Usage: 그것, 참 고약했겠네

출처: http://www.et-house.com/pages/directory/example-view.asp?id=604471&category=000200060001&ctype=2

* * *

A: What a hassle!
(얼마나 엉망진창인지!)

A: After waiting an hour to claim my suitcase, I found it torn and all taped up.
(한 시간을 기다려서 짐을 찾았더니 짐이 찢어져서 온통 테이프로 덕지덕지 붙여놓았더라니까.)

B: That's terrible.
(그것 참 고약했겠네.)

B: Did you complain to anyone?
(항의하지 않았어?)

[발췌] 미국의 지방 자치 제도 (2009)

출처: 미상
자료: 문서 링크

※ 발췌:

(6) Special District

  ○ 특별구는 일정한 구역의 하수처리, 소방, 상수도, 공해방지 등과 같은 하나 또는 둘 이상의 특별한 서비스를 제공하기 위한 정부단위(Units of Government)로서, 특별구를 설치하는 목적은, 지방정부가 규정하고 있는 각종 세제 및 부채 한계 등을 극복하고, 아울러 세금의 부담을 직접 수혜를 받는 County, 지방정부 거주 주민들에게 확대 또는 축소하여 불만을 최소화하기 위한 것임.

  ○ 특히 도시 외곽 지역인 교외 지역에서 City Government를 새로이 설치하지 않고, 도시와 같은 행정 서비스를 받기 위하여, 특별구를 많이 설치하고 있음.
     또한 특별구는 지방정부 단위에서 비교적 적은 인구에 제한된 지역을 조건으로 하고 있으나, 주정부 단위 또는 몇 개의 주정부가 협의하여 설치하는 지역구(Regional District)가 있으며, 이는 보통 법으로 설치하고 있음. 현재 이와 같이 지역구로 운영되고 있는 것은 Chicago주의 「Metropolitan Sanitary District」, San Francisco시의 「Bay Area Rapid Transit District」등이 있고, 또한 New York 및 New Jersey 주가 공동으로 운영하는 「Port Authority」등이 있음.

 ○이와 같은 특별구 및 지역구의 운영은 집행위원회를 구성하고, 위원은 타 정부기관에 의하여 임명되거나 또는 주민이 선거로 선출하며, 주민들의 필요에 의하여 설립되고 있는 특별구는, 과거 30년 동안 2배로 확대되어, 92년 현재 31,555개가 존재, 지방정부별로 평균 1개가 있을 정도로 증가함으로써, 많은 주민들의 행정서비스에 기여․ California주에는 약 5천개의 Special Districts가 존재, 하나 또는 그이상의 목적을 수행하고 있으며, 주로 화재예방, 수질관리, 오락, 위생시설, 홍수통제등의 기능을 수행

(7) School District

  ○ 특별구의 하나인 학교구는 가장 보편화되어있는 지방정부로서, 30년 전에는 대부분 지방정부별로 설치하여 5만 여개가 넘었으나, 지방재정의 한계로 지금은 1/3 수준인 14,422개가 설치되어 있으며, 다른 특별구와는 달리 학교구는 불필요한 재정지출을 줄이기 위하여 인근 지역과 통합, 대단위화 하여 점차 학교구의 숫자는 줄어들고 있음

  ○미국 지방정부의 학교구는 지방정부별로 설치되는 것이 원칙이나, 인구가 5～6천명 이하인 Borough, Town, Village, Township등에서는, 인근 지역과 협의하여 2～5개의 지방정부별로 하나의 학교구를 설치운영하고, 재정부담은 유치원에서 고등학교까지의 운영에 필요한 예산을 각 지방정부의 부동산 평가금액을 기준으로 부담시키고 있으며, 보통 지방정부 재정의 40～50% 정도가 교육비로 지출되고 있음.

