큰 바다 건너 머나먼 나라 원주민들의 목소리

그들이 남긴 어록에는 삶·자아·환경이 일체를 이루는 독특한 자연관과 생명관이 있다. 그들은 이미 태곳적부터─강제로 제거되기 전까지─심층 생태주의를 포괄하는 삶과 사회와 철학을 실천했던 것 같다. 더구나 군데군데 유·불·선의 미묘한 교집합과 유비를 이루는 영적 체험 같은 것도 발견할 수 있다.

* * *

출처: https://twitter.com/bot_Indian

인디언들은 마음을 영적인 마음과 육체적인 마음 두부분으로 나누었다. 영적인 마음은 사물의 본질과 관련된 순수한 정신이다. 우리가 영적인 기도를 통해 키우고자 하는 마음이 그것이다. 그런 형태의 기도는 간절히 도움을 청하는 것과는 다른 것이었다. ... 두번째의 육체적인 마음은 더 낮은 차원의 일이었다. 사냥이나 전투에서 성공하고 병을 치료하고 소중한 목숨을 보호하는 것과 같은 개인적이고 이기적인 것들과 관계가 있었다. 위험을 피하고 행복을 지키느 행동 모두 이 육체적 자아에서 나온다.

바위는 스스로 여기 온 것이 아니라네.
나무는 스스로 여기 서 있는 것이 아니라네.
그것을 만드신 분이 계시니
우리에게 모든 것을 보여주시는 분이라네.
<유키 족 '노래'>

흔해 빠진 막대기와 돌덩이에도
영적 본질이 담겨 있으므로
우주 전체를 가득 채우고 있는
신비로운 힘의 형상으로써 존중해야 한다.
<오세이지 족 선지자의 '가르침'>

어떤 식으로든 서로 연결되지 않은 것이란 존재하지 않는다. 우리가 하는 모든 행동은 우주 전체에 영향을 미친다. 따라서 우리는 아침에 무릎 꿇고 만물 지으신 이에게 '저를 용서하소서' 하고 기도한다. 풀줄기 하나 구부러뜨리기 전에. <위네바고 족>

너 자신을 알고, 너 자신이 되는 법을 배워라. 너는 너 자신과 가장 가까운 친구가 되는 법을 배워야 한다. <인디언들이 아이들에게 주는 가르침 /체로키 족>

자연을 아끼는 위대한 방법은
자연에게 말을 거는 것이다.
그대와 나의 일부인 강과 호수와 바람에게
말을 거는 것이다. <미니콘주 수 족 '절름발이 사슴 존'의 이야기>

인디언의 세계는 원 안에서 이루어진다.
우주의 힘은 매번 원의 형태로 작용하며
모든 것은 둥글게 되려고 애쓴다.
먼 옛날 우리가 강하고 행복했을때
힘은 신성한 원형 고리로부터 나왔다.
고리가 끊어지지 않는 한 우리는 번창했다. 

인간은 아무것도 만들지 못한다.
인간은 많은 것을 안다고 생각한다.
만물은 말한다. 창조주가 자신들을 만들었다고.
만물은 말한다. 스스로를 만들 수 없다고.
인간은 나무 한 그루도 만들 수 없다. <모히칸 족, 어느 청년의 일기> 

인간으로 태어난 것은 성스러운 신임이다. 이 특별한 은혜에는 신성한 책임이 있으며 나무, 물고기, 숲, 새, 지구상의 모든 살아있는 존재가 받은 은혜를 뛰어넘는다. 그래서 인간에게는 그들을 돌볼 의무가 있다. <오논다가 족, '책임'>

모든 큰 영혼들과 마찬가지로, 나무의 영혼 역시 모든 삶에게 똑같이 자신의 앎을 나눠준다. 위대한 정령이 하나의 싸앗 속에 그토록 많은 힘을 심어 놓았다면, 인간에게는 얼마나 더 많은 능력을 심어 놓았겠는가. <영원한 천둥, 모호크 족>

나는 또한 우리가 크든 작든 위대한 힘을 부여받았다는 것을 이해했다. 편안한 나무 그늘 아래 서서 나는 겸허함을 이해했다. 내 전 생애에 걸쳐 언제나 나를 보호하고 지켜줄 더 큰 영혼이 존재한다는 것도 이해했다.

우리는 불이면서 동시에 꿈이다. 우리는 이 어머니 대지 위에 나타난 완벽한 우주의 육체적 표현이다. 우리는 이곳에 경험하기 위해 왔다. 우리는 수백만 번의 계절 속의 손짓 하나, 수백만 번의 태양 속의 눈짓 하나다. <불개의 말, 샤이엔 족>

대지의 얼굴을 엉망으로 [만들면] 결국 우리의 눈을 멀게 해 아름다움마저 볼 수 없게 [된다]는 것을. 무분별하게 대지의 향기를 더럽히는 것은 집안에 독한 냄새를 들여오는 것과 같다는 것을. 우리가 대지를 보살필 때 대지가 우리를 보살핀다는 것을.

삶의 어떤 폭풍우 속에서도 나무 잎사귀 하나 떨리지 않고 물결 하나 일지 않[는 모양으로] 그 영혼이 흔들리지 않고 변함없이 평화로움을 유지하는 것, 그 본성 속에 변함없이 삶의 이상적인 자세와 행동을 간직하는 것을 인디언은 생의 최고 목표로 삼았다.

[발췌: J. Shelton's] Money Meltdown: Restoring Order to Global Currency System (2009)

출처: Judy Shelton (2009). Money Meltdown: Restoring Order to Global Currency System. Simon & Schuster.
자료: 구글도서



※ 발췌 (excerpts): Legacy of Bretton Woods

p. 27.

( ... ... ) came to telling members how they were to conduct their monetary and financial affairs. The International Clearing Union would even reserve the right to change the value of the bancor relative to gold if its governing board deemed it useful; the very definition of the value of the international monetary unit would not be beyond the reach of the authorities empowered to managed the union. Member countries, too, would be able to make adjustments in their exchange rates as long as the governing board granted them permission to do so. Decisions could be changed on the basis of new information; rules would be tempered by collective wisdom and discretionary judgment. Indeed, Keynes suggested that during the five years after the inception of the system, the governing board should "give special consideration to appeals for adjustments in the exchange-value of a national currency on the ground of unforeseen circumstances." [n.20]

In short, Keynes wanted it both ways. The need to preserve international monetary stability should not get in the way of expansionist domestic policies. "There should be the least possible interference with internal national policies," he wrote in the preface to his April 1943 draft proposal, "and the plan should not wander from the international terrain."[n.21] Still, it was clear that some degree of national monetary sovereignty would have to be sacrificed if the plan were to work. The basic objective in setting up an International Clearing Union, after all, was to avoid the chaos of exchange rate manipulations that had characterized the interwar period.

Keynes was keenly aware of the need to establish an orderly system for handling balance of payments adjustments among trading nations, and he was eager to start the global rebuilding process. While Keynes knew that achieving international monetary stability demanded that member nations surrender the right to define their currency's rate of exchange to a supernational organization, he also understood it was a sensitive issue and sought to reassure governments they would still retain some control over their monetary fate. In any case, he was thoroughly convinced that global economic cooperation was vital for the preservation of peace. "A greater readiness to accept supernational arrangements must be required in the post-war world than hitherto," Keynes asserted. In his view, the proposal for an International Clearing Union was nothing less than a call for global "financial disarmament."[n.22]


p. 28.

WHITE'S BLUEPRINT

Compared to Keynes, who had a tendency to wax poetic in his proposals for international cooperation, Harry Dexter While was all business. When White's boss, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, asked him to prepare a paper outlining the possibilities for coordinated monetary arrangements among the United States and its allies, White responded quickly with a crisp, comprehensive proposal.

Morgenthau made the request to his subordinate on December 14, 1941, one week after the attack on Pearl Harbor. What Morgenthau had in mind, according to J. Keith Horsefield, who wrote the history of the International Monetary Fund, was the establishment of a stabilization fund to help provide monetary assistance to the Allies during the war and to hamper the enemy. Ideally, the fund would serve as the basis for setting up a postwar international monetary system and might evolve into some kind of "international currency."[n.23]

Just over two weeks later, White submitted a report entitled "Suggested Program for Inter-Allied Monetary and Bank Action." The objectives of the program, as laid out by White, were:

(1) To provide the means, the instrument, and the procedure to stabilize foreign exchange rates and strengthen the monetary systems of the Allied countries.

