depreciate on his hands, and to every one who finances this business with borrowed money that he will, sooner or later, lose 100 per cent on his liabilities (since he will have to pay back in terms of commodities twice as much as he has borrowed). Modern business, being carried on largely with borrowed money, must necessarily be brought to a standstill by such a process. It will be to the interest of every one in business to go out of business for the time being; and of every one who is contemplating expenditure to postpone his orders so long as he can. The wise man will be he who turns his assets into cash, withdraws from risks and the exertions of activity, and awaits in country retirement the steady appreciation promised him in the value of his cash. A probable expectation of Deflation is bad enough; a certain expectation is disastrous. For the mechanism of the modern business world is even less adapted to fluctuations in the value of money upwards than it is to fluctuations downwards.

  In the second place, in many countries, Deflation, even were it desirable, is not possible; that is to say, Deflation in sufficient degree to restore the currency to its pre-war parity.  For the burden which it would throw on the taxpayer would be insupportable.  I need add nothing on this to what I have already written in the second chapter above.  This practical impossibility might have rendered the policy innocuous, if it were not that, by standing in the way of the alternative policy, it prolongs the period of uncertainty and severe seasonal fluctuation, and even, in some case, can be carried into effect sufficiently to cause much interference with business.  The fact, that the restoration of their currencies to the pre-war parity is still the declared official policy of the French and Italian Governments, is preventing, in those countries, any rational discussion of currency reform.  All thoseㅡand in the financial world they are manyㅡwho have reasons for wishing to appear "correct," are compelled to talk foolishly.  In Italy, where sound economic views have much influence and which may be nearly ripe for currency reform, Signor Mussolini has threatened to raise the lira to its former value.  Fortunately for the Italian taxpayers and Italian business, the lira does not listen even to a dictator and cannot be given castor oil.  But such talk can postpone positive reform; though it may be doubted if so good a politician would have propounded such a policy, even in bravado and exuberance, if he had understood that, expressed in other but equivalent words, it was as follows: “My policy is to halve wages, double the burden of the National Debt, and to reduce by 50% the prices which Sicily can get for her exports of oranges and lemons.”

  One single countryㅡCzechoslovakiaㅡhas made the experiment on a modest but sufficient scale. Comparatively free from the burden of internal debt, and free also from serious budgetary deficits, Czechoslovakia was able in the course of 1922, in pursuance of the policy of her Finance Minister, Dr. Alois Rasin, to employ the proceeds of certain foreign loans to improve the exchange value of the Czech crown to nearly three times the rate which had been touched in the previous year. The policy has cost her an industrial crisis and serious unemployment. To what purpose? I do not know. Even now the Czech crown is not worth a sixth of its pre-war parity; and it remains unstabilised, fluttering before the breath of the seasons and the wind of politics. Is, therefore, the process of appreciation to continue indefinitely? If not, when and at what point is stabilisation to be effected? Czechoslovakia was better placed than any country in Europe to establish her economic life on the basis of a sound and fixed currency. Her finances were in equilibrium, her credit good, her foreign resources adequate, and no one could have blamed her for devaluating the crown, ruined by no fault of hers and inherited from the Habsburg Empire. Pursuing a misguided policy in a spirit of stern virtue, she preferred the stagnation of her industries and a still fluctuating standard.[1]


If the restoration of many European currencies to their pre-war parity with gold is neither desirable nor possible, what are the forces or the arguments which have established this undesirable impossibility as the avowed policy of most of them? The following are the most important:

1. To leave the gold value of a country's currency at the low level to which war has driven it is an injustice to the rentier class and to others whose income is fixed in terms of currency, and practically a breach of contract; whilst to restore its value would meet a debt of honour.

  The injury done to pre-war holders of fixed interest-bearing stocks is beyond dispute. Real injustice, indeed, might require the restoration of the purchasing power, and not merely the gold value, of their money incomes, a measure which no one in fact proposes; whilst nominal injustice has not been infringed, since these investments were not in gold bullion but in the legal tender of the realm. Nevertheless, if this class of investors could be dealt with separately, considerations of equity and the expedience of satisfying reasonable expectation would furnish a strong case.

