[서평] 제3의 길’: 서유럽 사민주의의 혁신인가 투항인가?

자료: 진보평론 18호

지은이: 신정완, 성공회대 교수

서평 대상: 제3의 길과 신자유주의 (김수행․안삼환․정병기․홍태영 공저, 2003, 서울대출판부)

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1990년대 이래 우리 학계에서 가장 많이 거론되어온 용어는 아마 ‘세계화’와 ‘신자유주의’일 것이다. 세계화와 신자유주의는 이제 단순히 학술적 용어라기보다는 수많은 대중이 일상생활을 통해 수없이 자주 부딪치는 압도적 현실로 다가왔다. 특히 1997년 말 이후 우리 사회가 경험한 IMF 경제위기는 세계화와 신자유주의의 엄혹한 모습을 생생히 보여주었다. 신자유주의적 지향의 세계화를 추진해온 핵심 세력은 나라 수준에서는 물론 미국이고, 사회집단 수준에서는 초국적 기업들이라 할 수 있다. 주지하다시피 신자유주의적 지향의 세계화는 빈부격차의 증대, 금융 불안정성의 심화 등 수많은 부작용을 초래했고, 특히 최근에는 미국의 군사적 패권주의와 결합되어 더욱 무서운 모습을 보여주고 있다.

그렇다면 신자유주의적 세계화에 대항할 수 있는 유력한 이념과 세력은 어디에서 찾을 수 있을 것인가? 소련-동구 사회주의의 붕괴 이후 국가사회주의에 대한 미련을 버리게 된 중도좌파적 지식인과 사회운동세력은 유럽의 사민주의 이념과 세력에 상당한 기대를 걸어왔다. 사민주의 운동의 힘이 과거 케인즈주의의 전성기만 못하다는 것은 분명하지만, 그래도 100년 이상의 역사를 자랑하는 유럽 사민주의 운동의 역량이 그리 녹록하지는 않을 것이라고 기대해온 것이다. 특히 급속히 진행되어가고 있는 유럽통합 운동은 지금까지는 주로 신자유주의적 기조 하에 진행되어왔지만, 일단 유럽통합이 완료되면 유럽이 미국에 대항할 수 있는 큰 힘을 갖게 될 것이고, 따라서 유럽 사회들에 깊이 뿌리내린 사민주의 운동의 힘이 머지않아 진가를 발휘할 수도 있으리라 기대한 것이다. IMF 경제위기 와중에 국내 학계 및 정치권에서 영국의 토니 블레어가 이끄는 ‘신노동당’의 지도이념인 ‘제3의 길’에 큰 관심을 보였던 것도, 혹시 ‘제3의 길’이라는 것이 불가역적 현상으로서의 세계화를 전제로 한 현실주의적이면서도 진보적인 대안일 수 있지 않을까 하는 기대감의 발로였다고 할 수 있다.

김수행, 안삼환, 정병기, 홍태영이 공동으로 집필한 책 ꡔ제3의 길과 신자유주의ꡕ는 이러한 기대감이 근거 없는 것이라는 점을 분명히 한다. 신자유주의의 새로운 버전(version), 그것도 상당히 기만적인 버전이라 할 수 있는 영국의 ‘제3의 길’뿐 아니라, 독일 사민당의 ‘신(新)중도’(Neue Mitte), 그리고 영국과 독일 사민주의 세력의 우경화를 비판하며 전통적인 사회주의적 가치를 어느 정도 표방한 프랑스 사회당의 프랑스식 ‘제3의 길’ 역시 크게 보면 신자유주의의 틀에서 벗어나지 못했다는 것이다.

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이렇게 필자들은 기본 시각을 공유하고 있지만 각국의 사례를 분석하는 방식과 각국 사민주의 운동의 우경화를 해석하는 방식에서 상당한 차이를 보이고 있기도 하다. 영국 사례를 분석한 김수행 교수는 오래 전부터 보수당 대처(M. Thatcher) 정권 이후 영국 사회의 신자유주의적 개편이라는 주제에 천착해왔는데, 이 책을 통해 블레어의 ‘신노동당’ 정부의 경제정책과 사회정책에 관한 가장 자세하고 입체적인 설명을 제공해주고 있다. 특히 공황론 전공자답게 경기변동과 정책 변화간의 상관관계를 매우 세밀하게 다루어주고 있다. 특히 주목할 만한 부분은 김수행 교수가 케인즈주의 전성기의 서유럽 사민주의 세력의 이념 및 정책 노선을 국가사회주의 및 자유시장주의와 확연하게 구별되며 나름의 정합성을 갖는 독자적 이념이자 정책노선으로 간주하며 비교적 호의적 평가를 내리고 있다는 점이다.

독일 사례를 분석한 정병기 박사는 독일 현 사민당 슈뢰더 정권의 ‘신중도’ 노선이 영국 블레어 정권의 ‘제3의 길’과 별다른 차이가 없다는 점을 강조하며, 이러한 사민당 노선의 우경화의 역사적 뿌리를 추적하는 데 많은 지면을 할애하고 있다. 특히 라쌀(Lassale)주의가 독일 사민당의 이념과 정책노선에 지속적으로 영향을 미쳐왔다는 점을 강조한다. 독일 사민당은 처음에는 맑스주의적 성향이 강한 혁명적 계급정당인 사민주의노동자당(SDAP)으로 출범하였으나 라쌀주의자들의 전독일노동자연맹(ADAV)과 통합하면서 의회주의적 계급정당으로 변모하였고, 2차대전 이후에는 계급정당적 성격을 더욱 약화시키며 ‘친근로자적 국민정당’으로 변모해갔고 마침내 슈뢰더 정권 하에선 주로 중간계층의 이익을 대변하며 경제성장을 최우선시하는 ‘부르주아적 국민정당’으로까지 나아가게 되었다는 것이다.

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그러나 아쉬운 점도 적지 않다. 우선 전공 분야가 다른 필자들이 공동으로 집필한 관계로 사례 분석의 방식이 나라마다 표준화되어 있지 않다. 김수행 교수의 글은 주로 경기변동과 경제-사회정책의 변화간의 상관관계를 다룬 전형적인 정치경제학적 성격의 글인 데 반해, 정치학자인 정병기 박사의 글과 홍태영 박사의 글은 이념사 분석에 많이 치중하고 있다. 또 김수행 교수의 글은 1980년대 이후 보수당과 ‘신노동당’의 정책 노선 분석에 대부분의 지면을 할애하고 있는 데 반해, 정병기 박사와 홍태영 박사의 글은 1970년대 이전 시기에 대한 분석에 꽤 많은 지면을 할애하고 있다.

특히 정병기 박사의 글의 경우 서술방식에 있어 상당한 불균형을 발견할 수 있는데, 1970년대 사민당-자민당 연립정부 시기의 정책에 대한 소개가 전혀 이루어지지 않고 있으며, 1980년대 이후 기민련/기사연-자민당 연정과 1998년 이후 사민당-녹색당 연정의 정책기조를 규정한 중요한 배경인 독일 통일, EMU 가입 등이 미친 효과에 대한 설명이 매우 부족하다. 또 서술방식에 있어 시기별 서술로 일관한 김수행 교수와는 달리 시기별 서술과 이슈별 서술을 혼합시킴으로써 시기별 흐름을 제대로 파악하는 것을 매우 어렵게 하고 있다.

홍태영 박사의 글은 프랑스 정치문화의 특성으로서 공화주의적 전통을 강조한 것은 좋으나 이것이 글 전체를 관통하여 반복적으로 강조될 정도로 중요한 요인인가 하는 의문이 들기도 하고, 경제조건의 변화에 대한 설명이 전반적으로 부족하다는 약점이 있다. 또 서술방식에 있어 프랑스 사민주의 세력의 이념과 정책의 변화를 중심으로 서술하면서 이에 대한 이해를 돕는 차원에서 시대상의 변화와 프랑스의 사회복지제도의 특성 등에 대한 설명을 배치하는 것이 아니라, 종합적인 시대상의 변화와 프랑스 사회복지제도의 특성에 대한 설명에 지면을 너무 많이 할애하고, 또 복지국가의 유형에 대한 에스핑-안델센(G. Esping-Andersen)의 설명을 장황하게 소개하는 등 글의 흐름을 너무 자주 끊어 놓고 있다.

전반적으로 필자들간에 서술방식의 표준화를 위한 사전 협의가 매우 미흡했던 것 같다. 좋은 학제적 연구를 이루기 위해선 서로 다른 전공분야를 가진 연구자들이 모여 집필하는 것만으로는 부족하고, 연구자들간의 긴밀한 협의를 통해 높은 수준의 입장 공유를 이루어내고 서술방식의 통일성도 달성하는 것이 매우 중요하다는 점을 새삼 느끼게 된다. 또 책의 구성에 있어 책 말미에서 각국 사례 분석의 결과를 통합 정리해준 것은 좋으나 이러한 정리가 별다른 이론적 틀에 기대지 않고 앞부분의 사례 분석들을 요약, 정리해주는 선에 머물러 있다. 책의 서두에서 유럽 사민주의 운동의 이념적, 정책적 특성을 개관해주고 자본주의 발전국면별로 유럽 사민주의 세력의 정책 노선이 변화해오게 된 이유를 자본주의라는 구조적 제약과 사민주의 운동의 정책자율성 사이의 관계 차원에서 일반론적으로 설명해 주었더라면 더 낫지 않았을까 하는 생각도 든다. 그리고 이러한 일반론적 설명을 바탕에 깔고나서 각국 사례를 분석했더라면 사민주의 운동의 일반적 성격과 각국의 특수한 조건을 반영하는 각국 사민주의 운동의 특수성과 편차를 더 입체적으로 보여줄 수 있었을 것 같다.

또한 자본운동의 세계화라는 압력에 어떻게 대응할 것인가 하는 문제와 관련하여 각국 사민주의 세력 내에서 전개된 논쟁을 좀더 자세히 소개해주었으면 좋았을 것 같다. 그렇게 했더라면 향후 정치경제적 여건의 변화에 따라 서유럽 사민주의자들이 새로이 선택할 수 있는 정책노선의 폭이 어느 정도인지를 독자들이 예상하는 데 도움을 줄 수 있었을 것이다.

Some readings in Liberalism

자료 1: Political Philosophy (출처: Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

a. Liberalism

The term “liberalism” conveys two distinct positions in political philosophy, the one a pro-individualist theory of people and government, the second a pro-statist or what is better termed a “social democratic” conception. Students of political philosophy ought to be aware of the two schools of thought that reside under the same banner to avoid philosophical confusions that can be resolved by a clarification of terms. The “Great Switch,” as cultural historian Jacques Barzun notes, took place in the late Nineteenth Century, a switch which was the product of shifting the political ground towards socialist or social democratic policies under the banner of liberal parties and politics.