(2) To establish an agency with means and powers adequate to provide the capital necessary:

  (a) to aid in the economic reconstruction of the Allied countries;
  (b) to facilitate a rapid and smooth transition from a war-time economy to a peace-time economy in the Allied countries;
  (c) to supply short-term capital necessary to increase the volume of foreign trade─where such capital is not available at reasonable rates from private sources. [n.24]

A study in efficiency, the analysis was detailed and to the point. White felt, however, that stabilizing the international monetary system and supplying cheap loans to Allied countries were two different tasks. While a special multilateral bank could be set up to take care of the latter, White noted, "monetary stabilization is a highly specialized function calling for a special structure, special personnel, and special organization," [n.25] White suggested that two separate institutions would therefore be required: (1) an Inter-Allied Bank and (2) Inter-Allied Stabilization Fund.

The reaction to White's proposal was positive. Morgenthau was impressed and began laying the political groundwork for introducing what he sensed might well become a monumental international project. In April 1942, after some revisions and refinements, White's paper was circulated under the title "Preliminary Draft Proposal for a United Nations Stabilization Fund and a Bank for Reconstruction and Development of the United and Associated Nations." Among the primary purposes of the stabilization fund, White emphasized, was the need to stabilize foreign exchange rates among the United Nations countries and to encourage the flow of productive capital. He also wanted to promote sound note issuing and credit practices among the United Nations countries and to reduce barriers to foreign trade. [n.26]

( ... )

[발췌: IMF's] The White Plan (1942)

출처: IMF. IMF History Volume 3 (1945-1965). 1996(개정판).
자료: 구글도서


※ 발췌 (excerpts):

The White Plan

The first definitive version of Mr. White's plan for Stabilization Fund was a mimeographed draft dated April 1942. This covered both the Fund and the Bank. It comprised an Introduction, an Outline of the Articles proposed for the Fund and for the Bank, and extensive commentaries on these Articles. That extract (A) below omits the Articles for the Bank and also the commentary on them except for a section which dealt with "A New international currency."

The final version of Mr. White's plan was issued by the U.S. Treasury in printed form on July 10, 1943. This is reproduced in (B) below.

* * *

(A) Preliminary Draft Proposal for a United Nations Stabilization Fund and a Bank for Reconstruction and Development of the United and Associated Nations

(April 1942)
H. D. WHITE, Assistant to the Secretary, U.S. Treasury Department

This report has been prepared at the request of Secretary Morgenthau that I draft a plan for an International Stabilization Fund and an International Unit of Currency.

He felt that the requirement of furthering the war effort and preparing for the financial needs of the reconstruction period called for the immediate preparation and study of preliminary proposals.─H. D. WHITE

*

INTRODUCTION

Suggested Plan for a United and Associated Nations Stabilization Fund and a Bank for Reconstruction and Development of the United and Associated Nations

It is yet too soon to know the precise form or the approximate magnitude of post-war monetary problems. But one thing is certain. No matter how long the war lasts nor how it is won, we shall be faced with three inescapable problems: to prevent the disruption of foreign exchanges and the collapse of monetary and credit systems; to assure the restoration of foreign trade; and to supply the huge volume of capital that will be needed virtually throughout the world for reconstruction, and for economic recovery.

If we are to avoid drifting from the peace table into a period of chaotic competition, monetary disorders, depressions, political disruption, and finally into new wars within as well as among nations, we must be equipped to grapple with these three problems and to make substantial progress toward their solution.


Specific plans must be formulated now

Clearly the task can be successfully handled only through international action. In most discussions of post-war problems this fact has been recognized, yet to date─though a number of persons have pointed to the solution in general terms─no detailed plans sufficiently realistic or practical to give promise of accomplishing the task have been formulated or discussed. It is high time that such plans were drafted. It is time that detailed and workable plans be prepared providing for the creation of agencies with resources, powers and structures adequate to meet the three major post-war needs.

Such agencies should, of course, be designated to deal chiefly with post-war problems. But their establishment must not be postponed until the end of hostilities. It takes many months to set up such agencies. First, a plan has to be perfected. Then it has to be carefully considered by a number of countries. In each country, again, acceptance can follow only upon legislation. That alone will consume many months and possibly longer. And even when the plan is finally accepted, much time will be further consumed in the collection of personnel, and the performance of the preliminary ground work which must be done before effective operations can begin. Altogether, a year may be required before a proposal can be transformed into an operating agency.

Obviously, therefore, even though no important immediate ends will be served by having such agencies functioning during war time, it will be an error to wait until the end of the war is in sight before beginning serious discussion of plans for establishing such agencies. No one knows how soon the war will end, and no one can know how long it will take to get plans approved and the agencies started. Yet, if we are to "win the peace," which will follow the war, we must have adequate economic instruments with which to carry on effective work as soon as the war is over. it would be ill-advised, if not positively dangerous, to leave ourselves at the end of the war unprepared for the stupendous task of world-wide economic reconstruction.


Specific proposals will help win the war.

But there is an additional important reason for initiating at once serious discussion of specific proposals. Such discussion will be a factor toward  winning the war. It has been frequently suggested, and with much cogency, that the task of securing  the defeat of the Axis powers would be made easier if the victims of aggression, actual and potential, could have more assurance that a victory by the United Nations will not mean in the economic sphere, a mere return to the pre-war pattern of every-country-for-itself, or inevitable depression, of possible widespread economic chaos with the weaker nations succumbing first under the law-of-the-jungle that characterized international economic practices of the pre-war decade. That assurance must be given now. The people of the anti-Axis powers must be encouraged to feel themselves on solid international ground, they must be given to understand that a United Nations victory will not usher in another two decades of economic uneasiness, bickering, ferment, and disruption. They must be assured that something will be done in the sphere of international economic relations that is new, that is powerful enough and comprehensive enough to give expectation of successfully filling a world need. They must have assurance that methods and resources are being prepared to provide them with capital to help them rebuild their devastated areas, reconstruct their war-distorted economies, and help free them from the strangulating grasp of lost markets and depleted reserves. Finally, they must have assurance that the United States does not intend to desert the war-worn and impoverished nations after the war is won, but proposes to help them in the long and difficult task of economic reconstruction. To help them, not primarily for altruistic motives, but from recognition of the truth that prosperity, like peace, is indivisible. To give that assurance now is to unify and encourage the anti-Axis forces, to greatly strengthen their will and effort to win.

Nor will the effect be on the anti-Axis powers alone. Whether within the Axis countries the will to fight would be weakened by such arrangements is not certain, but assuredly it would not be strengthened. And certainly the people in the invaded countries, and the wavering elements in the Axis-dominated and Axis-influenced countries would be given additional cause to throw in their lot more definitely and openly with the anti-Axis forces if their is real promise that an orderly prosperous world will emerge from a United Nations victory.


Two International Government Agencies must be established─A Stabilization Fund and a Bank for Reconstruction

( ... )

[자료: S. Herbert Frankel's] “United Nations Primer for Development” (QJE, 1952)

S. Herbert Frankel (1952).“United Nations Primer for Development,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 66, no. 3 (August 1952)

• 자료: http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/1885306?sid=21104887283521&uid=2&uid=3738392&uid=4

CF. Gerald M. Meier (2004). Biography of a Subject: An Evolution of Development Economics. Oxford University Press.

CF. Devesh Kapur, John Prior Lewis, Richard Charles Webb (1997). The World Bank: History. Brookings Institution Press.

CF. Louis Emmerij (2005). "How Has the UN Faced up to Development Challenges?" Forum for Development Studies, No.1, 2005.

CF. William Easterly ed.(2008). Reinventing Foreign Aid.

CF. Gerald M. Meier(1985). "Introduction:The Formative Period."

[자료] The United Nations and Colonialism ...

RE: WETE

출처: The United Nations and Colonialism: A Tentative ...
자료: jstor, http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2705599?sid=21104880132561&uid=3738392&uid=2&uid=4


CF. James M. Carter (2008). Inventing Vietnam: The United States and State Building, 1954–1968

CF. William Easterly (2010). Democratic Accountability in Development: The Double Standard.

[발췌: 김명섭] 동아시아 냉전질서의 탄생: '극동'의 부정과 '대동아'의 온존 (2005)

출처: 백영서 외, 《동아시아 지역 질서: 제국을 넘어 공동체로》 창비. 2005.
자료: 구글도서


※ 발췌(excerpts):

동아시아 냉전질서의 탄생: '극동'의 부정과 '대동아'의 온존 (김명섭)

p.265:

( ... ) 그러나 2차대전 이후의 전후질서는 평화체제가 아닌 냉전체제로 이어졌더. 2차대전은 종식되었지만 종료되지 못했다. 세계적 수준에서의 '이룰 수 없는 평화'와 '일어나 것 같지 않은 전쟁'이 공존하는 상황으로서의 냉전(Cold War)[주]3은 1989년까지 지속되었다. 냉전은 2차대전과 같은 뜨거운 전쟁(Hot War)은 아니었다. 그렇다고 서로를 인정하고 화합한다는 의미의 뜨거운 평화(Hot Peace)도 아니었다. 그것은 차가운 평화(Cold Peace)에 비해 좀더 갈등적이었고, 뜨거운 전쟁에 비해 약간 더 평화적인 상태였다. 그러나 이것은 어디까지나 세계적 수준에서의 관찰이다. 세계적 수준에서의 냉전은 어디까지나 지역적 열전, 특히 동아시아에서의 열전에 의해 담보되었다.

