2012년 6월 29일 금요일

Dic: well (as probably, indeed)

9 [ADV] modal ADV △You use well after verbs such as `may' and `could' when you are saying what you think is likely to happen.

  • The murderer may well come from the estate...
  • Ours could well be the last generation for which moviegoing has a sense of magic.

may/might/could well △used to say that something is likely to happen or is likely to be true
  • What you say may well be true.
  • You could try the drugstore, but it might well be closed by now.

4. can/could well: easily
  • She could well afford to pay for it herself.

5. can/could/may/might well: probably
  • You may well be right.
  • It may well be that the train is delayed.

6. can/could/may/might well: with good reason
  • I can't very well leave now.
  • I couldn't very well refuse to help them, could I?
  • ‘What are we doing here?’ ‘You may well ask (= I don't really know either).’

10) (preceded by could, might, or may) indeed
  • you may well have to do it yourself
.... COBUILD, LDOCE, OALD, COLLINS

2012년 6월 27일 수요일

[용어] 급수 (級數, series)

자료 1: paran 사전 (원출처: 동서문화 PASCAL)

수열(數列) , 이 있을때, 이것을 덧셈기호(+)로 연결한 +…를 무한급수 또는 급수라 하며, 간단히 이라고 나타내기도 한다. 이것에서는 위와 같은수열을 순차적으로 배열하여 더하면 어떻게 되는가를 문제로 삼게 된다. 또 여기서, =+…+이라 나타내면 이것을 급수 +…의 제부분합 또는 부분합이라 한다.   (... 이하 생략 ...)

자료 2: 수학사랑


무한수열의 각 항을 차례로 합의 기호 + 로 연결한 식 이 무한급수 또는 급수이다. (... ...)

series를 왜 級數라고 번역했는지 그 이유를 알기는 어렵다.
일상적으로 級數는 '기술 따위의 우열에 따라 매기는 등급'을 의미한다.
그러나 수학에서의 級數에서는 그런 의미를 전혀 찾을 수 없다. series와 級數 사이에 다른 어떤 연관도 찾아보기 어렵기 때문에 級數는 series를 낱말 그대로 충실히 번역한 것으로 보기도 어렵다. 오히려 그 보다는 항이 순서 있게 무한히 엮여져 하나의 전체를 이루고 있는 그 형태를 적절히 나타내기 위해 series와 무관하게 만든 것으로 보인다.
일반적으로 무한급수이 수렴하는지 또는 발산하는지 알기 위해서는 부분합의 수열 [, 즉]
합의 수열을 고려하게 된다.
이때 각 항을 비교해 보면 '층계 또는 단계', 즉 級이 있다고 할 수 있다. 이러한 이유에서 級數라고 했을지 모른다.


자료 3: ...

[윤소영 교수] 현대경제학 강의노트(2004년)

자료: 현대경제학강의
지은이: 운소영 교수

한글문서인데 강의노트겸 교재로 사용된 자료 같다.

A Quote of Francis Hackett

프랜시스 해킷의 다음 인용문은 여러 군데서 보이지만 그 인용의 원출처는 정확하지 않다. 새뮤얼슨이 그의 《경제학 The Economics》에서 인용한 것을 재인용하는 사례가 대부분이다.

I believe in materialism. I believe in all the proceeds of a healthy materialism--good cooking, dry houses, dry feet, sewers, drain pipes, hot water, baths, electric lights, automobiles, good roads, bright streets, long vacations away from the village pump, new ideas, fast horses, swift conversation, theaters, operas, orchestras, bands--I believe in them all for everybody. The man who dies without knowing these things may be as exquisite as a saint, and as rich as poet; but it is in spite of, not because of, his deprivation.

자료 1: Paul A. Samuelson & William D. Nordhaus, The Econmics, 19th edn., p.521

자료 2: Land Use Policy in the United States

pp. 175~176

I believe an appropriate point of departure into my assignment would be to define economic forces, institutional forces, and what constitutes our land policy.