Etymologically, the former is the sounder description since liberalism is derived from the word “liberty,” that is, freedom and toleration rather than notions of justice and intervention that took on board in the Twentieth Century. Yet, the pro-statist connotation pervades modern thinking so much so that it is difficult to separate its notions from the previous meanings without re-classifying one or the other. The former is often referred to as ‘classical liberalism’ leaving the latter unchanged or adapted to “social democratic liberalism,” which is a rather confusing mouthful; “modern liberalism” is an easier term to wield and shall be used unless the emphasis is laid upon the socialist leanings of such modern liberals.

In the broadest, presently popularly accepted term the modern liberal accepts rights against the person and rights to entitlements such as health care and education. The two positions do not sit well philosophically however, for they produce a host of potential and recurrent inconsistencies and contradictions that can only be resolved by stretching the definition of freedom to include the freedom to succeed (or freedom to resources) rather than the freedom to try. This sometimes generates difficult and perhaps insurmountable problems for those who seek to merge the classical and modern doctrines; nonetheless, the (modern) liberal project is actively pursued by modern thinkers such as J.S. Mill, John Rawls, Will Kymlicka, Ronald Dworkin and others. For these writers, the historical emphasis on toleration, plurality and justice underscore their work; they differ on their interpretation of toleration, public and private roles, and the perceived need for opportunities to be created or not. Some modern liberals, however, do try to remove themselves from classical liberalism (for example, Kymlicka) and therefore become more like ‘social democrats’, that is, humanitarians of a socialist bent who assert the primacy of minorities and even individuals to partake freely in the democratic processes and political dialogues, or whose emphasis on equality demands an active and interventionist state that classical liberals would reject.

Dworkin, for example, claims justice is the essential motif of liberalism and that the state’s duty is to ensure a just and fair opportunity for all to compete and flourish in a civil society. That may require active state intervention in some areas – areas that classical liberals would reject as being inadmissible in a free economy. Dworkin’s position emanates from Aristotle’s ethical argument that for a person to pursue the good life he requires a certain standard of living. Poverty is not conducive to pursuing the contemplative life, hence many modern liberals are attracted to redistributive or welfare policies. Such fairness in opportunity to create equal opportunities underpins John Stuart Mill’s liberalism for example. However, the modern liberal’s emphasis on equality is criticized by classical liberals who argue that people are neither born equal nor can be made equal: talents (and motivation) are distributed unequally across a population, which means that attempts to reduce men and women to the same status will imply a reduction in the ability (or freedom) of the more talented to act and to strive for their own progression. Similarly, the modern liberal’s criticism of inherited wealth is chastised as being misplaced: although the policy connects well to the desire to ensure an equal start for all, not all parents’ gifts to their children are monetary in nature. Indeed, some, following Andrew Carnegie’s self-help philosophy, may contend that monetary inheritances can be counter-productive, fostering habits of dependency.

Both modern and classical liberals may refer to the theory of a social contract to justify either their emphasis on the free realm of the individual or the fostering of those conditions liberals in general deem necessary for human flourishing. Classical liberals derive their theory of the social contract initially from Thomas Hobbes’s model (in Leviathan) in which individuals in a state of nature would come together to form a society. Liberals of both variations have never believed such a contract ever took place, but use the model to assess the present status of society according to criteria they believe the contract should include. Hobbes leaned towards a more authoritarian version of the contract in which individuals give up all political rights (except that of self-preservation which he sees as a natural, inalienable right) to the sovereign political body whose primary duty is to ensure the peace; John Locke leaned towards a more limited government (but one that could justly take the alienable life of an aggressor); Rousseau sought a thoroughly democratic vision of the social contract; and more recently Rawls has entertained what rights and entitlements a social contract committee would allot themselves if they had no knowledge and hence prejudices of each other.

Both classical and modern liberals agree that the government has a strict duty towards impartiality and hence to treating people equally, and that it should also be neutral in its evaluation of what the good life is. This neutrality is criticized by non-liberals who claim that the assumed neutrality is in fact a reflection of a specific vision of human nature or progress, and although critics disagree what that vision may entail, their claim prompts liberals to justify the underlying assumption that promotes them to accept such issues as: equal treatment by the law and by the state; liberty to pursue one’s life as one sees fit; the right to private property, and so on.

Nonetheless, broad liberalism accepts and emphasizes that people ought to be tolerant towards their fellow men and women. The modern importance of toleration stems from the Renaissance and post-Reformation reactions to the division in the Church and the ensuing persecutions against heterodoxy. Freedom in religious belief extends to other realms of human activity that do not negatively affect neighbors, for example in sexual or romantic activities, the consumption of narcotics, and the perusal of pornography. But what is philosophically more important is that the liberal doctrine of toleration permits the acceptance of errors – that in pursuing the ethical good life and hence the appropriate political life, people may make mistakes and should be permitted to learn and adapt as they see fit; or, alternatively, that people have a right to live in ignorance or to pursue knowledge as they think best. This is held in common with political conservatives who are somewhat more pessimistic and skeptical of our abilities than most liberals. Classical and modern liberals do unite in expressing a skepticism towards experts knowing what is in the best interest of others, and thus liberals tend to reject any interference in people’s lives as unjustifiable and, from utilitarian point of view, counter-productive. Life, for the liberal, should be led from the inside (self-oriented) rather than outside (other- imposed); but modern liberals add that individuals ought to be provided with the resources to ensure that they can live the good life as they see fit. The classical liberal retort is who will provide those resources and to what age should people be deemed incapable of learning or striving by themselves?

Despite such differences over policy, liberals – of both the social democratic and classical strain – predominantly hold an optimistic view of human nature. In modern philosophy the position is derived from Locke’s psychological theory from An Essay on Human Understanding that people are born without innate ideas and hence his environment, upbringing, and experiences fashion him: for classical liberals this implies a thorough rejection of inherited elitism and hence of supposed natural political hierarchies in which power resided with dynasties; for modern liberals this implies the potential for forging appropriate conditions for any individual to gain a proper education and opportunities.

Liberals applaud those institutions that reason sustains as being conducive to human freedoms: classical liberals emphasizing those institutions that protect the negative freedoms (rights against aggression and theft) and social democratic liberals the positive freedoms (rights to a certain standard of living). If an institution is lacking according to a critical and rational analysis – failing in its duty to uphold a certain liberal value – then it is to be reorganized for the empowerment of humanity. At this juncture, liberals also divide between deontological (Rawls) and utilitarian theorists (Mill). Most classical liberals ascribe to a general form of utilitarianism in which social institutions are to be reorganized along lines of benefiting the greatest number. This attracts criticism from conservatives and deontologists – according to what ends? – according to whose analysis? – comprising which people? and so on. Deontologists are not precluded from supporting liberalism (Immanuel Kant is the most influential thinker in that regard), for they hold that the proper society and hence political institutions should generate those rules and institutions that are right in themselves, regardless of the particular presumed ends we are seeking (for example, happiness).

Modern liberals lean towards a more interventionist government, and as such they place more emphasis on the ability of the state to produce the right political sphere for humanity and thusly emphasize reform projects more than classical liberals or conservatives. Peace, to choose one example, could be brought to warring peoples or natives if only they admit to the clearly defined and rational proposals of the liberal creed – that is, they should release themselves from parochial prejudices and superstitions and submit to the cosmopolitanism of liberal toleration and peace. The variants here – as in the host of applied subjects – are broad ranging: some liberals espouse the need to secure peace through the provision of a healthy standard of living (effected by appropriate redistribution policies from rich countries to poor); others promote the free market as a necessary condition for the growth of the so-called “soft morals” of commerce; while others emphasize the need for dialogue and mutual understanding through multi-cultural educational programs. These kind of programs, the modern liberals argue, ideally should be implemented by the world community through international bodies such as the UN rather than unilaterally which could arouse complaints against imperialist motives; however, once the beneficial classical or modern liberal framework is created, the state and political institutions ought to remain ethically neutral and impartial: the state is to be separated from imposing itself on or subsidizing any belief system, cultural rites, forms of behavior or consumption (so long as they do not interfere in the lives of others).

The liberal seeks the best form of government which will permit the individual to pursue life as he or she sees fit within a neutral framework, and it is the possibility of a neutral framework that critics challenge the liberal ideal.

자료 2: Classical Liberalism, Libertarianism, and Individualism, by Jonathan Dolhenty, Ph.D. , (출처: The Radical Academy)

자료 3: Liberalism: Ideology and social philosophy, by Paul Treanor

자료 4: The ethics of the free market: why market liberalism is wrong, by Paul Treanor

[자료] Medicating Pippy

자료: http://www.docdiller.com/oped/52-medicating-pippy.html
지은이(By): Lawrence Diller
Los Angeles Times, December 27, 1999

* * *

Pippy Longstocking just left my office on Ritalin. Of course that ís not her real name. Her name could be Kayley, Anna, Natalie or that of a half-dozen other girls I saw this week at my behavioral pediatrics practice in an affluent suburb east of San Francisco.

Eleven year old Pippy was not performing up to her potential at her private school according to her teacher. She daydreamed and when called upon was often not prepared to answer. She could be silly in the classroom. This girl in my office demonstrated academic skills two grade levels above average. She spoke to me cogently and thoughtfully about her life. She dreamt about living on a ranch with many animals. She did act a bit nervous and giggly with her parents and more serious younger brother. But she did not seem to me like a serious case of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and I told her parents so. I didn't think she needed medication at this time. I suggested that we work on making consequences more immediate for Pippy at home and at school and if she still was struggling a few months from now perhaps Ritalin could be tried then.

Pippy's mom asked me if there was really anything bad about taking Ritalin and if not, why not do it now so that Pippy could do better in school immediately. I said that most children and adults have little problem taking Ritalin and that it was probably pretty safe. It works the same on children and adults, ADHD or not, to improve focus and attention on tasks found boring or difficult. Pippy's dad, uneasy about using a drug that also had abuse potential, thought they should wait.

The family came back to see me a week later. Dad had changed his mind. Another doctor felt Pippy had mild ADHD and gave them a prescription. Pippy apparently felt okay about taking it. The prescribing doctor had only left the instructions on the bottle, 1 to 3 tablets per day. They asked me to tell them more about using the medication. I internally shrugged and started to tell them how to titrate the optimal dose and frequency using a teacher feedback sheet. They left happy. I felt strange.

I find myself evaluating and prescribing medication for more and more Pippys and Tom Sawyers. These seemingly normal children are inattentive or disinterested in school and bit slow to finish their chores at home. Concerned and loving parents bring them in because the children aren't performing up to their potential or are disruptive in their classrooms.