세계적 수준에서의 냉전의 특성은 '대립적 양축구조'였다. 그 동안의 많은 연구들은 미국과 소련이라는 '양축이 왜 대립하게 되었는가'라는 문제(냉전의 기원 문제)에 치중했다. 이에 비해 둘 사이의 관계가 대립적이든 상호의존적이든 '어떻게 두개의 축으로 압축되었는가'라는 문제는 간과되었다. 2차대전 이후의 세계질서가 양축구조였다는 것은 무엇보다 영국·프랑스·네럴란드 등과 같은 서유럽이 주요 행위자의 대열에서 탈락했음을 의미하는 것이었다. 왜 이들은 2차대전의 승전국들이었음에도 불구하고 역사적 주도성을 상실한 것일까? 이러한 물음이야말로 냉전시대 유럽인들의 뼈아픈 성찰의 화두였으며, 탈냉전시대의 유럽헌법을 낳은 원동력이기도 했다. 그 이유는 첫째, 2차대전을 통해 유럽이 폐허가 되었기 때문이다. 둘째, 전쟁 발발 당시 전세계 인구의 ㅇㄱ 3분의 1을 지배했던 식민질서[주]4가 그 추동력을 상실했기 때문이다. ( ... ) 식민질서에 대한 국내적(식민모국의) 안티테제는 좌파정치세력이 주도했던 반제운동이었다. 그리고 국제적 안티테제는 미국과 소련이라는두 반제(反帝)적 제국(帝國)들이었다.[주]5 미국의 자신의 어머니였던 유럽제국에 대한 부정의 소산이었고, 소련의 자신의 전신인 러시아제국을 초월하고자 했다.

두 반제적 제국들간의 냉전과 마그마처럼 분출하고 있던 민족해방운동세력 사이에서 동아시아는 새롭게 탄생했다. 그것은 유럽 중심적 '극동' 개념을 탈피한 동아시아였지만 냉전에 의해 분절된 동아시아였[다.]  p. 266.

p. 271:

( ... ) 만방이 기념할 자취"라고 보았다.[주]17 이러한 러일전쟁에 대한 평가는 1893년(메이지 26년) 타루이 토오끼찌가 출간한 <대동아합방론>에 나타난 당시의 사조를 연상시킨다 타루이의 논지는 "아시아의 제민족이 일치단결하여 동맹군을 결성하고 백인 제국주의의 침략에 공동으로 방어하여 쇠퇴하는 동양의 기운을 만회하는 흥아(興亞)의 대업을 양성"[주]18해야 한다는 것이었다. 이런 측면에서 이또오 히로부미에 대한 안중근의 거사는 배신당한 동양평화론에 대한 응징이었다. 동양을 이야기함으로써 일본은 중서관계를 동서관계로 대체했고, 동양의 대표임을 자임했다. 중국을 지나(支那)라고 부르면서 동양에 속하는 하나의 나라로 상대화했다. 일본은 동양이라는 개념, 나아가 동아(東亞)라는 개념을 통해 세계에서 통용될 자신들의 근대적 정체성을 창출해내고자 했다.[주]19 이것은 지역적 수준에서 일본을 중심으로 한 새로운 질서를 수립하려는 것과 궤를 같이하는 것이었다. 일본·조선·중국을 주축으로 하는 '동아'의 개념은 점차 타이완·몽골·티베트·만주, 그리고 남양(南洋)으로 확장되었다. 일본은 '동아'의 개념을 통해 민족적 정체성을 희석하고자 했지만 각각의 민족국가들을 수립하고자 하는 역사적 흐름과의 충돌은 계속되었다.

제1차 세계대전과 러시아혁명 이후의 세계질서를 논의하는 베르싸유회의에서 일본은 영국·프랑스·미국·이딸리아 등의 승전국들과 어깨를 나란히하는 'G5'의 하나로 대우받기를 원했다. 일본 내에서는 코노에 후미마로의 「영미 본위의 평화주의를 배격한다」(1918년)라는 글이 주목을 받았다. 1차대전 이후의 세계에서는 국제협조, 국제주의, 문화교류, 상호의존성의 추구 등이 활발하게 논의되었고, 평화주의는 이러한 흐름을 함축하는 새로운 화두였다. 코노에 후미마로는 일찍이 '아시아보전론'을 내세웠고 동아동문서원의 모체인 동아동문회를 주도했던 코노에 아쯔마로의 아들이었다. 독일과 오스트리아에 유학했던 코노에 아쯔마로는 러시아의 남진에 맞서서 아시아단결론을 주창했다. 1898년 동아회와 동문회가 합쳐진 동아동문회가 발족되었는데, 그 강령의 1조는 '지나'를 보존해야 할 것, 2조는 '지나' 및 조선의 개선을 조성할 것 등이었다. 그리고 동아동문회의 주의서(主意書)는 "형제들은 집안에서 서로 다투고 열국은 그 틈을 노리고 있으니, 시국은 나날이 어려워지고 있다"라고 주장했다.[주]20

코노에 후미마로의 주장은 서양, 특히 영미적인 사고를 모방해서 유럽에서의 전쟁을 선과 악의 싸움이라고 보는 대신, "현상유지를 도모하는 국가와 현상타파을 도모하는 국가와의 전쟁"으로 보아야 한다는 것이었다.[주]21 현상유지국가는 이미 "거대한 자본과 풍부한 천연자원을 독점"하고 있기 때문에 무력에 의존하지 않고 '평화주의'를 표방한 '경제적 제국주의'를 통해 세계적 표준을 제시하고자 한다는 것이다. 이에 비해 "영토가 좁고 원료가 빈곤하고 인구도 많지 않아서 제조공업품의 시장으로서 빈약한" 일본이 영미 본위의 평화주의에 심취하는 것은 전혀 무의미하다는 것이다. 진정한 평화를 위해서는 일본이 '후진국들'과 함께 경제적 제국주의를 타파하고, 특히 베르싸유에서 거부당했던 "황인종에 대한 차별대우의 철폐"를 요구하지 않으면 안된다고 주장했다. 코노에는 이것이 불가능할 경우 일본도 "자기생존의 필요상 전쟁 전의 독일처럼 현상타파적 행동을 취하게 될 것"임을 경고했다.[주]22

1차대전 이후 평화체제의 모색과정에서 일본의 반(反)인종주의적 입장은 거부되었고, 일본대중의 분노를 촉발시켰다. 당시 일본인들의 불만과 관련해서 패전국 독일이 누리고 있던 샨뚱 반도지역에서의 특권을 이양받고자 했던 일본의 야망이 베르싸유체제에 반영되지 못했던 점이 강조되었다. 이러한 영토적 측면 이외에도 일본인들은 국제연맹헌장 규약에 인종평등조항을 삽입하고자 했던 일본측의 제안이 거부된 것에 분노했다. 백호주의와 같은 인종차별적 정책을 시행하고 있던 오스트레일리아 등의 반대가 주효했다. ( ... ) 베르싸유에서 미결된 아시아의 질서는 1921년 11월에 시작되어 1922년 2월에 종결된 워싱턴회의에서 논의되었다. 미국·영국·프랑스·이딸리아·중국·벨기에·네덜란드·포르투갈·일본 9개국이 참가한 약 3개월에 걸친 회의 결과 해군 군비제한 조약, 중국에 관한 9개국 조약, 태평양에 관한 4개국(미·영·불·일) 조약 등 7개 조약이 체결되었다. 영일동맹은 폐기되었고, 일본은 샨뚱성에대한 이권을 중국에 반환했다.[주]23

( ... ) 1903년 영국에서 <동양의 이상>, 그리고 1904년 미국에서 <일본의 각성>이라는 책을 출간했던 오까꾸라 텐신은 좀더 많은 독자를 확보하게 되었다. <동양의 이상>에는 이미 "아시아는 하나다"라는 구절이 있었다. <일본의 각성>에서는 "유럽의 영광이 아시아의 굴욕"이 되는 현실을 변혁하는 것이 급선무로 여겨졌다. 양자( ... )

p.276:

( ... ) 1940년 7월 22일 제2차 코노에 내각의 출번과 더불어 일본은 새로운 국가정책안을 승인했다. 1940년 7월 26일 승인된 이 정책안은 '동아신질서'에 관한 구상을 담도 있었다.[주]30