Economic forces will be interpreted to mean the influences of materialistic wants or desires of individuals and society upon actions and society. Much has been said against treating man as economic machine, a creature with no motives or purposes other than what the economic textbeeoks say he has. But, can we assert that such motivations of man are not important, that people do not prefer more of the scarce items used in our living to less, or than our actions are influenced only by other purposes? Perhaps money income, property, or other means to material well-being are also means to such higher-level purposes as happines, satisfaction, prestige, or social status, but, if so, materialism may be a necessary condition for attending these high-level purposes.[주2] Francis Hackett, an Irishman, expresses the role of materialism(economics) as follows:
I believe in materialism. I believe in all the proceeds of a healthy materialism--good cooking, dry houses, dry feet, sewers, drain pipes, hot water, baths, electric lights, automobiles, good roads, bright streets, long vacations away from the village pump, new ideas, fast horses, swift conversation, theaters, operas, orchestras, bands--I believe in them all for everybody. The man who dies without knowing these things may be as exquisite as a saint, and as rich as poet; but it is in spite of, not because of, his deprivation.[주3] 
[주3] Quoted by Paul A. Samuelson, Economics: An Introductory Analysis. 5th Ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961). p 775.

자료 3: Fish, Wildlife, and Economics

Frank H. Bollman, University of California
I believe in materialism. I believe in all the proceeds of a healthy materialism--good cooking, dry houses, dry feet, sewers, drain pipes, hot water, baths, electric lights, automobiles, good roads, bright streets, long vacations away from the village pump, new ideas, fast horses, swift conversation, theaters, operas, orchestras, bands--I believe in them all for everybody. The man who dies without knowing these things may be as exquisite as a saint, and as rich as poet; but it is in spite of, not because of, his deprivation. (Francis Hackett, Ireland).
Introduction (... ...)

자료 4: The rise and fall of economic growth: a study in contemporary thought

자료 5: 경제윤리의 필연성에 관한 소고

[책] Land Use Policy in the United States

자료: 구글도서

제목: Land Use Policy in the United States
편집자: Howard W. Ottoson
에디션: 재판
발행인: Beard Books, 2001
ISBN: 1587980991, 9781587980992
길이: 484페이지

목차

History and Appraisal of U S Land Policy to 1862 3
Free Land Policy in Operation 18621935 28
The Homestead in Perspective 47
Homestead and Community on the Middle Border 65
The Relevance of the Jeffersonian Dream Today 86
The Political Forces 137
The Economic and Institutional Forces 175
Land for Agriculture 203
Resolving Land Use Conflicts 282
Intra and InterPrivate 307
Private and Public Conflicts 336
Public and Private Interest in Public Land 350
Some Policy Issues for the United States 400
Role of Land Policy in Providing Incentives 441
Making Policy for Land Use 462
The Contributors 470
The Use of Urban Land 231
Land for Recreation 255
저작권

2012년 6월 26일 화요일

[자료] 경제 윤리의 필연성에 관한 소고

지은이: 소병철
자료: 자료링크2 ;


※ 인터넷에 소론을 공개해주신 저자 분께 감사드린다.


요약:

본고의 목적은 이른바 실증 경제학자들이 주장하는 경제와 윤리의 공약 불가능성 테제에 맞서 경제 윤리의 필연성을 입증하는 것이다. 시장의 무도덕성(amorality)이나 경제 행위의 가치중립성을 역설하는 모든 이론은 하나의 자가당착에 빠져들 수밖에 없다. 왜냐하면 시장과 경제 행위에 관한 모든 이론은 순수하게 기술적인 요소만을 포함하고 있지는 않기 때문이다. 시장 이론과 그것의 기초를 제공하는 호모에코노미쿠스(homo economicus)의 인간학은 사실상 하나의 기술적인 진리 이상의 어떤 것을 우리에게 말하고 있다. 환언하면 자기 이익을 극대화하는 것이야말로 지극히 정당한 행위의 동기라는 규범적인 선입견이 그러한 이론적 장치들을 통해 일종의 선험적인 예단으로서 우리에게 강요되고 있는 것이다. 그렇다면 실증 경제학의 시장 이론과 호모에코노미쿠스의 인간학은 명백히 우리의 경제 행위를 우리의 사유의 규범적인 차원과 결부시키는 하나의 방식임에 틀림없다. 이처럼 경제와 윤리가 공약 불가능하다는 실증 경제학자들의 주장은 그들의 이론 자체에 숨어 있는 암묵적인 전제들에 의해 반박된다. 이렇게 해서 우리는 경제와 윤리의 일상적인 상호 관련과 함께 경제 윤리의 필연성을 의식하게 된다. 그렇다면 이제 경제 윤리는 경제적인 관계들이 존재하는 삶의 모든 고리에서 호모에코노미쿠스의 맹목적인 극대화 충동을 규제하는 ‘경제의 정치’ 역할을 수행해야만 한다. 그리고 이는 곧 경제적인 합리성과 도덕적인 합리성이 경제 윤리라는 접점에서 수렴될 수 있음을 의미하는 것이기도 하다.