Ritalin production is up 700% in the decade. Dexedrine and Adderall production, the other two stimulants used for ADHD, has tripled in the past three years. America uses 85% of the world's stimulants. While school age boys remain the largest users of Ritalin, girls and adults are the most rapidly increasing groups taking the drug.

The Colorado State Board of Education, concerned about too many Pippys on medication, recently passed a resolution which made national headlines, discouraging teachers from referring children to doctors for evaluations and prescriptions.

Russell Barkley, arguably the leading theorist and researcher on ADHD, has said that the use of stimulants for ADHD will be seen as one of the great discoveries of the late 20th century. I'm not so sure. Even as I prescribe more and more Ritalin to help round and octagonal peg children fit into square educational holes, I know that Barkley, himself, is worried about the trivialization of the disorder. While several surveys say we are still under treating ADHD, regional variations in treatment widely vary. In some rural areas virtually no children get Ritalin. Yet in Virginia Beach one in five white fifth grade boys receive Ritalin at school.

Ritalin fits our current biological model of ADHD. Training parents and modifying classrooms also help but some say these interventions are too costly and less effective than medication. That may be so in which case I wish to offer a Swiftian Modest Proposal of my own. With classroom sizes now averaging about 30 kids per class and about four million children taking Ritalin I propose we increase the number of children taking Ritalin to seven million and we could probably increase class size to 45 children and save a lot of money.

Ritalin works but I don't see it as the moral equivalent or substitute for better parenting and schools for our children. Currently, our country has an intolerance for temperamental diversity in our children. I worry about an America where there is no place for an unmedicated Pippy Longstocking.

전진하는 새벽

.
.
갑자기 “전진하는 새벽”을 부르고 싶어진다.

적진으로 떠난 사람과 안녕을 고하고,
아니 그가 고집하는 적진을 버리고
새로이 맞은 세상.

고독과 가난과 가족밖에 없는 세상이지만
거기서 기꺼이 기쁨을 찾아보자고 했던 동지를 만나,
봄날의 따사로움과 매서운 한파를 같이 견디었건만
현실은 여전히 녹록지 않다.

동지가 괴로워한다.
고독과 추위와 권태와 불안과 공허감에 괴로워한다.

힘이 되어주고 싶지만
나의 싸움을 통해 그와 함께 열어갈 짧은 생을 축복하고 싶지만
오감과 육체를 조이는 현실의 고통을 해결해주기는 아직 시간이 부족하다.

동지여, 그대를 위해 부른다.

쏟아지는 빗발 뚫고 오던 무거운 어깨
말없이 동녘 응시하던 동지의 젖은 눈빛
이제사 떠오니 당신은 깃발로 ... 깃.발.로!
두견으로 외쳐대던 사선의 혈기로
약속한다 그대를 믿고 전진하는 새벽

[자료] Marie Jahoda, social psychologist

자료 1: Obituary, The Independent (2001년 5월)

자료 2: Wikipedia

[자료] 산업사회와 노동문제

자료 1: 유럽의 산업화와 노동계급(광주대학교 이영석 교수): 1장 요약, 3장 요약

자료 2: 독일 노동문학의 역사와 현재적 의미: 조규희(한국외대), 독일문학 제87집

※ 발췌:

• 그렇지만 노동문학의 의미는 끊임없이 변화되고 있는 ‘노동(세계)’ 개념 그 자체에서 확인된다. 오늘날 노동이란 대체 무엇인가? 노동이 이루어지는 노동세계가 아직도 다른 생활영역과 뚜렷이 구분되는 전통적 ‘작업장’의 의미를 갖고 있는가? 1998년 IMF 위기 이후 본격화된 산업구조조정으로 우리사회에서는 1차, 2차 생산세계를 뜻하는 노동이 지속하기는 하나 ‘과거의 노동세계’로 밀려나는 추세에 있다. 서구에서와 같이 기업합리화라는 명분아래 생산직, 육체 노동자 등의 ‘낡은’ 노동자계급은 거리로 내몰리고, 대신 정보서비스기술산업에 대한 투자가 확장되었다. 노동세계의 이러한 구조적 변화와 함께 ‘비정규직’ 노동은 일상의 삶으로까지 널리 확대되어 있다. 바야흐로 노동은 ‘공장 밖’의 일상으로 확대되어 가고 있다.

[자료] The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis

자료: source1, source2(sciencemag), joster.org, source4,

• Author(s): Lynn White, Jr.
• Source: Science, New Series, Vol. 155, No. 3767 (Mar. 10, 1967), pp. 1203-1207
• Published by: American Association for the Advancement of Science
• Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1720120

※ The author is professor of history at the University of California, Los Angeles. This is the text of a lecture delivered 26 December 1966 at the Washington meeting of the AAAS.

※ First three paragraphs:

A conversation with Aldous Huxley not infrequently put one at the receiving end of an unforgettable monologue. About a year before his lamented death he was discoursing on a favorite topic: Man's unnatural treatment of nature and its sad results. To illustrate his point he told how, during the previous summer, he had returned to a little valley in England where he had spent many happy months as a child. Once it had been composed of delightful grassy 'glades; now it was becomming overgrown with unsightly brush because the rabbits that formerly kept such growth under control had largely succumbed to a disease, yxomatosis, that was deliberately introduced by the local farmers to reduce the rabbits' destruction of crops. Being something of a Philistine, I could be silent no longer, even in the interests of great rhetoric. I interrupted to point out that the rabbit itself had been brought as a domestic animal to England in 1176, presumably to improve the protein diet of the peasantry.

All forms of life modify their contexts. The most spectacular and benign instance is doubtless the coral polyp. By serving its own ends, it has created a vast undersea world favorable to thousands of other kinds of animals and plants. Ever since man became a numerous species he has affected his environment notably. The hypothesis that his fire-drive method of hunting created the world's great grasslands and helped to exterminate; the monster mammals of the Pleistocene from much of the globe is plausible, if not proved., For 6 millennia at least, the banks of the lower Nile have been a human artifact rather than the swampy African jungle which nature, apart from man, would have made it. The Aswan Dam, flooding 5000 square miles, is only the latest stage in a long process. In many regions terracing or irrigation, overgrazing, the cutting of forests by Romans to build ships to fight Carthaginians or by Crusaders to solve the logistics problems of their expeditions, have profoundly changed some ecologies. Observation that the French landscape falls into two basic types, the open fields of the north and the bocage of the south and west, inspired Marc Bloch to undertake his classic study of medieval agricultural methods. Quite unintentionally, changes in human ways often affect nonhuman nature. It has been noted, for example, that the advent of the automobile eliminated huge flocks of sparrows that once fed on the horse manure littering every street.

The history of ecologic change is still so rudimentary that we know little about what really happened, or what the results were. The extinction of the European aurochs as late as 1627 would seem to have been a simple case of overenthusiastic hunting. On more intricate matters it often is impossible to find solid information. For a thousand years or more the Frisians and Hollanders have been pushing back the North Sea, and the process is culminating in our own time in the reclamation of the Zuider Zee. What, if any, species of animals, birds, fish, shore life, or plants have died out in the process? In their epic combat with Neptune have the Netherlanders overlooked ecological values in such a way that the quality of human life in the Netherlands has suffered? I cannot discover that the questions have ever been asked, much less answered.

(... continued on some of the source links marked above)

※ & some more excerpt:

(... ...) What did Christianity tell people about their relations with the environment?

While many of the world's mythologies provide stories of creation, Greco-Roman mythology was singularly incoherent in this respect. Like Aristotle, the intellectuals of the ancient West denied that the visible world had had a beginning. Indeed, the idea of a beginning was impossible in the framewrok of their cyclical notion of time. In sharp contrast, Christianity inherited from Judaism not only a concept of time as nonrepetitive and linear but also a striking story of creation. By gradual stages a loving and all-powering God had created light and darkness, the heavenly bodies, the earth and all its plants, animals, birds, and fishes. Finally, God had created Adam and, as an afterthouht, Eve to keep man from being lonely. Man named all the animals, thus establishing his dominance over them. God planned all of this explicitly for man's benefit and rule: no item in the physical creation had any purpose save to serve man's purposes. And, although man's body is made of clay, he is not simply part of nature: he is made in God's image.

Especially in its Western form, Christianity is the most anthropocentric religion the world has seen. As early as the 2nd century both Tertullian and Saint Irenaeus of Lyon were insisting that when God shaped Adam he was foreshadowing the image of the incarnate Christ, the second Adam. Man shares, in great measure, God's transcendence of nature. Christianity, in absolute contrast to ancient paganism and Asia's religions (except, perhaps, Zoroastrianism), not only established a dualism of man and nature but also insisted that it is God's will that man exploit nature for his proper ends.

At the level of the common people this worked out in an interesting way. In Antiquity every tree, every spring, every stream, every hill had its own genius loci, its guardian spirit. These spirits were accessible to men, but were very unlike men; centaurs, fauns, and mermaids show their ambivalence. Before one cut a tree, minded a mountain, or dammed a brook, it was important to placate the spirit in charge of that particular situation, and to keep it placated. By destroying pagan animism, Christianity made it possible to exploit nature in a mood of indifference to the feelings of natural objects.

It is often said that for animism the Church substituted the cult of saints. True; but the cult of saints is functionally quite different from animism. The saints is not ^in^ natural objects; he may have special shrines, but his citizenship is in heaven. Moreover, a saint is entirely a man; he can be approached in human terms. In addition to saints, Christianity of course also had angels and demons inherited from Judaism and perhaps at one remove, from Zoroastrianism. But these were all as mobile as the saints themselves. The spirits ^in^ natural objects, which formerly had protected nature from man, evaporate. Man's effective monopoly on spirit in this world was confirmed, and the old inhibitions to the exploitation of nature crumbled. (...)

The Christian dogma of creation, which is found in the first clause of all the Creeds, has another meaning for our comprehension of today's ecological crisis. By revelation, God had given man the Bible, the Book of Scripture. But since God had made nature, nature also must reveal the divine mentality. The religious study of nature for the better understanding of God was known as natural theology. In the early Church, and always in the Greek East, nature was conceived primarily as a symbolic system through which God speaks to men: the ant is a semon to sluggards; rising flames are the symbol of the soul's aspiration. This view of nature was essentially artisitic rather scientific. (...)

What we do about ecology depends on our ideas of the man-nature relationship. More science and more technology are not going to get us out of the present ecological crisis until we find a new religion, or rethink our old one. (...)

Dic: hold (some of its intransitve usages)

12 [VERB] V | If part of a structure holds, it does not fall or break although there is a lot of force or pressure on it.

• How long would the roof hold?