일본은 자국을 중심으로 세 개의 동심원적 지역권을 상정했는데, 첫 번째는 내역 혹은 내권이라고 분류되는 지역권으로서 일본과 조선(내선일체), 만주를 비롯한 연해주, 그리고 양쯔강 이남의 우한(武漢)과 상하이 등을 포괄하는 지역이었다. 두 번째는 소동아라고 분류되는 지역권으로서 중국과 시베리아, 인도네시아, 인도차이나 등을 포괄하는 지역권이다. 세 번째가 대동아로서 이것은 오스트레일리아와 인도, 그리고 태평양 열도를 포괄하는 지역권이다. 일본은 소동아 건설을 위해 적어도 20년이 걸릴 것이라고 내다보았고, 이어서 영국과 그 동맹국들 간의 분쟁을 거쳐야만 대동아를 건설할 수 있으리라고 전망했다.[주]31

1941년 8월 루즈벨트와 처칠이 발표한 '대서양헌장'은 민족자결, 영토보전, 경제적 국제주의, 사회보장, 군비축소, 국제협조 등을 표방했다. 미국은 대서양헌장을 통해 유럽제국들이 2차대전 이후 또다시 베르싸유 체제하에서 되풀이했던 것과 같은 제국적 욕망에 쐐기를 박고자 했다.[주]32 일본은 대서양에 맞서는 개념으로 대동아를 내세워 아시아 인민들을 동원하고자 했다. 이러한 일본의 전략은 ( ... )

[주]40. ^Chronique d'une guerre oubliee: La guerre d'Indochine, 1945~1954^. 1er coffret: Saigon, perle de l'Empire, Cassettes Radio France. 로물로의 제안에 관해서는 Romulo Gladys Zehnphennig, ^The General Carlos P. Romulo: Defender of Freedom^, Minneapolis: T.S. Dension & Company, Inc. 1965, 98, 100면; Robert S. Ward, ^Asia for the Asiatics?: The Techniques of Japanese Occupation^, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1945, 205면; F.C. Jones, ^Japan's New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and Fall, 1937~45^, Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London: Oxford University Press 1954, 498면.

p. 281:

( ... ) 2차대전 직후 베트남내전과 중국내전에서 보여준 미국의 태도는 1947년 마셜플랜과 트루먼독트린에서 표명된 미국의 단호한 태도에 비하면 확실히 미온적이었다.[주]45 이런 면에서 미국은 동아시아에서도 '초대'받을 수 있는 가능성을 열어놓았다. 미국을 초대한 데에는 미국이 일본제국주의로부터의 해방을 위한 후원자(한국의 이승만과 필리핀의 퀴리노), 유럽제국주의에 대항하기 위한 동반자(에스빠냐와 싸우는 필리핀, 네덜란드와 싸우는 인도네시아, 프랑스와 싸우는 인도차이나, 영국과 싸우는 말레이시아·버마·인도), 서구적 근대의 전파자(일본)가 될 수 있다고 보는 기대가 있었다.[주]46 ( ... ... )

Some guiding comments about kinds of Bitcoin

Bitcoin is a payment network that requires you to be its shareholder in order to use it.─http://twitter.com/oleganza

Bitcoins don't need to be changed into dollars any more than email needs to be printed. Legacy currencies has no intrinsic value, they have vendor lock-in.─http://twitter.com/BlockZombie

Dic: conceive sth; conceive of sth

1. conceive (of) sth:

  - to develop or form, esp. in the mind.
  - If you conceive a plan or idea, you think of it and work out how it can be done.

• She had conceived the idea of a series of novels.
• He conceived of the first truly portable computer in 1968.
• She conceived a passion for music.

2. conceive of sth / conceive N-clause

  - (1) to have an idea of; imagine; think. (2) to hold as an opinion; believe
  - If you cannot conceive of something, you cannot imagine it or believe it.
  - If you conceive (of) something as a particular thing, you consider it to be that thing.

• I just can't even conceive of that quantity of money.
• He was immensely ambitious but unable to conceive of winning power for himself.
• The ancients conceived the earth as afloat in water.
• We conceive of the family as being in a constant state of change.
• Elvis conceived of himself as a ballad singer.
• Language may be conceived of as a process which arises from social interaction.
• I can hardly conceive what it must be like here in winter.
• He could not conceive that anything really serious could be worrying his friend.

..... Collins, Cobuild, LDOCE

CF.

• The state is about efficient administration, not about power and conflict. 
• He conceives of the state as about efficient administration, not about power and conflict.
• The state is conceived of as about efficient administration, not about power and conflict.

[발췌: D. Abreu & M.K. Brunnermeier's] Bubbles and Crashes (2003)

출처: Dilip Abreu and Markus K. Brunnermeier (2003). "Bubbles and Crashes," Econometrica, Vol. 71, No. 1 (Jan 2003).


※ 발췌 (excerpts) :

This paper argues that bubbles can persist even though all rational arbitrageurs know that the price it too high and they jointly have the ability to correct the mispricing. Though the bubble will ultimately burst, in the intermediate term, there can be a large and long-lasting departure from fundamental values. A central, and we believe, realistic, assumption of our model is that there is dispersion of opinion among rational arbitrageurs concerning the timing of the bubble. This assumption serves both as a general metaphor for differences of opinion, information and beliefs among traders, and, more literally, as a reduced-form modeling of the temporal expression of heterogeneities amongst traders. While it is well understood that appropriate departures from common knowledge will permit bubblles to persist, we believe that our particular formulation is both natural and parsimonious. The model provides a setting in which 'overreaction' and self-feeding price drops leading to full-fledged crashes will naturally arise. It also provides a framework that allows one to rationalize phenomena such as 'resistance lines' and fads in information gathering.

[발췌: UN ECAFE's] Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East (1949)

출처: United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East 1949, prepared by the Secretariat of the Economic Commission For Asia and the Far East (New York: Lake Success, 1950)
자료: http://www.unescap.org/publications/survey/surveys/survey1949-4.pdf



※ 발췌 (excerpts):

CHAPTER 16

Economic Planning

Total economic planning, under which the resources of a country are allocated and utilized by the state in accordance with a predetermined plan for a fixed period of time, has not been applied to any of the countries in Asia and the Far East, although in parts of China under the control of the People's Government, and to a lesser extent in Burma, a trend in that direction has been recently visible. Other countries in the region have adopted partial economic planning, whereby the State undertakes to plan and develop these resources considered essential to the development and strengthening of the national economy, with the cooperation of private enterprise. Private enterprise is supervised, controlled and assisted by the Government. Under this arrangement, initiated during war-time and extended in post-war years, national development plans have been prepared which in some cases extend to most branches of national economy and others cover only a few limited fields where planned development appears desirable or imperative. The plans differ in the scope covered, degree of definiteness, assignment of priorities and possibility of implementation, but the objectives to be achieved are more or less similar.


OBJECTIVES OF ECONOMIC PLANNING

Four principal objectives in the economic plans of countries in the region may be distinguished, namely, industrialization, economic independence, rehabilitation and recovery, and improvement of the balance-of-payments position. ( ... ... )


PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION

Problems in implementing economic development projects are complex and interrelated. The three key economic problems relate to financing, the supply of scarce factors of production and industrial policy. The urgency to find solution varies  widely from country to country and from project to project, but the problems are common to all.

( ... ... )

(1) Financing

 (1.1) Hoarding and real estate investment

 (1.2) Lack of adequate financial institutions

(2) Supply of Scarce Factors of Production

 (2.1) Shortage of fuel and power

 (2.2) Shortage of capital goods

 (2.3) Inadequate supply of raw and auxiliary materials

 (2.4) Inadequate supply of transport facilities

 (2.5) Need of technical and managerial personnel

(3) Industrial Policy

 (3.1) Sequence of industrial development

 (3.2) Scope of state enterprise

 (3.3) Protective trade restrictions

To sum up, the problems of implementing economic plans in the region are complex and interrelated. The increase in economic planning is unquestionably one of the most significant post-war phenomena in Asia and the Far East. Nevertheless, the amount of planning already accomplished to date indicates that inadequacy of sound planning remains an important obstacle to economic development. ( ...


APPENDIX: POST-WAR ECONOMIC PLANNING IN JAPAN

짤막한 스피노자 인용문들

어떤 서양 분 ( https://twitter.com/BenedictSpinoza )덕분에 가끔식 듣는 스피노자의 짤막한 인용문들이 순식간에 뇌리를 파고들 때가 종종 있다. 물론 나의 오역을 바탕으로 그 뇌리가 작동하는 것이겠지만... 가끔씩 적어놓고 수시로 보고 생각해 봐야겠다.