2012년 6월 21일 목요일

[자료] ECONOMIC GROWTH WITH FOREIGN SAVINGS



ECONOMIC GROWTH WITH FOREIGN SAVINGS? ( Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira and Yoshiaki Nakano, 2003)

WHY FOREIGN SAVINGS FAIL TO CAUSE GROWTH (Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira, Paulo Gala, January, 2007)


[메모] U.S. Foreign Indebtedness: Are We investing What We Borrow?

자료: http://www.frbkc.org/PUBLICAT/ECONREV/EconRevArchive/1989/3q89faus.pdf

Jon Faust,
Economic Review, July/August 1989, FRB of Kansas City

※ 발췌(Excerpts):

In the decades following WWII, the U.S. came to be known as the world's largest lender, helping to finance economic growth throughout the world. Indeed, by 1981 the U.S. had amassed $141 billion in net holdings of foreign assets. In the three years that followed, however, U.S. net holdings were totally eliminated and by 1987 this country's net position was a negative $368 billion. The U.S. has now become the world's largest debtor.

There is widespread disagreement regarding the implications of this foreign indebtedness for the economic future of the U.S. Some economists argue that inflows of foreign capital bode well for the U.S., setting the stage for increasing productivity. Other economists counter that this country is borrowing to consume beyond its means and that growth of U.S. living standards will suffer when the bill comes due.

The behavior of investment in productive physical capital will play an important role in resolving this debate. If foreign funds have facilitated an investment boom, then rising economic growth and prosperity may result. On the other hand, if foreign funds are augmenting consumption rather than investment, slower growth in living standards may be in the offing.

This article examines investment as a central factor in appraising the foreign indebtedness of the U.S. The article concludes that investment has been weak in the 1980s and that the combination of weak investment and strong growth of foreign indebtedness could threaten growth in U.S. living standards.

(...)

I. U.S. Foreign Indebtedness: Historical Perspective

The U.S. has undergone a remarkably rapid swing from its status as a net creditor to its current position of indebtedness in the world economy. Chart 1 shows the net foreign indebtedness of the U.S. for the period since 1954. Falling steadily until 1981, bet indebtedness declined in all but 8 years from 1954 to 1981. Since 1981, though, net foreign indebtedness of the U.S. has soared.

Chart 1:


While the surge of U.S. indebtedness has caused widespread concern, history reveals that indebtedness by itself is not an accurate barometer of economic well-being. On the contrary, rising indebtedness has at times been associated with good times, and falling indebtedness with bad times. This section provides a historical perspective for evaluating U.S. indebtedness, indicating that although the U.S. has been deeply indebted before, the speed of the recent buildup is unprecedented.


Defining and measung net foreign indebtedness

Net foreign indebtedness of the U.S. is defined as net U.S. holdings of foreign assets. These net holdings are computed as the dollar value of foreign assets held by U.S. citizens less the dollar value of U.S. assets held by foreigners. For example, in 1981 the net holdings of the U.S. peaked at $141 billion, when the U.S. held $720 billion in foreign assets and foreigners held $579 billion in U.S. assets.

Assets considerd in calculating foreign indebtedness include financial debt (such as bonds), stock market holdings, and direct foreign ownership of physical capital. Thus, what is often caled U.S. foreign "debt" actually inculdes stock market holdings and direct investment as well as financial debt. In this article, U.S. net holdings of foreign assets are referred to as net indebtedness of the U.S.

Referring to net indebtedness of the U.S. as U.S. foreign debt has led to some confusion when the situation of the U.S. has been compared with the debt problems of Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina. The debt of these countries, which has attracted widespread attention, is financial debt in the form of bonds and bank loans. Furthermore, the gross debt of these countries is typically discussed, not their net debt.

The figures on U.S. net indebtedness probably overstate the true foreign indebtedness of the U.S. The overstatement arises because the computation of the dollar value of direct investment is based on original purchase price, rather than on current market value. Much of U.S. direct investment abroad took place long ago during the buildup of net foreign assets before 1982. The value of many of these assets has appreciated a great deal, implying that the original purchase price substantially understates the true value of U.S. holdings. Because many foreign holdings in the U.S. were acquired quite recently, the original purchase price more accurately reflects the value of foreign holdings.[주1] Nevertheless, while the value of U.S. net indebtedness is not precisely reflected in the statistics, most analysts would agree that the U.S. is currently indebted to the world and that U.S. indebtedness is growing at an unprecedented rate.