13 [VERB] V | If laws or rules hold, they exist and remain in force.

• These laws also hold for universities.

10 [VERB] V, V | If a good situation holds, it continues and does not get worse or fail.

• Our luck couldn't hold for ever.
• Would the weather hold?

11 [VERB] V | If an argument or theory holds, it is true or valid, even after close examination.

• Today, most people think that argument no longer holds.

..... Cobuild

What is Critical Thinking

자료: Main site: http://www.class.uidaho.edu/crit_think/ctw-m/index.htm

• Introduction
• Argument Identification
• Argument Reconstruction
• Argument Evaluation
• Glossary
• Links

[자료]FALLING BEHIND

자료: http://www.unicef-irc.org/files/documents/d-3802-Falling-behind.pdf

출처: UNICEF

지은이(By): Peter Adamson

※ 메모: 자료의 발생 시기를 알려면 상위 디렉토리의 공개 자료 목록을 뒤져봐야 하지만, 그럴 시간은 지금 없다 (나중으로)

※ 개요 발췌:

Some children will always fall below the average, whether in health, wealth, or education. And some will always be in the bottom 10%. So much is obvious. But here’s a trickier question. How far behind is too far? Is there a point beyond which falling behind is not unavoidable but unacceptable, not inequality but inequity?

A report issued this month by UNICEF’s Innocenti Research Centre in Florence tries to answer this question. It shows that some countries are allowing children to fall much further behind than others. And it argues that the consequences are enormous for the economy and for society as well as for the children themselves.

[자료] 미래세대와 신앙교육

자료: 미래세대와 신앙교육: 다중적 앎과 다중적 경험의 문화세대 위한 교육목회적 대안
지은이: 김영래 박사 (감리교신학대학교, 기독교교육학 교수)
출처: 제36회 청암논단 (2003년6월25일) 주사랑 장로교회 에서

※ 검색어: participating consciousness

※ 발췌 메모:
(...) 그러면 이제 EPIC 교회모델을 토대로 다중적 앎의 기독교 교육적 함의를 간단히 살펴보자.

(1) 경험적 앎: 전통적 교육은 경험을 학습의 한 요소로 보지 않았다. 오히려 Paulo Friere가 말하는 "은행저축식(banking)" 개념을 지지했다. 은행저축식 개념의 가장 큰 문제점은 학습자가 교육을 의미 있고 상관성 있게 만들 수 있는 행동(action)이 배제되어있다는 점이다. 때문에 전통적 교육에 의존한 기독교교육은 행동이 수반되지 않는 앎의 문제라는 치명적 결함을 가지게 된 것이다. 그러면 어떻게 경험적 앎을 기독교교육에 포함시킬 것인가? David Kold는 첫째, 인식과 의미를 가져올 활동적 실험과 발견을 통해 앎을 경험할 수 있으며, 둘째, 추상적 개념들을 형성하기 위해 환경 속에서 구체적 행동을 통해 경험적 앎을 갖게 되고, 셋째, 공동체의 사회적 삶에서의 생산적 관여와 참여가 경험적 앎을 가능하게 한다고 했다.
David Kolb가 지적하듯이 학습에는 반드시 활동적 요소를 가지고 있어야 하며, 바로 이 같은 앎이 바로 Friere가 말하는 프락시스가 되는 것이다. 이러한 앎의 활동은 학습자로 하여금 학습을 일차원적 사고로 조직하는 것에서 벗어나, 지식은 사고(사고의 행동: actions of the mind)와 행동(육체의 행동: actions of the body)의 연합을 통해 구성되게 되는 것이다. 이러한 맥락에서 기독교교육에서도 놀이와 작업을 통한 학습은 매우 중요한 의미를 지닌다. 즉 앎과 삶이 별개의 것이 아니라 하나의 통합적 작용이라는 것을 활동을 통해 인지되고, 경험되며, 신념화 될 수 있게 되는 것이다.

(2) 참여적 앎: 물리학자인 John Wheeler는 "우리는 '관찰자(observer)'라는 낡은 말을 지워 버리고, 이를 '참여자(participator)'라는 말로 대치해야 한다"고 하였다. 사실상 앎의 주체와 앎의 대상이 분리된 앎이란 존재하지 않는다. 단지 그렇게 상정해왔을 뿐이다. 참여된 의식(participating consciousness)이라 불리 우는 Michael Polanyi의 인식론에 의하면 지식에는 촛점적(focal)인 것과 부수적(subsidiary)인 것이 있는데, 촛점적 지식은 인식자의 집중된 관심이 대상에 대한 정보를 획득하는 것이고, 부수적 지식은 인식자가 사용하는 대상 그 자체를 넘어서는 실마리 또는 도구로 사용되는 지식을 말한다. 즉 망치로 못을 치는 지식은 촛점적 지식(명시적 지식: explicit knowledge)에 해당하며, 망치를 들고 있는 손에 저장된 지식이 부수적 지식(암묵적 지식: tacit knowledge)이 되는 것이다. 그리고 이러한 과정의 가운데 인식자가 참여하게 되는 것이다.
이러한 참여된 의식을 촉진시키는 기독교 교육적 방법 중 대표적인 예로 이야기 들려주기(storytelling)를 생각해 볼 수 있을 것이다. Jeanette Brown에 의하면 "이야기는 우리와 같은 사람들의 행동양식의 결과를 깨닫고 느끼게 만드는 이야기의 주인공들이 사는 방식 속에 우리 자신을 동일시하게 하는 역할을 한다"고 했다. 다시 말해 참여란 단지 정보나 사실을 듣는 것을 넘어서 이야기의 사건에 한 부분이 된다는 것을 뜻한다. 더 나아가 이야기 들려주기는 이야기를 나누고 배우면서 다양한 활동과 경험 속에 참여하게 하여 학습자로 하여금 자신의 삶에 주체적 참여자가 되도록 하는 것이다.

(3) 이미지 추구적/상호작용적 앎: Gregor T. Goethals가 지적하였듯이 대중 미디어의 영향력이 점차 증대되면서 이를 통해 묘사되는 이미지는 권위의 상징과 공동의 가치를 전달하는 역할을 담당하고 있다. 미디어 시대를 살고 있는 세대들에게 영상적 이미지로 전달되는 내용은 문자보다 더욱 강력한 인상을 남기는 것이 또한 사실이다. 때문에 시청각교육의 중요성이 대두되는 것은 지극히 당연한 결과라고 볼 수 있다. 살펴보면 이미지의 교육적 역할은 결코 새로운 현상은 아니다. 아테네의 아크로폴리스나 올림피아와 델피의 다양한 이미지들은 이미 교육적 기능을 수행해왔다. 다시 말해 신전의 조각상들은 교육을 받지 못한 사람들이 신화들을 시각적 이해할 수 있도록 돕는 역할을 해왔던 것이다. 기독교 전통에서 살펴보면 초대교회에서 중세에 이르기까지 교회는 이미지를 통한 메시지의 표현과 전달에 적극적이었다. 그러나 종교개혁 이후 현대에 이르기까지 문자 중심의 논리적 소통이 주도적 위치를 차지하면서 상대적으로 이미지에 의한 메시지의 전달은 객관성이 결여된 신뢰할 수 없는 방법으로 치부되었다.
그러나 영상을 포함하는 대중 미디어의 등장은 지식의 형성과 경험의 양상을 전환시키는 결정적인 역할을 하였다. Margaret R. Mills "이미지는 [이것을 경험하는] 이의 삶의 상황과 태도와 가치가 개인화 되고 무의식적 선택에 적합하게 된 메시지의 관심을 가진 인지를 허락한다"고 하였다. 다시 말해 이미지는 개인에 따라 다양한 해석을 가능하게 하며 그 해석은 자신의 삶의 상황에 연관을 가지는 생명력 있는 지식 경험을 이루게 된다는 것이다. 앎에 있어서 일차적 경험이 요구되는 신앙교육에 있어서 이미지는 특별한 의미를 지닌다고 볼 수 있다. 그러므로 이미지 추구적 앎은 "시각을 통한 이해(to understand through the eyes)"를 가지고 다양한 해석과 창조를 필요로 하는 포스트모던 상황에서 언어적 추상적 앎이 가지는 단편성과 편협성을 극복하는 적극적 방안으로 인정되어야 하는 것이다. 그래서 Joseph C. Pearce는 기독교교육자는 반드시 "눈을 감고 바로 앞에 존재하지 않는 사물의 이미지를 만들어 낼 수 있어야 한다"고 주장하였다.

(4) 연결적/공동체적 앎: 연결적 앎은 모든 앎의 대상은 서로 밀접히 연결되어 있으며, 서로가 서로를 위해 존재한다는 사실을 인식하게 하는 것이다. 어떠한 진리도 독립적이며 객관적으로 존재할 수 없으며, 상관성과 전체성이라는 원리에 의해 이해되어지는 것이다. 이러한 이해는 현재 전지구적으로 당면한 환경과 생태학적 문제(environmental and ecological issues)에 대한 생태신학적 해법으로서 그 중요성을 가진다. 사실상 우리는 오랫동안 Charles Dawin의 적자생존이론에 근거하여, 강자와 약자 사이에 형성된 먹이사슬(food chain)의 관계로 세상을 이해해왔다. 그러나 존재하는 모든 것은 서로의 생존을 위해 협조하는 먹이망(food net)의 틀에 속에서 논의되어야 하는 것이다. 바로 이러한 연유에서 연결적 앎은 생명력 있는 지식을 생성해내는 요건이 되는 셈이다.
한편 공동체적 앎에 대한 언급하자면, 지식은 본래 자율성(autonomy)을 이상으로 하는 전통적 인식론적 구조에 의해 이해되어져 왔기 때문에 개인적 노력이라고 여겨졌다. 또한 자율적 인간은 자기충족적(self-sufficient)이며, 독립적(independent)이어야 한다고 생각했다. 따라서 이러한 자율성의 이해는 개인주의를 고무시켜왔다. 이러한 개인주의는 결국 공동체적 관계의 유형을 손상시키는 결과를 가져왔다. 학습자들은 다른 사람들과의 협조를 통해 학습한다. 학습자가 다른 사람들로부터 소외되지 않고 대화, 협력, 협조가 일어나는 학습자 공동체의 일부일 때 가장 활발히 학습하게 된다. 전통적 인식론적 구성은 지식형성의 중심으로 개인에 초점을 맞추어왔다. 개인주의적 인식론은 그것이 기독교의 신앙과 일치하거나, 기독교 신앙형성에 효과적인가에 대한 적절한 분석 없이 무의식적으로 우리의 목회와 교육의 많은 부분을 구성해왔다...[결국] 개인주의라는 문화적 환경은 기독교 신앙형성과 목회에 대한 제한점들을 보지 못하게 했다. Maureen R. O'brien은 비판적 사고(critical thinking)보다 연결을 맺는 것(making connections)이 참된 실천신학의 모습이라고 했다.