* * *

If people were born free, they would form no concept of good and evil so long as they were free. (E4p68)

In proportion as a mental image is related to more things, the more frequently does it occur and the more it engages the mind. (E5p11)

어떤 마음속 이미지를 통해 바라보는 사물들이 많아질수록 그 이미지는 더욱 빈번하게 떠오르며 더 강하게 마음을 움직이게 된다.

Our greatest good is the knowledge of the union which the mind has with the whole of Nature. (TIE)

The greater the number of other images with which an image is associated, the more often it springs to life. (E5p13)

Desire that arises from an emotion--that is, a passive emotion--is blind. (E4p59s)

Christians rest their case simply on miracles, that is, on ignorance, which is the source of all wickedness. (E73)

Politicians must necessarily be elected whose private fortunes and advantage depend on the general welfare and the peace of all. (TP)

The supreme authority for the interpretation of Scripture is vested in each individual. (TTP)

In Nature there cannot exist two substances without their differing entirely in essence. (E2)

자연에 본질이 완전히 다르지 않고 따로 존재할 수 있는 실체(? substance)는 없다. / 자연에 서로 다른 실체가 존재한다면 그 본질도 완전히 다를 수밖에 없다. / ...

In the mind there is no absolute, or free, will. The mind is determined to volition by an infinite chain of causes. (E2p48)

마음에 절대 의지라든가 자유 의지라는 건 없다. 의지는 원인의 무한 연쇄에 따라 휘둘릴 뿐이고 마음은 그에 따라 정해질 뿐이다.

The better the mind understands the order of Nature,the more easily it can restrain itself from useless pursuits. (TIE)

자연의 질서를 잘 이해할수록 쓸데없는 일에 연연하는 욕심을 억제하기 쉽다.

cf. 아메리카 원주민들이 볼 때 얼굴 흰 자들은 자연의 조화에 대해선 문맹이나 다름없다. 그들은 자연의 언어를 이해하지 못한다. 그들이 그토록 파괴적인 이유가 거기에 있다. (북미 원주민이 남긴 기록을 전하는 https://twitter.com/bot_Indian 에서)

[메모] Problems of the Pacific, 1929 : proceedings of the third conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations

출처: Problems of the Pacific, 1929 : proceedings of the third conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Nara and Kyoto, Japan, October 23 to November 9, 1929 / edited by J.B. Condliffe.

자료 1: http://trove.nla.gov.au/work/9529384?q&versionId=11055899

※ 컨퍼런스 차례:

• The machine age and traditional culture
• Food and population in the Pacific
• Industrialization in the Pacific countries
• China's foreign relations- extra-territoriality
• China's foreign relations- concessions and settlements
• The financial reconstruction of China
• The problems of Manchuria - Diplomatic relations in the Pacific
• The future development of the wheat-growing industry of Australia /​ A.H.E. Macdonald
• China's cotton industry : a statistical study of ownership of capital, output, and labor conditions /​ S.T. King and D.K. Lieu
• An index of the physical volume of foreign trade in China, 1868-1927 /​ Franklin L. Ho
• The tariff autonomy of China ; The relinquishment of extra-territoriality in China /​ Mingchien Joshua Bau
• Extra-territoriality in China /​ James T. Shotwell
• The international settlement at Shanghai
• International economic co-operation in China /​ Wu Ding-chang
• The boycott in China /​ Masunosuke Odagiri
• Manchuria : a statistical survey of its resources, industries, trade, railways, and immigration /​ Chu Hsiao
• Chinese colonization and the development of Manchuria /​ C. Walter Young
• The Manchurian question /​ Shuhsi Hsu
• Japan's position in Manchuria /​ Masamichi Royama
• Manchuria, its past and present /​ Yosuke Matsuoka
• Chart of treaty provisions for peaceful settlement among the Pacific states, concluded before September 1, 1929 /​ Max Richard White.

....

[발췌: R.H. Tawney's] Land and Labor in China (1932)

출처: R. H. Tawney, ^Land and Labor in China^ (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1932)


※ 차례 (contents):

PREFATORY NOTE  (7)

I. INTRODUCTORY  (11)

II. THE RURAL FRAMEWORK  (23)

III. THE PROBLEMS OF THE PEASANT  (51)

• (1) METHODS OF CULTIVATION  (51)
• (2) MARKETING  (54)
• (3) CREDIT  (58)
• (4) LAND TENURE  (63)
• (5) POVERTY, WAR AND FAMINE  (69)

IV. THE POSSIBILITIES OF RURAL PROGRESS  (78)

• (1) ANALOGOUS PROBLEMS ELSEWHERE  (78)
• (2) AGRARIAN POLICY  (82)
• (3) COMMUNICATIONS  (85)
• (4) SCIENCE AND EDUCATION  (88)
• (5) CO-OPERATION  (92)
• (6) LAND TENURE  (97)
• (7) DROUGHT AND FLOOD  (102)
• (8) POPULATION, MIGRATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRY  (103)

V. THE OLD INDUSTRIAL ORDER AND THE NEW  (109)

• (1) THE LEGACY OF THE PAST  (109)
• (2) THE GROWTH OF CAPITALIST INDUSTRY  (121)
• (3) PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL POLICY  (140)

VI. POLITICS AND EDUCATION  (161)

APPENDIX  (196)  / INDEX  (203)

* * *

※ 발췌 (excerpts):

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTORY

(p. 011-1) China moved till yesterday in an orbit of her own, little influencing the West and little influenced by it. Partly because of her long isolation, partly because the foundations of her own civilisation were singularly stable, partly as a result of the new resources of science and technique to which the West became heir in the 19th century, the perspective of her recent history has been foreshortened. She had mastered certain fundamental arts of life at a time when the West was still ignorant of them. Like her peasants, who ploughed with iron when Europe used wood, and continued to plough with it when Europe used steel, she carried one type of economic system and social organisation to a high level of achievements, and was not conscious of the need to improve or supersede it. For ages the most powerful agent in spreading civilisation in the East, it was not till less than a century ago that she was forced against her will into continuous and intimate contact with the civilisation of the West.

(p.011-2) The phenomenon which disturbed the balance was the rise of the great industry, first in England, and then, a generation later, on the Continent of Europe, and in the United States. ( ... ... )


(p. 019-1) Such contrast between the static civilisation of China─as it was formerly called─and the mobile economy of the West are easily drawn and easily misinterpreted. They are misinterpreted when the differences which they emphasise are assumed to be the expression of permanent characteristics. History, with its record of the movement of leadership from region to region, lends little support to the theory that certain peoples are naturally qualified for success in the economic arts, and others unfitted for it, even were the criteria of such success less ambiguous than they are.

(p. 019-2) The traditionalism which has sometimes been described as a special mark of Chinese economic life is the characteristic, not of China, but of one phase of civilisation which Europe has shared with her.

• Rapid economic changes as a fact, and continuous economic progress as an ideal, are the notes, not of the history of the West, but of little more than its last four centuries; and the European who is baffled by what appears to him the conservatism of China would be equally bewildered could he meet his own ancestors. 
• During nearly a thousand years, the crafts of the husbandman, the weaver, the carpenter and the smith saw as little alteration in the West as they have seen in the East. In the former, as in the latter, common men looked to the good days of the past, not to the possibilities of the future, for a standard of conduct and criterion of the present; accepted the world, with plague, pestilence and famine, as heaven had made it; and were incurious as to the arts by which restless spirits would improve on nature, if not actually suspicious of them as smelling of complicity with malignant powers. In the former, as in the latter, political confusion, civil disturbance, brigandage and recurrent starvation were for generations the rule rather than the exception. 
• It is true, however, that, for wide ranges of Chinese life, the contrast is valid, though the area to which it applies is year by year contracting. In technological equipment and industrial organisation, as in the foundations of law, psychology and social habits, on which both ultimately rest, the greater part of the West lives on one plane, the greater part of China on another.

(p. 020-1) What is true to-day is less true than yesterday, and may be false tomorrow. The forces which have caused the economic development of China and the West to flow in different channels are a fascinating theme for historical speculation, but they are one on which a layman is precluded from entering. Naturally, he will remind himself that the question is not merely why the economic life of China has not change more, but why that of the West has changed so much. ( ... ... )

Dic & Usages: be enough of a/an + noun

• Show your babies how important they are ... that they are enough of a reason to not live in fear and tyranny.
• The cash and the prize lists in many cases are enough of a temptation to get in, but think more for example what is your ultimate music goal.
• ... but certainly even in the suburban and rural regions of Beijing and, of course, the smaller cities obvious foreigners are enough of a rarity for people to stop and stare.

.... http://corpus.byu.edu/glowbe/x.asp?r1=&w=1024&h=600

* * * 

△ to be enough of a/an + noun = to be sufficiently qualified as a...

• I'm not enough of an expert to answer this question.