One simple conclusion to be drawn from Char 2 is that increases in indebtedness do not necessariy signal bad times; conversely, decreases in indebtedness do not necessarily signal good times. For example, the most rapid increase in the credit position of the U.S. occurred at the beginning of the Great Depression, certainly a low point in U.S. economic history. In contrast, the U.S. moved steadily toward indebtedness during the 1950s and 1960s─two relatively prosperous decades.


Some indication of what has caused indebtedness to swing widely since the Civil War can be gained by examining the behavior of saving and investment over this period. Chart 3 shows national saving, gross domestic private investment, and government saving as shares of national income. While private saving is not presented in the chart, it can be derived as national saving minus government saving.

Chart 3: National saving, government saving, and investment


Investment and national saving reached record rates near 20% as net indebtedness peaked in the early 1890s. The period between 1890 and the middle of the Great Depression was one of decline from these record levels in both saving and investment. This decline was associated with a rapid fall in U.S. net indebtedness, especially during WWI and at the beginning of the Great Depression.

U.S. net indebtedness fell during this period because investment declined more steeply than saving. As noted above, the difference between saving and investment, rather than their levels, leads to changes in indebtedness. Thus, as investment suffered more than saving, excess saving flowed abroad, increasing the net credit position of the U.S.

Indebtedness rose sharply during the period of U.S. involvement in WWII. During this period both saving and investment fell sharply, but saving fell more sharply than investment. Thus, there were capital inflows that increased the rate of indebtedness.


The period from WWII to 1982 was one of relatively steady investment, saving, and government deficits. Saving generally exceeded investment during this period, leading to capital outflows. These outflows contributed to a very gradual increase in the dollar value of the U.S. net credit position with the rest of the world. Because income grew more rapidly than the net credit position, however, the size of the net credit position as a share of income declined steadily.

The most striking feature of the period since 1982 is the sustained excess of investment over saving. The capital inflows required to finance the excess of investment over saving from 1983 to 1987 have averaged over 2.5% of income. These inflows exceed over a percentage point any capital inflows sustained since the Civil War. The only previous periods since the Civil War when capital inflows have exceeded even 1 percent of income were from 1884 to 1893 and again in 1943.

This review of history gives mixed signals about the implications of the recent surge in U.S. indebtedness. It may be comforting that large swings in indebtedness have occurred before, and that some periods of rising indebtedness have been associated with good times. However, the fact that the current capital inflows are without precedent is disconcerting. The next section explains the central role investment play in determining whether indebtedness will enhance or diminish growth in living standards.


II. The Importance of Investment to Debtors


The essential reason why investment is important to debtors is the same for individuals, businesses, and countries: successful investments yield income. Suppose a country uses borrowed funds to finance investment projects and that these projects generate more than enough income to pay the interest on the loan. In this case the debt can be serviced with income left over to increase living standards. In contrast, suppose that a country finances a higher level of consumption by cutting back on investment and by borrowing abroad. In this case, the results could be quite different. (... ...)

(... ...)

A Previous period of indebtedness: the late 1800s

(... ...)

Two views of the current U.S. indebtedness

Those who are optimistic about the recent rise in U.S. indebtedness have argued that something very similar to the events of a century ago is happening in the U.S. today. This contention is strongly debated by a group that foresees more austere times resulting from U.S. indebtedness. The accounts these two camps give of U.S. economic prospects make clear the important role investment will have in resolving this debate.[주7]


^Prosperity ahead?^ The prosperity view of economic prospects begins with the proposition that, since 1982, investment opportunities in the U.S. have been much better than those in 1970s and early 1980s.[주8] Proponents of this view have put forward several reasons for this central proposition. President Reagan was vocal in support of free market capitalism, championing changes in government policies and taxes to benefit businesses. Supporters of supply-side economics believe that these tax cuts and regulatory reforms may have greatly stimulated investment in the U.S. Some analysts have also argued that the deep recession that ended in 1982 enhanced business prospects by promoting efficiency, by moderating wage demands, and perhaps most important, by lowering the inflation rate to under 5%.