  ○참고로, California주에는 1,069개의 School Districts가 존재하며, 약
700만명의 학생들이 등록하고 있고, 통상 5명으로 구성된 주민직선의 「Board of Education」에 의해 관리 및 통제되고 있음.
      - 586개의 Elementary Districts
      - 104개의 High School Districts
      - 308개의 Unified (elementary and High School) Districts
      - 71개의 Community College Districts

[발췌] Sanitary Improvement in New York during the last quarter of a century

출처: Popular Science Monthly, Vol. 39, No. 21 (1891년 7월)
자료: 구글도서


※ 발췌 (excerpt): pp. 319~

SANITARY IMPROVEMENT IN NEW YORK DURING THE LAST QUARTER OF A CENTURY

BY GENERAL EMMONS CLARK

During the quarter of a century (1836-1860) preceding the war for the Union, a great change occurred in the character and social condition of the population of the large cities upon the Atlantic seaboard, and especially in the city of New York. The famine in Ireland, and the extreme poverty of the people of that unfortunate country; the unsuccessful revolutions in various parts of the Continent; and the popular belief that Fortune beckoned the poor and oppressed of foreign lands to comfortable homes and to personal, political, and religious freedom beyond the Atlantic were chief among the causes of the immense emigration at that period to the US. ( ... ... )

Native-born citizens viewed with considerable apprehension and dissatisfaction this great influx of foreigners, with their diverse languages, customs, and religions; to avoid unpleasant associations they reluctantly surrendered their dwellings and found new homes in the more northerly part of the island, or beyond the East River, in Brooklyn; and this migration continued until large sections of the city were almost entirely occupied by tenement-houses. In all such districts the sanitary condition, which had been fairly good, rapidly deteriorated; the municipal government made no effort to enforce regulations necessary to insure cleanliness and to promote the health and comfort of the poor and helpless; and thus between the years 1830 and 1860 a considerable part of the city year by year drifted into a condition deplorable to the philanthropist and disgraceful to the corporation. ( ... ... ) Although the necessity of sanitary reform and improvement was evident, it was not until 1864 that an organized and intelligent movement was made to remove the evils which had gradually accumulated and which seriously threatened the health and permanent prosperity of the metropolis. The great draft riot of 1863, when the city was for several days controlled by the ignorant and dangerous classes, a large amount of property destroyed, many lives lost, business suspended, and the streets unsafe for traffic or passage, was largely instrumental in awakening the New York public to the absolute necessity of reform and improvement in the social condition of a considerable portion of its population.

On the 29th day of February, 1864, at a meeting of the Citizens' Association, at that time an organization of great activity and influence, and composed of the most prominent intelligent and public-spirited citizens of New York, a committee of inquiry was appointed to obtain full and reliable information relative to the sanitary condition of all parts of the city. Upon the report of this committee a Council of Hygiene and Public Health was organized, and under its direction a thorough sanitary survey of the city was made during the year. The city was divided into 29 sanitary districts, and to each district was assigned a competent physician as sanitary inspector, to make a house-to-house visitation, and to report upon every possible source of preventable disease and every nuisance dangerous to life or detrimental to health. ( ... ... ) The work was faithfully and intelligently accomplished, and in 1865 the reports of the Council of Hygiene and Public Health and of the sanitary inspectors of districts were published in a large volume. These reports were so startling in their disclosures, and the advent of Asiatic cholera was at that time so imminent, that public attention was directed to the subject, and it was not difficult to secure the enactment by the New York Legislature of 1866 of "an act to create a Metropolitan Sanitary District and Board of Health therein, for the preservation of health and life, and to prevent the spread of disease."

• This act clearly defined the duties of the Board of Health, 
• and conferred upon it discretionary powers, judicial and legislative, never before intrusted to any executive body in this country. 
• Under this law the Board of Health was organized in New York March 5, 1866, and on the 20th day of April it enacted the necessary sanitary rules and regulations for the government of the city, since known as the Sanitary Code.

To demonstrate this sanitary improvement in New York during the quarter of a century that has elapsed since the organization of the Board of Health in 1866, it is necessary to briefly describe the sanitary condition of the city as it appeared to the Council of Hygiene and its sanitary inspectors in 1864. ( ... 당시 위생 상태에 대한 생생한 언급 ... )

Sanitary reform is of slow growth; for every improvement is an attack more or less important upon the prejudices or the property of a considerable number of citizens and tax-payers, and is, therefore, vigorously resisted. ( ... ... )

[발췌: J.A. Goldman's] Building New York's Sewers

출처: Joanne Abel Goldman (1997). ^Building New York's Sewers: Developing Mechanisms of Urban Manangement^. Purdue University Press.
자료: 구글도서


※ 발췌 (excerpts): pp. 1~

Prologue to Policy

We have all been frustrated when potholes in roads are not repaired. We expect "the city" to fix them. We are intolerant when clear water does not come out of the tap. We expect "the city" to provide clean and safe water. The list continues. We expect "the city" to build sewers to receive our wastewater and carry it away. Similarly, we assume that "the city" should maintain professional police, fire, and health departments to keep our neighborhoods safe. Why do we have these expectations? These services were neither intrinsic to municipal charters nor implicit in their charge. Rather, at some point the city was given, and accepted, the responsibility for providing smooth roads, an ample and healthful supply of water, effective means of disposing of wastewater, and police and fire protection.