  But this is not the actual situation. The vast issues of War Loans have swamped the pre-war holdings of fixed interest-bearing stocks, and society has largely adjusted itself to the new situation. To restore the value of pre-war holdings by Deflation means enhancing at the same time the value of war and post-war holdings, and thereby raising the total claims of the rentier class not only beyond what they are entitled to, but to an intolerable proportion of the total income of the community. Indeed justice, rightly weighed, comes down on the other side. Much the greater proportion of the money contracts still outstanding were entered into when money was worth more nearly what it is worth now than what it was worth in 1913. Thus, in order to do justice to a minority of creditors, a great injustice would be done to a great majority of debtors.

  This aspect of the matter has been admirably argued by Professor Irving Fisher.[1] We forget, he says, that not all contracts require the same adjustment in order to secure justice, and that while we are debating whether we ought to deflate to secure ideal justice for those who made contracts on old price levels, new contracts are constantly being made at the new price levels. An estimate of the volume of contracts now outstanding, classified according to their age, would show that some contracts are a day old, some are a month old, some are a year old, some are a decade old, and some are a century old, the great mass, however, being of very recent origin. Consequently the average, or centre of gravity, of the total existing indebtedness is probably always somewhat near the present. Before the war, Professor Fisher estimated, very roughly, that contracts in the United States were on the average about one year old.

  When, therefore, the depreciation of the currency has lasted long enough for society to adjust itself to the new values, Deflation is even worse than Inflation. Both are "unjust" and disappoint reasonable expectation. But whereas Inflation, by easing the burden of national debt and stimulating enterprise, has a little to throw into the other side of the balance, Deflation has nothing.

2. The restoration of a currency to its pre-war gold value enhances a country's financial prestige and promotes future confidence.

Where a country can hope to restore its pre-war parity at an early date, this argument cannot be neglected. This might be said of Great Britain, Holland, Sweden, Switzerland, and (perhaps) Spain, but of no other European countries. The argument cannot be extended to those countries which, even if they could raise somewhat the value of their legal-tender money, could not possibly restore it to its old value. It is of the essence of the argument that the exact pre-war parity should be recovered. It would not make much difference to the financial prestige of Italy whether she stabilised the lira at 100 to the £ sterling or at 60; and it would be much better for her prestige to stabilise it definitely at 100 than to let it fluctuate between 60 and 100.

  This argument is limited, therefore, to those countries the gold value of whose currencies is within (say) 5 or 10 per cent of their former value. Its force in these cases depends, I think, upon what answer we give to the problem discussed below, namely, whether we intend to pin ourselves in the future, as in the past, to an unqualified gold standard. If we still prefer such a standard to any available alternative, and if future "confidence" in our currency is to depend not on the stability of its purchasing power but on the fixity of its gold-value, then it may be worth our while to stand the racket of Deflation to the extent of 5 or 10 per cent. This view is in accordance with that expressed by Ricardo in analogous circumstances a hundred years ago.[1: see below p.153] If, on the other hand, we decide to aim for the future at stability of the price level rather than at a fixed parity with gold, in that case cadit quaestio

  In any case this argument does not affect our main conclusion, that the right policy for countries of which the currency has suffered a prolonged and severe depreciation is to devaluate, and to fix the value of the currency at that figure in the neighbourhood of the existing value to which commerce and wages are adjusted.

3. If the gold value of a country's currency can be increased, labour will profit by a reduced cost of living, foreign goods will be obtainable cheaper, and foreign debts fixed in terms of gold (e.g. to the United State) will be discharged with less effort.

  This argument, which is pure illusion, exercises quite as much influence as the other two. If the franc is worth more, wages, it is argued, which are paid in francs, will surely buy more, and French imports, which are paid for in francs, will be so much cheaper. No! If francs are worth more they will buy more labour as well as more goods,ㅡthat is to say, wages will fall; and the French exports, which pay for the imports, will, measured in francs, fall in value just as much as the imports. Nor will it make in the long run any difference whatever in the amount of goods the value of which England will have to transfer to America to pay her dollar debts, whether in the end sterling settles down at four dollars to  the pound, or at its pre-war parity. The burden of this debt depends on the value of gold, in terms of which it is fixed, not on the value of sterling. It is not easy, it seems, for men to apprehend that their money is a mere intermediary, without significance in itself, which flows from one hand to another, is received and is dispensed, and disappears when its work is done from the sum of a nations's wealth.