According to the prosperity view, the improvement in business prospects has had four implications. First, a boom in investment began in 1983, when businesses became aware of the rosy economic future reflected in these investment opportunities. Second, consumption rose as consumer became more confident about economic prospects. Third, the strong demand for credit to finance the new investment and consumption pushed up real interest rates in this country. Fourth, investors across the world sought to take advantage of the high interest rates available in this country, leading to inflows of foreign capital.

^Austerity ahead?^ The second view of he current situation predicts austerity in the future.[주9] This view of U.S. foreign indebtedness begins with the proposition that the U.S. has cut back saving for the future in favor of consuming in the present. Proponents of the austerity view support their central proposition by pointing to the data on rates of saving and consumption since 1982.

The reduction of government saving is reflected in the budget deficits registered in the 1980s(Chart 4). From 1983 to 1988 the budget deficit averaged 2.9% of gross national product, much higher than the average of 1.0% for the 1954-88 period. In the post-Civil-War period, budget deficits of this size in relation to national income have occurred only during wars and the deepest recessions. The fall in private saving has been smaller. Private saving as a share of national income has fallen to 16.3% in the current economic expansion, down from an average 16.9% in the 1954-88 period, and well under the average rate of 17.1% for expansion since 1954. The counterpart of the decrease in saving has been an increase of over two percentage points in personal consumption expenditures as a share of national income, rising from an average of 62.8% in the current expansion.
[주9] See, for example, Friedman 1988 and Summers 1988

As with the prosperity view, four steps are predicted to follow from the central assertion of the austerity view. First, consumption rises and saving falls. Second, reduced saving reduces the domestic pool of funds available for lending. Third, competition among borrowers for the reduced pool of investment funds drives interest rates upward, squeezing some borrowers out of the market and reducing investment. Fourth, as in the previous account, increased interest rates attract foreign capital.

The predictions of both the prosperity and austerity views of the the U.S. economic outlook are quite similar. Both views predict strong consumption, high real interest rats, and inflows of foreign capital.[주10] Each of these predictions has been borne out since 1982. The debate between backers of these two views has been difficult to resolve precisely because the predictions of the views are so similar. There is, however, one important difference in the two views. The prosperity view predicts strong investment, while auterity views predicts weak investment.


The overall message from this review of the competing views of U.S. economic prospects is that the behavior of investment is among the most important issues determining the effect of U.S. external indebtedness.[주11] If strong investment has been laying the groundwork for rapid economic growth, then widespread concern about foreign debt may be displaced. Rapid economic growth can allow the U.S. to pay interest and dividends on foreign-held assets, while still allowing U.S. living standards to increase. On the other hand, weak investment─investment that is insufficient to support growth─may be doubly bad. Slower income growth, undesirable by itself, is made worse if a significant share of future income must go to pay interest on a large foreign debt.

III. Weak Investment in the 1980s

There has been considerable debate as to whether investment in the 1980s has been weak or strong. Economists supporting the prosperity view assert convincingly that an investment boom has followed the recession in 1982, whereas economists supporting the austerity view make as strong a case that investment has been weak. The opposing camps measure investment differently and apply different standards to determine when investment is strong or weak. This section evaluates these two positions and concludes that investment in the 1980s has been weak.


Before beginning the analysis, however, an alternative approach to addressing the question about investment should not be ruled out. This appraoch involves examining the actual inflows of foreign funds and determining whether or not the funds have been spent on productive capital. Pursuing this line of analysis, for example, would involve analyzing whether the capital flowing from Japan has gone to build factories or to pay for corporate takeovers. This approach is not very useful in evaluating U.S. economic prospects. Total productive investment in the U.S. is the more important issue for economic growth, and it is relatively unimportant whether Americans or foreigners fund the investment. For example, even if all of the foreign funds were spent on productive capital, slow income growth could still result if total investment fell. Thus, this section examines whether the rise in foreign indebtedness has been mirrored by a rise in investment, and it leaves aside the issue of whose money paid for which asset.

The weak if net fixed investment (...)

Net versus gross fixed investment (...)

Misleading investment growth  (...)

Weakness of broader investment measures (...)

Implications for the future

Three risks in the current course of strong growth in foreign indebtedness and weak investment can be identified.

(1) The first risk is that weak investment will lead to slower income growth than in the past. As noted above, investment leads to growth in income by allowing workers to be more productive. Productivity growth has been sluggish in the U.S. since the mid-1970s, and weak investment risks further slugishness.