City services came to be assumed as perceptions and expectations of municipal institutions changed. Colonial cities did not generally provided water, sewerage facilities, or the utilities that come under rubric of public works. Collecting water and disposing of wasters as well as heating and lighting the home were responsibilities left to citizens themselves. Rather, the efforts of colonial governments were largely directed toward the regulation of commerce and business. City councils controlled wages and prices and monitored craft trades and manufacturing enterprises.[n.1]  During the first half of the 19th century, the scope of city services broadened.[n.2]  Many of the larger cities introduced new water supplies, facilitated the construction of comprehensive sewage systems, and increased the effort to monitor the public's health.

The 19th century was a particularly dynamic period for American cities, as demographic shifts and population growth transformed the comparatively sedate walking towns of the 18th century into the bustling urban centers of the 20th century. As the populations of cities swelled, burdening the built environment, it strained limited water supplies and taxed conventional patterns of waste disposal. Contemporaries complained that cities were degenerating into unhealthy and unsafe places, and increasingly throughout the 19th century, municipal institutions were called upon to respond to the perceived deterioration. Albeit at times reluctantly, city administrators responded and assumed a more active role in providing public services. To administer them, new mechanisms of city management were created. The 19th century marks a critical period in the evolution of the modern American city. By studying how municipalities incorporated public works into their agenda, we can identify the factors that shaped our current expectations for city services and the forces that determined how the city chose to accommodate expectations.

The book explores the process by which New York City came to construct a sewer system to discharge wastewater during the 19th century. The complexity inherent in the construction, maintenance, and management of New York City's system arose as a consequence of the decision to integrate the functions of water supply and wastewater disposal. Wastes flowed in a medium of water through a series of conduits to be discharged into nearby rivers. An effective water carriage system required a copious supply of water and a rational system of sewer pipes laid at a carefully calculated grade of declination to the point of outfall.

During the first half of the 19th century, New York's political institutions and traditional patterns of policy making precluded the constructin of the infrastructure necessary to accomplish adequate sewerage. The mechanisms of infrasturcture management themselves had to be transformed before a comprehensive sewer system could be build. ( ... ... )

The issue of waste disposal is as old as human civilization, but until the middle of the 19th century, it remained largely a private matter. In a fashion that was common for most American cities through the beginning of the 19th century, residents of Manhattan discharged their wastes into privies, which were subsequently removed or buried. The ^Minutes of the Common Council^ testify that there was always some fraction of the population that neglected the proper maintenance of these waste facilities, allowing underground sinks to fill and flood, contaminating groundwater, cellars, and streets. In contrast to the situation at midcentury, however, these complaints numbered comparatively few. While the putrefying wastes of this relatively small population was an occasional nuisance, the volume of waste generated as the population swelled during the 19th century created an alarming situation. The perceived deterioration of the environment, exacerbated by periodic epidemics and provocative theories of health that linked disease with unsanitary conditions, advanced the call for reform. Quite simply, urbanization presented the city with more waste than traditional methods of disposal seemed able to manage effectively.

The term "effectively" is a subjective one that warrants explanation. Certainly, 18th-century streets would have appeared dirty by 20th-century standards, so one could argue that sanitation was never "effectively" dealt with. Notwithstanding our present-day assessment, the issue here is how contemporaries viewed their environment. It seems clear that the intensity with which mid-19th-century New Yorkers called for sanitary improvement indicates either that conditions had deteriorated to unacceptable levels by contemporary standards or that those standards themselves became more rigorous. In either case, the widely perceived insalubrity of the city prompted the demands of reformers, who called for aggressive municipal action to improve the sanitary condition of the city.