In concluding this section, let me quote on the issue between Deflation and Devaluation two classic authorities, Gibbon and Ricardo, the one to represent the imposing but false wisdom of the would-be upright statesman, the other to speak in clear tones the voice of instructed reason.

  In the 11th chapter of The Decline and Fall, Gibbon deems incredible a story of how in A.D. 274 Aurelian's deflationary zeal to restore the integrity of the coin excited an insurrection which caused the death of 7000 soldiers. “We might naturally expect,” he says, “that  the reformation of the coin should have been an action equally popular with the destruction of those obsolete accounts, which by the emperor's order were burnt in the forum of Trajan.  In an age when the principles of commerce were so imperfectly understood, the most desirable end might perhaps be effected by harsh and injudicious means; but a temporary grievance of such a nature can scarcely excite and support civil war.  The repetition of intolerable taxes, imposed either on the land or on the necessaries of life, may at last provoke those who will not or who cannot relinquish their country.  But the case is far otherwise in every operation which, by whatsoever expedients, restores the just value of money.”

  Rome may have understood the principles of commerce imperfectly in the third century and not perfectly in the twentieth; but that does not save her citizens from experiencing their applications.  Signor Mussolini might peruse with interest the annals of Aurelian, who, "ignorant or impatient of the restraints of civil institutions," fell by the hand of an assassin within a year of his deflation of the currency, "regretted by the army, detested by the Senate, but universally acknowledged as a warlike and fortunate prince, the useful thought severe reformer of a degenerate State."

  Ricardo, speaking in the House of Commons on the 12th of June 1822,[1] gave his opinion that: "If in the year 1819 the value of the currency had stood at 14s. for the pound note, which was the case in the year 1813, he should have thought that, on a balance of all the advantages and disadvantages of the case, it would have been as well to fix the currency at the then value, according to which most of the existing contracts had been made; but when the currency was within 5% of its par value, he thought they had made the best selection in recurring to the old standard."

  The same is repeated in his Protection to Agriculture,[1] where he approves the restoration of the old standard when gold was £4: 2s. per standard ounce, but adds that, if it had been £5: 10s., "no measure could have been more inexpedient than to make so violent a change in all subsisting engagements."

II. Stability of Prices versus Stability of Exchange.
p. 154 (p. 163 on PDF)

Since, subject to the qualification of Chapter 3, the rate of exchange of a country's currency with the currency of the rest of the world (assuming for the sake of simplicity that there is only one external currency) depends on the relation between the internal price level and the external price level , it follows [:]
  • that the exchange cannot be stable unless both internal and external price levels remain stable. 
  • If, therefore, the external price level lies outside our control, we must submit either to our own internal price level or to our exchange being pulled about by external influences. 
  • If the external price level is unstable, we cannot keep both our own price level and our exchanges stable. And we are compelled to choose.

  In pre-war days, when almost the whole world was on a gold standard, we had all plumped for stability of exchange as against stability of prices, and we were ready to submit to the social consequences of a change of price level for causes quite outside our control, connected, for example, with the discovery of new gold mines in foreign countries or a change of banking policy abroad.  But we submitted, partly because we did not dare trust ourselves to a less automatic (though more reasoned) policy, and partly because the price fluctuations experienced were in fact moderate.  Nevertheless, there were powerful advocates of the other choice.  In particular, the proposals of Professor Irving Fisher for a Compensated Dollar, amounted, unless all countries adopted the same plan, to putting into practice a preference for stability of internal price level over stability of external exchange.

The right choice is not necessarily the same for all countries.  It must partly depend on the relative importance of foreign trade in the economic life of the country.  Nevertheless, there does seem to be in almost every case a presumption in favour of the stability of prices, if only it can be achieved.  Stability of exchange is in the nature of a convenience which adds to the efficiency and prosperity of those who are engaged in foreign trade.  Stability of prices, ...

( ... pp. 156-157 are missing ... )

  If the Governor of India had been successful in stabilising the rupee-sterling exchange, they would necessarily have subjected India to a disastrous price fluctuation comparable to that in England.  Thus the unthinking assumption, in favour of the restoration of a fixed exchange as the one thing to aim at, requires more examination than it sometimes receives.