(2) A second risk comes from the burden of indebtedness. If borrowed funds are not used to generate new income, spending in some areas will ultimately have to be cut back to pay the interest and dividends on foreign-held assets in the U.S. This burden is currently not large in relation to national income, but U.S. indebtedness has been growing rapidly in relation to national income. The ultimate burden will depend on how large net capital flows are in the years ahead.

(3) A final risk is posed by the adjustments required to slow the growth of indebtedness. U.S. indebtedness cannot grow indefinitely as a share of nation income; the burden of indebtedness would eventually outstrip the U.S. ability to pay. Just as market forces guarantee that corporations and individuals cannot borrow an unimited amount, market forces will also ultimately halt the growth in the rate of U.S. indebtedness. These market forces may also have detrimental effects on living standards. For example,[:]

(3.1) the interest rates at which the U.S. can borrow may rise, increasing the burden of indebtedness.

(3.2) Further, the real value of the U.S. dollar may fall relative to other currencies. This would imply that a given dollar value of interest payments to foreigners will represent a larger sacrifice of U.S. goods than before.[주19]

[주19] A description of these effect and their likely importance is provided in Lawrence 1988.

The likely importance of these effects is subject to debate. Some economists contend that growth in living standards will stagnate, while others contend that the likely effects may be small. Choosing between these predictions is difficult, in part because the combination of weak investment and rising indebtedness has persisted for a relatively brief period. (... ...)





Dic: 생겨나다, 생기다

생겨나다: 연세한국어사전

생기다: 연세한국어사전, cf. 국립국어원 표준국어대사전(네이버)


Dic: investment (some of its countable and uncountable usages)

N-UNCOUNT:

1. usu with supp, oft N in n△Investment is the activity of investing money.

  • He said the government must introduce tax incentives to encourage investment...
  • to encourage foreign investment (OALD)
  • investment income (OALD)
  • [investment in something] This country needs investment in education. (OALD)
4. usu N of n △Investment of time or effort is the spending of time or effort on something in order to make it a success.
  • I worry about this big investment of time and effort.
  • The project has demanded considerable investment of time and effort. (N-VAR acc.to. OALD)
N-VAR:

2. usu with supp △An investment is an amount of money that you invest, or the thing that you invest it in.
  • You'll be able to earn an average rate of return of 8% on your investments.
  • a minimum investment of $10000 (N-COUNT acc.to. OALD)
  • a high return on my investments  (N-COUNT acc.to. OALD)
  • Our investments are not doing well. (N-COUNT acc.to. OALD)
  • We bought the house as an investment (= to make money).  (N-COUNT acc.to. OALD)
N-COUNT:

3. usu sing, usu adj N △If you describe something you buy as an investment, you mean that it will be useful, especially because it will help you to do a task more cheaply or efficiently.
  • When selecting boots, fine, quality leather will be a wise investment...
  • A microwave is a good investment. (OALD)
..... COBUILD, OALD

2012년 6월 18일 월요일

Dic# push someone or something into the background


CF. merge into the background / sink into the background / recede into the background

CF. [4] position in which sb/sth is not important/noticed | VERB + BACKGROUND 

▷ blend into, fade into, melt/merge into, recede/retreat into, slip into the background: 
  • The dispute over the new contract allowed her other problems to fade into the background. 
  • He had learnt how to melt invisibly into the background. 
▷ keep/remain/stay in the background:
  • He prefers to remain in the background and let his assistant deal with the press. 
▷ hover in the background:
  • I could see my secretary hovering in the background. 
.... Oxford Collocation Dic for Students of English


the background noun [S] ▷If someone or something is in the background, they are not the main point of attention:
  • Her worries about her job have faded into the background since she learnt about her father's illness. 
.... CALD
* * *

[1] (...) Its name is anxiety. Composed of fear, self-doubt, guilt, dread, and self-reproach, it ties your stomach in knots, makes sweat ooze from your pores, makes your head hurt, your memory blur, and your concentration dissipate. You can't wash it away, will it away, or beat it away. The only way to contain it is to embrace it, to make it your ally and your friend.

1. Although anxiety can unnerve you and make you feel paralyzed, consider its ability to energize you. Watch it carefully, without emotion or judgment distorting your vision, and you will see it raise the hairs on your neck, excite your thought processes, heighten your senses, stir your imagination and make you keenly aware of being alive. (...) 

3. Talk to your anxiety as with an old friend. Look at it as your best personal source of camaraderie, loyalty, and friendly support. Let it work for you, not against you and you have not only tamed the beast but have created a more enjoyable and positive environment for yourself. Your self-doubts will always linger but they are at a manageable level where you can calmly push them into the background while you concentrate on making a great self-presentation. (...) 