... http://www.eslhq.com/forums/esl-forums/english-questions/enough-other-people-68066/

* * *

• Looking at some of the related polls and comments on our site, it seems that there are a number of folks that feel this is a solid step in the right direction for Samsung. ... or they feel that Galaxy Alpha wasn't enough of a departure in the looks department. ... So what's different, and why now? While there have been premium options before, Samsung honestly probably didn't feel they were enough of a threat.   [source]

• The internet was just getting underway back then, e-books weren't really a thing yet, but still, they were enough of a thing that it felt like a conscious choice to put it on paper. So let's think about how to earn that paper. ... [source]

• I don't know why people originally wore ties. But I think we should stop schools from making girls wear them, they are enough of a burden on us men. [source]

[발췌: P.B. Trescott's] Jingji Xue: The History of the Introduction of Western Economic Ideas into China, 1850-1950 (2007)

출처: Paul B. Trescott (2007). ^Jingji Xue: The History of the Introduction of Western Economic Ideas into China, 1850-1950^. Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong.
자료: 구글도서



※ 발췌 (excerpts):

cf. Chapter 3 begins at page 46:

Chapter 3

Sun Yat-sen

( ... ... )

p. 47:

Henry George placed much of the blame for China's economic distress on bad domestic government and on imperialism. In his 1924 lectures, Sun claimed that "the European powers are crushing China with their imperialism and economic strength" (1943, p. 36). Both George and Sun argued that the existence of a government with democratic form would not assure good policies. For Sun, it was the weakness, rather than the wickedness, of the state which seemed most deplorable (1943, p. 198)

( ... ... )

pp. 51-52:

Sun's writings on economic development are available in English chiefly in four volumes. The International Development of China, initially published in 1920, was largely an extension of the transportation program which Sun had been developing since 1912. And the end of World War I, Sun believed that China could and should attract a large inflow of foreign capital. However, Sun's grandiose proposals went unnoticed by the western powers. His second major publication, his famous San Min Chu I (the Three People's Principles), was published in 1925 as a transcription of lectures delivered in 1924 on the themes of nationalism, sovereignty, and livelihood. The lectures were probably influenced by the willingness of the Soviet Union to assist Sun's political organization, the Kuomintang. The text is a rambling patchwork of political rhetoric, but most commentators agree that it presented ideas of which Sun had maintained consistently for twenty years or more. [n.14] At the same time it reflects his favorable view of Lenin's New Economic Policy. Additional writings appeared in English in a volume inappropriately titled Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary, originally published in 1918, and in Prescription for Saving China (Wei 1994).

The International Development of China grew out of Sun's efforts to interest the western powers in providing capital and expertise to aid China's development at the end of World War I. Sun envisioned a vast network of state-owned and state-dominated enterprises:

I suggest that the vast resources of China be developed internationally under a socialistic scheme ... It is my hope that as a result of this, the present spheres of influence can be abolished; the international commercial war can be done away with; the internecine capitalist competition can be got rid of, and ... the class struggle between capital and labour can be avoided. (Sun 1928, p. 6)

The bulk of The International Development of China was concerned with railway and waterway development. The waterway plans, often presented in loving detail, embodies the mixture of good sense and fantasy so often characteristic of Sun's economic ideas. He proposed the development of three major seaports. Two of these were proposed for relatively undeveloped locations, probably to enable the development authority to capture much of the rise in land values to be engendered (Sun 1928, pp. 28, 31). For inland waterways, Sun stressed a multi-purpose approach concerned with flood control and reclamation as well as navigation.

( ... ... )

[발췌: 쑨원] The International Development of China (1922)

출처: Sun Yat-sen (1922). The International Development of China. G. P. Putnam's Sons. New York and London. The Knickerbocker Press.
자료: Project Gutenberg


※ 발췌 (excerpts):

* * *

PREFACE

As soon as Armistice was declared in the recent World War, I began to take up the study of the International Development of China, and to form programs accordingly. I was prompted to do so by the desire to contribute my humble part in the realization of world peace. China, a country possessing a territory of 4,289,000 square miles, a population of 400,000,000 people, and the richest mineral and agricultural resources in the world, is now a prey of militaristic and capitalistic powers—a greater bone of contention than the Balkan Peninsula. Unless the Chinese question can be settled peacefully, another world war greater and more terrible than the one just past will be inevitable. In order to solve the Chinese question, I suggest that the vast resources of China be developed internationally under a socialistic scheme, for the good of the world in general and the Chinese people in particular. It is my hope that as a result of this, the present spheres of influence can be abolished; the international commercial war can be done away with; the internecine capitalistic competition can be got rid of, and last, but not least, the class struggle between capital and labor can be avoided. Thus the root of war will be forever exterminated so far as China is concerned.

Each part of the different programs in this International Scheme, is but a rough sketch or a general policy produced from a layman's thought with very limited materials at his disposal. So alterations and changes will have to be made after scientific investigation and detailed survey. For instance, in regard to the projected Great Northern Port, which is to be situated between the mouths of the Tsingho and the Lwanho, the writer thought that the entrance of the harbor should be at the eastern side of the port but from actual survey by technical engineers, it is found that the entrance of the harbor should be at the western side of the port instead. So I crave great indulgence on the part of experts and specialists.

I wish to thank Dr. Monlin Chiang, Mr. David Yui, Dr. Y. Y. Tsu, Mr. T. Z. Koo, and Dr. John Y. Lee, who have given me great assistance in reading over the manuscripts with me.

Sun Yat-sen.

Canton, April 25, 1921.

Dic: put together (an agreement, plan, or product)

• We wouldn't have time to put together an agreement. 
• We got to work on putting the book together.
• It took all morning to put the proposal together.
• I think we can put together a very strong case for the defence.
• to put together a model plane/an essay/a meal
• to put together a new bookcase; to put together a tax package.

* * *

△ If you put together an agreement, plan,or product, you design and create it.

△ to prepare or produce something by collecting pieces of information, ideas etc

△ to make or prepare something by fitting or collecting parts together

△ To construct; create

△ create by putting components or members together; assemble, piece, set up, tack, tack together

... COBUILD, LDOCE, OALD, American Heritage, WordNet

Dic: 조계지(租界地), 조차지(租借地)

출처: 서울시립대학교, 도시인문학 사전

* * *

영어 : concession, settlement, leased territory
한자 : 租界地, 租借地


근대적인 국제조약이 양 국가 사이에 체결되어 개항장이 정해지면, 해당 국가의 외국인 거주를 위해서 일정 지역을 조차(租借)하여 머무르게 한 곳을 말한다. 이 때 영토를 빌려주는 국가를 조대국(租貸國), 빌리는 국가는 조차국(租借國)이 된다.

19세기에 들어서 제국주의 국가들의 식민지 쟁탈 상황이 심해지는 상황 속에서 독재적이고 배타적인 정치지배를 실행하기 위한 거점으로 활용되었다. 이 지역은 조대국의 국내법이 미치지 않는 치외법권 지역으로서, 자연스럽게 제국주의 국가의 침략과 식민화의 거점이 되었다. 중국과 한국의 경우에는 ‘조계지(租界地)’라는 이름으로 존재하였고, 일본의 경우, ‘거류지(居留地)’라는 이름으로 존속하였다. 중국에서 아편전쟁의 결과로 1845년에 상해(上海)에 조계지가 생겨난 것이 최초이다. 이후 중국은 영국, 프랑스, 독일, 일본 등의 국가와 조약을 체결하면서 조계지가 28개나 되기도 하였다.

한국에서는 1877년 부산항조계조약으로 처음 생겨나게 되었다. 조계지는 한 국가만이 전유하는 전관조계와 여러 국가가 함께 사용하는 공동조계로 나뉘기도 했다. 제2차세계대전까지 존속하였고, 현재는 국제교통의 자유 원칙 아래 외국인의 거주와 영업은 자유로우며, 특별한 경우 국내법에 의해 제한을 받는 것도 있으나 원칙상 내국인과 법적인 평등을 갖는다.

* * *

CF. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Concession_(territory)

CF. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Concessions_in_China

[발췌: Frederick J.D. Lugard's] Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa

출처: Frederick J.D. Lugard (1922). Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa. Routledge, 2013 [1st edn, 1922]

자료: 구글도서

※ 발췌 (excerpts): pp. 69-71.

In character and temperament the typical African of this race-type is a happy, thriftless, excitable person, lacking in self-control, discipline, and foresight, naturally courageous, and naturally courteous and polite, full of personal vanity, with little sense of veracity, fond of music, and "loving weapons as an oriental loves jewelry." His thoughts are concentrated on the events and feelings of the moment, and he suffers little from apprehension for the future, or grief for the past. "His mind," says Sir C. Eliot, "is far nearer to the animal world than that of the Europeans or Asiatic, and exhibits something of the animal's placidity and want of desire to rise to rise beyond the state he has reached,"─in proof of which he cites the lack of decency in the disposal of the dead, the state of complete nudity common to one or other, or to both sexes among so many tribes, the general (though not universal) absence of any feeling for art (other than music), and the nomadic habits of so large a section of the race.