  Especially is this the case if the prospect that a majority of countries will adopt the same standard is still remote. When by adopting the gold standard we could achieve stability of exchange with almost the whole world, whilst any other standard would have appeared as a solitary eccentricity, the solid advantages of certainty and convenience supported the conservative preference for gold.  Nevertheless, even so, the convenience of traders and the primitive passion for solid metal might not, I think, have been adequate to preserve the dynasty of gold, if it had not been for another, half-accidental circumstance; namely, that for many years past gold had afforded not only a stable exchange but, on the whole, a stable price level also.  In fact, the choice between stable exchanges and stable prices had not presented itself as an acute dilemma.  And when, prior to the development of the South African mines, we seemed to be faced with a continuously falling price level, the fierceness of the bimetallic controversy testified to the discontent provoked as soon as the existing standard appeared seriously incompatible with the stability of prices.

  Indeed, it is doubtful whether the pre-war system for regulating the international flow of gold would have been capable of dealing with such large or sudden divergences between the price levels of different countries as have occurred lately.  The fault of the pre-war régime, under which the rates of exchange between a country and the outside world were fixed, and the internal price level had to adjust itself thereto (i.e. was chiefly governed by external influences), was that it was to slow and insensitive i its mode of operation.  The fault of the post-war régime, under which the price level mainly depends on internal influences (i.e. internal currency and credit policy) and the rates of exchange with the outside world have to be adjust themselves thereto, is that it is too rapid in its effect and over-sensitive, with the result that it may act violently for merely transitory causes.  Nevertheless, when the fluctuations are large and sudden, a quick reaction is necessary for the maintenance of equilibrium; and the necessity for quick reaction has been one of the factors which have rendered the pre-war method inapplicable to post-war conditions, and have made every one nervous of proclaiming a final fixation of the exchange.

  We are familiar with the causal chain along which the pre-war method reached its result.  If gold flowed out of the country's central reserves, this modified discount policy and the creation of credit, thus affecting the demand for, and hence the price of, the class of goods most sensitive to the ease of credit, and gradually, through the price of these goods, spreading its influence to the prices of goods generally, including those which enter into international trade, until at the new level of price foreign goods began to look dear at home and domestic goods cheap abroad, and the adverse balance was redressed. [※ 금본위제하의 국제수지 조정과 물가 변동 ] But this process might take months to work itself out.  Nowadays, the gold reserves might be dangerously depleted before the compensating forces had time to operate.  Moreover, the movement of the rate of interest up or down sometimes had more effect in attracting foreign capital or encouraging investment abroad than in influencing home prices.  Where the disequilibrium was purely seasonal, this was an unqualified advantage; for it was much better that foreign funds should ebb and flow between the slack and the busy seasons than that prices should go up and down.  But where it was due to more permanent causes, the adjustment even before the war might be imperfect; for the stimulus to foreign loans, whilst restoring the balance for the time being, might obscure the real seriousness of the situation, and enable a country to live beyond its resources for a considerable time at the risk of ultimate default.

  Compare with this the instantaneous effects of the post-war method.  If at the existing rate of exchange the amount of sterling offered in the exchange market during the course of the morning exceeds the amount of dollars offered, there is no gold available for export at a fixed price to bridge the gulf.  Consequently the dollar rate of exchange must move until at the new rate the offerings of each of the two currencies in exchange for one another exactly balance in amount.  But it is the inevitable result of this that within half an hour the relative prices of commodities entering into English-American trade, such as cotton and electrolytic copper, have adjusted themselves accordingly.  Unless the American prices move to meet them half-way, the English prices immediately rise correspondent to the movement of the exchange.

  This means that relative prices and be knocked about by the most fleeting influences of politics and of sentiments, and by the periodic pressure of seasonal trades.  But it also means that the post-war method is a most rapid and powerful corrective of real disequilibria in the balance of international payments arising from whatever causes, and a wonderful preventive in the way of countries which are inclined to spend abroad beyond their resources.