[2] (...) The so-called poor are not worth a second look in a scenario of exclusion. A similar prejudice affects the reality of death itself as we push its eventuality into the background far too often, mainly because it’s too damn uncomfortable to face. Yet, without a genuine recognition of death as an eventual fact, we fail to retain an authentic embrace of the inevitable. Not only is it vital to come to terms with our own mortality, but it’s also worth it to come to terms with the many who lose their lives in these marginalized conflicts, where human life is mistakenly disposed of much too casually. (...)



[3] The author suggests that the situation of the only child is in general unfavorable. It is true, there are no other children in the family that can be preferred to him or that can push him into the background. On the other hand, he is threatened with the danger of being thwarted in his development by the excessive love and anxiety of the parents. Above all, he becomes accustomed to his role as autocrat. (...)



[4] (...) My recommendations are challenging, but necessary. The behaviour and attitude of some of these youngsters can be appalling. There’s a temptation to push them into the background and hope they will go away. But they won’t. If we don’t give them what they need to get their lives on track, we will all pay, via the cost of prisons, mental health services, crime and welfare benefits. If we don’t begin to solve this problem, we will continue to pass it on through the generations.

... http://educationviews.org/2012/03/08/how-we-can-turn-the-underclass-kids-around/

[5] (...) They indicate that some dialogue partners they have encountered lament how in dialogue people sometimes feel obliged to push into the background their deepest convictions. I was glad to hear this, since it agrees with my own insight, that both dialogue and the serious study of another religion beg us to go deeper into our own tradition, our faith.

(...) To some extent, it's probably necessary to 'to push into the background [one's] deepest convictions', but that seems a small price to pay for learning, for growing.
..

2012년 6월 17일 일요일

[메모] Some comments on full employment and 'classical' economy

자료 1: Wikipedia, Full employment

(As of June 17, 2012)

Full employment, in macroeconomics, is the level of employment rates when there is no cyclical unemployment.[1] It is defined by the majority of mainstream economists as being an acceptable level of natural unemployment above 0%, the discrepancy from 0% being due to non-cyclical types of unemployment. Unemployment above 0% is advocated as necessary to control inflation, which has brought about the concept of the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU); the majority of mainstream economists mean NAIRU when speaking of "full" employment.

Economic concept

What most neoclassical economists mean by "full" employment is a rate somewhat less than 100% employment, considering slightly lower levels desirable. Others, such as James Tobin, vehemently disagree, considering full employment as 0% unemployment.[2]

Rates of unemployment substantially above 0% have also been attacked by John Maynard Keynes:
"The Conservative belief that there is some law of nature which prevents men from being employed, that it is 'rash' to employ men, and that it is financially 'sound' to maintain a tenth of the population in idleness for an indefinite period, is crazily improbable - the sort of thing which no man could believe who had not had his head fuddled with nonsense for years and years. The objections which are raised are mostly not the objections of experience or of practical men. They are based on highly abstract theories – venerable, academic inventions, half misunderstood by those who are applying them today, and based on assumptions which are contrary to the facts…Our main task, therefore, will be to confirm the reader’s instinct that what seems sensible is sensible, and what seems nonsense is nonsense."
– J.M. Keynes in a pamphlet to support Lloyd George in the 1929 election.

The 20th century British economist William Beveridge stated that an unemployment rate of 3% was full employment. Other economists have provided estimates between 2% and 13%, depending on the country, time period, and the various economists' political biases.

Before Milton Friedman and Edmund Phelps, Abba Lerner (Lerner 1951, Chapter 15) developed a version of the NAIRU. Unlike the current view, he saw a range of "full employment" unemployment rates. He distinguished between "high" full employment (the lowest sustainable unemployment under incomes policies) and "low" full employment (the lowest sustainable unemployment rate without these policies).

(...)




※ Thanks to the unknown author for his opening his writing (as of June 17, 2012): 

Neo Classical versus Keynesian LRAS curves 

Neo-classical and Keynesian are two different approaches/bodies of thinking to certain macroeconomic principles and government policy. This is your first introduction to differences in their opinion, and as you will see later, they differ in opinion with regards to much economic theory. 