*********
Newton과 Descartes로부터 이어져 내려오는 분석적 관점은 산업혁명의 시작과 함께 기술적 세계관(a technological worldview)으로 발전하면서 경험적 논리와 증명을 중시하는 서구 사상의 기초를 제공하였다. 이러한 세계관 아래서 앎의 방법은 피할 수 없이 제한되고 축소될 수밖에 없었다. 또한 교육은 학습의 다양한 가능성을 격려하기보다는 제약하고, 무엇보다도 학습자 자신의 잠재적 앎의 기회를 확장시키지 못하는 방향으로 흐를 수밖에 없었다. 그러나 최근에 일고있는 생태학적 세계관(ecological worldview)은 통전성과 전인성의 가치를 인정하면서 전뇌사고(whole-brain thought), 연역과 귀납의 융합, 이성적, 그리고 직관적 앎의 통합을 통해 이해와 경험의 지평을 넓히려고 하고 있다. 특별히 이성과 계시의전영역을 다루는 기독교교육에 있어서 이러한 세계관을 바탕으로 한 앎의 방법의 다양화는 중요하고 시급한 과제라고 하지 않을 수 없다. 이러한 측면에서 Leonard Sweet이 제시한 EPIC 교회모델로부터 발전시킨 경험적, 참여적, 이미지추구적/상호적, 연결적/공동체적 앎은 미래를 맞이하고 있는 교육과 신학에 있어서 계속적으로 연구되고 적용되어야 할 주제라고 생각한다.

[자료] Some readings in participating consciousness

자료 1: An epistemology of "participating consciousness": Overcoming the epistemological rupture of self and world

지은이: Sharon Warner
출처: Religious Education, Spring 1998

※ 메모(Except):

Abstract

This paper posits that the "age of disbelief" is rooted in both Cartesian and positivistic epistemologies. The primary thrust of both of these epistemologies is a decisive separation between self and world. This paper explores the problems of such a separation and proposes an alternative epistemology, an epistemology of "participating consciousness." Drawing upon the work of Michael Polanyi, the paper uses the constructs of tacit knowing, indwelling, and fiduciary commitment to explicate how an epistemology of "participating consciousness" overcomes the self-world rupture. Faith knowing shaped by this epistemology is a knowing of integrative wholeness.

INTRODUCTION

In his book, Coloring Outside the Lines, John Westfall tells the following story:

The Seattle Mariners, when owned by George Argyros, created a surprising controversy by firing God. It seems that God was being blamed for their losing seasons. The Owner thought that if he could just get God out of the locker room, the team might win more games. He thought there were too many Christians on the team, and that prayer and Bible study were causing them to lose ball games.... To my dismay, the director of the council of Churches agreed with [Argyros's] position. "If those players want to meet God, they can go to church like everyone else," he said. "They shouldn't take God into the locker room anymore than you would expect a banker to take his (sic) faith into the bank when he goes to work." (1991, 32-33)

The "culture of disbelief," as Stephen Carter has described it, is a culture in which religion is banished from the public square and its discourse relegated to the private affairs of its believers. In such a culture, Carter explains, religion is fine in private, "but there is something askew when those private beliefs become the basis for public action." Since public discourse and action are "bounded by requirements of rationality and reason," religious discourse and action are to be avoided. "The consistent message of modern American society is that whenever the demands of one's religion conflict with what one has to do to get ahead, one is expected to ignore the religious demands and act . . . well . . . rationally." This expectation, that religious belief can and should be left behind as one enters all public life, "reinforces the vision of religion as an arbitrary and essentially unimportant factor in the makeup of one's personality, as easily shrugged off as a favorite color" (1993, 8, 42, 13, 56). Carter argues that such superficial treatment of religious life within the public sphere shapes a "culture of disbelief."

Carter's provocative probe into modern American culture implicates many issues of cultural analysis. But one of the most fundamental is the epistemological roots of this "culture of disbelief." This "culture of disbelief ' is a product of our way of knowing the world. The ways we attempt to know and understand the world intimately shape our relationship with the world. Douglas Sloan says this well:

[O]ur ways of knowing directly affect the way we relate to the world and, hence, the kind of world we create for ourselves through our institutions, our technologies, and our conceptions of reality. The world we apprehend and live in is structured by our consciousness. (1982, 2)

Because the way we relate within our culture is shaped by our epistemology, it is important to ask epistemological questions as we try to understand what is going on in our culture. What kind of knower and knowledge is shaping (and is being shaped by) this culture of disbelief? What kind of knowing process is demanded by such a culture? What are the alternatives? These epistemological underpinnings of a culture of disbelief are crucial to discern, for as we name and, when need be, reform that epistemology, we find ourselves reshaping our public life, our culture.

The epistemological psyche of the culture of disbelief is formed and rooted deep in the mind of Cartesian thought. But there are epistemological alternatives. The splitting of the public and private self of religious people demanded by a culture of disbelief is grounded in the Cartesian epistemological split of self and world. In tension with this epistemological psyche is an epistemology of "participating consciousness." By an epistemology of participation we can begin to shape a public life and culture where the pluralism of modern life as well as the religious commitments of many are respected in the public square. The following discussion seeks to expose the Cartesian epistemological roots of this culture of disbelief and outline the contours of a more holistic epistemology

LOGIC OF CARTESIAN AND MODERN EPISTEMOLOGY

The process of knowing takes place through the relation between self and world. The modern epistemological assumptions about the relation between self and world are a product of the reformulation of self-world relations in the 16th and 17th centuries. The revolutionary work of Galileo Galilei, Sir Isaac Newton, and Francis Bacon laid the foundation for the epistemology of the scientific era. However, the hinge point of the transformation of self-world relations that characterized this revolution resided in the epistemological propositions of Rene Descartes. (... continued on the source link above)

자료 2: Can humans survive automation?

지은이: Clive Hamilton
출처: Speech to the Manning Clark House conference, "Science and Ethics: Can homo sapiens survive?" Academy of Science, Canberra, 17 May 2005

※ 메모(Except)

(...) In Europe before the sixteenth century the dominant worldview was organic.  People mostly lived in coherent, whole communities in which spiritual and material phenomena were not clearly differentiated.  Individual needs were not so much subordinated to those of the community but found expression through those of the community.  

This is not to deny that these societies were often exploitative and sometimes impoverished, but only to make the point that the way people experienced themselves in the world was radically different from the way we experience ourselves today.  The organic view of the world was reflected in people’s innermost perceptions of themselves and their relationship with their environment.  Morris Berman has written:

The view of nature that predominated in the West down to the eve of the Scientific Revolution was that of an enchanted world.  Rocks, trees, rivers, and clouds were all seen as wondrous, alive, and human beings felt at home in this environment.  The cosmos, in short, was a place of belonging (Berman, 1981, p. 16).

The separation of self, with its detached intellect, that came with the European Enlightenment was unimaginable to those who lived a ‘participating consciousness’. Participating consciousness is the sense within the observing subject that the act of observation is not divorced from the observed, that the external world is alive and can be known through unmediated experience in a way different from that arising from deliberative reflection.  It encompasses the sense that the transformation of the external world is also a transformation of the world within. 

So for those possessed of participating consciousness, mind participates in the world instead of functioning as a detached organ of perception and cognition.  Traditionally, indigenous people have understood that the support the natural world provides to their survival must be repaid by nurturing and recreating the land each day.  In this way there is a mutually sustaining cycle between humans and their natural world just as there is for each creature that plays its own unique role in the reproduction of the cosmic cycle. In modern guise, this is perhaps the central insight of ecology.

(...)

Consciousness

Thus, the story of the modern epoch is one of progressive disenchantment, a transition that involved a profound psychological loss.  The world apprehended by nonparticipating consciousness becomes describable in terms of matter and motion, the twin conceptual pillars of the new ‘mechanical philosophy’. Non-participating consciousness is characterised by the rigid separation of the observer and the observed, subject and object. 

The psychology of non-participation and the self-definition it reflects are reproduced and reinforced every day.  We are bombarded by the ideology of science, the notion that all is knowable, that human development is a process of progressive discovery of a finitely knowable universe.  Every time we learn of a new discovery it suggests that a bit more of the unknown becomes known to us and is thereby conquered.  We have even begun to unlock the mysteries of space, conquering it with space travel, extending the physical boundaries of the known, as though by looking ever further outward we can avoid the pressure to look inward.  

This science of knowing is a science of control; the unknown is outside of us and therefore a threat.  Our non-participation in the world is doubly reinforced by the activities that dominate our societies - work whose aim is to put objects into the market, and recreation. Watching television is the ultimate act of non-participation.  The world is taken away, moulded, packaged and made ‘more exciting’ and then served up behind a glass screen. 

All of this was driven by the rise of commerce and the specific form of rationality that accompanied it.  The rationality of economics and commerce is in no sense timeless and universal.  As the early sociologist Max Weber (1968, p. 376) argued, the essence of modern capitalism lies in its peculiar form of rationality.  Market exchange and wage labour are the pillars of capitalism; market exchange is of its essence rational in the sense that all commitments other than pure economic self-interest are irrelevant. The material progress of the scientific-industrial revolution was built on the idea of calculability. Weber stressed the extraordinary importance of calculability as the basis for efficient capital accounting and thus profit making.  Rational decision-making depends wholly on the ability to calculate outcomes.  There can be no place for intuition. (...)

자료 3: Sensing corporeally: toward a posthuman understanding, Google books,
지은이: Floyd Merrell , University of Toronto Press, 2003

※ 메모:

(...) Figure 30 affords us an image of our lost enchantment of the world in the face of the imperialistic disenchantment that has suffocated sensuousness(signs 111-311) due in large part to the bully tactics of symbolicity(331-333_, the linear, logical, rational, either/or categories of symbolicity. It tells us that Polanyi's subsidiary awareness has made way for obsessive focus on particulars, which fall into predetermined pigeonholes of thought and behaviour. It also tells us that Polanyi's ^distal^ sensations (of 'secondary qualities'), and that Geertz's experience-near and participating consciousness are sent to the back of the tour bus schedules for a visit to those quaint folks at the hoedown, while detached experience-distant enjoys the big window of the bluegrass music. It implies how Wetern objective knowledge sees a two-dimensional strip as nothing more that a strip, whereas participating consciousness senses it in Mobius fashion: it is enfolded and enveloped within the strip, such that inside-outside become continuous with it and it becomes continuous with the strip. (...)