  Thus when there are violent shocks to the pre-existing equilibrium between the internal and external price-levels, the pre-war method is likely break down in practice, simply because it cannot bring about the re-adjustment of internal prices ^quick enough^.  Theoretically, of course, the pre-war method must be able to make itself effective sooner or later, provided the movement of gold is allowed to continue without restriction, until the inflation or deflation of prices has taken place to the necessary extent.  But in practice there is usually a limit to the rate and to the amount by which the actual currency or the metallic backing for it can be allowed to flow abroad.  If the supply of money or credit is reduced faster than social and business arrangements allow prices to fall, intolerable inconveniences result.  Perhaps some of the incidents of debasement of the coinage which are sprinkled through the currency history of the late Middle Ages were really due to a similar cause.  Prior to the discovery of the New World the precious metals were, over a long period, becoming progressively scarcer in Europe through natural wastage in the absence of adequate new supplies, and the drain to the East; with the result that from time to time the price level in England (for example) would be established on too high a level in relation to European prices.  The resulting tendency of silver to flow abroad, being accentuated perhaps by some special temporary cause, would give rise to complaints of a "scarcity of currency," which really means an outflow of money faster than social organisation permits prices to fall.  No doubt some of the debasement were helped by the fact that they profited incidentally a necessitous Exchequer.  But they may have been, nevertheless, the best available expedient for meeting the currency problem.[1]  We shall look on Edward III's debasements of sterling money with a more tolerant eye if we regard them as a method of carrying into effect a preference for stability of internal prices over stability of external exchanges, celebrating that monarch as an enlightened forerunner of Professor Irving Fisher in advocacy of the "compensated dollar," only more happy than the latter in his opportunities to carry theory into practice.

  The reader should notice, further, the different parts played by discount policy under the one regime and under the other.  With the pre-war method discount policy is a vital part of the process for restoring equilibrium between internal and external prices.  With the post-war method it is not equally indispensable, since the fluctuation of the exchanges can bring about equilibrium without its aid;ㅡthough it remains, of course, as an instrument for influencing the internal price level and through this the exchanges, if we desire to establish either the one or the other at a different level from that which would have prevailed otherwise.

III. The Restoration of a Gold Standard
p. 163 (p. 170 on PDF)

Our conclusion up to this point are, therefore, that, when stability of the internal price level and stability of the external exchanges are incompatible, the former is generally preferable; and that on occasions when the dilemma is acute, the preservation of the former at the expense of the latter is, fortunately perhaps, the line of least resistance.

  The restoration of the gold standard (whether at the pre-war parity or at some other rate) certainly will not give us complete stability of internal prices and can only give us complete stability of the external exchanges if all the other countries also restore the gold standard.  The advisability of restoring it depends, therefore, on whether, on the whole, it will give us the best working compromise obtainable between two ideals.

  The advocates of gold, as against a more scientific standard, base their cause on the double contention,[:]
  • that in practice gold has provided and will provide a reasonably stable standard of value, 
  • and that in practice, since governing authorities lack wisdom as often as not, a managed currency will, sooner or later, come to grief.  Conservatism and scepticism join armsㅡas they often do.  
  • Perhaps superstition comes in too; for gold still enjoys the prestige of its smell and colour.
  The considerable success with which gold maintained its stability of value in the changing world of the 19th century was certainly remarkable.  I have applauded it in the first chapter.  After the discoveries of Australia and California it began to depreciate dangerously, and before the exploitation of South Africa it began to appreciate dangerously.  Yet in each case it righted itself and retained its reputation.

  But the conditions of the future are not those of the past. We have no sufficient ground for expecting the continuance of the special conditions which preserved a sort of balance before the war. (A) For what are the underlying explanations of the good behaviour of gold during the 19th century? [:]

  (1) In the first place, it happened that progress in the discovery of gold mines roughly kept pace with progress in other directionsㅡa correspondence which was not altogether a matter of chance, because the progress of that period, since it was characterised by the gradual opening up and exploitation of the world's surface, not unnaturally brought to light pari passu the remoter deposits of gold.  But this stage of history is now almost at an end.  A quarter of a century has passed by since the discovery of an important deposit.  Material progress is more dependent now on the growth of scientific and technical knowledge, of which the application to gold-mining may be intermittent.  Years may elapse without great improvement in the methods of extracting gold; and then the genius of a chemist may realise past dreams and forgotten hoaxes, transmuting base into precious like Subtle, or extracting gold from sea-water as in the Bubble.  Gold is liable to be either too dear or too cheap.  In either case, it is too much to expect that a succession of accidents will keep the metal steady.