Neo-classical LRAS curve 

The neo-classical LRAS curve is shown on the left below. Neo-classical economists believe that the LRAS curve is perfectly inelastic at the full employment level of output. They believe that the potential output of the economy is dependent on the quantity and quality of the factors of production and is independent of the price level. In the long run, neo-classical economists believe that economies will operate at the natural rate of unemployment (i.e. equilibrium unemployment). Keynesian LRAS curve 

The Keynesian view is that even in the long-run there can be unemployment above the natural rate. Their view of the LRAS curve is shown on the right above. 

(... ...)

2012년 6월 10일 일요일

암송의 기억


Du temps que je gardais les bêtes sur le Luberon, je restais des semaines entières sans voir âmes qui vivent, seul dans le pâturage avec mon chien Labri et mes ouailles. De temps en temps l'ermites du Mont de Lures passaient par là pour chercher des simples, ou bien j'apercevais la face noir des charbonniers du Piémont. C'étaient des gens naïfs, silencieux ...

오래전 불어를 공부하는 방법이 마땅히 없어 통째로 텍스트를 암송하고 적어보곤 했다. 알퐁스 도데의 단편, 《별 Les étoiles》을 통째로 암송했었는데, 오늘 갑자기 생각나 적어보니, 여기까지밖에 기억나지 않는다. 철자도 많이 틀렸을 것 같다. 다시 생각날 때 또 기억을 떠올려 적어보자(2012.6.10).

Du temps que je gardais les bêtes sur le Luberons, je restais des semaines entières sans voir âmes qui vivent, seul dans le pâturage avec mon chien Labri et mes ouailles. De temps en temps l'ermite du Mont de Lures passait par là pour chercher des simples, ou bien j'apercevais la face noir des charbonniers du Piémont. Mais c'étaient des gens naïfs, silencieux, ayant perdu le goût de parler .... (2012. 6.11)
완전히 기억에 잊힌 정보가 아주 조금씩이라도 재생되는 것이 신기하다. 오늘 또 한 어구를 추가할 수 있을 것 같다. 경제학으로 머리가 아플 때 잠깐 다른 구석의 뇌를 자극하는 것도 나쁘지 않으리.

Du temps que je gardais les bêtes sur le Luberons, je restais des semaines entières sans voir âmes qui vivent, seul dans le pâturage avec mon chien Labri et mes ouailles. De temps en temps l'ermite du Mont de Lures passait par là pour chercher des simples, ou bien j'apercevais la face noir des charbonniers du Piémont. Mais c'étaient des gens naïfs, silencieux, ayant perdu le goût de parler, ne sachant pas ce qui se disait en bas dans les villages et les villes ..... (2012. 6.12)
산의 이름을 일컫는 Mont de Lures의 철자가 달랐던 것 같다. 아마도 Mont de l'Ure(s). (2012. 6.13)


2012년 6월 8일 금요일

예문: some and others; sometimes and other times


The modern market economy can suffer from poverty amidst plenty when insufficient aggregate demand leads to deteriorating business conditions and high unemployment. At other times, excessive government spending and reliance on the monetary printing press can lead to runaway inflation.

  1. At some times ..... At other times라고 적지는 않았지만, <can... when ...>이 전자의 역할을 한다. 그래서 at other times로 받아 뒤 문장을 적었을 것이다.
  2. 전자, <The modern market economy can suffer from ...>에 쓰인 can은 <─할 수 있다는 능력>을 뜻하지 않고 <something is true sometimes or is true in some circumstances>를 뜻할 때 쓰인 사례다.
  3. 즉,  <can... when ...>의 구문에서 이미 sometimes가 암묵적으로 등장했다. 따라서 이럴 때도 있고(sometimes: can ...when..), 저럴 때(at other times)도 있다는 식의 흐름이다.


2012년 6월 6일 수요일

[메모] 미국 가계부문의 부동산 총가치(2002~2006)

자료: Federal Reserve, Flow of Funds Accounts of the U.S., March 8, 2007



B.100. Balance Sheet of Households and Nonprofit Organizations (1)

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ billions
                              2002         2003        2004      2005(Q4)     2006(Q4)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Assets
2   Tangible assets
3     Real estate
4        Household(2,3)    13,764.2   15,241.3   17,165.2 19,402.8   20,620.8
5        ...
6     ......


(2) At market value.
(3) All types of owner-occupied housing including farm houses and mobile homes, as well as second homes that are not rented, vacant homes for sale, and vacant land

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

※ 2002~2006 4년 동안 미국 가계가 보유하는 부동산의 명목가치는 총 6조 8,566억 달러만큼 늘었다.