This demand for improved sanitation was not unique to New Yorkers. During the 1850s and 1860s, many city leaders across the United States and Europe responded to similar concerns, claiming that unsanitary conditions jeopardized the health of their citizens, and they supported the constructin of capital-intensive, technologically sophisticated city-wide sewer systems. Chicago and Brooklyn were at the vanguard of such reforms in the US, modeling systems for comprehensive sewerage on the British experience. New York City, on the other hand, remained reluctant to build such integrated facilities. This is particularly curious in light of the fact that New York was the largest and richest city in the US at mid-century. ( ... ... )

The growth and diversity that characterized New York City during the first third of the 19th century strained the institutions that managed the city. The mercantile ideology that formed the basis of the colonial city eroded at this time, and a decentralized ward orientation replaced it. The changing character of the city is the subject of chapter 1. The perceived coherence of New York City in 1800 fell into chaos by the second third of the century, which led to a demand for new public works, the subject of chapter 2 and 3. The demand for sanitary reform in the mid-19th century should be understood as a consequence of changing expectations of the quality of urban life. Rising standards for public health and new expectations of services prompted the construction of a complex sanitary infrastructure in New York. A necessary prerequisite to sanitary reform was the perception that improvement was warranted; existing practices were deemed inadequate for the protection of public health. ( ... ... ) The manner in which these questions were answered determined the nature of the facilities that were constructed.

In chapter 2 and 3, the haphazard fashion in which the city built individual sewer lines, adhering to local interests, is contrasted with manner in which the state water commissioners built, and the Croton Aqueduct Department managed, the Croton Aqueduct. The construction of this integrated and technically sophisticated aqueduct is the subject of chapter 2. Unexpectedly, the water that the aqueduct introduced into the city strained existing storm sewers, and the volume of standing water on the city streets increased. Furthermore, as the Croton Aqueduct could abundantly supply a medium through which sewage could flow, the water-carriage system became a viable alternative to prevailing methods of waste disposal. Together, the increased nuisance of flooding and the appeal of the water-carriage system of sewage disposal intensified the demand for sewage construction. The efforts of the Common Council to accommodate this new charge is the subject of chapter 3.

The introduction of public works into the city landscape pitted engineers against politicians, the city against the state, and the private interests against the public good. These issues are considered in chapters 4 and 5. In chapter 4 physicians and public-works engineers, the key lobbyists for comprehensive sanitary reform, joined ranks and waged a relentless campaign for the adoption of a new paradigm to provide city services. In the middle of the 19th century, they assumed a professional posture and demanded influence over the shaping of a reform agenda.

The state responded to this lobby as it took more active role in managing New York City. This is the subject of chapter 5. Through a series of charter revisions, between 1849 and 1857, the state tried to remove much of from the province of city politics and local politicians. This spirit of reform presented a window of opportunity for the physicians and engineers to place their priorities on the state docket. In the 1860s, the state confirmed their professional status and incorporated these experts into the mechanisms of city management.

( ... ... )

Chapter 3

Building the Sewers

While the Croton Aqueduct effectively provided a fresh, clean, and copious supply of water to New York City, the city's sewers never shared the same success. The contrast between building and managing a water supply system and constructing and direct sewerage begun in the last chapter continues in this one, but now the focus is on sewers. The systemic process of aqueduct construction is contrasted with the piecemeal mode of building the sewers. The most significant distinction between water supply and sewerage was the very conception of the services. While the Croton Aqueduct was conceived of as a system from its inception, sewers continued to be viewed as individual conduits. Consequently, the mechanism that managed sewer construction, the sources that funded them, and the nature of their construction all confirmed the piecemeal character of the service. As the demand for sewers mounted after midcentury, new conduits were constucted and old ones were extended. Yet the concept of a system was still not embraced. Lacking any rational mode of integration, the effectiveness of these public works deteriorated.

The water that the Croton Aqueduct supplied provided a medium through which wastes could be conveyed to the nearby rivers for disposal. This raised the real possibility of introducing a comprehensive sewer system in New York. Indeed, sewers became the city's wastewater disposal of choice in 1845. Consequently, the demand for sewers increased. However, the inability of the Common Council to effectively manage the construction of a comprehensive, integrated sewer system lessened the anticipated benefits of this improvement. Although the sewer contract itself defined rules for construction, imposed standards for materials, and detailed a protocol for inspection and supervision of work, problems with sewers continued to surface. These exacerbated tensions between the Croton Aqueuct Department and the Common Council as they vied for control over infrastructure development.