  (2) But there was another type of influence which used to aid stability.  The value of gold has not depended on the policy or the decisions of a single body of men; and a sufficient proportion of the supply has been able to find its way, without any flooding of the market, into the Arts or into the hoards of Asia for its marginal value to be governed by a steady psychological estimation of the metal in relation to other things.  This is what is meant by saying that gold has “intrinsic value” and is free from the dangers of a “managed” currency.  The independent variety of the influences determining the value of gold has been in itself a steadying influence.[:]
  • The arbitrary and variable character of the proportion of gold reserves to liabilities maintained by many of the note-issuing banks of the world, so far from introducing an incalculable factor, was an element of stability.  For when gold was relatively abundant and flowed towards them, it was absorbed by their allowing their ratio of gold reserves to rise slightly; and when it was relatively scarce, the fact that they had no intention of ever utilising their gold reserves for any practical purpose, permitted most of them to view with equanimity a moderate weakening of their proportion.  A great part of the flow of South African gold between the end of the Boer War and 1914 was able to find its way into the central gold reserves of European and other countries with the minimum effect on prices.
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 (B) But the war has effected a great change.  Gold itself has become a “managed” currency.  The West, as well as the East, has learnt to hoard gold; but the motives of the United States are not those of India. [:]
  • (1) Now that most countries has abandoned the gold standard, the supply of the metal would, if the chief user of it restricted its holdings to its real needs, prove largely redundant.  
  • (1.1) The United States has not been able to let gold fall to its “natural” value, because it could not face the resulting depreciation of its standard.  It has been driven, therefore, to the costly policy of burying in the vaults of Washington what the miners of the Rand have laboriously brought to the surface.
[※ BTW, a writer who calls himself author quotes this passage like this: In a withering assault on the maintenance of the value of the American dollar by hoarding gold, a policy he[Keynes] dismissed as burying in the vaults of Washington what the miners of the Rand have laboriously brought to the surface. ... (KHNW, p.25)  
Is really Keynes here assaulting the Fed's policy of hoarding gold? Does Keynes really oppose, as this writer says, to ‘the maintenance of the value of the American dollar by hoarding gold’ in this context? Rather, he is pointing out that the necessity and costly nature of that policy to protect the standard of gold-dollar from depreciating, that the Fed could not help doing it because of gold standard. ]
  • (2) Consequently gold now stands at an “artificial” value, the future course of which almost entirely depends on the policy of the Federal Reserve Board of the United States.  The value of gold is no longer the resultant of the chance gifts of Nature and the judgment of numerous authorities and individuals acting independently.  
  • (3) Even if other countries gradually return to a gold basis, the position will not be greatly changed.  The tendency to employ some variant of the gold-exchange standard and the probably permanent disappearance of gold from the pockets of the people are likely to mean that the strictly necessary gold reserves of the Central Banks of the gold-standard countries will fall considerable short of the available supplies.  The actual value of gold will depend, therefore, on the policy of three or four of the most powerful Central Banks, whether they act independently or in unison.  If, on the other hand, pre-war conventions about the use of gold in reserves and in circulation were to be restoredㅡwhich is, in my opinion, the much less probable alternativeㅡthere might be, as Professor Cassel has predicted, a serious shortage of gold leading to a progressive appreciation in its value.
  (4) Nor must we neglect the possibility of a partial demonetisation of gold by the United States through a closing of its mints to further receipts of gold.  The present policy of the United States in accepting unlimited imports of gold can be justified, perhaps, as a temporary measure, intended to preserve tradition and to strengthen confidence through a transitional period.  But, looked at as a permanent arrangement, it could hardly be judged otherwise than as a foolish expense.  If the Federal Reserve Board intends to maintain the value of the dollar at a level which is irrespective of the inflow or outflow of gold, what object is there in continuing to accept at the mints gold which is not wanted, yet costs a heavy price?  If the United States mints were to be closed to gold, everything, except the actual price of the metal, could continue precisely as before.

  Confidence in the future stability of the value of gold depends therefore on the United States being foolish enough to go on accepting gold which it does not want, and wise enough, having accept it, to maintain it at a fixed value.  This double event might be realised through the collaboration of a public understanding nothing with a Federal Reserve Board understanding everything.  But the position is precarious; and not very attractive to any country which is still in a position to choose what its future standard is to be.