Through the ages the Africans has evolved no organized religious creed, and though some tribes appear to believe in a deity, the religious sense seldom rises above pantheistic animism, and seems more often to take the form of a vague dread of the supernatural. It is curious that whereas in East Africa Sir C. Eliot observes that prayers are always addressed to a benevolent deity, in the West the prevalent idea seems to be the propitiation of a malevolent spirit. Belief in the power of the witch and wizard, and of the Juju-priest and witch-doctor, in charms and fetish, and in the ability of individuals to assume at will the form of wild beasts, are also common among many tribes. To these superstitions the Hamite is less prone.

The African negro is not naturally cruel, though his own insensibility to pain, and his disregard for life─whether his own or another's─cause him to appear callous to suffering. He sacrifices life freely under the influence of superstition, or in the lust and excitement of battle, or for ceremonial display. The wholesale executions of Mtesa of Uganda, or Behanzin of Dahomey, would seem to have been dictated rather by a desire for the ostentatious display of power, or even by a blood-lust, than by a love of witnessing pain. If mutilation and other inhumane punishments are inflicted, it is because nothing less would be deterrent.

He lacks power of organisation, and is conspicuously deficient in the management and control alike of men or of business. He loves the display of power, but fails to realise its responsibility. His most universal natural ability lies in eloquence and oratory. He is by no means lacking in industry, and will work hard with a less incentive than most races. He has the courage of the fighting animal─an instinct rather than a moral virtue. He is very prone to imitate anything new in dress or custom, whether it be the turban and flowing gown of the Moslem, or the straw hat and trousers of the European, howver unsuited to his environment and conditions of life. He is an apt pupil, and a faithful and devoted friend.

In brief, the virtues and the defects of this race-type are those of attractive children, whose confidence when once it has been one is given ungrudgingly as to an older and wiser superior, without question and without envy. "Valiant, clever, and lovable, they bear no malice and nurse no grievance." [n.1]

To attempt to condense into a paragraph or two a subject which would provide material for an many chapters, is to court contradiction, and indeed there is hardly a single trait that I have named to which I cannot quote striking exceptions within my own experience. For the ability to evolve an organised system we may point to the Baganda, the Benis, and the Yorubas, no less than to the Abyssinians and the Fulani; for indigenous art to the bronzes and the wood-carving of the Benis, the cloths and leather-work of the Hausas and Yorubas, and bead and straw work of Uganda; for natural religion to the ancestor-worship of the Bantus and other tribes; and so on. But, speaking generally, the characteristics of the predominantly negro races are, I think, as I have described them, and Sir Chas. Eliot from personal experience extends his description to the West Indies and the Southern States of America. [n.2]

Perhaps the two traits which have impressed me as those most characteristic of the African native are his lack of apprehension and inability to visualise the future, and the steadfastness of his loyalty and affection. In illustration of the former, told elsewhere, which occurred in my earliest experience of Africa thirty odd years ago, and seemed to me to afford a clue to his character and modes of thought.

( ... ... )

[책: P. T. Bauer's] Dissent on Development

출처: P. T. Bauer. Dissent on Development. 2nd edn. Harvard University Press. 1976.
자료: 구글도서

주요 차례:

Introduction to the Revised Edition  (p. 17)

1. The Vicious Circle of Poverty and the Widening Gap
  A. The Vicious Circle (p. 31): Section 1 ~ 8
  B. A Widening Gap?  (p. 49): Section 9 ~ 17

2. Dissent on Development
  A. Comprehensive Central Planning (p. 69): Section 1 ~ 11
  B. Foreign Aid  (p. 96): Section 12 ~ 19

  Appendix to Part A: Specific Arguments for Planning

3. The Economics of Resentment: Colonialism and Underdevelopment  (p. 147)
  1. Colonial Status and Material Progress  (p. 147)
  2. Colonialism as Exploitation?  (p. 150)
  3. Colonialism and Sovereignty  (p. 152)
  4. A Legacy of Colonialism  (p. 153)
  5. ~ 8.

4. Marxism and the Underdeveloped Countries  (p. 164)
  1. Pertinent Elements of Marxism  (p. 164)
  2. External Exploitation  (p. 165)
  3. Interpretation of Imperialism  (p. 167)
  4. Political and Economic Independence  (p. 168)
  5. Prerequisite of Progress  (p. 171)
  6. Policy Prescriptions of Marxism-Leninism  (p. 173)
  7. Appeal of Marxism-Leninism  (p. 175)
  8. Special Appeal in Poor Countries  (p. 177)
  9. Debasement of the Language  (p. 180)

5. Asian Vistas  (p. 183)
  1. Mainsprings of Progress  (p. 183)
  2. Reinterpretation of Planning  (p. 185)
  3. Transformation of Man and Society  (p. 189)
  4. Hostility to the Prosperous  (p. 197)
  5. Compulsory Standardisation and its Implications  (p. 198)
  6. Raising Income as Ground for Compulsion  (p. 200)
  7. Comprehensive Planning: Objectives and Corollaries  (p. 203)
  8. Provenance of Resources and the Role of the Intellectuals  (p. 205)
  9. Planning as an Axiom  (p. 207)
  10. The Rural Sector  (p. 208)
  11. Expectations from Birth Control  (p. 212)
  12. Economic Change in South-East Asia  (p. 215)
  13. ~ 15.

 Appendix: Technical Apparatus and Some Preoccupations of the Book

6. A Critique of UNCTAD  (p. 234)
  1. ~ 15.

7. Economics as a Form of Technical Assistance  (p.272)
  1. Some Relevant Theory  (p. 272)
  2. Some Ambiguities  (p. 276)
  3. The Value of Economic History  (p. 277)
  4. The Problems of Ceteris Paribus  (p. 279)
  5. Variables and Parameters  (p. 281)
  6. Selection of Variables  (p. 282)
  7. Importance of Fundamentals  (p. 286)
  8. Disregard of Standards  (p. 289)

8. Study of Underdeveloped Economies  (p. 291)
  1. The Relevance of Economics  (p. 291)
  2. Difficulties and Opportunities  (p. 292)
  3. Two Unsuccessful Approaches  (p. 294)
  4. Some Instances of Progress  (p. 296)
  5. Differences in Economic Aptitudes  (p. 298)
  6. External Contracts and Economic Progress  (p. 300)
  7. The Limitations of Formal Theory  (p. 303)
  8. Cooperation between Disciplines  (p. 304)

List of Works Cited  (p. 307)

...

[책: P. T. Bauer's] Reality and Rhetoric: Studies in the Economics of Development

출처: P. T. Bauer. Reality and Rhetoric: Studies in the Economics of Development. Harvard University Press. 1986.
자료: 구글도서

주요 차례:

Preface

1. Remembrance of Studies Past: Retracting First Steps   (p. 1)

2. Market Order and State Planning in Economic Development  (p. 19)

3. Foreign Aid: Issues and Implications  (p. 38)

4. Multinational Aid: An Improvement?  (p. 63)

5. Ecclesiastical Economics: Envy Legitimized  (p. 73)

6. Black Africa: the Living Legacy of Dying Colonialism  (p. 90)

7. Industrialization and Development: the Nigerian Experience  (p. 106)

8. The Economics of Post-War Immigration Policy in British West Africa  (p. 128)

9. Substance and Method in Development Economics: a Commentary on the Views of Professor Stern  (p. 140)

10. Further Reflections on the State of Economics  (p. 152)

Notes and References  (p. 164)

...

[발췌 11장: Hayek's Road to Serfdom] The End of Truth

자료: [구글도서] his Collected Works, vol.2 (Univ. of Chicago Press 2009) ; [구글도서] Routledge(1944 [2001]);Some HTML (& its contents) ; Some PDF ; ... 차례/독서노트 ;
※ This is a reading note with excerpts taken and some personal annotations or remarks added, in trying to partially read the above text. So visit the links above or elsewhere to see the original work.

* * *

※ 발췌 (excerpts):

Chapter 11

THE END OF TRUTH

It is significant that the nationalization of thought has proceeded everywhere pari passu withe the nationalization of industry.

─E. H. Carr

1. The most effective way of making everybody serve the single system of ends toward which the social plan is directed is to make everybody believe in those ends. To make a totalitarian system function efficiently, it is not enough that everybody should be forced to work for the same ends. It is essential that the people should come to regard them as their own ends. ... ...