In 1849, with the Croton Aqueduct project essentially complete up to the distribution network itself, the Water Commission was dissolved. In its place, mindful of the calls for coordinated water supply and sewage disposal, the state legislature combined these functions under a new Croton Aqueduct Department and charged it with the responsibility for maintaining, constructing, and managing water supply and sewage facilities in New York City. While the charge of the Croton Aqueduct Department now included the management of sewer construction, the Common Council retained its authority to determine where and when these facilities would be laid. It setting up overlapping authority for these two bodies, the state erred, for the priorities of the Common Council could not be reconciled with those of the Croton Aqueduct Department.

( ... ... )

[발췌: M.V. Melosi's] The Sanitary City

출처: Martin V. Melosi (2008). The Sanitary City: Environmental Services in Urban America from Colonial Times to the Present. University of Pittsburgh
자료: 구글도서


※ 발췌 (excerpt): pp. 61~

Chapter 5

Subterranean Networks: Wastewater Systems as Works in Progress, 1830-1880

In contrast with strides made in waterworks, the development of underground wastewater systems was meager between 1830 and 1880. Noted sanitary engineer William Paul Gerhaud observed that progress in sewerage had been much slower than water supply. "This can be, in a measure, explained by the fact that taxpayers are nearly always willing to pay a small annual tax for water," he argued, "and hence the financial success of such a scheme is rarely in doubt, whereas a sewerage system does not yield an annual revenue, but, on the contrary causes sometimes large operating expenses." "It is," he concluded, "... a much more difficult matter to induce communities to introduce a sewer system."

Gerhard recognized what historian Sam Bass Warner Jr. has called a "first things first" philosophy, in which basic improvements in sewage disposal were being forced to wait "until the water supply problems were solved."[n.2] Few cities were in a position to finance two major technologies of sanitation simultaneously. Private companies had footed the bill for the early development of water-supply systems, sometimes with governmental support, but a similar path for sewerage systems was unlikely because its revenue-generating potential was limited.

Eventually, underground sewers came to be recognized as valuable in starving off epidemics, preventing flooding, and making available connections to water closets. But the initial public support for them was sluggish. Privy vaults and cesspools had been relatively effective and inexpensive disposal options until piped-in water was available. Open ditches sufficed as storm drains in communities not yet experiencing rapid expansion. In New York City, many property holders in the 1850s resisted connecting to sewers where they were available, since the law did not compel them to do so. Landlords of the poor were unwilling to make connections on their property, ready to let their tenants endure the stench of the privies and cesspools.[n.3]

In essence, many people failed to see the advantage of a system that evacuated something as unwanted as sewage when other methods of disposal were available. The Chadwickian notion of bringing the serpent's tail into the serpent's mouth had no more advocates in the US than in England. With such inertia to overcome, the "pre-sewer" era carried on into the late 19th century. Even in places where some underground conduits and extensive surface-drainage systems existed, ordinances often prohibited the disposal of fecal matter into sewers.[n.4]

Expanding urban populations and piped-in water began to challenge the old methods of sewage disposal as early as the 1830s. As in England, water closets appeared in some middle-class homes soon after running water became available. Since the early market was small, the initial impact on sewage-disposal habits was minimal. For example, New York City had only about 10,000 water closets for a population of 630,000 in 1856. In 1864, Boston(180,000) had only 14,000, and in 1874 Buffalo(125,000) had only 3,000.

As running water became more common, the cesspool-privy vault systems began to fail. In 1880, approximately one-third of all urban households had water closets, and water-consumption rates were rapidly increasing. The greater volume of water used in homes, businesses, and industrial plants flooded cesspools and privy vaults, inundated yards and lots, and posed a major health hazard.[n.5]

Breakdown of the old methods came as a result of a clash between incompatible technical systems. Privy vaults and cesspools could not contend with a water-delivery system that increased volume so dramatically. It was the environmental implications of this clash of technologies that provided momentum for change Flooding problems, and especially threats to health, were directly traceable to the breakdown of the pre-sewer systems. Yards inundated with wastes became new battlegrounds for programs of environmental sanitation.

Because of high costs and planning necessary to construct and maintain citywide sewerage systems immediate change did not occur. ( ... ... )

[발췌] Short History of New York City Board of Health

출처: http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/about/boh.shtml

※ 발췌 (excerpt):

Yellow fever was plaguing New York City when the Board of Health held its first meeting in 1805. Led by Mayor De Witt Clinton, the board evacuated stricken neighborhoods and started collecting mortality statistics,  to "furnish data for reflection and calculation." Yellow Jack swept the city for last time in 1822, but cholera, typhus and tuberculosis persisted, fueled by crowding and a lack of sanitation.