  This discussion of the prospects of the stability of gold has partly answered by anticipation the second principal argument in favour of the restoration of an unqualified gold standard, namely that this is the only way of avoiding the dangers of a “manged” currency.

  It is natural, after what we have experienced, that prudent people should desiderate a standard of value which is independent of Finance Ministers and State Banks.  The present state of affairs has allowed to the ignorance and frivolity of statesmen an ample opportunity of bringing about ruinous consequences in the economic field.  It is felt that the general level of economic and financial education amongst statesmen and bankers is hardly such as to render innovations feasible or safe; that, in fact, a chief object of stabilising the exchanges is to strap down Ministers of Finance.

  These are reasonable grounds of hesitation.  But the experience on which they are based is by no means fair to the capacities of statesmen and bankers.  The non-metallic standards, of which we have experience, have been anything rather[? other] than scientific experiments coolly carried out.  They have been a last resort, involuntarily adopted, as a result of war or inflationary taxation, when the State finances were already broken or the situation out of hand.  Naturally in these circumstances such practices have been the accompaniment and the prelude of disaster.  But we cannot argue from this to what can be achieved in normal times.  I do not see that the regulation of the standard of value is essentially more difficult than many other objects of less social necessity which we attain successfully.

  If, indeed, a providence watched over gold, or if Nature had provided us with a stable standard ready-made, I would not, in an attempt after some slight improvement, hand over the management to the possible weakness or ignorance of Boards and Governments.  But this is not the situation.  We have no ready-made standard.  Experience has shown that in emergencies Ministers of Finance cannot be strapped down.  Andㅡmost important of allㅡin the modern world of paper currency and bank credit there is no escape from a “managed” currency, whether we wish it or not;ㅡconvertibility into gold will not alter the fact that the value of gold itself depends on the policy of the Central Banks.

  It is worth while to pause a moment over the last sentence.  It differs significantly from the doctrine of gold reserves which we learnt and taught before the war.  We used to assume that no Central Bank would be so extravagant as to keep more gold than it required or so imprudent as to keep less.  From time to time gold would flow out into the circulation or for export abroad; experience showed that the quantity required on these occasions bore some rough proportion to the Central Bank' liabilities; a decidedly higher proportion than this would be fixed on to provide for contingencies and to inspire confidence; and the creation of credit would be regulated largely by reference to the maintenance of this proportion.  The Bank of England, for example, would allow itself to be swayed by the tides of gold, permitting the inflowing and outflowing streams to produce their "natural" consequences unchecked by any ideas as to preventing the effect on prices.  Already before the war, the system was becoming precarious by reason of its artificiality.  The "proportion" was by the lapse of time losing its relation to the facts and had become largely conventional.  Some other figure, greater or less, would have done just as well.[1]  The War broke down the convention; for the withdrawal of gold from actual circulation destroyed one of the elements of reality lying behind the convention, and the suspension of convertibility destroyed the other.  It would have been absurd to regulate the bank rate by reference to a "proportion" which had lost all its significance; and in the course of the past ten years a new policy has been evolved.  The bank rate is now employed, however incompletely and experimentally, to regulate the expansion and deflation of credit in the interests of business stability and the steadiness of prices.  In so far as it is employed to procure stability of the dollar exchange, where this is inconsistent with stability of internal prices, we have a relic of pre-war policy and a compromise between discrepant aims.

  Those who advocate the return to a gold standard do not always appreciate along what different lines our actual practice has been drifting.  If we restore the gold standard, are we to return also to the pre-war conceptions of bank-rate, allowing the tides of gold to play what tricks they like with the internal price-level, and abandoning the attempt to moderate the disastrous influence of the credit-cycle on the stability of prices and employment? Or are we to continue and develop the experimental innovations of our present policy, ignoring the "bank ratio" and, if necessary, allowing unmoved a piling up of gold reserves far beyond our requirements or heir depletion far below them?