[용어] cosmopolitan, cosmocrat, cosmopolitanization

자료 1: Cosmocrats Bullish on Global Economy, Newsweek (2010년 5월)

The more cosmopolitan you are, the more optimistic you are about economic prospects, or so it seems, according to a new study by HSBC. The bank surveyed more than 2,000 “global citizens” (a.k.a., people who are affluent, well educated, traveled, and often multilingual) in 10 major world cities and found that they were much more bullish on the state of their own personal finances, as well as the health of the global economy, than the average Joe. Seventy-two percent reported no change in personal spending over the last three years, and few fretted about losing a job.
In fact, these high fliers were so optimistic that the majority had not touched their portfolio allocations (which are more diversified globally than those of the average Western investor) from 2008 onward, despite the financial crisis. According to Andy Ireland, the head of premier wealth management for HSBC, this comes down to “a belief in the growth potential of emerging markets.” Indeed, when asked which nations would lead the world in business opportunities over the next decade, most respondents chose China and India, and nearly 70 percent did not include the U.S. in their top picks. For those at home in the world, the U.S. feels less homey.

자료 2: Cosmopolitan urbanism, Google books (Jon Binnie, 2006, Routledge)

※ 메모: (...) (As Louis Wirth wrote in his classic essay 'Urbanism as a way of life', in a big city 'no single group has the undivided allegiance of the individual'(2000[1938]: 101). The urban cosmopolitan self is thus both hybrid and fragmented. It is hybrid in that it is made up of a fusion of different identities. And it is fragmented in as much as the successful urbanite is skilled at taking on and taking off a whole series of different temporally bounded identities as they move about the city.

Cosmopolitanization

So that is cosmopolitanism. But if we think back to Julia and Paul's movement through Auckland it is clear that neither of the two definitions of cosmopolitanism outlined above by themselves provide much analytical leverage. (...)

Some readings in work and market

자료 1: The impact of privatisation and the marketisation on employment conditions in the public services

• 지은이: Mike Ironside and Roger Seifert
• 출처: Radical Statistics, Issue 86

자료 2: Beyond commodification: re-reading the future of work

• 유료정보로 요약만 볼 수 있음.
• 지은이 및 출처: Colin C. Williams, (2004) "Beyond commodification: re-reading the future of work", foresight, Vol. 6 Iss: 6, pp.329 - 337

[자료] 페미니즘 이론의 정치성: 젠더와 성정치

자료: source

지은이: 노 승희 (전남대학교)


※ 메모:

둘째, 가부장제의 또 다른 주요 이데올로기 장치인 모성(mothering, motherhood)은 여성의 정체성, 특히 여성의 젠더 정체성 구성과 관련하여 이성애주의가 가장 주효하게 작동하는 지점이다. 가부장제는 남성을 생산주체로 설정하고 여성을 생산의 하부구조에 편입시킴으로써 사회구성에 있어서 불균등한 성별분업을 체계화한다. 그 중에서도 가부장적 가족제도는 여성의 존재이유를 출산과 결부시킴으로써, 끊임없이 사회적․상징적 차이를 생물학적인 성적 차이로 환원하고, 그 차이를 여성에 대한 남성의 지배를 합리화하는 알리바이로 삼는다. 모성은 여성의 역할로 규정된 출산과 아이의 양육을 중심으로 제도화되어 가부장적 가족제도의 지주역할을 해왔다. 가부장제는 종교적 관행과 다양한 문화기제들을 동원하여 모성을 이상화함으로써 여성에게 이성애적 젠더 정체성을 세뇌하고 남성의 지배권력을 은폐한다. 이러한 사실을 간파한 슐라미스 파이어스톤(Shulamith Firestone)은 인공생식 등 모든 가능한 방법을 통해 여성을 생물학적 생식의 지배로부터 해방시키고 출산과 육아의 역할을 남성도 담당하도록 하여야 한다고 주장했다. 기존의 생식 중심적인 가족은 젠더 불균형과 세대간 불평등의 권력구조를 만들어낼 뿐만 아니라 때로는 극도로 배타적인 가족이기주의를 조장하여 사회적 소통을 방해해왔다. 이러한 가족제도의 모순을 해결하기 위한 대안으로서, 파이어스톤은  혈연적인 결속보다는 공동체적 삶의 영위를 지향하는 ‘가구’(household)를 구성할 것을 제안하였다.

Some sentences

• "The mind is a superb instrument if used rightly. Used wrongly, however, it becomes very destructive. To put it more accurately, it is not so much that you use your mind wrongly—you usually don't use it at all. It uses you."
  
  
• I decide that certain heresies are ridiculous and unworthy of any credit, not so much because the world of science says, ‘It is not so!’ but because the world of nonscience says, ‘It is’, so enthusiastically. It is not so much that I have confidence in scientists’ being right, but that I have so much in nonscientists’ being wrong.”
  
  
• It is not so much that learners acquire structures or models to understand the world, but they participate in frameworks that have structure. Learning involves participation in a community of practice."
  
  
• ... it is not so much that one kind of sentence is to be preferred over another but that a good craftsperson uses the right tool for the right job and doesn't use the same tool all the time.
  
  
  
• No series of reflections on student writing would be complete without at least a mention of misplaced modifiers and the dangling participle, those impish saboteurs of seriousness. Like the run-on sentence, such errors are ultimately a breakdown of thinking. It is not so much that the student fails to apply a rule. It is rather that he fails to grasp the point of the rule. He fails to see how, in an uninflected language like English, logical and syntactic connections are expressed largely through word order.

Dic: so long

1. a very long time

• I haven't seen him in so long.

2. goodbye

• So long, see you tomorrow.
• If he didn't want to see her anymore, would he be able to tell her so long?

.... http://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/so+long

Dic: ─자고

어미.

■ ((동사 어간 뒤에 붙어))
「1」해할 자리에 쓰여, 자신의 생각이나 주장을 청자에게 강조하여 일러 주는 뜻을 나타내는 종결 어미.

• 같이 가자. 함께 가자고.

「2」해할 자리에 쓰여, ‘너의 말이나 생각이 이런 것이냐?’ 하는 뜻으로 묻는 데 쓰는 종결 어미. 빈정거리거나 거부하는 뜻을 나타낼 때도 있다.

• 나도 같이 가자고?
• 그 일을 함께 하자고?

.... 표준국어대사전(국립국어원)

■

1. 제안하는 내용으로 표현된 내용을 간접적으로 옮김을 나타냄.

• 갑:밥 먹으러 가자.
  을:쟤가 뭐라고 하니?
  병:밥 먹으러 가자고 하는데.
• 갑:언젠가는 꼭 밝혀 냅시다.
  을:뭐라고 했어요?
  갑:언젠가는 꼭 밝혀 내자고 했어요.

2.
ㄱ. [제안하는 내용절을 요구하는 일부 동사 앞에서 누가 무엇을 어찌할 때, ‘무엇을’에 해당하는 것을 나타내는 데에 쓰이어] ‘-ㄹ 것을’의 뜻을 나타냄.

• 친구에게 단풍 구경을 가자고 청하는 편지다.
• 그녀는 그의 마음을 달래 주기 위해 바둑을 한 판 두자고 제안했다.
• 달리는 차 안에서 현주가 호텔로 돌아가자고 말한 후, 곧바로 바닷가 장면이 나왔다.
• 언젠가는 반드시 알아내자고 굳게 결심했다.

ㄴ. [누가 무엇을 어찌할 때, ‘무엇을’에 해당하는 내용절을 나타내어] ‘-려고’의 뜻을 나타냄.

• 이는 나를 잡아가자고 하는 수작이 아니냐.

.... 연세한국어사전

An Excerpt, The unmanageable consumer

자료: Google books
(공)저: Yiannis Gabriel,Tim Lang

* * *

The Future of Brands

It is now being argued by some commentators that 100 years of brands may be drawing to a close. The phenomenal success of Naomi Klein's book No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies(2000) has highlighted a change in public sentiment. No longer is it unfashionable to argu, as we did in the first edition of this book, that brands are oppressive and gloss over more complex and fraught supply-chain relations. Klein's book became a focal text for an anti-consumerist ethos that sought to challenge the hegemony of brands and the violence of fashion and styles. It also captured a mood that was first expressed in a politically significant way in demonstrators against GATT trade talks held in December 1999. While not making much of a dent on the sale of brands, Klein's book was instrumentall in capturing an anti-corporate sentiment and helped voice a dissatisfaction with the power of brands. This was not what the brand psychologists had either anticipated or wanted in the decades of brand build-up and ascribing monetary value to brands.

The 'No Logo' ethos, despite its success in capturing imaginations has not made much of a dent in the continuing rise of brands(Gilmore, 1999, 2003). 'Own label' products, however, have grown on the back of the retailers' increasing power at the expense of manufacturers(Randall, 1994; Randall and Chartered Institute of Marketing, 1990; Seth and Randall, 2001). Changes in retailing have encouraged consumers to purchase 'own label' products, thus undermining the value of some bigger brands. For all this, a fierce campaign is being staged to capture consumer spending and link it with particular brands. The decline of brands seems unlikely. Belief in comsumer choice and the power of brands remains an article of faith not only for market researchers and their psychological gurus, but also for corporations most consumers.

Sir Michael Perry, the Chairman of Unilever, one of the world's biggest brand owners, summed up this article of faith well in his presidential address to the 1994 UK Advertising Association, stating that 'brands--in their small way--answer people's need...'(Perry, 1994). His argument deserves full quotation as a classic statement of the creed vis-a-vis the consumer:

In the modern world, brands are a key part of how individuals define themsellves and their relationships with one another. The old, rigid barriers are disappearing--class and rank; blue collar and white collar; council tenant and home owner; employee and housewife. More and more we are simply consumers--with tastes, lifestyles and aspirations that are very different.

It's a marketing given by now that the consumers defines the brand. But the brand also defines the consumer. We are what we wear, what we eat, what we drive. Each of us in this room is a walking compendium of brands. You chose each of those brands among many options--because they felt 'more like you'.

The collection of brands we choose to assemble around us have become among the most direct expressions of our individuality--or more precisely, our deep psychological need to identity ourselves with others.(Perry, 1994;4)

He added:

Our whole skill as branded goods' producers is in anticipation of consumer trends. In earlier appreciation of emerging needs or wants. And in developing a quality of advertising which can interpret aspirations, focus them on products and lead consumers forward.(Perry, 1994:18 our emphasis)

(...)