Everything changed in 1866, when the New York State Legislature expanded the Board and insulated it from political influence by setting aside seats for physicians and scientists. Newly empowered, the Board decreed that "neither hogs nor goats [could] run at large in our city" and pressured landlords to maintain their buildings. Cholera death promptly fell by 90%.

The 11-member Board of Health remains a vital force today. Most members─appointed by the Mayor withe the consent of the City Council─serve 6 years terms. Each Board member is a recognized expert, and the group represents a broad range of health and medical disciplines. They serve without pay and like judges, cannot be dismissed without cause. As the overseers of New York City's Health Code, the Board has enacted countless measures to improve the wellbeing of New Yorkers over the years ....

2015년 중반 코스피 지수의 기술적 양상: 하방 변동성 분출의 징후

일단 간단한 메모 형태로 초안을 적어 봄.


Ⅰ. 지난 25년 간 지수 추이, 두 번 나타난 4~5년짜리 대형 쐐기꼴

     [그림 1] 지난 25 간의 코스피 월봉

1. 2000~2005년 사이, 코스피는 위아래로 출렁이는 변동성이 축소되면서 쐐기꼴을 형성한다. 그리고 쐐기 폭이 좁아지는 마지막 국면에서 쐐기 상단의 하락 추세선 위아래로 넘나드는 불안정한 움직임을 보인다. 그 양상은 하락 추세선의 돌파→붕괴→재돌파→지지를 거쳐 위쪽 방향으로 변동성이 분출하는 식이다. 
2. 한편, 2011~2015년 사이에도 코스피는 위아래로 출렁이는 변동성이 축소되면서 다시 한 번 쐐기꼴을 형성한다. 그리고 2015년 4월 들어, 쐐기 상단의 하락 추세선 위아래로 넘나드는 불안정한 움직임을 보인다. 그 양상은 6월 19일 현재 하락 추세선의  돌파→붕괴를 연출했고, 이제 재돌파(혹은 재돌파 실패)의 갈림길을 코앞에 두고 있다.

  [그림1-1] 2000~2005년 코스피 월봉

2004년 초부터 3분기까지 하락 추세선의 돌파→붕괴→재돌파→지지의 흐름을 거쳐 4분기부터 변동성이 폭발한다.

   [그림 1-2] 2011~2015년 코스피 월봉

2015년 4월 쐐기 상단의 하락 추세선을 돌파→붕괴 후 갈림길을 앞두고 있다.

Ⅱ. 최근의 지수 추이 (주봉과 일봉)

  [그림 2-1] 2011~2015년 주봉

일봉을 보면, 쐐기꼴 상단의 하락 추세선을 돌파→지지→시험→붕괴를 거쳐, 재돌파 혹은 재붕괴의 갈림길에 와 있다.

   [그림 2-2] 2015년 상반기 일봉

Ⅲ. 2011~2015년 출현한 대형 쐐기의 기술적 진행 양상


1. 2011년 하반기~2013년 상반기에 걸친 쐐기의 형성 및 정점 돌파의 양상

쐐기 상단의 하락 추세선을 돌파→붕괴→재돌파하는 흐름이 이어지다 쐐기의 정점을 하향 돌파하면서 변동성이 분출한다.

    [그림 3-1] 2011년 하반기~2013년 상반기의 쐐기 형성(주봉)

같은 시기의 지수 흐름을 일봉으로 보면 다음과 같다. 쐐기꼴의 정점(약 1890)을 돌파하면서, 직전 하락폭의 100% 추가 하락이 뒤따른다(즉 약 2015→1890으로 약 120p 하락 한 뒤, 곧바로 1890→1770으로 약 120p 추가 하락).

    [그림 3-2] 2011년 하반기~2013년 상반기 쐐기 형성 (일봉)

2. 2013년 하반기~2014년 중순에 걸친 쐐기의 형성 및 정점 돌파의 양상

그 후 새로운 쐐기가 형성되고 정점이 돌파되는 양상을 한 번 더 볼 수 있다. 2013년 하반기부터 2014년 4분기 사이에 나타난다. 이때는 쐐기 상단 하락 추세선의 돌파와 붕괴를 반복하지 않고, 한 번에 돌파하고 곧바로 정점을 하향 돌파하면서 변동성이 분출한다.