  In truth, the gold standard is already a barbarous relic.  All of us, from the Governor of the Bank of England downwards, are now primarily interested in preserving the stability of business, prices, and employment, and are not likely, when the choice is forced on us, deliberately to sacrifice these to the outworn dogma, which had its value once, of £3:17:10.5  per ounce.  Advocates of the ancient standard do not observe how remote it now is from the spirit and the requirements of the age.  A regulated non-metallic standard has slipped in unnoticed.  It exists.  Whilst the economists dozed, the academic dream of a hundred years, doffing its cap and gown, clad in paper rags, has crept into the real world by means of the bad fairiesㅡalways so much more potent than the goodㅡthe wicked Ministers of Finance.

  For these reasons enlightened advocates of the restoration of gold, such as Mr. Hawtrey, do not welcome it as the return of a "natural" currency, and intend, quite decidedly, that it shall be a "managed" one.  They allow gold back only as a constitutional monarch, shorn of his ancient despotic powers and compelled to accept the advice of a Parliament of Banks.  The adoption of the ideas present in the minds of those who drafted the Genoa Resolutions on Currency is an essential condition of Mr. Hawtrey's adherence to gold.  He contemplates "the practice of continuous co-operation among central banks of issue" (Res. 3), and an international convention, based on a gold exchange standard, and designed "with a view to preventing undue fluctuations in the purchasing power of gold" (Res. 11).[1] But he is ^not^ in favour of resuming the gold standard irrespective of "whether the difficulties in regard to the future purchasing power of gold have been provided against or not." "It is not easy," he admits, "to promote international action, and should it fail, the wisest course for the time being might be to concentrate on the stabilisation of sterling in terms of commodities, rather than tie the pound to a metal, the vagaries of which cannot be foreseen." [2]

  It is natural to ask, in face of advocacy of this kind, why it is necessary to drag in gold at all.  Mr. Hawtrey lays no stress on the obvious support for his compromise, namely the force of sentiment and tradition, and the preference of Englishmen for shearing a monarch of his powers rather than of his head.  But he adduces three other reasons: (1) that gold is required as a liquid reserve for the settlement of international balances of indebtedness; (2) that it enables an experiment to be made without cutting adrift from the old system; and (3) that the vested interests of gold producers must be considered.  These objects, however, are so largely attained by my own suggestions in the following chapter, that I need not dwell on them here.

  On the other hand, I see grave objections to reinstating gold in the pious hope that international co-operation will keep it in order. With the existing distribution of the world's gold, the reinstatement of the gold standard means, inevitably, that we surrender the regulation of our price level and the handling of credit cycle to the Federal Reserve Board of the United States.  Even if the most intimate and cordial co-operation is established between the Board and the Bank of England, the prepoderance of power will still belong to the former.  The Board will be in a position to disregard the Bank.  But if the Bank disregard the Board, it will render itself liable to be flooded with, or depleted of, gold, as the case may be.  Moreover, we can be confident beforehand that there will be much suspicion amongst Americans (for that is their disposition) of any supposed attempt on the part of the Bank of England to dictate their policy or to influence American discount rates in the interests of Great Britain.  We must also be prepared to incur our share of the vain expense of bottling up the world's redundant gold.

  It would be rash in present circumstances to surrender our freedom of action to the Federal Reserve Board of the United States.  We do not yet possess sufficient experience of its capacity to act in times of stress with courage and independence.  The Federal Reserve Board is striving to free itself from the pressure of sectional interests; but we are not yet certain that it will wholly succeed.  It is still liable to be overwhelmed by the impetuosity of a cheap money campaign.  A suspicion of British influence would, so far from strengthening the Board, greatly weaken its resistance to popular clamour.  Nor is it certain, quite apart from weakness or mistakes, that the simultaneous application of the same policy will always be in the interests of both countries.  The development of the credit cycle and the state of business may sometimes be widely different on the two sides of the Atlantic.

  Therefore, since I regard the stability of prices, credit, and employment as of paramount importance, and since I feel no confidence that an old-fashioned gold standard will even give us the modicum of stability that it used to give, I reject the policy of restoring the gold standard on pre-war lines.  At the same time I doubt the wisdom of attempting a "managed" gold standard jointly with the United States, on the lines recommended by Mr. Hawtrey, because it retains too many of the disadvantages, and because it would make us too dependent on the policy and on the wishes of the Federal Reserve Board.

Chapter 4 ends here on p. 176(and on p. 183 on PDF)

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