* * *

제목 The unmanageable consumer

Business and Management Series

저자 Yiannis Gabriel, Tim Lang

에디션 2, 개정

발행인 SAGE, 2006

• The Faces of the Consumer
• Chapter 1 The Emergence of Contemporary Consumerism
• Chapter 2 The Consumer as Chooser
• Chapter 3 The Consumer as Communicator
• Chapter 4 The Consumer as Explorer
• Chapter 5 The Consumer as IdentitySeeker
• Hedonist or Artist?
• Chapter 7 The Consumer as Victim
• Chapter 8 The Consumer as Rebel
• Chapter 9 The Consumer as Activist
• Chapter 10 The Consumer as Citizen
• Chapter 11 The Unmanageable Consumer

[자료] eudaimonia

자료 1: 행복에 대한 거의 모든 것들
원저: The Discovery of Happiness
지은이: 스튜어트 메크리디 편/김석희 역

※ 메모:
철학에서도 이런 의미의 '행복'을 자주 찾아볼 수 있다. 예를 들면 제3장에서 왕 케핑은 중국어 낱말인 '복(福)'이 의미하는 행복은 '행운' 또는 '신들과 화합하는 것'이라고 설명한다. '복'이라는 낱말이 이런 의미로 쓰일 경우, 당신은 행복감을 느끼지 않을 때조차 행복할 수 있다(예컨대 당신이 방금 행운을 얻었지만 아무도 그 사실을 아직 당신에게 알려주지 않았을 때). 그리스 낱말인 '에우다이모니아(eudaimonia)'는 흔히 '행복'으로 번역되지만, '최고의 생'으로 번역할 수도 있다. 이 낱말은 '신들의 총애를 받은'이라는 뜻이니까 중국어의 '복'과 아주 비슷하지만, '복'보다는 인생 전체에 대한 판단과 훨씬 밀접하게 결부된다. 기원전 6세기 아테니의 위대한 입법가인 솔론은, 살아 있는 사람을 행복한 사람이라고 부를 수는 없다고 말했다. 죽은 뒤에야 비로소 그 사람의 생애를 요약하고 평가할 수 있기 때문에, 죽기 전에는 그 사람이 행복한지 어떤지 모른다는 것이다. (1장 행복을 찾아서 중에서)


자료 2: 아리스토텔레스의 니코마코스 윤리학에 나타난 에우다이모니아와 습관형성 연구
출처: 교육철학(2008.12)
지은이: 김현숙

※ 메모:
에우다이모니아는 happiness와는 달리 ‘상태’나 ‘취향’이 아니라, ‘활동’이며, 아리스토텔레스는 에우다이모니아를 덕의 실천으로 보지, 그냥 덕을 지니고 있는 것으로는 보지 않는다(1098b31-1099a20). 공리주의의 ‘happiness’에 익숙한 현대인들은 ‘상태’를 나타내는 ‘happiness’와 ‘활동’을 포함하는 에우다이모니아의 확연히 다른 이 두 개념을 쉽게 혼동할 수도 있어서 (...)

자료 3: Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

“Eudaimonia” is an Aristotelian term loosely (and inadequately) translated as happiness. To understand its role in virtue ethics we look to Aristotle’s function argument. Aristotle recognizes that actions are not pointless because they have an aim. Every action aims at some good. For example, the doctor’s vaccination of the baby aims at the baby’s health, the English tennis player Tim Henman works on his serve so that he can win Wimbledon, and so on. Furthermore, some things are done for their own sake (ends in themselves) and some things are done for the sake of other things (means to other ends). Aristotle claims that all the things that are ends in themselves also contribute to a wider end, an end that is the greatest good of all. That good is eudaimonia. Eudaimonia is happiness, contentment, and fulfillment; it’s the name of the best kind of life, which is an end in itself and a means to live and fare well.

Aristotle then observes that where a thing has a function the good of the thing is when it performs its function well. For example, the knife has a function, to cut, and it performs its function well when it cuts well. This argument is applied to man: man has a function and the good man is the man who performs his function well. Man’s function is what is peculiar to him and sets him aside from other beings—reason. Therefore, the function of man is reason and the life that is distinctive of humans is the life in accordance with reason. If the function of man is reason, then the good man is the man who reasons well. This is the life of excellence or of eudaimonia. Eudaimonia is the life of virtue—activity in accordance with reason, man’s highest function.

The importance of this point of eudaimonistic virtue ethics is that it reverses the relationship between virtue and rightness. A utilitarian could accept the value of the virtue of kindness, but only because someone with a kind disposition is likely to bring about consequences that will maximize utility. So the virtue is only justified because of the consequences it brings about. In eudaimonist virtue ethics the virtues are justified because they are constitutive elements of eudaimonia (that is, human flourishing and wellbeing), which is good in itself.

Rosalind Hursthouse developed one detailed account of eudaimonist virtue ethics. Hursthouse argues that the virtues make their possessor a good human being. All living things can be evaluated qua specimens of their natural kind. Like Aristotle, Hursthouse argues that the characteristic way of human beings is the rational way: by their very nature human beings act rationally, a characteristic that allows us to make decisions and to change our character and allows others to hold us responsible for those decisions. Acting virtuously—that is, acting in accordance with reason—is acting in the way characteristic of the nature of human beings and this will lead to eudaimonia. This means that the virtues benefit their possessor. One might think that the demands of morality conflict with our self-interest, as morality is other-regarding, but eudaimonist virtue ethics presents a different picture. Human nature is such that virtue is not exercised in opposition to self-interest, but rather is the quintessential component of human flourishing. The good life for humans is the life of virtue and therefore it is in our interest to be virtuous. It is not just that the virtues lead to the good life (e.g. if you are good, you will be rewarded), but rather a virtuous life is the good life because the exercise of our rational capacities and virtue is its own reward.

It is important to note, however, that there have been many different ways of developing this idea of the good life and virtue within virtue ethics. Philippa Foot, for example, grounds the virtues in what is good for human beings. The virtues are beneficial to their possessor or to the community (note that this is similar to MacIntyre’s argument that the virtues enable us to achieve goods within human practices). Rather than being constitutive of the good life, the virtues are valuable because they contribute to it.

Another account is given by perfectionists such as Thomas Hurka, who derive the virtues from the characteristics that most fully develop our essential properties as human beings. Individuals are judged against a standard of perfection that reflects very rare or ideal levels of human achievement. The virtues realize our capacity for rationality and therefore contribute to our well-being and perfection in that sense. (...)

자료 4: Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The principal idea with which Aristotle begins is that there are differences of opinion about what is best for human beings, and that to profit from ethical inquiry we must resolve this disagreement. He insists that ethics is not a theoretical discipline: we are asking what the good for human beings is not simply because we want to have knowledge, but because we will be better able to achieve our good if we develop a fuller understanding of what it is to flourish. In raising this question—what is the good?—Aristotle is not looking for a list of items that are good. He assumes that such a list can be compiled rather easily; most would agree, for example, that it is good to have friends, to experience pleasure, to be healthy, to be honored, and to have such virtues as courage at least to some degree. The difficult and controversial question arises when we ask whether certain of these goods are more desirable than others. Aristotle's search for the good is a search for the highest good, and he assumes that the highest good, whatever it turns out to be, has three characteristics: it is desirable for itself, it is not desirable for the sake of some other good, and all other goods are desirable for its sake.

Aristotle thinks everyone will agree that the terms “eudaimonia” (“happiness”) and “eu zên” (“living well”) designate such an end. The Greek term “eudaimon” is composed of two parts: “eu” means “well” and “daimon” means “divinity” or “spirit.” To be eudaimon is therefore to be living in a way that is well-favored by a god. But Aristotle never calls attention to this etymology, and it seems to have little influence on his thinking. He regards “eudaimon” as a mere substitute for eu zên (“living well”). These terms play an evaluative role, and are not simply descriptions of someone's state of mind.

No one tries to live well for the sake of some further goal; rather, being eudaimon is the highest end, and all subordinate goals—health, wealth, and other such resources—are sought because they promote well-being, not because they are what well-being consists in. But unless we can determine which good or goods happiness consists in, it is of little use to acknowledge that it is the highest end. To resolve this issue, Aristotle asks what the ergon (“function,” “task,” “work”) of a human being is, and argues that it consists in activity of the rational part of the soul in accordance with virtue (1097b22-1098a20). One important component of this argument is expressed in terms of distinctions he makes in his psychological and biological works. The soul is analyzed into a connected series of capacities: the nutritive soul is responsible for growth and reproduction, the locomotive soul for motion, the perceptive soul for perception, and so on. The biological fact Aristotle makes use of is that human beings are the only species that has not only these lower capacities but a rational soul as well. The good of a human being must have something to do with being human; and what sets humanity off from other species, giving us the potential to live a better life, is our capacity to guide ourselves by using reason. If we use reason well, we live well as human beings; or, to be more precise, using reason well over the course of a full life is what happiness consists in. Doing anything well requires virtue or excellence, and therefore living well consists in activities caused by the rational soul in accordance with virtue or excellence.

Aristotle's conclusion about the nature of happiness is in a sense uniquely his own. No other writer or thinker had said precisely what he says about what it is to live well. But at the same time his view is not too distant from a common idea. As he himself points out, one traditional conception of happiness identifies it with virtue (1098b30-1). Aristotle's theory should be construed as a refinement of this position. He says, not that happiness is virtue, but that it is virtuous activity. Living well consists in doing something, not just being in a certain state or condition. It consists in those lifelong activities that actualize the virtues of the rational part of the soul.

At the same time, Aristotle makes it clear that in order to be happy one must possess others goods as well—such goods as friends, wealth, and power. And one's happiness is endangered if one is severely lacking in certain advantages—if, for example, one is extremely ugly, or has lost children or good friends through death (1099a31-b6). But why so? If one's ultimate end should simply be virtuous activity, then why should it make any difference to one's happiness whether one has or lacks these other types of good? Aristotle's reply is that one's virtuous activity will be to some extent diminished or defective, if one lacks an adequate supply of other goods (1153b17-19). Someone who is friendless, childless, powerless, weak, and ugly will simply not be able to find many opportunities for virtuous activity over a long period of time, and what little he can accomplish will not be of great merit. To some extent, then, living well requires good fortune; happenstance can rob even the most excellent human beings of happiness. Nonetheless, Aristotle insists, the highest good, virtuous activity, is not something that comes to us by chance. Although we must be fortunate enough to have parents and fellow citizens who help us become virtuous, we ourselves share much of the responsibility for acquiring and exercising the virtues.

[자료] Yearning for Balance

자료(source): Yearning for Balance Views of Americans on Consumption, Materialism, and the Environment


July 1995

Prepared for the Merck Family Fund by The Harwood Group
 
※ 메모:
 
The Downshifters


It appears that millions of Americans are already "downshifting" - they have chosen to scale back their salaries and lifestyles to reflect a different set of priorities. Twenty-eight percent of the survey respondents said that in the last five years, they had voluntarily made changes in their life which resulted in making less money - not including those who had taken a regularly scheduled retirement. The most common changes were reducing work hours, changing to a lower-paying job, and -uitting work to stay at home. It is unclear from this research whether 28% is a historically high or low figure, or if the proportion of downshifters has remained fairly constant over the years.