    [그림 3-3] 2013년 하반기~ 2014년 중순의 쐐기 형성(주봉)

같은 시기의 지수 흐름을 일봉으로 보면 이렇다. 이때도 정점 돌파 전 하락폭의 약 100%만큼 지수 하락이 뒤따른다.

   [그림 3-4] 2013년 하반기~ 2014년 중순의 쐐기 형성 (일봉)

3. 2015년 상반기 말에 다시 나타난 쐐기 상단의 하락 추세선 돌파와 붕괴

[그림 3-3]을 조금 확대해서 쐐기꼴의 상하단 추세선과 쐐기 정점을 표시해 보면 대략 이렇다.정점의 위치는 대충 어림한 것인데 1980~1985쯤에 위치하는 것으로 보인다. 6월 19일(금) 종가가 2046 정도이니 정점까지 약 60~70 포인트의 거리에 불과하다.

  [그림 3-5]  2015년 상반기 주봉

쐐기 정점을 위 [그림 2-2]의 일봉에 표시해 보면 이렇다.

4. 잠정적 결론

시장 상황에 따라서는 2~3 거래일 만에 정점을 건드릴 수 있어 보인다. 아니면 오르락내리락하면서 2~4주 정도가 걸릴 수도 있을 것이다.

1. 단순하게 자유 낙하로 단번에 정점을 하향 돌파한다고 가정하고 앞에서 언급한 쐐기 정점을 돌파하는 패턴을 적용하면, 계산은 이렇다. 2189－1980＝209이니 간단히 200으로 잡고, 이 하락폭을 쐐기 정점(1980)에서 빼면 1780이다. 쐐기 정점을 심리적으로 중요한 지수인 2000으로 어림한다고 치면, 2000－200＝1800이다. 
2. 그러나 정점 부근(1980~2000)에서 지수가 지지를 받고 한 번 더 상승 파동을 연출할 공산도 크다. 추이를 지켜보면서 지수 흐름의 예상을 바꿔갈 필요가 있다.

종종 코스피 지수의 주요 흐름에 대한 예상을 트위터에 계정 @hs_r에 올린다. 관심 있는 분들에게 참고가 되길 바란다.

[발췌] A History of Negro Slavery in New York

출처: Edgar J. McManus (2001). A History of Negro Slavery in New York. Syracuse University Press.
자료: 구글도서


※ 발췌 (excerpt):


For many years there were virtually no restrictions on the master's right to free his slaves. Since the slaves were legally chattels, the slaveowner had the power to dispose of them in any way he saw fit, and this included the power to renounce his rights of ownership completely. Ordinarily the courts interfered only if the owner manumitted a slave in order to avoid the claims of creditors. Until the 18th century the legal regulation of manumission varied considerably from town to town. But the crux of all the regulations was that masters might not abandon aged or infirm slaves under the pretext of freeing them. Since the local overseers of the poor were responsible for indigent freedmen, in most places the masters were required to obtain their approval before freeing a slave. Some towns insisted upon a manumission bond to guarantee that the freedman would not become a public charge.[n.3]

  Emancipation came under provincial control for the first time in 1712 as a result of uprising at New York City. The Assembly passed a law requiring slaveowners to post a bond of 200 pounds to guarantee that their freedmen were capable of self-support. Slaves manumitted by will were to be bonded in the same amount by the executor of the estate or the manumission would be void.[n.4] The real purpose of the law was not to keep freedmen off the public dole but to discourage manumission by making it financially prohibitive. The uprising convinced the lawmakers that free Negroes exert a bad influence on the slave force and that the safest course was to make slavery prescriptive.[n.5] Since few masters were willing to post a bond of 200 pounds, the law virtually ended private emancipation.

  This restriction of manumission was soon recognized for what it was: a misconceived policy which stirred up rather than prevented slave discontent. The ( ... ... )

Further evidence of the growing strength of antislavery can be found in a sweeping revision of the slave controls, enacted by the legislature in 1788. The revised code permitted owners to manumit slaves without posting a bond if the slave was under 50 years of age and not likely to become a public charge. It was left up to the local overseers of the poor to determine whether a slave being proposed for manumission qualified under the new regulations. The manumission bond was also waived for testamentary emancipations if the overseers were satisfied that the slave was in good health and capable of self-support. Negores who subsequently became a public charge were to remain free and any expense incurred by the country for their support was to be charged against testator's estate.[n.20]  ( ... ... )