2. This is, of course, brought about by the various forms of propaganda. ... ...

3. While in the totalitarian states this status of propaganda gives it a unique power over the minds of the people, the peculiar moral effects arise not from the technique but from the object and scope of totalitarian propaganda. ... ...

4. The moral consequences of totalitarian propaganda which we must now consider are, however, of an even more profound kind. They are destructive of all morals because they undermine one of the foundations of all morals: the sense of and the respect for truth. ... ... 

5. We have seen that agreement on that complete ethical code, that all-comprehensive system of values which is implicit in an economic plan, does not exist in a free society but would have to be created. ... ... 

6. And while the planning authority will constantly have to decide issues on merits about which there exist no definite moral rules, it will have to justify its decisions to the people—or, at least, have somehow to make the people believe that they are the right decisions. ... ...

7. This process of creating a “myth” to justify his action need not be conscious. ... ...

8. The need for such official doctrines as an instrument of directing and rallying the efforts of the people has been clearly foreseen by the various theoreticians of the totalitarian system. ... ... 

9. The most effective way of making people accept the validity of the values they are to serve is to persuade them that they are really the same as those which they, or at least the best among them, have always held, but which were not properly understood or recognized before. ... ...

10. The worst sufferer in this respect is, of course, the word “liberty.” ... ...

11. In this particular case the perversion of the meaning of the word has, of course, been well prepared by a long line of German philosophers and, not least, by many of the theoreticians of socialism. ... ...

12. If one has not one’s self experienced this process, it is difficult to appreciate the magnitude of this change of the meaning of words, the confusion which it causes, and the barriers to any rational discussion which it creates. ... ... 

13. It is not difficult to deprive the great majority of independent thought. ... ... 

14. Facts and theories must thus become no less the object of an official doctrine than views about values. ... ...

15. This applies even to fields apparently most remote from any political interests and particularly to all the sciences, even the most abstract. ... ...

16. Totalitarian control of opinion extends, however, also to subjects which at first seem to have no political significanc. ... ...

17. It is entirely in keeping with the whole spirit of totalitarianism that it condemns any human activity done for its own sake and without ulterior purpose. ... ...

18. Incredible as some of these aberrations may appear, we must yet be on our guard not to dismiss them as mere accidental by-products which have nothing to do with the essential character of a planned or totalitarian system. ... ...

19. The word “truth” itself ceases to have its old meaning. ... ...

20. The general intellectual climate which this produces, the spirit of complete cynicism as regards truth which it engenders, the loss of the sense of even the meaning of truth, the disappearance of the spirit of independent inquiry and of the belief in the power of rational conviction, the way in which differences of opinion in every branch of knowledge become political issues to be decided by authority, are all things which one must personally experience—no short description can convey their extent. ... ... 

21. The desire to force upon the people a creed which is regarded as salutary for them is, of course, not a thing that is new or peculiar to our time. ... ...

22. Probably it is true enough that the great majority are rarely capable of thinking independently, that on most questions they accept views which they find ready-made, and that they will be equally content if born or coaxed into one set of beliefs or another. In any society freedom of thought will probably be of direct significance only for a small minority. But this does not mean that anyone is competent, or ought to have power, to select those to whom this freedom is to be reserved. It certainly does not justify the presumption of any group of people to claim the right to determine what people ought to think or believe. It shows a complete confusion of thought to suggest that, because under any sort of system the majority of people follow the lead of somebody, it makes no difference if everybody has to follow the same lead. To deprecate the value of intellectual freedom because it will never mean for everybody the same possibility of independent thought is completely to miss the reasons which give intellectual freedom its value. What is essential to make it serve its function as the prime mover of intellectual progress is not that everybody may be able to think or write anything but that any cause or idea may be argued by somebody. So long as dissent is not suppressed, there will always be some who will query the ideas ruling their contemporaries and put new ideas to the test of argument and propaganda.

23. This interaction of individuals, possessing different knowledge and different views, is what constitutes the life of thought. ... ...

24. The tragedy of collectivist thought is that, while it starts out to make reason supreme, it ends by destroying reason because it misconceives the process on which the growth of reason depends. ... ...

[발췌: Hayek's Constitution of Liberty] Creative Powers of A Free Civilization

출처: F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty: The Definitive Edition (University of Chicago Press, 2011)

자료: 구글도서

※ 발췌(excerpts):

Chapter 2

The Creative Powers of A Free Civilization

Civilization advances by extending the number of important operations which we can perform without thinking about them. Operations of though are like cavalry charges in a battle─they are strictly limited in number, they require fresh horses, and must only be made at decisive moments.

─A. N. Whitehead

1. (p. 073-1) The Socratic maxim that the recognition of our ignorance is the beginning of wisdom has profound significance for our understanding of society. The first requisite for this is that we become aware of men's necessary ignorance of much that helps him to achieve his aims. Most of the advantages of social life, especially in its more advanced forms which we call "civilization," rest on the fact that the individual benefits from more knowledge than he is aware of. It might be said that civilization begins when the individual in the pursuit of his ends can make use of more knowledge than he has himself acquired and when he can transcend the boundaries of his ignorance by profiting from knowledge he does not himself possess.

(p. 073-1) This fundamental fact of man's unavoidable ignorance of much on which the working of civilization rests has received little attention. Philosophers and students of society have generally glossed it over and treated this ignorance as a minor imperfection which could be more or less disregarded. But, though discussions of moral or social problems based on the assumption of perfect knowledge may occasionally be useful as a preliminary exercise in logic, they are of little use in an attempt to explain the real world. Its problems are dominated by the "practical difficulty" that our knowledge is, in fact, very far from perfect. Perhaps it is only natural that the scientists tend to stress what we do know; but in the social field, where what we do not know is often so much more important, the effect of this tendency may be very misleading. Many of the utopian constructions are worthless because they follow the lead of the theorists in assuming that we have perfect knowledge.

(p. 074-1) It must be admitted, however, that our ignorance is a peculiarly difficult subject to discuss. ... ...

(p. 074-2) ... ...

(p. 074-3) ... ...

(p. 075-1) ... ...

(p. 075-2) ... ... 

(p. 075-3) ... ... 

(p. 076 ~ 077) ... ...

3. (p. 078-1) When we spoke of the transmission and communication of knowledge, we meant to refer to the two aspects of the process of civilization which we have already distinguished: the transmission in time of our accumulated stock of knowledge and the communication among contemporaries of information on which they base their action. They cannot be sharply separated because the tools of communication between contemporaries are part of the cultural heritage which man constantly uses in the pursuit of his ends.

(p. 078-2) We are most familiar with this process of accumulation and transmission of knowledge in the field of science─so far as it shows both the general laws of nature and the concrete features of the world in which we live. But, although this is the most conspicuous part of our inherited stock of knowledge and the chief part of what we necessarily know, in the ordinary sense of "knowing," it is still only a part; for, besides this, we command many tools─in the widest sense of that word─which the human race has evolved and which enable us to deal with our environment. These are the results of the experience of successive generations which are handed down. And, once a more efficient tool is available, it will be used without our knowing why it is better, or even what the alternatives are.

(p. 078-3) These "tools" which man has evolved and which constitute such an important part of his adaptation to his environment include much more than material implements. They consist in a large measure of forms of conduct which he habitually follows without knowing why; they consist of what we call "traditions" and "institutions," which he uses because they are available to him as a product of cumulative growth without ever having been designed by any one mind. Man is generally ignorant not only of why he uses implements of one shape rather than of another but also of how much is dependent on his actions taking one form rather than another. He does not usually know to what extent the success of his efforts is determined by his conforming to habits of which he is not even aware. This is probably are true of civilized man as of primitive man. Concurrent with the growth of conscious knowledge there always takes places an equally important accumulation of tools in this wider sense, of tested and generally adopted ways of doing things.

(p. 079-1) ... ...

(p. 079-2) ... ...

(p. 079-3) ... ...

(p. 080-1) ... ...

4. (p. 080-2) We have now reached the point at which the main contention of this chapter will be readily intelligible. It is that the case for individual freedom rests chiefly on the recognition of the inevitable ignorance of all of us concerning a great many of the factors on which the achievement of our ends and welfare depends. [n.10]

(p. 081-1) If there were omniscient men, if we could know not only all that affects the attainment of our present wishes but also our future wants and desires, there would be little case for liberty. And, in turn, liberty of the individual would, of course, make complete foresight impossible. Liberty is essential in order to leave room for the unforeseeable and unpredictable; we want it because we have learned to expect from it the opportunity of realizing many of our aims. It is because every individual knows so little and, in particular, because we rarely know which of us knows best that we trust the independent and competitive efforts of many to induce the emergence of what we shall want when we see it.

(p. 081-2) ... ...

※ Chapter 3, "The Common Sense of Progress", begins on page 91.