Downshifters offer a wide range of reasons for making these changes in their lives. In the survey, the most fre-uently cited reasons are: wanting a more balanced life (68% of downshifters); wanting more time (66%); and wanting a less stressful life (63%). About half (53%) of the downshifters did so to spend more time caring for their children. Downshifters are somewhat younger and more likely to have children than the population as a whole; 60% of them are women.

Downshifters spoke up in the focus groups as well, such as the Indianapolis man who recounted:

"I'm whole sold for simplifying your life, because that's what I just [did] . I left a job making three times the money that I'm making now; but by the same token, I've got more time with my family. I just had a little boy. I want to watch him grow up . I've got more time with my family, less stress."

A Los Angeles woman also described her decision to change her priorities:

"As I started climbing the corporate ladder, I really decided that I was hating it more and more, and I was bringing more and more work home . I was already hiring people to clean my clothes, watch my kid, and now clean my house. And I changed careers and got paid less. I sold the car and I bought a `65 Ford Falcon. And I'm much happier. I work two blocks from home and I'm doing something that I really enjoy."

Although many say they miss the extra income they once had, most downshifters describe themselves as being happy with the changes they made. "It's been a sacrifice, our pay was cut in half," said a Dallas woman who decided to leave her job, "butI I think it's the best choice that can happen, because you're with your children and they're in a loving environment." The Indianapolis man also felt he had made a good choice: "I'm much more content. I may not have the extra pocket money I had before, but I'm telling you, it's worth it."

On the survey, 87% of downshifters describe themselves as happy with the change, with 35% saying they do not miss the extra income (Figure 8). On other survey questions, downshifters are more likely than others to say that they are happier than their parents at the same age, and that they are more involved in their community - but they also tend to be less satisfied with their economic situation.

But the problem of materialism is as much a collective as an individual one - it is society that is out of whack, people say. And yet people cannot seem to describe how a more collective kind of change could take place. In a fragmented, atomized society, people are unsure where and how to begin; they seem fearful that if they act, others will not join them. A Frederick man described the sense of paralysis: "As an individual you don't really know what can be done about it, and how it can be fixed." A Dallas woman also feels stuck: "I'm not sure how you do it or how it would be received."

When given a list of policy changes that might help the environment and reduce the level of materialism in our society, survey respondents thought several policies were good ideas, but many doubted if they would make a big difference. 52% thought that limiting the amount of advertising allowed on prime-time television was a good idea and would make a difference while another 28% liked the idea but didn't think it would lead to positive change. 49% agreed that changing the tax structure to reduce taxes on savings and increase taxes on consumption was a good idea and would make a difference while another 24% liked the idea but were skeptical about its impact.

When people lack a sense that collective change is possible, even individual change then begins to seem ineffectual. "It seems like such a big problem," explained an Indianapolis woman, "how's one person going to be able to do it?" Thus, some conclude, it is pointless to act at all.

Yet others are hopeful that change is possible, and insist that changing our priorities is necessary - that we must try. "We can do it," declared a Frederick woman, "because so many of us have.... Some people have come to the realization that it's serious." A Los Angeles man agreed: "As an individual, I have the ability to change my behavior, the way I'm approaching something or doing something today and to make a difference." The question is whether people can find a way to reach out and work through these issues together. For now, people are skeptical of that. A Frederick man lamented, "You can't get everybody around the table. They can say it, but to get them to do that...."

[용어] social conservatism

자료 1: Social Conservatism: An Obituary

자료 2: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_conservatism

자료 3: http://usconservatives.about.com/od/typesofconservatives/a/SocialCons.htm

자료 4: Arnold Schwarzenegger is a Social Conservative

자료 5: Is social conservatism incompatible with libertarianism? (WSJ 토론방)

자료 6: [독자서평] 19세기 독일의 사회적 보수주의

자료 7: [한겨레] 종교와 진보

• 이런 의문은 단순히 개인 호기심 차원의 문제만은 아니다. 지난 미국 대선에서 확실히 드러났고, 5월 초에 있을 영국 총선에서도 고개를 들고 있으며, 한국에서도 조짐이 보이는 사회적 보수주의의 동향이 심상치 않기 때문이다. 사회적 보수주의는 한 지붕 여러 가족의 양상을 보이며 그 기원도 여러 갈래가 있다. 그러나 어떻든 사회적 보수주의가 정치에서 영향력 확대를 지속적으로 꾀하고 있는 것으로 보인다. 여기에 한국의 진보진영이 종교와 관련해서 유념해야 할 점이 몇 가지 있다.
• 둘째, 진보 진영에 가장 나쁜 선택은 사회적 보수주의를 정치·경제적 보수주의가 흡인하여 동맹을 형성하도록 방치하는 것이다. 사회적 보수주의가 때로 역사의 바퀴를 역전시키려는 것처럼 보이더라도 정의감과 보편성에 대한 공통분모가 있으면 그 불씨를 살려 사회진보의 원군으로 함께 할 수 있도록 설득해 내야 한다. 만일 그것이 불가능하다면 사회적 보수주의를 개인윤리의 차원으로 한정시켜 정치세력화를 차단해야 한다.

Kor: 나는 빵이 필요했다

1. 나는 빵이 필요했다. 
2. 나는 빵을 구을 오븐이 필요했다. 
3. 정부는 경제 운영을 개선할 방안이 필요했다. 
4. ... 이유는, 두 차례의 세계대전 사이 경기변동이 극적으로 증폭됨으로 말미암아 그들의 정부가 경제 운영을 개선할 방안이 필요했기 때문이었다. 

4를 “그들의 정부에게 경제 운영을 개선할 방안이 필요했다”로 적어야 할 때도 있겠지만, 4와 같이 특정 어구를 주어로 삼아서 적는 게 효과적일 때도 있을 것이다. 이중 주어가 아름답지 않은 것인지는 몰라도, 꽤나 유용한 표현 방식인 것 같다.   

[용어] 공유정신병적 장애(Shared psychotic disorder)

자료: http://drub.korea.ac.kr/hospital/m08_health/pop_medical.asp?sidx=575


※ 메모:


한 사람의 망상체계가 가까운 관계 때문에 다른 사람에게 전달되어 비슷한 망상체계를 갖게 된 경우를 말합니다. 이는 1977년 프랑스 정신과 의사 Lasegue와 Falret에 의해 기술된 folie a deux(이중 정신병), 또는 DSM-III-R의 유도정신병적 장애와 같은 양상의 것입니다. ICD-10에서는 유도성 망상장애라 합니다. 대체로 두 사람 사이에 일어나는 수가 가장 많습니다. 더 많은 숫자에서도 일어나며 한 가족 전체에서도 일어납니다. 학자에 따라 이를 비정형 정신병적 장애로 분류하기도 합니다.

소비사회(소비자사회), consumer society

몇 가지 관련 자료 스크랩:

자료 1: 소비사회에서 교회 공동체의 역할, 교회와 신앙 (2010.12)


자료 2: 시장과 종교-광고를 통해 본 소비사회의 인간 이해 , 한국기독교교회협의회 (2010.5)

※ 지은이: 강성영(한신대 신대원장)

※ 메모:

• 대중적 욕망과 소비에 기초해 있는 상업적 소비문화라고 할 수 있는 대중문화가 지배하는 현상에 대해서 소비사회의 이데올로기에 대한 비판이 필요하다. 나는 소비사회의 은밀한 신화와 이데올로기, 그리고 형이상학과 가치를 비판하고, 진정한 인간적 삶의 의미와 가치를 찾기 위해서 신학과 대중문화 특히 ‘광고’와 대화를 시도하고자 한다.
• 다소 막연한 개념인 “소비사회”(the consumer society)는 전근대적 유목 농경사회 이후 근대 산업사회를 거치며 발전한 고도 자본주의 또는 후기자본주의 사회를 규정하는 개념이다. 대량생산과 대량소비의 산업사회를 거치며 대중의 소비욕구는 가파르게 상승하였고, 단순히 삶의 기본적 욕구를 넘어서 물질적 감각적 욕구의 충족을 무한히 갈망하는 사회가 되었다. 소비사회를 그 특징으로 정리하면 다음과 같다.
• 1.1. “소비사회”는 의식주의 기본적 필요를 넘어서 “잉여와 사치”를 추구하는 소비자본주의 사회를 가리킨다. 포드주의(Fordism)의 주도하에 1920년대 미국의 산업체제는 명실상부 대량생산 체제를 갖추게 되었고, 그 다음 소비자를 양산하는 체제, 즉 ‘대중이 구매력을 갖도록 만드는 체계적인 계획’을 세우기 시작하였다. 따라서 대량소비를 가능하게 하는 객관적 조건인 시장의 전국적 확대 외에도 ‘노동시간의 단축과 임금의 상승’이 정책적으로 자리 잡았다. 이후 경제적 변화에서 눈에 띠는 것은 플라스틱 머니(plastic money)라고 불렸던 신용카드의 사용이 확산되며, 일반 소비계층의 소비욕구가 급신장한 점이다.
• 1.2. 소비사회는 생산물의 교환가치에 기초한 상품과 자본 및 생산적 노동의 관계가 아니라 소비자와 상품 사이의 관계에서 파생하는 소비능력으로 인간의 가치가 형성되는 소비중심사회이다. 이것은 임마누엘 칸트(I. Kant)가 말한 바와 같이 목적 자체로서 인간을 대하지 않고 수단으로서 상대적 가치를 가진 사물(Sache)과 혼동하는 것으로 일종의 ‘범주의 오류’에 다름 아니다.
• 1.3. 소비사회에서 소비대중은 상품의 소유와 소비에서 다른 사람과의 차이를 통한 욕구충족을 추구한다. 마르크스가 비판한 자본주의의 본질은 노동과 정신적 가치 등 모든 것이 다 시장의 교환가치로 전환되어 상품화된다는 것이었다. 그러나 그와 같은 마르크스의 비판이론은 이론적 유물에 불과하고, 현대 기호학은 모든 것이 기호적 교환과 같은 ‘모사’(simulation)의 차원으로 전락하여 실재적 가치가 다 사라졌다고 본다. 소비사회에서 소비자는 다른 이들과 다른 어떤 기호의 환영을 소비하고 싶어 한다. ‘차이화 코드’는 소비사회가 소비자를 유혹하는 차별화 기호의 놀이에 해당한다. (1.4 이하 생략)

자료 3: 세계의 미래, 세계가 본 한국의 미래, 신동아(2009. 6)